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Abstract:
In this thesis I examine how and why political Islam has come to occupy the position of 
ontological “other” for the United States, in particular in the period after September 11th 
and in the context of the “war on terror”. In order to do this, I argue that much of the 
language employed in analyses of political Islam within the various genres of academic 
writing, political statements, opinion pieces and think-tank reports during this period can 
be seen to constitute a "discourse" in the Foucaudian sense. In considering its 
epistemological, historical and ideological roots and manifold contemporary expressions, 
I demonstrate how this discourse has come to perform both an identity- 
constructing/affirming role, as well as a politically expedient, rhetorical justificatory 
function in mainstream political thought and action vis-a-vis the Muslim world. Despite 
its seemingly hegemonic hold on mainstream perspectives on political Islam, I examine 
the increasing body of literature that attempts to subvert the discourse on political Islam 
through critical reflection on issues o f U.S./westem identity, deconstruction of the 
discourse’s central assumptions and paradigms and, finally, the development of a 
counter-discourse in its place. These critical endeavours, as well as my own contributions 
to the counter-discourse, are also discussed in this thesis.
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Introduction
The question o f Islam as a political force is a vital question o f our times, and will be for 
several years to come. The precondition for its treatment with a minimum of intelligence 
is probably not to start from a platform o f hatred.
-Michel Foucault1
Now, it is only by speaking to the other (not giving orders but engaging in dialogue) that 
I can acknowledge him as a subject, comparable to what I am myself.
-Tzvetan Todorov2
Over the last two decades, and with renewed energy in the aftermath of the September 
11th 2001 attacks on U.S. soil, academics, pundits and politicians across the globe have 
engaged in extensive research and analysis, seeking to explain the origins, goals and 
character of Islamist movements.3 In an editorial for The Washington Post, U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discussed her perspective, remarking that lack o f 
freedom and hope in the Muslim world were to blame for religious “fanaticism,” which 
reaches its pinnacle in the act of suicide bombing. In many parts of the world, argued 
Rice, “a sense of hopelessness provides a fertile ground for ideologies of hatred that 
persuade people to forsake university educations, careers and families and aspire instead 
to blow themselves up — taking as many innocent lives with them as possible.”4
It was along similar lines that U.S. President George W. Bush elaborated his “Proposed 
Middle East Initiatives” for “Promoting Economic Growth,” proposals for strengthening 
and liberalizing the economies, media, and educational and judicial systems in the
1 Michel Foucault, Dits et Ecrits III (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 708, quoted in Francois Burgat, Face to Face 
with Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 177.
“ Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest o f  America: The Question o f  the Other, trans. R. Howard (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1984), 132.
3 Throughout this thesis I use the term “Islamist movement” interchangeably with “political Islam” to refer 
to those movements “whose purpose is to attain political power at the national level,” and who “generally 
accept the nation-state, operate within its constitutional framework, eschew violence (except under 
conditions o f foreign occupation), articulate a reformist rather than revolutionary vision and invoke 
universal democratic norms.” When referring to individuals who belong to such movements, I employ the 
term “Islamist”. “Understanding Islamism,” International Crisis Group, no. 37 (2 March 2005), i.
4 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Transforming the Middle East,” The Washington Post, 1 August 2003.
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region.5 According to Bush, the underlying rationale behind these proposals is the United 
States’ desire to enable the “men and women of the Muslim world,” who maintain 
“natural hopes of liberty,” to realize all the benefits inherent to membership in the 
“modem world.” Similar in substance and rhetoric to other proposals and policies of 
successive U.S. administrations (regardless of party political affiliation), vis-a-vis the 
Muslim world, and the Middle East more specifically, this statement is based on a 
dichotomous understanding of the relationship between the “Muslim” and “modem” 
worlds, in which the term “modem,” despite its cloak o f neutrality, actually signifies a 
very particular set of social, economic and political developments that have taken place in 
Europe and the United States, which the rest of the world is expected to emulate.
The use of sets of binary oppositions, perhaps most importantly the modem/anti-modem 
one, to define, explain and justify the West’s position vis-a-vis its various “others” is 
hardly a new phenomenon. Although one could reasonably argue that this discursive 
construction has been somewhat arbitrary in terms of “who at any given time fills the role 
of other,” it is clear that Islam has occupied that role quite consistently throughout the 
West’s modem, and even pre-modem, history.6 Iver B. Neumann, for example, has 
argued that while the “Turkish other” was vital in the creation and consolidation of a 
modem European identity which “evolved from the ashes of Western Christendom” 
between the fourteenth and nineteenth century, one can see evidence of the conceived 
existence of a general Muslim “other” over the last 1300 years o f “European” history.7 
Zohair Husain and David Rosenbaum concur, arguing that it was the West’s perception 
of its increasing vulnerability in the face o f the “formidable political, ideological, and 
military” Muslim power encroaching on its eastern borders during the period of Islam’s 
radical expansion that led to the conceptualization of Islam as Europe’s most threatening
Q
“other.” Realizing this force could not be easily subdued on the battlefield, “Christian 
Europeans vilified Muslims and denigrated Islam, describing it as a dangerous monolithic
5 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in Commencement Address at the University o f  South 
Carolina,” White House News and Policies (9 May 2003).
6 Iver B. Neumann, Classical Theories in International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press 1999), 41.
7 Neumann, 52.
8 From here on the term “other” will appear without quotation marks.
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force, a faith founded on deception and clumsy plagiarism of Judaism and Christianity, 
and depicting its believers as frightful caricatures.”9
While defining the other in terms of religion served the purposes of Western Christendom 
throughout the Middle Ages and even into the Renaissance, by the 1500s the “Turk” 
came to be defined less in terms of his religious or cultural deficiencies and more in terms 
o f his temporal distance from a civilized West. Once Europe entered what is now 
described as the period of Enlightenment, a period in which “reason” is said to have 
gained ascendancy over religion in the struggle to explain and structure human relations, 
a new conceptualization of its adversary was necessary.10 While religion could no longer 
be employed to explain or confirm the superiority o f the European in relation to the 
Muslim other, its level of civilization could. As the former was an enlightened, rational, 
scientific, progressive — in essence a thoroughly “modem” human being —  the latter 
could justifiably be marginalized or exploited insofar as he/she lacked the various 
attributes that made the European “modem.”11 A new dichotomy was elaborated in which 
a “civilized” and modem Europe, “defined by criteria such as ‘humanity,’ ‘law,’ and 
‘social mores,”’ stood in stark contrast to a backward, tyrannical and barbarian Turkish 
“other,” thus substantiating a “temporal identity” of Europe as more fully evolved than
19the rest of the world.
Friedrich Nietzsche alluded to the function o f the other in Western identity construction 
when discussing man’s attempt to cope with the onset o f nihilism, which he viewed as an
t %inevitable consequence of Enlightenment-derived modernity. In an effort to come to 
terms with the uncertainty that would arise in such a context, in which man’s desire for
9 Zohair Husain and David Rosenbaum, “Perceiving Islam: The Cause and Consequence o f  Islamophobia 
in Western Media,” in Religious Fundamentalism in the Contemporary World: Critical Social and Politcial 
Issues, ed. Santosh C. Saha, 171-206 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003).
10 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006), 
48.
11 According to Gerrit Gong, nineteenth-century lawyers even developed a legal language to differentiate 
between those who were considered “lull members o f  the ‘civilized’ international society [e.g., Western 
Europeans] from those who were merely part o f the European international system [e.g., ‘Turks’].” (quoted 
in Neumann, 56.
12 Ibid., 55; Hansen, 48.
13 Nihilism as a philosophical concept was given its most definitive form by Nietzsche, for whom it is “the 
radical repudiation o f value, meaning and desirability.” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 7.
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transcendental values was increasingly met with the modem realization that these values 
are essentially rooted in “nothingness,” and where all “external guarantees” ceased to 
exist along with their “ontological preconditions,” a highly disciplined system capable of 
providing order for the individual and world would need to be created.14 In lieu of secure 
foundations, a clear conception of the other was necessary to substantiate this all- 
encompassing order. This other would be viewed as “dirt, matter out of place, 
irrationality, abnormality, wasted, sickness, perversity, incapacity, disorder, madness, 
unfreedom,” which was in need of “rationalization, normalization, moralization, 
correction, punishment, discipline, disposal, realization, etc.”15
One could view the development of “the human subject as universal man,” who was 
bom, according to Coker, on the eve of the French Revolution and whose natural rights 
were elaborated in the Declaration o f the Rights o f Man (1789), as part of the conceptual 
effort to evade the deleterious affects of creeping nihilism on a Europe intoxicated with 
the belief that it had succeeded in developing, in the words o f Bakunin in 1867, “the most 
integral theory of humanity ever advanced.”16 The only task remaining for proponents of 
this revolutionary grand theory was to locate an alternative foundation on which it could 
be justified and perpetuated. This alternative came via the “othering” of individuals, 
societies, civilizations and religions outside the acceptable parameters set by a self- 
proclaimed “modem” and “enlightened” Europe. There was an added sense of urgency to 
the constmction of the other for reasons of political expedience, as the “emergence of 
new and secular sovereigns instead of the centralized and religiously based sovereigns in 
Europe required the creation of new mediation instruments.”17 It is within this context 
that the “civilizing missions” of nineteenth and twentieth century European colonialism 
and the relentless Cold War stmggle of the United States against the “Red Threat” can be 
seen. In the post-Cold War West, those who employ the discourse o f democracy and 
freedom (most recently and evidently exemplified in the rhetoric o f U.S. President
14 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f  Political Paradox (Minneapolis, 
MN: University o f  Minnesota Press, 2002), 14.
15 Ibid., 14.
16 Christopher Coker, The Twilight o f  the West (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1997), 13.
17 Nizar Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case o f  Islam in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Foreign 
Policy in a Constructed World, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, 227-48 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 238.
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George W. Bush to justify the “war on terror,” although certainly predating his 
presidency) claim that these concepts can, and indeed do, provide the ontological 
preconditions necessary to explain and justify certain transcendental truths, most 
important among them, the validity of U.S. exceptionalism.
While the nations constituting either side of the modem/anti-modem (“us”/”them”) 
divide have slightly altered over time, the basis for the existence of the dividing line, as 
defined by the children of the Enlightenment in their efforts to distinguish between 
“universal man” and those who refuse to see the light, has remained largely the same. On 
our side, with the United States at its helm since World War II, you have the democratic, 
“modem,” secular states, which abide by the rules of an ostensibly “universal,” 
“international” human rights regime and which are comprised of “modem,” law abiding 
individuals. On the other side, you have the pariah states or “tyrannies” that are anti­
modem,: that fail to respect individual rights, that resist liberal economic reforms, that are 
comprised of human beings who privilege the community over the individual, and that 
fail to make a clear separation between “church” and state.
Considering the United States’ overwhelming economic, political and cultural power in 
the world today and its ability to influence (by applying pressure directly or by the proxy 
of “international” institutions) the polities, societies and economies o f non-Westem 
states, the West’s “other” is more often than not non-state actors who reject the policies 
and practices of their “modernizing” governments because they desire a state, or an 
altogether different political configuration based on some or all of the characteristics that 
define the pariah state. In the context of the “war on terror,” Islamist movements are seen 
to pose the greatest threat to United States/Western ideological and material hegemony in 
the Muslim world.
By replacing the Turkish, Arab or Muslim other, political Islam has fulfilled what 
Todorov refers to, in his three-pronged analysis o f the self/other relationship, as the 
“axiological axis,” where a value is expressed (e.g., good/bad, or superior/inferior) in
11
1 o
order to justify imposition of the self on to the other. In doing so, the general Muslim 
other has been relegated to the “epistemic axis,” where the self is defined either by 
emphasizing similarities with the other, or by denying the other’s existence altogether.19 
In this case, the Muslim other, as opposed to the Islamist other, is acceptable so long as it 
assimilates, and hence relinquishes its unique ontological identity. The principal aim of 
this thesis is to explain how and why the Islamist other has come to occupy this space in 
relation to U.S. identity-construction, in particular in the period after September 11th and 
in the context of the “war on terror”.
I. Methodology
In order to accomplish this, I argue that the language employed in analyses of political 
Islam within the various “genres”20 of academic writing, political statements, opinion 
pieces and think-tank reports can be seen to constitute a “discourse” in the Foucaudian 
sense, in other words, they form a “structured system of meaning which shapes what we 
perceive, think” and to a certain extent “do” in regards to Islamism.21 Though the 
methodology employed in this thesis is based on a qualitative rather than quantitative 
approach, it was necessary to consider thousands of written and spoken statements on the 
subject in order to demonstrate the extent of the discourse’s sway over mainstream 
depictions o f political Islam in the United States throughout the “war on terror”. In 
addition to the vast quantity of academic sources considered from a diverse range of 
disciplines, including International Relations, Sociology, Political Economy and Middle 
Eastern Studies, I considered the following types of written documents: strategy 
documents, press releases, press conference and speech transcripts, and interviews with 
prominent members of both the Democratic and Republican parties; opinion pieces 
written by highly esteemed journalists from a variety o f political perspectives and writing 
for some of the country’s most influential newspapers and journals, including the New
]8 Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest o f  America: The Question o f  the Other, trans. R. Howard (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1984).
19 Messari, 230.
20 As Hansen argues, these “different genres o f foreign policy writing adopt different forms o f  knowledge,” 
which gain their authority through their interconnectedness, or “intertextuality,” a concept which is 
explained in greater depth later on in the introduction. Hansen, 8, 52.
21 Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions o f the Middle East: The History and Politics o f  Orientalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 184.
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York Times, Washington Post and New Republic; and, analyses written for leading think- 
tanks, from the neoconservative Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to the liberal Brookings Institution. Though the focus 
o f the political, journalistic and think-tank components o f this thesis is the written and 
spoken analyses of individuals and institutions based in the United States in the post- 
September 11th period, the academic component of the thesis is broader in scope, 
considering prominent writers on the subject from beyond the U.S. borders and predating 
September 11th, as this component’s purpose is to explain the intellectual roots of the 
discourse rather than solely demonstrate its current manifestations
As I argue in this thesis, the function of these analyses of political Islam, which are
neither entirely descriptive nor explanatory, but rather constitutive in nature, is to create
00and reinforce certain subjectivities and relationships o f power. In this case, the power 
relationship in question is that which exists between a culturally, economically and 
politically hegemonic United States that views itself as the rightful heir o f Europe’s 
position as the world’s beacon of democracy and human rights and leader of the “free 
world” vis-a-vis those political movements that place their Muslim identity at the centre
of their political practice, which use the “language of Islamic metaphors to think through
• » •  ► 0 \  their political destinies,” and which see “in Islam their political future.”
According to the Foucaudian conception o f discourse, one cannot put “knowledge on one 
side and society on the other,” as to do so would be to overlook the “fundamental forms 
of [the] knowledge/power” relationship. 24 As with European Orientalism of the
<yc t
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the “regime of power” that results from this 
relationship and that is internal to the discourse on political Islam means that “no one 
writing, thinking, or acting” on the subject can do so “without taking account o f the
22Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan- 
Smith (London: Routledge, 2002).
23 Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence o f  Islamism (London: Zed 
Books, 1997), 17.
24 Michel Foucault, ‘Theories et institutions penales,” Annuaire du College de France, 1971-1972, 283, 
cited in Sheridan, 125.
25 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power.” Translated by Paul Patton and Meaghan Morris. In Michel 
Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy. Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton, Eds. (Sydney, Australia: Feral 
Publications, 1979), 29-48.
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96limitations on thought and action imposed by” it. In order to explain the intricacies of 
the construction and maintenance o f the discourse on political Islam, this thesis focuses 
on its intertextuality, in other words, on the explicit and implicit ways in which 
authoritative references are made within certain texts and statements to other texts and 
statements and how, taken together, this body of self-referential discourse constructs and 
regulates the context in which people make sense of the images and words they come into
» • » 97 • *contact with on a daily basis. As Edward Said wrote in Covering Islam, the “context” is 
the discourse’s/image’s “setting, its place in reality, the values implicit in it, and not least,
90
the kinds of attitude it promotes in the beholder.”
As I am seeking to “radically” unsettle various “stable concepts and conceptual 
oppositions” that form the basis of the discourse on political Islam, I have chosen to
9Qemploy the post-modern method of deconstruction throughout the dissertation. In 
doing so, I seek to expose not only the erroneous grounds on which many of the central 
assumptions of the mainstream discourse are constructed, but also to demonstrate how 
various material interests are served by its particular formulation, which seeks “to
-in
naturalize and legitimize particular forms of knowledge and political practices.”
Indeed, to point out the importance of identity issues to U.S. foreign policy
considerations vis-a-vis the Muslim world is not to deny the significance of material and
geo-strategic factors, such as the United States’ need for abundant and secure sources of
oil, or its general antipathy towards radical upheaval because of the potential threat it
 ^1
poses to the economic and political stability of the international system. Rather than 
seeing identity and material interests as mutually exclusive, this thesis argues that often, 
as has been the case in the “war on terror,” these interests are co-constituting and 
mutually dependent.
26 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 3.
27 Hansen, 56.
28Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the M edia and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest o f  the 
World (London: Vintage Books, 1997), 48.
29 Devtek, 190.
30 Richard Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse,” 
Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007): 394-426.
31 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash o f  Cultures or Clash o f  Interests? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Though I will consider the complex relationship that exists between the various foreign 
policies of successive U.S. administrations vis-a-vis the Muslim world, as well the 
orientalist discourse o f the Islamist other and the identity functions it serves, I will not 
argue that a direct causal link exists between them. In this sense, the methodology 
employed here differs from that of constructivists who are similarly concerned with 
identity issues though they view them as independent variables capable of causally 
explaining various policy choices, as this perspective views state identity itself as a 
dependent factor in need of understanding and explaining. In other words, this thesis 
starts from the premise that there are no objective material factors completely 
independent of the context of discourse and identity. Even such seemingly objective 
factors as the interests of the military-industrial-complex or oil companies, which are 
often associated, in more materialist analyses, with the development and implementation 
of those foreign policies designed to create, respectively, perpetual war or complete 
energy “security”, must be understood within this context as they too are the “products of 
older and competing discourses,” which can be traced back to Manifest Destiny and 
various other elements o f America’s exceptional identity.
Overall, my work is guided, both normatively and methodologically, by the late Edward 
Said’s Orientalism, in particular by his desire to expose the role of power in the 
production and dissemination of the various “truths” regarding the “Oriental other” 
throughout the West’s colonial/imperial relations with the region, and the various forces 
that have led to such synergy in the descriptions of the “Orient” found in a wide variety 
of work from various disciplines and professions.34
Although I am aware that uncritical use of such terms as the “Muslim world,” and the 
“West,” both constructed concepts with varying degrees o f correspondence to some 
tangible reality, can be a problematic starting place for this sort of inquiry, I use them in 
this context to examine the dominant worldviews commonly associated with each, rather
32 In this thesis I will use a lower case “o” when using the term “orientalist” as an adjective.
33 Hansen, 30.
34 Said, 1978.
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than to approximate some “objective” reality, a usage I believe helps to overcome rather 
than compound essentialist views of both. Furthermore, I have chosen to employ the 
term “Muslim world” rather than “Middle East” as the principal unit o f analysis in this 
thesis as I am considering the ways in which the identity of the West, and the United 
States in particular, has been constructed vis-a-vis its perceived Islamist other, as opposed 
to the Arab other of Said’s Orientalism, as it entails a religious, rather than racial, ethnic 
or geographical delineation, though the Middle East figures prominently in the religious 
delineation as the birthplace of Islam. However, I employ the term “Middle East” when 
that is the term used by authors under consideration, even if it is erroneously employed 
by these authors to describe a broader geographical region where Islam is the 
predominant religion (e.g. southeast Asia, Muslim Africa, etc.). I also use this term when 
discussing U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis this region, which is generally assumed to 
include those states located in the geographical area stretching from Iran in the east to 
Lebanon, Israel and Palestine in the west and including North Africa, as this is the term 
most commonly used in foreign policy circles to describe the region.
II. Thesis Structure
Chapter One o f the thesis considers the discourse’s epistemological foundations in 
Enlightenment thought, focusing in particular on the various narratives on which 
mainstream International Relations (IR) theories and methodologies are founded, while 
taking into consideration the various challenges posed to these narratives from within the 
Western social sciences themselves, as well as from Islamic/Islamist political philosophy, 
with an eye towards pointing out areas of convergence and divergence between the two. 
By critically examining IR’s mainstream narratives of the state, modernity and the 
Enlightenment, this chapter demonstrates how the capacity of the discipline, and of the 
Western social sciences in general, to understand Islamist movements is limited by their 
narrow understanding o f what constitutes legitimate politics. In doing so, I aim to
35 For a good summary o f the critical perspectives on “Western” identity, in particular vis-a-vis its 
relationship with its Muslim Other, see Lockman, 8-38. Meyda Yegenoglu also presents a cogent argument 
against essentializing the “Western subject” in Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading o f  
Orientalism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2-4. For a similarly critical view o f  
essentialist conceptions o f  the “Islamic”/ “Muslim” worlds, see Said, 1978 and Sayyid.
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contribute to the increasingly vibrant efforts of scholars and activists (both secular and 
religious) to “de-center” the West, a necessary precursory step to the eventual prying 
open of a theoretical and methodological space within IR, and the Western social 
sciences in general, in which religious political movements can be seriously considered.
Though in this chapter I acknowledge the potential critiques that can be leveled at my 
analysis for using Islam as the alternative narrative with which to probe the limits of 
mainstream IR narratives in analyzing developments in the Middle East, considering the 
various other vibrant narratives that have developed out of the region, including Arab 
nationalism, socialism, and various liberal, secular ideologies, I would argue that Islam 
continues to serve a the “master-signifier” for a majority in the Muslim world and as “a 
central criterion of reference, despite the inroads made by secularism, westernization and, 
more recently, globalization.”37 As Graham Fuller has pointed out, Islam has acted as a 
“unifying force” across such a diverse and vast region of the world and for such an 
extensive period of time, that it has produced a “broad civilization that shares many 
common principles of philosophy, the arts, and society; a vision o f the moral life; a sense 
o f justice, jurisprudence, and good governance...” Furthermore, Islam is also the only 
one of these narratives to pose an epistemological and ontological, as well as strategic, 
threat to the West, both at present and throughout the West’s long and complicated 
relationship with the Muslim world.
Chapter Two considers the specific ways in which the Enlightenment foundations of the 
discourse on political Islam impact, via the “modem rationalist” paradigm, the 
construction of political Islam in academic literature as ontological other, contributing to 
its Western identity affirming function and laying the foundation for the discourse to take
36 As for the term “master signifier,” Said explains that despite the fact that there are discourses in which 
Islam is merely one element, amongst many, which can be construed as forming the “structure” o f the 
“chains o f signification,” nonetheless, “in a totalized universe o f  meaning we find a multiplicity o f nodal 
points operating to structure the chains o f  signification, but among them w e find one specific signifier- the 
master signifier- which functions at the level o f  the totality (that is, it retroactively constitutes that universe 
o f  meaning as a unified totality).” In the “Muslim world,” or those states where a significant majority o f the 
population consider themselves Muslim, that master signifier is Islam. Sayyid, 1997,45.
7 Maha Azzam, “Islamism revisited,” International Affairs 82, no. 6 (2006): 1119-32.
38 Graham E. Fuller, “A World Without Islam,” Foreign Policy , January-February 2008.
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hold on a broader scale. The “modem rationalist” approach holds that Islamism “is a 
reflex reaction to certain political or socio-economic circumstances” that generally arise 
as a result of the impact of globalization, outside intervention, or internal 
“modernization” processes, and it hence precludes a less deterministic, more 
contextualized understanding of the phenomenon, which would seek to understand
39Islamist movements on their own terms.
In this chapter, I will examine the two principal ways in which this approach impacts 
analysis of political Islam: 1) through “ideologization of terror” analyses, which view 
political Islam through the “lens” of the Islamist threat;40 and 2) through analyses which 
view political Islam as an anti-modem reaction to various socioeconomic or political 
developments. I will argue that, in both types of analyses, political Islam is viewed in 
orientalist terms, as an irrational, backward phenomenon and therefore undeserving of 
serious investigation by political scientists. In order to demonstrate the extensive nature 
of the discourse, I will discuss a broad range of academic literature on the subject, 
including works from such diverse disciplines as International Relations, Comparative 
Politics, Security and Terrorism Studies and Sociology.
While studying the role of the other in identity formation is an interesting endeavor in 
and o f itself, this thesis is primarily concerned with its implications for policy making, as 
dichotomous reasoning can never be neutral, and generally implies a rigid hierarchy that 
enables or excuses various forms o f exploitation. As Devtek contends, “this relation to 
others must be recognized as a morally and politically loaded relation. The effect is to 
allocate the other to an inferior moral space, and to arrogate the self to a superior one.”41 
Once this is achieved, “conduct toward the Other becomes more exploitative.”42 In this 
sense, the practice of “othering” is an essential tool for governments that subscribe to a 
realist worldview in that it enables policy makers to pursue the various components of a
39 Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Fundamentalism and Limits o f  M odem  Rationalism  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 23. The analysis in this thesis is heavily influenced not only by Euben’s 
definition o f the “modem rationalist” term, but by also by her approach to understanding political Islam in 
general. From this point on, I will use the term without quotation marks.
40 Burgat, 2005.
41 Devtek, 190.
42 Shapiro, 102.
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realist agenda, including national self-preservation and power maximization, by 
providing the necessary rhetorical justification to create and maintain a powerful military, 
as well as to secure the commitment of their citizens to make the ultimate self-sacrifice: 
to be willing to die in war on behalf of the state. According to Schmitt, the “other” is “the 
alien, and it is enough that in a very existential sense he is something so different and 
alien that war with him is possible in the extreme case...The notions friend and enemy are 
to be understood in their concrete, existential meaning, not as metaphors or symbols.”43
In order to understand how the U.S. government managed to sustain the validity of this 
self/other distinction, thereby providing the necessary rhetorical justification for waging a 
relentless and, in many of its practices, illegal “war,” against what is essentially a tactic — 
terrorism, one first has to understand the history o f this other in its various incarnations in 
relation to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. With this in mind, Chapter Three of the 
thesis explores the history o f “American Orientalism,” including consideration of the 
policies that have created and perpetuated U.S. hegemony in the region. This chapter will 
also discuss the watershed events that have led to major shifts in U.S. relations with the 
Muslim/Arab world and to the development and consolidation of the Islamist other 
discourse in the post-World War II period, including the creation of Israel, the OAPEC 
oil embargo, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the end of the Cold War, the rise of the 
Christian right and neocons on the U.S. foreign policy making scene, and finally, the 
attacks of September 11th. This chapter focuses in particular on the power-knowledge 
nexus and the numerous parallels that exist between the development and consolidation 
of European Orientalism and its American counterpart.
The two principal foreign policy implications of political Islam’s occupation of the space 
of other in the United States’ worldview will be considered in the last section of the 
thesis, which examines the discourse of political Islam in relation to the “war on terror,” 
focusing specifically on its political, journalistic and think-tank components. First, it 
creates a false distinction between two “ideal types” of Muslims, what Mahmood
43 Schmitt, quoted in Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers o f  ‘Truth": Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in 
Morenthau’s theory o f  power politics,” Review o f  International Studies 24 (1998): 185-200.
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Mamdami refers to as the “good Muslim, bad Muslim” distinction: “[o]ne is radical, 
uncompromising, and bent on a continuous rejection of the West. The other is 
Westernized and modem.”44 The latter, falling under Todorov’s “epistemic” category, is 
to be engaged and transformed into an (albeit lesser) version of the West’s self, while the 
former, subsumed within the “axiological axis” grouping, are to be vanquished. Second, 
the United States government turns a blind eye to the abuse of power, political repression, 
and large scale human rights violations carried out by authoritarian regimes that claim to 
be acting in the name of their own respective “war[s] on terror,” as it did with the actions 
of right-wing authoritarian regimes across the world throughout the Cold War. In this 
case, “human rights, elections, and free speech are sacrificed on the altar of saving 
democracies from nondemocrats.”45 As a result, actual democratic impulses initiated or 
supported by Islamist movements are stifled.
In order to better conceptualize how this discourse is constructed in a way that allows for 
the distinction to be made between “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims” and which 
inevitably assigns to the United States, and the West more broadly, the old colonial 
“white man’s burden” of distinguishing between and appropriately addressing the two, I 
employ Makau Mutau’s “savages-victims-savior metaphor.”46 Chapter Four examines the 
central role played by political Islam, which fulfils the “savage” enemy other component 
of the metaphor in the “war on terror” discourse, focusing particularly on the genres o f 
political statements, opinion pieces and think-tank reports. In doing so, I demonstrate 
how this discourse, similar to that concerning the European colonial powers’ mission 
civilatrice, is based on an eurocentric and orientalist vision of history that necessarily 
views religious movements, and Islamist movements in particular, as parochial, violent, 
intolerant and inherently counter to progress. As in previous chapters, I argue here that 
the epistemological roots o f the discourse can be traced back to the modem rationalist 
paradigm.
44 Messari, 238.
45 Ibid., 238.
46 Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victms and Saviors: The Metaphor o f Human Rights.” Harvard International 
Law Journal 42, no. 201 (Winter 2001).
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After considering the construction of the “savage” Islamist other in the discourse, 
Chapter Five examines the nature of the savage’s “victims.” Islamists, despite what the 
discourse posits as their backwards, violent and irrational nature, cannot be described as a 
threat in and of themselves. One must first locate the Islamist’s “victims” in order to 
justify the waging of a “war,” real or metaphorical, against them. In the case o f the U.S.- 
led “war on terror,” the victims of Islamist violence, both actual and prospective, include 
not only the entire American population and indeed all of “Western civilization,” but also 
all o f those “good Muslims” who too have been victimized by Islamist savagery. The 
“savior” is Western civilization itself, with “modernization” and “democracy” prescribed 
as generic cures for all associated ailments. In all cases, the victim’s absolute innocence 
is assumed, as is the corresponding guilt o f the perpetrator: the “savage” other.
By examining the construction of the innocent “victim” and angel “savior” vis-a-vis the 
“savage” enemy in the context of the “war on terror” discourse, this chapter will 
demonstrate how a modem rationalist understanding of political Islam, underpinned by a 
generally patronizing view of non-Westem peoples and cultures, and a deep-seated 
orientalist vision of the Muslim world, has impacted the types of non-military remedies 
prescribed by the discourse to address the Islamist “threat” in the context of the “war on 
terror”.
Though opposition has mounted in some comers of American public opinion to the 
deleterious impact of the “war on terror” on the human rights o f those people caught on 
the wrong side of the ctus”/ “them,” “good Muslim”/ “bad Muslim” divide, as well as to 
the assault on the civil liberties of Americans themselves that associated domestic 
policies have entailed, recent polls suggest that the discourse o f the Islamist “threat” has 
deeply impacted Americans’ perceptions in ways that could have negative ramifications 
for decades, if  not more, to come.47 In this case an orientalist fear o f the Islamist other has
47 Bemd Debusmann, “Radio Hoax Exposes Anti-Muslim Sentiment in U.S.,” Reuters Washington (1 
December 2006) A 2006 Gallup poll o f  more than 1,000 Americans showed that 39 percent were in favor 
of requiring Muslims in the United States, including American citizens, to carry special 
identification. Roughly a quarter o f  those polled said they would not want to live next door to a Muslim 
and a third thought that Muslims in the United States sympathized with al Qaeda, the extremist group 
behind the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington. A poll carried out by the Council on
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been compounded by a persistent ignorance amongst large portions of the American 
population of the history and current political, economic, social and religious dynamics o f 
the region, an issue which this thesis also addresses.
The thesis concludes by arguing that the first step for the Western-based scholar seeking 
to move beyond facile and reductive analyses of Islamist movements, restricted either by 
orientalist prejudices or modem rationalist over-simplifications, must be a reflective one. 
This entails a critical assessment of the epistemological and ontological foundations o f 
his/her own theories and methodologies, and an acknowledgment o f their analytical limits 
in understanding the worldview of movements constmcted on different foundations. 
Through the deconstruction of Western political and philosophical foundations, space 
will be created for a hermeneutic understanding of Islamism, which accepts that Islamist 
movements may desire to think and act outside the orbit of the West, rather than merely 
to ape its political and institutional structures. Rather than acceptance of absolute 
difference, distinguishing those (other) political movements whose worldviews exist 
outside the orbit of a Western-defined “ideal type” of “modernity” from their Western 
counterparts (self), this process requires acknowledgement of the possibility o f 
difference, which cannot be fully comprehended or accommodated if viewed only from a 
place of judgment and control.
In advocating this approach, I hope to aid in the creation of an alternative theoretical and 
methodological space in which to understand and engage the worldviews of political 
movements which ultimately view Islam as “another name for the hope of something 
better,” a view based on desires and goals that, if  viewed from a non-essentialized and
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), an advocacy group, found that for one in three Americans, the word 
Islam triggers negative connotations such as “war,” “hatred” and “terrorist.” The war in Iraq has 
contributed to such perceptions.
48 For example, see a recent poll undertaken by the Open Bethlehem Foundation which found that only 15 
per cent o f  Americans know that Bethlehem is a Palestinian city with a mixed Christian-Muslim 
community, with the majority believing instead that it is an Israeli town inhabited by a mixture o f  Jews and 
Muslims, and though the overwhelming majority o f  the Christians o f Bethlehem (78%) blame the exodus 
o f Christians from the town on Israel’s blockade, Americans are more likely (45.9%) to blame it on 
“Islamic politics” and are reluctant (7.4%) to blame Israel, no doubt a result o f  the distorted picture o f  
Islamist in Palestine, and the ruling party Hamas in particular, that they are bombarded with by the 
American press. “Americans Back Bethlehem — But are not Sure Where it Is: Two Nation survey: America 
vs. Bethlehem.” Zogby International Press Release, Thursday 21 December 2006.
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comparative perspective, may turn out to be not that other after all.49 Only after this space 
has been created will it be possible to truly end both the theoretical and real oppression of 
the “Muslim other” and, one hopes, halt the dangerous march of the United States 
towards the precipice of the proverbial “clash of civilizations” it so vigorously contends it 
is trying to avoid.
49 Sayyid, 160.
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Chapter One: Deconstructing the International Relations Meta-Narrative:
Creating Space for Theorizing on Political Islam
At bottom, movements such as Hamas seem to challenge our Westphalian certainties. Of 
course for Islamists recent history carries a different message. The nation state has none 
o f the benevolent associations that we couple to the Enlightenment. For most Arabs the 
drawing o f national boundaries was recent; was imposed- with few benevolent 
associations and little “enlightenment. ”
-Alistair Crooke1
To a certain extent, one can view the advent of the “modem rationalist” paradigm in the 
western social sciences as a step in the right direction insofar as it appears to provide the 
perfect antidote to the inherent racism of Orientalism. With its focus on the alleged 
“temporal” and “ethical,” as opposed to “spatial,” or civilizational/racial, divide between 
the West and the “rest,” it is certainly less included less inclined towards essentializing 
the cultures, societies and polities that comprise the Muslim world.2 However, the 
modem rationalist adherence to a dichotomous understanding of “tradition” versus 
“modernity” means that it has never been fully capable of escaping the logic of 
“othering.” Even for more critical thinkers like Marx and Weber and their contemporary 
intellectual heirs, alert to the “costs and contradictions o f rationalization,” there is an 
underlying belief that “traditional” modes of thought and social interaction serve as 
obstacles to the achievement of often abstract and contingent notions of economic and 
social “progress” inevitably defined in terms of specific Western experiences.4 In relation 
to the study of political Islam, the modem rationalist approach is dismissive of the 
relevance of religious belief as an independent variable capable of explaining certain 
political and social phenomena, dismissing it instead as “epiphenomenal” and therefore 
undeserving of serious intellectual consideration.5 This approach sees Islam as little more
1 Alastair Crooke, introduction to Azzam Tamimi, Hamas Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst & 
Company), xi.
" From hereon in the term “modem rationalist” will appear without quotation marks.
3 As Hansen has noted, often discourses do not involve a construction o f  the other as completely superior to 
self; rather, the construction o f this distinction is generally a more nuanced enterprise, involving the use o f  
“spatial, temporal and ethical constructions” to distinguish self from other. Hansen, 46-51.
4 Euben, 34.
5 Ibid., 23.
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than a ruse for political actors who instrumentalize religion as a means of mobilizing 
support for otherwise political or worldly agendas. In other words, “[t]he role of Islam is 
strictly secondary and mystifying. Islam is seen as a mere vocabulary through which 
legitimacy and representation are mediated.”6 Although most scholars today would deem 
it unacceptable to describe Islamist movements or the cultures/civilizations from which 
they derive as incommensurate with Western political movements, and hence incapable 
of being grasped through the same analytical tools used to understand and explain 
Western political phenomena, it is still acceptable to describe these movements 
temporally, insofar as they are viewed as less politically and socially evolved than their 
Western, secular counterparts, and ethically, insofar as they reject or qualify 
Enlightenment-derived notions of dignity, rights and freedom, as distinct and inferior.
Before examining in further detail some of the ways in which the modem rationalist 
paradigm has impacted certain strains of the discourse on political Islam, as well as the 
ways in which this discourse interacts with an aggressive U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis 
political Islam, and specifically in the context of the “war on terror,” it is important to 
first examine the epistemological roots of this paradigm in Western political thought. The 
discipline of international relations (IR), like the other disciplines comprising the social 
sciences, and natural sciences, for that matter, is a product o f the world within which it 
has developed. For this reason one must trace the roots of the discipline, as well as o f the 
concepts on which it is based, in order to fully comprehend the methodologies and 
subject matter chosen (or not chosen) by academics within the discipline, as well as the 
effects these may have on the actual practice of international relations, by their impact on 
the construction and formulation of foreign policy priorities. In an effort to examine the 
discipline’s “own sociology of knowledge” as it relates to the study of political Islam, I 
will explore the various narratives, or versions of history, used to describe some of the 
central concepts from which mainstream IR theory is derived, including “the state,” 
“sovereignty,” “modernity” and “rationality.” As Cynthia Weber has pointed out, “IR 
Theory is a site of cultural practice in which conscious and unconscious ideologies are
6 Sayyid, 39.
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circulated through stories that appear to be true.” By exploring the various 
narratives/stories that form the basis of IR theory, I hope to expose some of mainstream 
IR’s central assumptions as they relate to the way in which Islamist movements are 
viewed (if considered at all) by the discipline. The three IR narratives I will focus on in 
this chapter are: 1) the narrative of the state, based on the particular historical 
development of the European state; 2) the narrative of modernity, based on Europe’s 
economic, political and social development; and 3) the narrative of the Enlightenment, 
and the various concepts and methodologies associated with it. The uncritical acceptance 
o f its epistemological roots in Eurocentric, rationalist, Enlightenment-based thought has 
also had an ontological impact on mainstream IR, making it hard for IR scholars to 
understand and empathize with the worldviews of peoples and movements that adhere to 
different ontological foundations. As Vendulka Kubalkova argues, ‘‘it is infeasible to 
discuss religion in IR without appreciating that the difference in religious and secular
o
thought is ontological, i.e., in what in each of them ‘counts for real.’”
In an effort to avoid accusations of constructing a “red herring” out of a monolithic view 
of Western political philosophy, I will follow each narrative with a summary of some o f 
the principal critiques of these narratives that one can find in more critical strains of 
Western scholarship itself. Each of these sections will in turn be followed by a summary 
o f the principal Islamic challenges to the mainstream narratives, pointing out areas of 
convergence and divergence between the two in an effort to engage these seemingly 
opposed genres of critical thought. As Euben asserts, the fact that there are so many 
points of overlap between these critiques “suggests that, in a colonial and postcolonial 
world in particular, questions that define political theory have ceased to be, if  they ever 
solely were, Western.”9 The aim of this chapter thus is not to detract from the very 
vibrant and plural tradition of critical thought that has developed within the IR discipline 
over the past 20 years, but rather to add to that tradition by proposing an additional way 
to challenge these mainstream narratives and their continued hegemonic influence over
7 Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 2001), 6.
8 Vendulka Kubalkova, ‘Towards an international political theology,” Millennium: Journal o f  International 
Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 683.
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the study o f international relations. As David Campbell has argued, although challenges 
to various elements of the mainstream IR narratives do “not involve writing the ‘true’ and 
‘correct’ historical narrative to replace that which is in error,” they do attempt to 
“establish the space for a retheorization of foreign policy via the problematization” of 
them.10 Through examining the potential challenge o f Islam(ism) to some of the 
discipline’s principle narratives (shared by many other branches of the Western social 
sciences), I will examine the limits of the modem rationalist approach to explain and 
understand a variety of historical experiences that exist outside its narrow remit.
This chapter will conclude by arguing that the inability of mainstream IR concepts and 
the narratives from which they derive to consider the possibility o f worldviews that exist 
outside their own narrow “spatial,” “temporal,” and “ethical” boundaries marginalize or 
largely misunderstand Islamist movements and their potential to affect and be affected by 
the international system, within not only the academic but also the wider political and 
popular discourse. Only once these narratives are deconstructed and contextualized can 
Islamism in all its complexity be understood, not only in terms of the larger picture — of 
what Islamic movements share in common with other political movements which have 
also been impacted by the globally transformative social, economic, and political 
developments of the last several centuries —  but also the ways in which they are 
different, though not inferior, because of the specific religious, cultural, socio-economic, 
and political contexts in which they have developed.
1. The Mainstream Narrative of the Sovereign State
While the roots of the modem state system can be found in antiquity (e.g., the Greek city- 
states, 800 B.C.-168 B.C.), the narrative o f the state, as told within IR, is that the modem
• th thstate system is a European construct that first emerged in the course of the 15 and 16 
centuries, achieved maturity in the 17th century, culminating with the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, which put an end to the religious conflicts of late-16th and 17th
9 Euben, 123.
10 Campbell, 4.
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century Europe. For those seeking to trace the birth o f the “liberal, constitutional 
sovereign state” though, the date and event most often evoked are 1789 and the French 
Revolution, when the notion that a state’s sovereignty could only be achieved with the 
consent and support o f “the people” was first elaborated by the French philosophes, who, 
according to Thomas Paine, “excoriated the Westphalian states for their egotistical power 
struggles that sustained the domestic rule of the parasitic ‘plundering classes.’”11
Despite minor disagreements over the exact origins and timing of this development, there 
is a general consensus within IR that several factors played a role in the creation and 
consolidation of the modem state system, including: the birth of capitalism and changes 
to the modes of production; modem science and technology (specifically, weapons 
technology and improvements in ship design); and the emergence of the Protestant 
religions and the concomitant break-up of the universal church.12 In his article 
“Reformulating International Relations Theory: African Insights and Challenges,” Assis 
Malaquias points out a fourth factor, namely that the “development of the modem 
European state coincided with tendencies to create unifying cultures around a dominant 
language.” According to Karen Armstrong, this explains why the birth of the modem 
European state entailed a religious cleansing of sorts that would enable the new state to 
consolidate and justify its power as the sole and legitimate representation o f a specifically 
designated group of people. She traces the first modem European state to the late 15th 
century Spanish Inquisition and the subsequent Counter-Reformation.14 Together, these 
factors combined to fuse the nation and the state into a single political entity: the nation­
state. A crucial feature of the newfound European state was its success in inducing the 
population within its borders to transfer loyalty from the metaphysical nation to the 
physical state.
11 Christopher J. Bickerton, Phillip Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch, eds., Politics without Sovereignty: 
A Critique o f  Contemporary International Relations (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 
2007), 9.
Chris Brown, Understanding International relations (London: Houndsmills, Macmillan, 1997), 70.
13 Assis Malaquias, “Reformulating International Relations Theory: African Insights and Challenges,” in 
Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory (London: 
Palgrave, 2001), 13.
14 Karen Armstrong, The Spiral Staircase: My Climb out o f  Darkness (New York: Knopf, 2004).
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Despite the significant role religion played in creating and consolidating the modem 
state-system, considering the Treaty of Westphalia was largely concerned with dividing 
Europe into separate Catholic and Protestant spheres of influence as a means to put an 
end to the fighting, an important component o f the mainstream IR narrative of the 
development of the modem state is its secular nature, where it is assumed that during this 
period, the state came “to be constituted by a secularized eschatology in which one form 
of social organization and identity (the church) completely gives way to another (the 
state) at a readily identifiable juncture (the Peace of Westphalia).”15 According to this 
narrative, it was the elimination of God (and his representatives on earth via the 
institutions o f the Church) from the realm of socio-political affairs that cleared the way 
for a truly sovereign politics, one that “involves both material capacity in its 
institutionalized forms, such as the public power of the state, and the subjective will of 
every citizen,” as opposed to the “divine power that preceded it.”16
1.1 Challenges to the Mainstream Narrative o f the Sovereign State: Western Social 
Sciences
Despite its centrality within IR, there is a growing tendency to challenge the mainstream 
narrative o f the state and its concomitant theory o f sovereignty. These challenges range 
from the less confrontational “historical sociological” approaches which “like 
realism...give prominence to the state” but consider the “context, socio-economic and
17international, in which it [the state] is located and reproduced,” to the more radical,
post-structural and dialectical approaches, which start from the premise that nation-states
are “unavoidably paradoxical entities that do not possess prediscursive, stable 
• • 1 8identities.” As the editors of Politics Without Sovereignty, A Critique o f Contemporary 
International Relations have recently pointed out, this criticism includes both empirical 
studies that claim to prove the increasing irrelevance of the sovereign nation-state as
15 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f  Identity (Manchester: 
University o f  Minnesota Press/Manchester University Press, 1998), 40.
16 Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch, 10-11.
17 Halliday, 2 0 0 5 ,3 5 ,4 3 .
18 Campbell, 12.
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conceived by the mainstream narrative and normative ones that advocate an end to state 
sovereignty as we know it for various “moral and political” reasons.19
David Campbell, for example, found it necessary to begin his critical study o f U.S. 
foreign policy and the “politics of identity” by first deconstructing the mainstream IR 
narrative o f the modem nation-state. Regarding the post-Westphalian secularization of 
the state, he points out that historical sociological studies of the origins of the modem 
Western state have concluded “that there was neither a clean nor a clear break between 
the social formations of Christendom and subsequent sovereign communities,” a fact that 
was significant in post-Westphalian state construction and the “ordering of identity 
difference.”20 Furthermore, he argues against a facile understanding o f the history o f the 
modem nation-state according to which the states to emerge from the Peace of 
Westphalia were uniform in substance or form, as they ranged from the
despotically powerful French monarch, through the infrastructurally more 
organized English constitutional monarch (albeit consumed by civil war in 
the period), to the weak confederacy that was the mosaic of German petty 
states. Each of these forms has to be distinguished among themselves, 
from others existing earlier (such as the federated cities o f the Hanseatic 
League or the maritime empire of Venice), and in contrast to the 
considerably more intensive form of the modem state. Moreover, the 
development of these diverse state forms was a multifaceted process that 
was neither linear nor progressive.
In addition to critical inquiries into the origins of the narrative of the Western sovereign 
nation-state, many scholars today, both critical and liberal, have questioned their capacity 
to explain economic and political relations in the globalized, post-modern world. Most 
prominent amongst these critiques have been: Susan Strange’s The Retreat o f the State
19 Although the editors discuss these trends, they do so disparagingly, as the stated purpose o f the book is to 
“argue that the current movement against state sovereignty participates in the degradation o f  political 
agency at both the domestic and international levels. The case against sovereignty is generally cast as a way 
of opening up our political possibility, and to sever the relationship between the exercise o f  power and new 
possibilities for organizing the world. But its substance is to limit our sense o f  political possibility, and to 
sever the relationship between the exercise o f  power and political responsibility.” Bickerton, Cunliffe and 
Gourevitch, 1.
20 Campbell, 42.
21 Ibid., 43.
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(1997), which argues that “the rise of global financial networks, multinational 
corporations, regional trading blocs and expansion of the world economy has rendered 
the nation-state obsolete”; David Held’s (2003) Violence, Law and Justice in a Global 
Age, in which he similarly predicts the final days of the nation-state, although focusing on 
the “internationalization of communication and culture”; the liberal Robert Keohane, who 
believes “that the indivisible and inalienable right of sovereignty has been transformed 
into something that can be traded away”; and Stephen Krasner, who argues that 
“sovereignty has always been a kind of ‘organized hypocrisy,’ in which formal sovereign
77status fails to correspond with actual respect for sovereignty.”
Taking a different perspective, Campbell argues with urgency that the present state of 
affairs is:
more than just a result of interdependence, the proliferation of threats, or the 
overflowing of domestic issues onto the world stage (the conventional 
response). This is an irruption of contingencies that renders all established 
containers problematic. This irruption does not simply involve the
movement of problems from one domain to the other, but rather the
rendering asunder of those domains and their entailments. It makes little 
sense to speak of politics occurring in terms of a distinct “inside” or 
“outside” (such as a “Third World” that is spatially beyond our borders and 
temporally backward)...
For critical IR thinkers like David Campbell, the problem of the narrative of the
development o f the sovereign nation-state necessarily has normative implications: if not
historically accurate, then what purpose does it serve, he asks. For Campbell, the 
importance of this narrative is to justify the ontological status o f the state and normalize 
the inside/outside distinctions on which it is predicated and which are inherent to the 
realist understanding of the anarchical nature of the international realm, and hence the 
type of power politics necessary to secure a state’s survival in it. To challenge this 
narrative one must therefore be able to demonstrate that the state actually has “no 
essence, no ontological status that exists prior to and is served by either police or war.
“  Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch, 4-7.
23 Campbell, 18.
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Instead, ‘the state’ is ‘the mobile effect of a multiple regime of govemmentality,’ of 
which the practices of police, war, and foreign policy/Foreign Policy are all a part.”24 
Other critical/post-modem IR theorists such as Andrew Linklater and Richard Ashley 
have also questioned the role of the sovereign nation state in maintaining the status quo 
and have instead argued for “post-national” conceptions of citizenship that seek to 
overcome not only the types of conflict and suffering inherent in the realist-conceived 
and constructed international system, but the very (inter-subjective) identities and 
relationships that make them inevitable.
Despite these various challenges to the narrative of the state, several assumptions (e.g., 
that states are the dominant actors in the system, that their sovereignty is derived from the 
support and will of the “people,” that they are “exogenously constituted,” that they define 
security in “self-interested” terms, etc.)26 still dominate mainstream IR analyses. That this 
is so is a testament to a broad acceptance within IR of the Eurocentric version of the 
origins o f the state from which its generally accepted definition is derived. This 
definition, which Halliday terms “national-territorial totality,” is “replete with legal and 
value assumptions (i.e., that states are equal, that they control their territory, that they 
coincide with nations, that they represent their peoples),” all of which render problematic 
its use as a universal concept capable o f explaining all inter- and intra-state relations 
across the globe. Although the limitations of realism, including its “neglect of ideology 
and belief systems, minimization o f factors internal to states and societies, inadequate 
attention to economics, and...[its] view of inter-state relations marked by timeless, 
recurrent, patterns,” have been widely acknowledged, the theory still holds sway for 
those lured by its offer o f seemingly objective and parsimonious explanations of
9o
international relations.
24 Ibid., 202.
25 Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch, 4.
26 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81. 
Wendt argues that while “neorealists and neoliberals may disagree about the extent to which states are 
motivated by relative versus absolute gains...both groups take the self-interested state as the starting point 
for theory.”
27 Halliday, 1994,78.
28 Kubalkova, 675.
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1.2 Challenges to the Mainstream Narrative o f the Sovereign State: Islamic/Islamist 
Perspectives
If  adherence to the mainstream narrative of the state may still be justifiable when 
assessing international relations of states whose development paralleled that of the 
Westphalian states, its uncritical use in most other instances is problematic. Scholars 
focused on the international relations of non-Western parts of the world, for example, 
have argued that the European state differs fundamentally from the post-colonial state in 
its origins and subsequent development; therefore, they find the mainstream narrative of 
the Western sovereign state inadequate when it comes to understanding and explaining 
developments in these regions. As with the critical Western IR tradition discussed above, 
these analyses also start by problematizing the narrative o f the origins of the state, 
although they tend to focus on its inability to explain the particular development o f non- 
Westem states rather than challenging its empirical accuracy in the context o f a 
globalized world. For example, whereas the narrative of the origins of the European state 
holds that it emerged from a process that included the secularization of politics, the 
industrial revolution, the development o f capitalism, and the molding o f national 
identities through cultural and linguistic homogenization, Malaquias contends that 
African states “did not emerge as a result o f a long period o f social, economic, political, 
scientific, and religious development determined by Africans,” but rather are a result of 
“colonial imposition created to serve Western, not African, interests.”
In critiquing the use o f the Eurocentric narrative and definition o f the sovereign nation­
state to explain the post-colonial situation in Africa, many students of the region focus on 
the arbitrary/illegitimate nature of the territorial African state, and the subsequent 
persistence of ethnonationalism as a reaction to excessive and unwelcome centralizing 
and/or homogenizing tendencies of the state. Concerns are also raised about the 
legitimacy of African leaders and the problem this poses for IR theorists interested in 
utilizing an “objective,” rationalist conception o f “national interest” (as, for example,
29 Malaquias, 13.
30 Ibid., 15.
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defined by Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations). John F. Clark, in his essay “Africa’s 
International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” argues that the concept of national 
interest fails patently in Africa, for at least two reasons. First, African states were largely 
defined territorially by Europe and are thus comprised of people belonging to different 
ethnicities (or clans) who do not conceive o f themselves as a nation. As a result, the 
leaders of these states are just as likely to pursue sub-national — or, I would add, 
transnational (e.g., ethnic or religious) —  interests as they are state-wide interests. 
Second, underlying the notion that leaders will pursue the interests of their populations is 
the assumption that they understand and feel accountable to these populations. “However, 
in colonial and post-colonial Africa, many heads o f state have felt little or no obligation 
to their populations, and have shown that they are just as likely to pursue the interests of
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their foreign sponsors as that of their own citizens.” Although the same could be said 
about many non-African states, the colonial history and neo-colonial present render the 
African state more prone to both a diminished negative and positive sovereignty.
While their colonial history explains some of the overlapping characteristics marking the 
development of several Muslim states with that of their African counterparts (not to 
mention that several of these African states are also Muslim), it could be argued that the 
development of the Muslim state, or those states comprised o f peoples formerly 
belonging to the caliphate system of rule that developed in the aftermath of the Prophet 
Mohammed’s death, differs from the European state in two additional ways: the people
of these states have traditionally felt a greater allegiance to the larger, transnational 
community (ummah) delineated by the borders of religion (Islam) rather than by physical 
borders, language and ethnicity; and Muslim states, because of their unique historical 
development and epistemological and ontological realities, have not secularized in the 
same manner and to the same extent as their European counterparts. Both o f these factors 
also affect the Islamic critique of sovereignty, a concept, as discussed above, challenged 
extensively within Western social sciences as well, albeit from a different perspective.
3‘ Clark, 92.
32 Despite the proliferation o f historical accounts dismissive o f  the role played by the caliphate in unifying
the Muslim world throughout Islam’s history, Sayyid argues that one should not ignore the fact that “from
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While most Western critiques of the concept of sovereignty associated with the 
mainstream narrative of the state focus on its inability to accurately describe the current 
status of the state in a post-modern world where territorial boundaries are increasingly 
irrelevant, the Islamic critique holds that the state has never actually been a sovereign 
entity as it is only God who is sovereign, and people merely represent His will on earth. 
As Bobby Sayyid argues, for this reason “Islamists explicitly reject nationalism, 
dec luring that ‘an Islamic state’ is not a nationalistic state because ultimate allegiance is 
owed to God and thereby to the community of all believers - the ummah. One can never 
stop at any national frontier and say the nation is absolute, an ultimate end in itself” 
According to this argument, citizens of the Muslim world prior to the abolition of the 
Ottoman Caliphate may have formed families, clans, communities, regions, and 
allegiances which were delineated by physical boundaries, “but their ‘countries’ of origin 
did not imply their nationality.”34
liven for the mid-19th century “Islamic modernists” who actively sought out innovative 
means of resisting an increasingly powerful Europe as it encroached upon Islam’s 
w eakening borders, the idea of dividing up the ailing Ottoman empire into separate 
nation-states was greeted with skepticism. Muhammad ‘Abduh, the most famous of these 
modernist philosophers who came the closest to advocating acceptance of the nation-state 
as an organizing principle capable of resisting the numerous threats emanating from 
Europe, saw the division of the ummah into separate nation-states as a last resort, and one 
that should be mitigated by strict adherence by the newly formed states to the central 
precepts of Islam. It was for this reason that ‘Abduh referred to the state in terms 
reminiscent of the Caliphate, e.g., as ‘al-khliafat al-Islamiyyah, or hukumat al-khilafah 
(government o f the Caliphat) in order to stress what he believed was the necessary 
continuity between the former and the latter. As Enayat pointed out, ‘Abduh
the death o f the Prophet until 3 March 1924, there was always a caliph,” and that the caliph ensured the 
recognition o f Islam as a “master signifier” for Muslims. Sayyid, 55-56.
”  Ibid., 91.
^ Nassib, 2003.
35 Hamid Enayat, M odem  Islamic Political Thought (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005).
35
acknowledged the difficulties the Muslim world would confront in 
restoring a truly just (in the eyes of Allah) Caliphate, [and] argued that the 
only alternative was the nearest arrangement to it: the Islamic State. Yet 
even in recognizing this, ‘Abduh argued cogently against the Muslims’ 
adoption of foreign, mainly Western, laws and institutions.
Although many in the Muslin world came to support the idea of the nation-state as a 
necessary tool in the effort to resist European imperialism, the recognition of a “basic 
contradiction between nationalism as a time-bound set of principles related to the 
qualities of and needs of a particular group of human beings, and Islam as an eternal, 
universalist message, drawing no distinction between its adherents except on the criterion 
of their piety” meant this support was tenuous at best and therefore capable o f being
17overturned. Furthermore, there remained hope among many advocates o f this strategy 
that it was merely a first phase in the struggle to regain a sovereign, and territorially 
succinct Muslim ummah, and that the “liberation of the respective country or 
administrative zone was a further step in the direction o f one all-embracing Islamic 
entity.”38
Even the leaders of what came to be known as the Arab Revolt, the World War I uprising 
against the Ottoman Empire fought by British supported Arab tribes who sought to attain 
territorial independence for their peoples independent of the increasingly defunct Empire, 
saw their long term and overriding goal as eventually returning to the distinct Islamic 
system of rule: the Caliphate. In the words of the Nuri al-Said, “comrade-in-arms” of the 
leader of the Revolt, Hussein ibn Ali of the Hashemite family, who would later serve 
several terms as prime-minister of mandate Iraq:
All Arabs and particularly those o f the Near and Middle East have deep 
down in their hearts the feeling that they are “members of one another.”
The “nationalism” springs from the Muslim feeling of brotherhood 
enjoined on them by the Prophet Muhammad in his last public speech. It 
differs therefore from a great deal o f European nationalism and patriotism. 
Although Arabs are naturally attached to their native land their
36 Ibid., 78.
37 Ibid., 114.
38 Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology o f  Hamas (London: Routledge, 1998), 50.
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nationalism is not confined by boundaries. It is an aspiration to restore the
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great tolerant civilization of the early Caliphate.
Although Sayyid also acknowledges that the nation-state came to be seen as both a means 
(via nationalism) and an end (the liberated state) of the majority of anti-colonial 
movements in the Muslim world, he argues that this approach was adopted in large part 
due to the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal, in 1924, and 
the subsequent hegemonic diffusion of his “apologist” discourse.40 This discourse sought 
to situate the Muslim world within the West’s “tradition of progressive history” by 
adopting Western terminology, concepts and institutions to describe and address political, 
sociological, and economic developments so as to prove their legitimacy and value to the 
West.41 According to Sayyid, Kemal’s historic decision to abolish the Caliphate was 
made in light of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent success of the 
European nations, and his belief that Turkey’s only chance for survival lay in the pursuit 
o f its own national interests, and the consequent rejection o f the idea of a universal 
Muslim state.
The great reforming bureaucrats like Rashid Pasha, Ali Pasah and Midhad 
Pasha, and the Sultan Abdulhamid II were motivated by a desire to make 
the Ottoman Empire compete successfully in the predatory international 
climate of the nineteenth century, where the great European powers 
hovered above the “sick man of Europe,” waiting for it to fall.42
By abandoning the Caliphate in favour of a modem nation-state, in essence Kemal was 
abandoning the ummah and joining the Westphalian/European nation-state system. With 
the abolition of the Caliphate and the implementation of a “modemizing’VWestemizing 
program, the most powerful Muslim state in the world created a path that would be 
difficult for other leaders of the Muslim world not to follow. Subsequent developments
39 General Nuri al-Said, quoted in Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A H istory (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 130.
40 Sayyid avoids criticisms o f oversimplifying Kemalism and overstating its importance to the Muslim 
world with this disclaimer: “I have chosen not to focus on providing a detailed analysis o f Kemalism’s 
actual status in the various historical and political contexts —  which I am well aware would demonstrate 
significant variations —  since the purpose here is not to furnish a detailed and exhaustive analysis o f  
Kemalism but to establish Kemalism as a means o f reading a wider Muslim political context. Sayyid, 33.
4lIbid., 113.
42 Ibid., 67.
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within the post-colonial regimes of the Muslim world are a testament to the pressure, 
both internal and external, to conform to the Kemalist/modemist project.43 However, 
despite the best efforts of the Kemalist leaders to displace Islam as the “master signifier” 
for citizens of their newly independent nation-states, their acts had the paradoxical effect 
o f politicizing Islam “[b]y removing it from the centre of their constructions of political 
order ... [and instead] unsettling it and disseminating it into the general culture where it 
became available for reinscription.”44 In this sense, one can see the rise in the 1970s of 
the counter-hegemonic discourse of Islamism as an attempt to reassert Islam, as opposed 
to national identity, as the “master signifier” for the Muslim world and, as demonstrated 
by the discourse and ideology of Ayatolah Khomeini, leader of the Islamist revolution in 
Iran and ideological influence to a significant portion of the Islamist movements that 
followed, to replace Kemalism with its own set of meta-narratives capable of “restoring] 
the precious symbolic continuity interrupted by the irruption of Western categories.”45 
One of the central components of this attempt to “decentre the West” was the perceived 
need for the Muslim world to return to the ummah as an organizing principle, both 
religiously and politically, and as a structural alternative to the imposed nation-state 46
Sayyid’s reading of the ideological origins of contemporary Islamist movements is 
confirmed by the autobiographical stories of former Arab-nationalists-tumed-Islamists 
recounted in Francois Burgat’s Face to Face with Political Islam. In this book, Burgat 
argues that Islam never ceased to serve as a central “reference” point in the worldviews
43 Sayyid argues that the post-colonial Kemalist regimes could be described as implementing one o f  two 
strategies: 1) the Pahlavist strategy, in which Islam is “displaced as a master signifier and its displacement 
reinscribed in terms o f  its being an ‘alien imperialist ideology’.” The aim of this strategy is to evoke the 
population’s pre-Islamic history as a means o f  portraying Islam as an interruption- a distortion o f the ‘true’ 
identity o f  the society in question. According to Sayyid, this strategy was employed in Iran by Mohammed 
Reza, in Egypt by Gamal Abdul Nasser, in Iraq by the Baathist regime; and 2) “the quasi-caliph strategy, in 
which Islam is included in the political order but is articulated with state power, through the institution o f  
what could be called a pseudo-caliphate.” This strategy was practiced by King Hussein o f Jordan, King 
Hassan o f  Morocco, and the successive Saudi rulers. According to Sayyid these attempts “to reproduce a 
situation in which Islam is closely tied to the state remains within the discourse o f Kemalism, since the 
nation is still used as the nodal point o f  the political order.” Ibid., 107.
44 Ibid., 107.
45 Francois Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 50. For more on the 
impact o f  the Iranian Islamist revolution on budding Islamist movements, see: Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey o f  
the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (Orlando: Harcourt, 2007); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: 
Al-Qaida's Road to 9/11 (London: Allen Lane, 2007); as well as Sayyid.
46 Ibid., 118.
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o f the majority of those involved in the anti-colonial/nationalist movements, even if not 
made explicit by the leaders of these movements. Furthermore, Burgat explains the 
proliferation of Islamist movements in the period following independence as the result of 
activists coming to terms with the fact that the version of nationalism their leaders had 
adopted, e.g., secular and heavily influenced by Western ideas and experiences, failed to 
adequately reflect their own religious and cultural identities. In the words of one 
prominent Egyptian intellectual and nationalist-activist-tumed Islamist, Tariq al-Bishri, 
there was no need for explicitly Islamist movements during the anti-colonial struggles 
because “the nationalism of Mustafa Kamal was expressed in the language of Islam and 
not the language of secularism.”47 After the independence struggles had been won, 
though, it became clear that the leaders had adopted “Western references” and “values of 
modernity” disconnected from their religious and cultural contexts. On the other hand, 
the Islamist movements “invited society to return to the values that had previously 
dominated it and to Islam as a source of legitimacy and social regulation.”48
Jacqueline Kaye and Fouzi Slisli argue similarly that Western liberal accounts of the anti­
colonial struggles of the Muslim world often undermined or completely ignored that they 
were “distinctly Islamic in character,” providing such examples as Emir Abdelkader in 
Algeria; the Mahdi (Muhammed Ahmad) in Sudan; Islam’s role in India’s liberation 
struggle; and “various Islamic anti-colonial movements in Ghana and Nigeria.”49 Sukant 
Chandan adds Sheikh Izz al-Din Qassam, “killed by the British in the First Palestinian 
Intifida,” in....and the Islamists in the National Liberation Front (FLN) who fought 
against the French colonizers to this list, adding that many of the anti-colonial liberation 
struggles evoked “Islamic leaders” such as the 12th century Kurdish political and military 
leader Salahuddin al-Ayoub, who conquered the Crusaders in the twelfth century, to 
motivate the fighters amongst their ranks.50 Furthermore, as Maha Azzam points out, 
many of the deeply religious individuals who participated in the anti-colonial struggles 
felt betrayed by what they felt was the encroachment o f secularism via post-colonial
47 Burgat, 26.
48 Ibid., 26.
49 Jacqueline Kaye and Fouzi Slisli, “A liberal logic: reply to Fred Halliday,” Opendemocracy.com  (8 
December 2006).
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nationalist regimes. Azzam argues that “for the Islamists, it is secularism, not religion, 
that is the deviation from the norm. Thus, what is viewed as a ‘return to the fundamentals 
of religion’ is seen by many as a return to the norm,” a perspective also shared by 
renowned Professor of Islamic Studies at George Washington University Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr.51
According to Sayyid, notions of nation and secularism are Western imports that invaded 
the Muslim world via Kemal. This belief was shared by many of the second generation of 
Muslim reformers like Hassan al-Banna’, Navyab Safavi and Sayyid Qutb, who generally 
opposed all strains of nationalism, whether linguistic, ethnic, or civic, arguing that their 
predecessors were mistaken in believing that nationalism and the division of the Muslim 
world into separate, autonomous nation-states was the only means of resisting foreign 
domination. This new generation of Islamist philosophers and activists believed that 
“Islam possesses enough ideological and emotional resources to galvanise the masses in 
the cause o f independence,” where independence signifies not freedom from domination 
of one nation or another, but rather the independence of the “global ‘abode of Islam’ — 
though this time called, not the traditional term dar al-Islam (the ‘abode of Islam’), but
e*y
the newly-coined al-watan al-Islami (the ‘Islamic homeland’).”
The Tunisian Islamist political activist Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi argues like Sayyid 
that the secular state is an ideological Western import. However, in his telling of the 
story, it has been imposed on predominately Muslim North Africa by native leaders 
seeking to maintain their privileged relations with the former colonizers, and thus 
maintain their authority and wealth within the country (again, an argument similar to the 
one made by post-colonial theorists regarding the unrepresentative nature o f the post­
colonial state). For Ghannouchi, the secular state in North Africa “has been no more than 
a tool delegated, as if  by design, by the former colonizer to an elite that has been 
entrusted to take care o f the colonizer’s interests and to reproduce its relations and
50 Sukant Chandan, “Secularism and Islamism in the Arab World,” Conflicts Forum (7 October 2007).
51 Maha Azzam, “Islamism revisited,” International Affairs 82, no. 6 (2006): 1119-32; Nasr, 239.
52 Enayat, 115.
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values.” Murtaza Garia argues along similar lines, that secular nationalism is an 
ideology propagated in Muslim countries via local elites who “had their training and 
education in countries which have taken good care that they return home as "authentic’ 
nationalists to operate by proxy for their masters.”54 Hossein Nasr concurs with this 
perspective, pointing out the schism between the post-colonial rulers and the people they 
ruled as the former “although native, possessed a mental perspective akin to the 
worldview of the West and distinct from the prevailing beliefs and Weltanshauung o f the 
vast majority of those over whom they ruled in the name of independence and 
nationalism.”55
Even academics like Fred Halliday who reject analyses which seek to understand Islamist 
movements solely through analysis of written or spoken pronouncements of leading 
clerics and activists and religious texts without regard for context, accept that the Western 
concept o f the nation-state is often seen as alien to the history and religious traditions of 
the Muslim world. For example, in his book The Middle East in International Relations, 
Halliday points out that rejection of “nationalist categories of fragmentation” has its basis 
in several Quranic passages, for example: "‘it states that all believers are brethren (49:10) 
and attributes sovereignty over land to God not to man (38:65-6).” And even though, 
according to Halliday, many modem Islamists may have merely instrumentalized the 
Quran in rhetorical manoeuvres to mobilize the masses, history demonstrates that Islamist 
groups have, in fact, “acted transnationally: they have inspired each other by ideology 
and by example, and ‘struggling’ jihadi Muslims have gone from one country to another 
to participate in the struggle;” many have even been members of organizations that 
incorporate groups in more than one country. The Muslin Brotherhood, al-Ikwhan al- 
Muslimin, for example, founded in Egypt in 1928, became the ideological and 
organizational model for successive branches in several Arab countries that persist today, 
including Palestine and Jordan. The participation of young men from all over the Muslim 
world in the various conflicts over the years that have entailed a real or perceived Jihad
53 Tamimi, 115.
54 Murtaza Garia, “Nationalism in the Light o f  the Qur’an and the Sunnah,” in The Impact o f  Nationalism 
on the Muslim World, ed. M. Ghayasuiddin (London: Al-Hoda Publishers, 1986), 27.
55 Nassr, 238.
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against non-Muslim encroachment on Muslim peoples/lands (e.g., the war in Afghanistan 
against the Soviet occupiers or the conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya) is further evidence 
of this trend. “That there is an ‘Islamist transnationalism’ is therefore, unquestionable: it 
has existed in some form through history, was reconstructed by Schulze’s ‘Islamic 
public’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and has found a third form in the era of 
mass migration and the Internet from the 1980s onwards.”56
In her article “Towards an International Political Theology,” Kubalkova argues that 
mainstream IR analyses view religion as “a private affair of individuals, a domestic issue 
of stales, or it is liminal; in any event, it eludes the territorial boundaries characteristic of 
state-centric IR studies.”57 In the preceding section I explained why this is the case by 
demonstrating how the narrative of the sovereign state, as told within mainstream IR, 
precludes consideration of some of the defining elements of states which have developed 
along non-Western trajectories, in particular Muslim-majority states, and the subsequent 
effects their specific developmental paths may have on contemporary and future political 
developments in these states. That this is the case is evidenced by facile statements that 
continue to be made in regards to Islamist movements that seek to overcome what they 
see as artificial borders unnecessarily dividing the Muslim ummah (as well as in regards 
to their secular Arab nationalist counterparts who have similarly rejected the arbitrarily 
drawn borders separating the brothers and sisters of the Arab nation) by lamenting the 
failure of these movements to just accept “the natural course and develop into modem-
r o
day state nationalism” and “get on with it.”
2. The M ainstream N arrative of Modernity
Having discussed how mainstream IR’s state-centric nature and definition of the modem 
sovereign state limits discussion of the origins and relevance of political Islam in the 
world today, I hope to have exposed how the narrative of a specific historic event, 
namely the rise of the Western nation-state, came to assume a universal meaning.
Halliday, 2005,241.
Kubalkova, 676.
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Mainstream IR’s Eurocentric narrative o f the state is very much linked to another widely 
accepted narrative: that which describes the history of “modernity.” As Joe Migdal has 
pointed out, the state’s very existence “was part and parcel of the great transformation 
bringing modernity.. .”59
Similar to the IR narrative on the origins of the state, the discipline’s narrative of 
“modernity” can be traced to 17th century Europe. And while there is some disagreement 
on the exact timing and origins of this development, the concept o f modernity retains its 
hold upon scholars because there is at least implicit agreement regarding many of its 
features, one of which is the development of the modem state. As Richard Falk explains 
in Religion and Politics, this concept is generally associated with:
the ascendancy of reason, science, and statist forms of political 
organization as they emerged in Europe during the 13th to 17th centuries, 
culminating in the triumph of industrial capitalism in the 19th century, and, 
finally, complemented by the October Revolution in Russia that brought 
state socialism into the world. Implicit in the dynamic o f modernism was 
its globalisation by way of colonialist extension and capitalist expansion.60
Taking these historical events into consideration, the “stages o f growth” theory that came 
to form the foundation of much sociological thought in the 19th and 20th centuries 
combined Weber’s polarized conceptualization of the differences separating “traditional” 
from “modem” societies and Comte’s theory of evolution.61 According to this theory, all 
societies were alike at the “traditional” stage and eventually would all pass through the 
same set o f changes that led the West to the “modem” stage. The understanding was that 
all nations, despite their disparate cultures, histories and collective visions for the future, 
were destined to become modem states, if only they kept to the “right” path. That path 
consisted specifically o f the application of technology to control nature and increase per 
capita growth, government secularization and democratization, and rational government
58 Karsh, 7.
59 Joel S. Migdal, “Studying the State,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, eds. 
Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, 208-236 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
209.
60 Quoted in Euben, 22.
61 Peter F. Klaren and Thomas J. Bossert, Promise o f  Development: Theories o f  Change in Latin America 
(Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1986).
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policies to increase capital accumulation and investment and foster entrepreneurship. In 
essence, the path to modernization included the death of subsistence agriculture, 
communal living and God (at least on the public scene) and the subsequent birth of 
technologically advanced industry, monetary wealth and the individual. Societies that did 
not adhere to this path “were judged deficient because they allegedly lacked many of the 
features and institutions which modem European societies seemed to possess and which
£%7h \u supposedly enabled Europeans to achieve progress, knowledge, wealth and power.”
The political orientations of adherents to this narrative of modernization have run the 
gamut from conservative to progressive, left to right (although for the progressive/left 
adherents, the process of modernization is not seen as the final “stage” in and of itself, 
but rather as a prerequisite for arrival at the final stage, which includes some form of 
communist or social democratic system). Despite the seemingly obvious differences in 
their “worldviews” or concepts of the good life, political theorists who have subscribed to 
this theory, either explicitly or implicitly, have accepted an Eurocentric understanding of 
what it means to be modem. According to Ali Mazrui, this understanding of modernity 
has its roots in Darwin’s theory o f evolution. Drawing the connection between Darwin’s 
theory of stages o f evolution and the stages of growth concept employed by 
modernization theory, Mazrui writes:
In its earliest forms, social Darwinism had a strong and perhaps biological 
basis. Differing stages in the evolution of human societies were sometimes 
attributed to biological distinction among peoples. This was the influence 
of Charles Darwin on racism in Europe. The ideological repercussions 
were indeed long-term.
Darwin’s influence in the realm of politics proved particularly dangerous because of the 
potential for adherents of the “stages” theory to use positive evolution a posteriori to 
explain why some civilizations are more advanced than others, and subsequently why 
some are more capable of ruling others. The history of modem Europe is replete with 
examples of uses of the “survival of the fittest” concept to justify the brutal rule of a fully
6' Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions o f  the M iddle East: The History and Politics o f  Orientalism  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 87.
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‘ evolved” society over one composed o f less “fit” members. Europe’s imperialist 
expansion throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and the expansionist agenda of the 
Third Reich, for example, were justified in this light. Despite its dark history, social 
Darwinism managed to seep into the mainstream of several disciplines within the social 
sciences, including IR. Noting the influence o f the German right on the discipline in its 
early stages, and disputing the common belief that IR emerged out o f the English 
speaking world, Halliday argues that “many o f the central themes of realism appear as 
(domesticated) descendents of the militaristic and racist Social Darwinism o f the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”64
As already noted, conservatives and fascists were not the only ones to adhere to this 
version of modernization. As Mazrui points out, Karl Marx was, in fact, an enthusiastic 
supporter of Darwin’s theories, albeit for different reasons, so much so that the 19th 
century political philosopher wanted to dedicate the first volume o f Das Kapital to 
Charles Darwin (who declined the honor).65 The centrality of the belief in the 
inevitability of the (social) evolution of man to Marx’s conception o f historical 
materialism is a testament to the influence o f Darwinism on the 19th century Prussian 
political philosopher. As with other adherents of modernization theory, both past and 
present, Marx viewed tradition, including culture and religion, variously as obstacles to a 
better future and reactions to oppression or uncertainty. In the Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte, for example, Marx argued that the full potential of a revolutionary 
movement can be limited by the tendency of its participants to hark back to their past for 
symbolic references. This sentiment is expressed in a somewhat critical passage on the 
way the 1848 French revolutionaries looked back to the 1789 revolution as a means of 
understanding and framing their struggle:
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing 
themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, 
precisely in such periods o f revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up
Mazrui, 70. 
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the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle 
cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of the world history 
in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language...a beginner 
who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his mother 
tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can 
freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it without 
recalling the old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new.66
According to this narrative, the only path to the next stage o f development is the one 
which leaves the “dead generations” behind and in which the “old” or “native” ways are 
fully replaced with the “new.” Despite the diversity in ends pursued by the various 
people/parties that subscribed to the modernization theory, they all shared the belief that 
religion, tradition and culture are liminal to the understanding or creation of any modem 
or modernizing society, and that societies for whom religion, tradition and culture still 
matter are insignificant to understanding the modem world.
This Eurocentric narrative o f modernity had a particularly negative effect on the study 
and understanding of some Muslim societies, whose continuing adherence to religion, 
communalism, and traditional customs made them appear antithetical to the modem 
Western mindset which was believed to be vital to the establishment of thriving and 
dynamic political and economic systems. In looking at the impact of this understanding 
of modernity on analysis of political systems in the Muslim world by one of the first 
proponents of the narrative, who also no doubt influenced by contemporary orientalist 
theories of the “Muslim mind” that were de riguer at the time, Lockman explains how:
Weber used the term “sultanism” to characterize the political systems of 
these [Muslim] patrimonial states, whose mlers he saw as rapacious and 
arbitrary despots unencumbered by any effective limits on their power over 
their subjects. As a result Islamic societies failed to develop institutions and 
centers of power independent of the state, including a vigorous urban middle 
class, autonomous cities or a system of rational law (as opposed to the
* A7sacred law o f Islam), leading to stagnation and social decay.
66 Karl Marx, The K arl Marx Library, Volume 1, ed. Saul K. Padover (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972), 
245-46.
67 Lockman, 87.
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Weber’s analysis o f the roots of what he saw as the backwardness and corrosion at the 
heart o f the Muslim world were, like Marx’s views “on Asian societies in general” based 
on a “powerful tradition in European thought” which included everyone from 
“Renaissance political thinkers to Montesquieu to Hegel to James Mill and John Stuart 
Mill and beyond,” and which came to tautologically define European superiority in 
relation to that which it claimed not to be, namely despotic, arbitrary and traditional, the
/ : o
attributes imputed to “Oriental” political systems by these thinkers. As Lockman points 
out, “this way o f contrasting Islamic societies to an idealized model o f European history 
and society provided a basis for depicting the former as culturally or racially defective.”69
2.1 Challenges to the Mainstream Narrative o f Modernity: Western Social Sciences
While it is not within the scope or intent of this chapter to address all methodological and 
theoretical social science strains that fall under the broad “postmodern” label, in this 
section I will summarize some principal components of the postmodern critique o f the 
notion of “modernity,” insofar as they offer insight into the theoretical limitations of 
mainstream IR theory in analyzing religious politics, in general, and political Islam in 
particular.
Analyzing the work of academics who have described political Islam as a postmodern
70movement, Sayyid first elaborates on their common understanding of modernity which 
critiques the narrative described above. Modernity, Sayyid writes, “can be described as a 
discourse which formed and consolidated Europe.”71 Sayyid goes on to explain how the 
postmodern movement saw Europe’s consolidation as contingent on its colonial/imperial 
power, and thus was skeptical of all discourse that might facilitate that consolidation. If 
modernity, one o f the narratives that comprised this discourse, was in part responsible for 
the physical, intellectual and spiritual oppression of the colonized, postmodemity was the 
movement which sought to decolonize, or liberate those whose voices had previously
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 The literature discussed by Sayyid in this section will be considered, along with other writers who have 
viewed political Islam as a postmodern movement, in Chapter Two o f  this dissertation.
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been suppressed. Robert Young, in fact, traces the origins o f the post-modern movement 
to the aftermath of the Algerian war of independence, when a number o f French 
intellectuals, who were either from French Algeria or empathized with the plight of the 
Algerian people (i.e., Sartre, Althusser, Derrida and Lyotard), sought to understand the
* » 77anti-colonial struggle in theoretical terms.
The basis of their critique of Europe’s narrative of modernity was its simplistic view of
human history as an ongoing process in constant progression towards perfection of the
1%human ideal, a view based on its underlying belief in history as a unilinear process. To 
conceive of history as such requires:
the existence of a centre around which events are gathered and ordered.
We think of history as ordered around the year zero o f the birth o f Christ, 
and more specifically, as a serial train o f events in the life o f people from 
the “centre,” the West, the place of civilization, outside of which are the 
primitives and the developing countries.74
For those who subscribe to this narrative of modernity, the West’s privileged status as 
“developed” is necessarily reliant on its antithesis: “underdevelopment.” In other words, 
the West would not be modem if  it had no touchstone other against which it could 
measure its own progress. The West relies on definitions of what it considers not modem, 
or “primitive,” to define itself as modem. According to Gianni Vattimo, the only way to 
develop an unbiased understanding of history is by first dispelling the myths around 
which History, as interpreted by a particular group of historians representing the interests 
and prejudices of the group to which they belonged, has been written. Young described 
this process as the “de-centering of the West,” a process in which the intimate
nc
relationship between modernity and the West becomes untangled. Once this “de­
centering” takes place, space is opened up in which different narratives of history and 
understandings of what it means to be modem can be articulated. For Lyotard this 
process entails overcoming the ‘"totalizing instincts of the modem, and seeking the
71 Sayyid, 107.
72 Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History in the West (London: Routledge, 1990).
73 Sayyid, 108.
74 Gianni Vattimo, quoted in Sayyid, 108.
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dissolution of all grand narratives, particularly those which claim a universal end,” 
regardless of how noble the purported end, such as “freedom,” might be. In calling for a 
'war” on modem narratives, “including those of progress, universality and 
enlightenment’” post-modernists often call for the “embrace of the particular over
totality.”76
Arnold Toynbee argued along similar lines regarding the need to dispel the illusions on 
which the modernity narrative is based, in particular in relation to the study of the “East”:
But apart from illusion due to the word-wide success o f Western 
civilisation in the material sphere, the misconception of “the unity o f 
history”— involving the assumption that there is only one river of 
civilisation, our own, that all others are either tributary to it or else lost in 
the desert sands—may be traced to three roots: the egocentric illusion, the 
illusion of the “unchanging East,” and the illusion o f progress as a 
movement that proceeds in a straight line.77
For post-modernists like David Campbell who look at the impact of the modernity 
narrative on the foreign policy practices of Western states, its deconstruction is vital not 
only to open up space for a more pluralistic account of history, but also for its real world 
implications, in particular to institute a more peaceful world order. This belief is based on 
the idea that aggressive foreign policies are often the result of an existential need of states 
lacking an “ontological” basis for existence to continually construct and reinforce their 
identities via the discovery of external threats that often do not exist objectively, at least 
not to the extent portrayed by these governments. According to Campbell, this pathology 
can be traced back to the proverbial “death of God” in the modem period, when all 
foundations for human existence and for the particular organization and regulation of 
society that marked the modem period were eliminated with nothing left to replace them. 
As a result, this period was marked by anxiety and ambiguity as the need “for external 
guarantees” persisted while the “ontological preconditions” necessary to sustain them 
ceased. According to Connolly, “modernity is thus an epoch of secret insistence
°  Sayyid, 109.
Nicholas Gane, Max Weber and Postmodern Theory (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 84.
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jeopardized by its own legacy of truthfulness and honesty: its bearers demand that every
no
hidden faith be exposed, but faith is necessary to ground the superiority of modem life.”
In place of the faith and certainty previously provided by Christendom, the modem 
Western state “requires discourses of ‘danger’ to provide a new theology of truth about 
who and what ‘we’ are by highlighting who or what ‘we’ are not, and what ‘we’ have to 
fear.” For Campbell then the process o f deconstructing this narrative of modernity and its 
role in constmcting and maintaining national identity is part and parcel o f exposing the 
insider/outsider, us/them distinctions that underpin the type of aggressive foreign policy
7Qthat “give rise to a boundary rather than acting as a bridge.”
2.2 Challenges to the Mainstream Narrative o f Modernity: Islamic/Islamist Perspectives
Similar to the post-modern critiques of the narrative of modernity based on a Eurocentric 
and unilinear reading of history, many scholars and activists have chosen deconstruction 
of the narrative, and subsequent “de-centering” of the West, as a starting point for 
elaborating an alternative, Islamic worldview. According to Ahmet Davutoglu, “the idea 
of unilinear historical progress,” which begins with ancient Greece and ends with the 
Modem Age with no stops in non-European territory along the way, has been used to 
“identify the history of mankind with the history o f Europe,” by excluding the 
contributions of civilizations that do not fit within the “existing hegemonic paradigm of
OA
Western civilization.” Yet though the Islamic critique o f modernity shares 
methodological tools with its post-modem counterpart, and even some Islamic scholars 
have recognized the importance of the “spaces” opened up by postmodernism to religion, 
there is an anxiety amongst proponents of the former regarding what they see as the 
seemingly opposed ends sought by the respective projects. This uncertainty is expressed 
by Hossein Nasr:
77 Arnold J. Toynebee, A Study o f  History, 1965, 55, quoted in Ahmet Davutoglu, Alternative Paradigms: 
The Impact o f  Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press 
o f  America, 2002), 172.
78 Connolly, quoted in Campbell, 48.
79 Campbell, 51.OA
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the very relativization of values and cultural norms preached by post­
modernism, while seeking to destroy sacred traditions and trivializing 
them and also superficially accepting certain of their tenets, allows at the 
same time a certain “space” to be created within which religions, whether 
they be Judaism, Christianity or Islam or for that matter Hinduism and 
Buddhism can be practiced to some extent. But o f course such “spaces” 
are not allowed to cover the whole living space o f the post-modern world01
and therefore conflicts are bound to arise in certain domains.
Yet still Nasr believes that the Islamic understanding of modernity shares more in 
common with postmodernism than it does with the mainstream narrative. When it comes 
to “questions such as the relation of religion to politics, the nature o f knowledge, the 
source of ethics, the relation of private ethics to public life, the rapport between religion 
and science (including the social and human sciences) and many other issues which are of 
concern to post-modern philosophers,” Seyyed Hossein Nasr argues that there is “every 
possibility of dialogue and discourse,” between postmodernists and Muslims, some of
O'}
which he believes has already taken place.
in addition to challenging the validity of the historical events chosen to comprise the 
modernity narrative, and its function in creating, maintaining and justifying unequal 
power relations between the Western and non-western worlds, Muslim critiques often 
challenge its underlying notion of progress. Whereas adherence to tradition, custom, and 
zealous belief in religion were often seen as obstacles to progress and as forces inhibiting 
the development o f modem man and society in the West, in Islam, on the contrary, is the 
belief “that the ethical ideal and perfectibility are reflected in the continuity of the eternal 
tradition from the past through the present to the future.” The secular notion o f progress, 
on the other hand, “justifies the break between past and present and glorifies the
O'.
future.” Hossein Nasr explains that the roots of this difference lie in the Islamic belief in 
the perfection of the life of the Prophet Muhammad as a man and believer, a view also 
extended to his contemporaries. Viewing this era as “the best generation of Muslims” 
implies that every subsequent generation has moved further from that perfection in its
Nl Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization (San Francisco: Harper One, 2002), 258.
Ibid., 257-258. 
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societal practices and lifestyle. According to Hossein Nasr, this view, that “the best 
generation o f Muslims are those who are his [the Prophet’s] contemporaries, then the 
generation after, than the following generation until the end of time, is sufficient to 
nullify, from the Islamic point o f view, the idea of linear evolution of man and progress
04
in human history.”
Samer Akkach concurs with Hossein Nasr’s distinction between the secular Western and 
Islamic conceptions of progress, arguing that if one were to compare the Arab and 
Turkish scholars, scientists, and bureaucrats from the second half of the 17th century 
through the 19th century to their European counterparts, one would find a very different 
approach towards inherited wisdom of the past. Whereas in the West “the remarkable 
success achieved in the field of science...in the seventeenth century prompted an 
unprecedented emphasis on the autonomy of human reason and a rejection of the habitual 
reliance on religious sources and the authority of tradition,” Muslim intellectuals during 
this period “dismissed only the unenlightened approaches o f their immediate 
predecessors, while romanticizing the achievements of the earlier periods of the Prophet
oc
and the golden era.” As there was no definitive break with tradition in the Muslim 
experience, “the intellectual zone separating the modem from the pre-modem has since 
remained blurred.”86
For Davutoglu, the main differences between secular Western and Muslim notions o f 
progress, and, subsequently, what for each of them constitutes modernity, hinge on their 
distinct “time-consciousnesses.” Western time-consciousness, as described by Johann 
Galtung, consists o f the belief in time where “social processes are unidirectional, with 
progress from low to high and so forth, but also with crisis to be overcome, possibly 
ending well, with a positive Endzustand (state of end).” In Islam,
time can not be conceived by serial and categorically separated 
periodisation; rather it can be conceived by the continuity o f social
84 Hossein Nasr, 213.
85 Samer Akkach, Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi: Islam and the Enlightenment (Oxford: Oneworld Publications 
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processes, which may also have a circular character. There is a constancy 
related to the basic characteristics of Haqq (Truth) and Batil (Falsehood), 
so there is always the possibility of a positive and negative Endzustand 
(state of end) which is the examination of human being in the world. 
Additionally there should be a positive Anfangzustand (state of beginning) 
as well as the intention o f a positive Endzustand (state of end).
This fundamental difference in time-consciousness can explain, for example, how a 
prominent Islamist such as Sayyid Qutb could have compared a country like Egypt in the 
1950s, despite its material, technological and scientific advancements, to the pre-Islamic 
period in Arabia, referred to in the Qur’an as Jahiliyya. While Westerners may have 
considered the increasing secularization, use of advanced technology, changing societal 
relationships and adoption of Western dress in Egypt during this period as a sign that the 
country, and possibly the Arab world in general, had finally achieved a certain level of 
“modernity,” and hence progress, for a deeply religions person like Qutb, all o f this 
represented a further step away from the perfection o f the period of Muhammad, and 
hence was no different from the period before the religion had been revealed to the 
Prophet. For Qutb, “the only civilized community...is the moral one; real freedom is
• • * o omoral freedom, and true justice is Islamic justice.”
Despite the growing number o f Western academics who question the substance and 
function of the mainstream narrative of modernity, acknowledging some of the above 
critiques regarding its Eurocentric nature, the narrative’s impact on the social sciences, as 
well as on the practice of politics across the world, is almost etched in stone. These 
notions have affected the treatment o f religious movements in several ways. Adherence 
to the modernity narrative has, for example, led academics to either overlook the subject 
of religion and religious political movements entirely as left-over remnants of a
OQtraditional society likely to disappear soon or to view them within the narrow 
framework set by the narrative.90
87 Ahmet Davutoglu, Civilisational Transformation and the Muslim World, (Kuala Lampur: Mahir 
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Another way in which the modernity narrative has influenced the dismissal o f religion 
and religious movements is in structuralist analyses which often utilize “dependency,” 
“neo-Marxist,” or “underdevelopment” theories/paradigms. In these analyses national 
economies are seen as structural elements within a global capitalist system characterized 
by asymmetric, interdependent relationships, in which the international system, rather 
than the nation, serves as the unit o f analysis. The impact of domestic factors, including 
religion and religious movements, on politics is generally marginalized. As with the 
narrative o f the nation-state, serious analysis of non-Westem phenomena is hindered 
when a Eurocentric understanding o f modernity influences the subconscious level of 
thought, and is thus taken as the truth, rather than a truth among many.
3. The Mainstream Narrative of the Enlightenment
Intimately connected to the narrative of modernity and notions of progress inherent 
within it is the narrative of the Enlightenment, whose impact on the social sciences is 
vast. While neorealists cling to its concept of rationality, critical theorists (at least those 
influenced by Marx, Kant and Hegel) are enticed by its promise o f emancipation.91 In this 
section, I will trace the origins o f this narrative and the influence of its underlying 
assumptions —  including a very narrow and Eurocentric understanding of rationality, as 
well as an almost evangelical belief in the power o f science to understand and improve all 
aspects of life —  on the study of international relations in general, and political Islam in 
particular.
although deeply religious sentiment may still exist within developing nations, he is centrally concerned 
with [political] conflict: “I shall not deal with communal conflicts based on religious, ethnic, or linguistic 
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As the impact o f modernization was felt most strongly across the northwestern comer of 
Europe, it was there, according to the narrative, that the intellectual response to the 
phenomenon first developed. According to Ernest Gellner, this response, or what has 
come to be known as the “Enlightenment”:
strove to understand the economic and social success of the first modem 
societies, and make possible their emulation, and so proposed a secular 
version of a salvation religion, a naturalist doctrine o f universally valid 
salvation, in which reason and nature replaced revelation. It did so because07
it perceived the role of new, secular knowledge in the new social order.
While religion promised salvation of the soul, the Enlightenment offered salvation o f the 
mind. Through reason, man could free himself from “superstition and the forces of 
ignorance, and, more directly, from political tyranny, and, perhaps, the tyranny of
O'*
material necessity.”
It is in light o f this pursuit of the advancement of secular knowledge that the development 
of “scientific” methodologies should be seen. According to Kubalkova, during this 
period, in which the “celebration o f reason unleashed a tremendous range of intellectual 
activities previously restricted by the medieval acceptance o f God’s revelation as the 
truth,” the fateful separation between science and philosophy, two previously 
synonymous fields of study, took place.94 In response to the growing importance placed 
on the various fields of “Science”95 and the subsequent loss o f prestige of philosophy, 
August Comte, one o f the “founding fathers” o f positivism, introduced the idea of the 
“social sciences,” a new field of study which would apply fundamentals of the “natural 
sciences” to philosophy and the study of politics. John Gray provides a comprehensive 
description o f positivism, pointing out three central tenets of the “catechism”:
First, history is driven by the power of science; growing knowledge and 
new technology are the ultimate determinants of change in human society.
Second, science will enable natural scarcity to be overcome; once that has 
been achieved, the immemorial evils o f poverty and war will be banished
92 Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), 90.
93 Brown, 57.
94 Kubalkova, 8.
95 According to Kubalkova, these disciplines included astronomy, chemistry and physics. Ibid., 8.
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forever. Third, progress in science and progress in ethics and politics go 
together; as scientific knowledge advances and becomes more 
systematically organised, human values will increasingly converge.96
With its universal scope and deterministic nature, positivism promised to replace religion 
in providing the answers, or at least the methods to find those answers, to humanity’s 
age-old questions about life. Those who employed positivist methods believed in the 
existence o f objective facts, and “above all in the possibility o f explaining the said facts 
by means of an objective and testable theory, not itself essentially linked to any one 
culture, observer or mood.”97 According to the Enlightenment narrative, with modernity 
and the advent of scientific methods of social inquiry, traditional man was transformed 
into rational man, which meant his knowledge was derived through analytic deduction as 
opposed to revelation. In its universalism and determinism, positivism repudiated the 
validity o f revelation and sought to “supersede clear fallacies taught by religious
Q Q
authorities...” Positivism had a great impact on the development o f the social sciences
ththroughout the 19 century, influencing scholars as diverse as Marx, Engels, and 
Durkheim. Its continued influence on the disciplines of the social sciences, in particular 
IR, can be seen today insofar as academics continue to “search for the same kinds of laws 
and regularities in the international world as they assume characterize the natural 
world.”99
3.7 Challenges to the Mainstream Narrative o f the Enlightenment: Western Social 
Sciences
The narrative of Enlightenment and its positivist methodology have profoundly affected 
the social sciences in general, and IR in particular, most importantly through an uncritical 
acceptance o f naturalism, the central concept on which positivism is based, a subjective 
understanding o f rationality, based on the Enlightenment experience, and an adherence to
96 Gray, 27.
97 Gellner, 25.
98 Jacob Neusner ,Tamara Sonn and Jonathan E. Brockopp, Judaism and Islam in Practice: A Sourcebook 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 219.
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the belief in the possibility o f purely objective scholarship. Before examining the Islamic 
challenges to this narrative, I will first consider the long and diverse history o f 
intellectual resistance to the Enlightenment narrative in general, and these points 
specifically, as it has developed over the last several centuries within Western political 
thought.
Perhaps the most contentious element of the Enlightenment narrative has been its reliance 
on a reductionist account of the allegedly smooth and complete transition during this 
period from a religious to a scientific/rational worldview. Crucial to this concept is the 
belief that the study of the social world is amenable to the same scientific methodologies 
used to study the natural world, as the two worlds do not fundamentally differ. Implicit in 
this belief, often referred to as naturalism, is the notion that man, because he can know 
society as he knows nature, has a certain power over his own destiny. Although this 
unquestioning reliance on scientific methods as a means of understanding the world was 
ubiquitous in intellectual quarters in the West by the middle o f the eighteenth century, 
there were, from the beginning, those skeptical of the potential impact of this morally 
foundationless worldview on future societies. As Rousseau put it in a classic passage that 
illustrates his anxiety about the destructive individualism he believed would inevitably 
result from general acceptance of this worldview:
It is reason that engenders vanity, and reflection that reinforces it; it is 
what turns man back upon himself; it is what separates him from 
everything that troubles and afflicts him. It is Philosophy that isolates him; 
it is by means of Philosophy that he secretly says at the sight of a suffering 
man, perish if  you wish, I am safe...nothing is as gentle as [man in his 
primitive state] when placed by Nature at equal distance from the stupidity 
o f the brutes and the fatal enlightenment o f civil man.. .The example of the 
Savages...[confirms] that all subsequent progress has been so many steps 
in appearance towards the perfection of the individual, and, in effect the 
decrepitude of the species.1 0
While Rousseau’s comments on the perils o f an Enlightenment-influenced world were 
based on an idealization of “primitive” man rather than fear o f a future devoid of God,
100 Quoted in Euben, 60.
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they show that these developments were not always as smooth or widespread as some 
religious and post-modern critics of the Enlightenment have assumed. Decades earlier, 
another great although less renowned French thinker, the mathematician Blaise Pascal 
(1623-1662), expressed a similar malaise regarding the future of an enlightened world 
where man is left to his own devices to answer the most pressing questions concerning 
his existence, including “who put him there, what he has to do, [and] what will become of 
him when he dies.”101 This skepticism of a future where vital metaphysical questions are 
left unanswered left Pascal feeling “moved to terror, like a man transported in his sleep to 
some terrifying desert island, who wakes up quite lost with no means of escape.”
According to Gray, even the “catechism” o f positivism itself was not as removed as it 
claimed from the religious cosmology it presumed to replace. For example, this idea that 
all societies across the globe would converge in a common rejection of tradition and 
religion and instead adopt “rational, scientific and experimental modes of thought” was 
not at all a modem conception, but rather had its roots in Christianity and shared with 
monotheism in general a belief in redemption for all humanity. This shared belief can be 
traced back to positivism’s inheritance of a Christian perspective o f history, according to 
Gray, although its adherent suppressed “Christianity’s saving insight that human nature is 
ineradicably flawed - they announced that by the use of technology humanity could make 
a new world.” He goes on to argue that when adherents to this school o f thought 
“suggested in the third and final stage of history that there would be no politics, only 
rational administration, they imagined they were being scientific; but the belief that 
science can enable humanity to transcend its historic conflicts and create a universal
103civilization is not a product o f empirical inquiry. It is a remnant o f monotheism.” 
Indeed, many adherents of Enlightenment thought were themselves deeply religious 
individuals. Immanuel Kant, for one, was adamant about grounding the emancipatory talk 
of the period in religious foundations. In his Critique o f Practical Reason (1788), for 
example, Kant argued that “moral law was inscribed within each human being, which,
101 Quoted in Armstrong, 74.
102 Quoted in Armstrong, 74.
103 Gray.
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like the grandeur of the heavens, filled him with awe and wonder,” and that ultimately it 
was the potential o f an afterlife that led people to act morally.104
Other liberal thinkers like David Hume and Bertrand Russell were also aware o f what 
they saw as the limits of pure reason, in particular in its ability to understand 
metaphysical questions, which they believed “exceed[ed] the boundaries of rationality 
altogether.”105 Perhaps the most well-known skeptic of the inherent good of rampant 
rationality was Max Weber, who pondered the impact of a tyrannical science dominating 
all elements of human life to the peril o f ethics and moral values. In the conclusion to one 
of his most renown works, the Protestant Ethic, Weber questioned the ability of science 
to unequivocally “engender human ‘progress’ or the qualitative advancement o f life. He 
argued instead that modem culture is characterized by sterility and passionlessness: for of 
the “last men” of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: “Specialists 
without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level o f 
civilization never before achieved.”106 Yet unlike Nietzsche and the post-modernists 
influenced by him, Weber did not call for “abandonment of the scientific vocation,” 
which he viewed as an impossible return to the “infancy o f thought.” Rather, he called for 
the continued use of “science to help tackle the practical and technical problems of our 
day,” tempered by “responsible value-judgments.” 107
Weber’s belief in the limits of instrumental reason to comprehend the intricacies of social 
life came to influence what is today known as the hermeneutical tradition of the Western 
social sciences. As outlined in his Economy and Society, Weber developed two distinct 
concepts to differentiate between the positivist methods used in the natural sciences to 
seek out causal explanations to natural phenomena (Erklaren) and the interpretive 
methods used to understand social behavior based on acknowledgement that this type of
104 Ibid.
105 Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings o f  Abdolkarim  
Soroush, edited and trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 136.
106 Weber, 1992,182, quoted in Gane, 62.
107 Ibid., 62 ,154 .
59
behavior is “oriented by and to the behavior of others,” an assertion leading “directly to
108the central hermeneutic theme that action must always be understood from within.”
In advocating a hermeneutic approach, Weber also challenged the notion of rationality 
underlying the positivist understanding of human action. Instead o f defining rationality 
according to some supposedly objective standards derived from scientific inquiry, Weber 
argued instead that an actor’s rationality should be defined by his/her ability to choose the 
most effective means to achieve his/her ends. This understanding of “instrumental 
rationality” had “nothing to say about either the source or the rationality of the agent’s 
goal” ; as long as the action taken could be shown to further the actor’s ends, it would be 
“rational.”109 The job o f the social scientist seeking to understand the reasons for an 
actor’s particular action would therefore be to first examine and understand the operative 
rules underpinning the context in which the action was taken. Various critical thinkers 
within IR today, including cognitivists, post-structuralists, standpoint and postmodern 
feminists, continue to be influenced by Weber’s belief that rational action can only be 
understood within a “framework of shared meanings -- rules and collective values.”110 As 
Wendt explains, these varied approaches all “share a concern with the basic 
‘sociological’ issue bracketed by rationalists - namely, the issue of identity- and interest- 
formation.”111
Numerous contemporary philosophers share a similar fear of the impending 
disenchantment o f an over-rationalized world as expressed by classical skeptic political 
philosophers like Weber and Nietzsche, who found the “spectre of domination in the 
promise of emancipation itself.” Alasdair MacIntyre and Chris Taylor, for example, 
worry that nihilism is an inevitable result o f the West’s loss o f moral and philosophical 
foundations. Echoing Weber’s apprehensions of the tyranny o f scientific reason, 
Macintyre writes about the rule-obsessed societies that have developed as a means to 
mitigate the inevitable moral anarchy of a society with no theological or teleological
108 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 72.
109 Hollis and Smith, 74.
110 Wendt, 392.
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foundations. Without these foundations, society’s leaders can provide no compelling 
reason for its members to live moral lives, as there are no objective or scientifically 
quantifiable criteria to define morality. Seemingly arbitrary rules are thus constructed to 
define limits for individuals with no moral compass to otherwise direct them through 
life’s obstacles. Yet these rules are liable to constant challenge as they are drawn
117“without appeal to impersonal and unassailable criteria...”
For MacIntyre, the fundamental error made by followers of the Enlightenment is their 
rejection of the Aristotelian moral tradition in which the authority of laws and virtues is 
grounded “in a conception of the good that is itself meaningful only within the context o f 
specifiable practices and traditions.” Like both MacIntyre and the Islamist critique o f 
modernity, Taylor traces many of contemporary Western society’s ills to the 
Enlightenment’s “rejection both o f the established social hierarchy and o f transcendent 
moral criteria,” which he feels has “eclipsed a universally recognizable hierarchy of ends 
and thus enabled the emergence and eventual dominance of moral subjectivism and an 
atomistic pursuit o f self-realization.”113
In addition to the skepticism, even hostility, expressed towards the Enlightenment 
narrative’s uncritical acceptance o f positivism and a supposedly objective understanding 
of rationality, there has also been a healthy dose of cynicism expressed regarding the 
narrative’s adherence to the notion of objective scholarship, in which “a theory could be 
articulated, understood, assessed, without any reference to its author and his social 
identity.”114 This belief, referred to by Christopher Lloyd as the theory and observation 
distinction, allowed academics to conduct research without having to acknowledge their 
place within the historically specific context in which their research was conducted.115 
This weakness of positivism, recognized early on by Weber when he wrote, “No science 
is absolutely free from presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamental value to
111 Ibid.
112 Quoted in Euben, 71.
113 Quoted in Euben, 72.
114 Gellner, 25.
1,5 This distinction is one o f the four main features o f  logical positivism which Christopher Lloyd 
summarizes in his book The Structures o f  History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 72-3.
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the man who rejects these presuppositions” came to form the crux of the post-structuralist 
critique. 116 In particular, post-structuralist/post-modem philosophers drew attention to 
what they saw as the co-constitutive relationship between power and knowledge, as well 
the various interrelations connecting texts and meanings. Poststructuralists like Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Derrida all shared their rejection of totalizing, essentialist, and 
foundationalist concepts. In Orientalism, a work profoundly influenced by Foucaudian 
theory and methodology, Said provides a succinct explanation of Foucault’s concept of 
discourse:
A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual...is not 
easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, 
institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still 
greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most important, such 
texts can create not only knowledge, but also the very reality they appear 
to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or 
what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or 
weight, not the originality o f the given author, is really responsible for the
117texts produced out o f it.
For Foucault, the notion that human beings are “autonomous and rational and possess our 
own distinctive ‘se lf” was itself a construct derived from the Enlightenment narrative
and the discourse it produced, rather than some objective understanding of human
* 118 existence or history.
Within IR, the greatest critics of positivism’s belief in objective truth are found within 
constructivist, critical theory and the “post” movements, all of which have been 
influenced, directly or indirectly, by Foucault. For example, mainstream constructivists, 
otherwise known as “soft constructivists,”119 believe there is a “fundamental difference 
between ‘brute facts’ about the world, which remain true, independent o f human action, 
and ‘social facts’ which depend for their existence on socially established
116 Weber, 153, quoted in Gane, 57.
117 Said, 94.
118 Lockman, 185.
119 In her article ‘Towards an International Political Theology,” Vendulka Kubalkova quotes Steve Smith 
in arguing that mainstream or “soft” constructivism (i.e., Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, etc.) has 
hijacked the agenda o f  constructivists by assuming “an unthreatening role o f  an adjunct explanation for 
those things that the positivist mainstream finds difficult to explain.” Kubalkova, 677.
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190conventions.” Constructivists are most concerned when the distinction between these 
two types o f facts becomes blurred, because it is then that the social fact’s contingency is 
forgotten and the fact thus becomes more susceptible to manipulation. Constructivism, 
though, is often considered one of the least radical of the critical IR theories because of
191its rejection of the post-structuralist “conception of identity as relationally constituted.”
In its belief that states have pre-social identities, constructivism also can be accused of 
reifying the state, albeit in an attempt to counter the reified logic o f anarchy. As Weber 
explains, “by insisting on the state as the author/decision-maker of all tales — 
constructivism misses the opportunity to deliver on another o f its promises, to restore a
199focus on process and practice in international politics.”
Similar to constructivists, critical theorists (both those influenced by Marx, Kant and 
Gramsci, as well as those belonging to the historical-hermeneutic tradition, such as 
Gadamer and Wittgenstein) also believe that all knowledge is socially constructed, except 
they add to the mix the Foucaudian notion o f power, by arguing that constructed 
knowledge is often used as a means of furthering the interests of one person/group at the 
expense of another. What is commonly referred to as the “emancipatory” element of their 
agenda relates to this understanding of knowledge and to the belief that human beings are 
capable o f overcoming both political and material oppression by revealing and better 
comprehending these forms of oppression via the application of reason.
3.2 Critique o f the Mainstream Narrative o f the Enlightenment: Islamic/Islamist 
Perspectives
As in the case of mainstream narratives o f the state and modernity, in their critiques of 
the Enlightenment narrative there is much common ground between critical voices within 
the Western social sciences and Islamic challenges. John Gray has even gone so far as to 
argue that the “intellectual roots” of the Islamic challenge can be found in the European 
“Counter-Enlightenment,” as it was in this late 18th/early 19th century movement that
Brown, 52. 
121 Hansen, 24.
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philosophers like J. G. Hamman and Soren Kierkegaard rejected the secular notion of
reason and defended religious faith in terms o f subjective experience. J. G. Herder, for
example, “rejected the Enlightenment ideal of a universal civilisation, believing there are
1many cultures, each in some ways unique.” Although this sequence of events is highly 
questionable, considering that many of the central issues raised by the Counter- 
Enlightenment, in particular regarding the nature of the relationship of science and 
philosophy to divine revelation, had already been debated by Islamic scholars centuries 
before, for example by prominent 11th and 12th century Islamic philosophers such as al- 
Ghazali, Ibn Bajjah (Avempace) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), his point regarding the 
similarities in critiques is nonetheless valid.
Similar to the Western critiques expressed by classical and contemporary philosophers 
alike, at the heart of the Islamic critique of the Enlightenment narrative is a rejection of 
the view that the social world can be understood with the same tools used to comprehend 
the natural world, in other words, naturalism. Like Kant, Hume and Russell, Muslim 
scholars and activists who expressed anxiety regarding the spectre of tyrannical 
rationalism have not denied the importance of reason itself, but rather have criticized its 
unbridled use to answer metaphysical questions beyond its scope. As Sayyid Qutb put it: 
“‘reason’ isn’t rejected, disregarded or banished from learning through revelation and 
understanding what it receives; it comprehends what is necessary as well as surrendering 
to what is beyond its scope.”124 In defense of reason, at least when employed within 
certain boundaries, Qutb even goes so far as to argue that
this development [of our mind] is connected to man’s duty on Earth as 
Allah’s vice-regent, and [vice-regency] requires that the creation o f man’s 
mind is according to this design because it is the most suitable one for 
performance o f this role. Man will advance in grasping the laws o f matter 
and exploiting them at the same time that he advances in the knowledge o f 
various aspects of “man’s reality,” moving beyond what he had known 
before.125
122 Weber, 78.
123 Gray, 25.
124 Sayyid Qutb, The Islamic Conception and its Characteristics, 20-21, quoted in Euben, 71.
125 Euben, 63-64.
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Yet even with the material advances this use of his mind is guaranteed to produce, “man” 
must recognize that some questions regarding “the secret o f life and death and of his
10f*soul,” will remain “hidden, beyond the scope of his reason.”
Even the earlier Muslim modernists who rejected the simplistic opposition of science and 
rationality to religion believed that positivist methods simply could not penetrate some 
realms o f human existence. Modernists such as the Egyptian Muhammad 4 Abduh, urged 
followers to employ their critical faculties whenever possible within the confines of 
Islamic law; he also cautioned rationalists to recognize the limits of scientific inquiry, 
specifically in areas governed by the metaphysical and spiritual. ‘Abduh insisted that 
attempts to penetrate these realms are both futile and perilous:
As for speculation about the essence of the creator, on the one hand, it is 
an attempt to probe that which is forbidden to human reason; on the other 
hand, the pursuit o f His essence is beyond the grasp of human faculties.
These pursuits are foolish and dangerous, foolish because they are a search 
for that which is unattainable, dangerous because it amounts to a strike 
against faith in that it is an attempt to define that which cannot be defined,107and an attempt to limit that which has no limits.
According to Davutoglu, the centrality of (rule bound) rationality in Islam is the principle 
factor that distinguishes the development o f Islam as an institutionalized religion from its 
Christian counterpart, in particular in relation to the absence of a clergy within (Sunni) 
Islam. At the heart of this difference lies the method in which the divine revelation was
collected and transformed into text, which entailed “rational epistemological analysis” in
1^0
the case o f Islam. Explaining why this is the case, Davutoglu wntes:
Objective testimonies of the companions of the Prophet were the sole 
criterion in establishing the canonical text of the divine message. In even 
more systemised fashion, objective testimony was the basis for the 
collection and classification of hadith, the second legitimate source of 
religion.129
126 Ibid., 63-62.
127 ‘Abduh, Theology o f  Unity, 1966,18-32, quoted in Euben, 108.
128 Davutoglu, 184.
129 Ibid., 184.
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Later, the same rational approach needed to collect and transform the divine revelation 
into text was needed by followers to interpret the meaning o f the divine text. The 
“human, and therefore subjective, dimension of interpretation” itself “prevented the 
formation of a church organization monopolising judgement.” The prominent Tunisian 
Islamist Rachid Ghannouchi has similarly discussed the importance of reason to the 
religion, proclaiming that:
Islam places no restrictions on the mind, and the Qur’an clearly
encourages believers to explore, think and search. Faith itself must be
grounded in conviction based on reason; there is no compulsion in
religion. Islamic doctrine places no limits on thought, reason or 1^1exploration.
Many academics argue that it was precisely the privileged status o f reason in Islamic
thought and culture that enabled the manifold scientific and philosophical advances
associated with the region throughout the Middle Ages, and which are often attributed
with catalyzing Europe’s colossal transformation during the Renaissance and later
1 ^Enlightenment periods. As the reputable physicist Jim al-Khalili put it: “Clearly, the 
scientific revolution o f the Abbasids [8^-13th century Muslim caliphate whose 
headquarters were in Baghdad] would not have taken place if  not for Islam—in contrast 
to the spread of Christianity over the centuries, which had nothing like the same effect in
1 ' I tstimulating and encouraging original scientific thinking.” Taking into consideration the 
prominent role the “Arabic sciences” played in the development o f both eastern and 
western societies during this period, many 19th century Muslim philosophers believed the 
Muslim world was also ideally-suited for the types of material advancements that came to 
be associated with the modem period. According to ‘Abduh:
Islam reproaches leaders of religions for simply following in the footsteps 
of their forebears, and for their adherence to the plans of their 
ancestors... Thus it liberates the power of reason from its fetters, releasing
132 See for example Muzaffar Iqbal, Science and Islam (Oxford: Greenwood Press, 2007); and Akkach,
2007.
133 Jim Al-Khalili, “It’s time to herald the Arabic Science that prefigured Darwin and Newton,” The 
Guardian (30 January 2008).
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it from enslavement to blind imitation of tradition. Islam has restored 
reason to its kingdom, a kingdom in which it reigns with judiciousness and 
wisdom, deferring to God alone and conforming to His sacred law. There 
are no limits to the possible pursuits within its domain, and no end to the 
extent of the explorations possible under its banner.134
Yet similar to the anxiety of contemporary Western political philosophers like MacIntyre 
and Taylor regarding the inevitable encroachment of nihilism where moral and 
philosophical foundations have been eroded, the Islamic critique also expresses anxiety 
towards a world “spiritually damaged” by the “separation of knowledge from the
1 *3 C 9
scared.” Hossein Nasr sees no “universally accepted” response to the Westernization 
and secularization of knowledge in the Muslim world, especially now that it feels 
increasingly threatened by a “politically, economically and militarily superior” region of 
the world that many feel they can confront only through mimicry. He concludes 
somewhat optimistically that there will be more convergence in opinion once the extent 
of the damage caused by the belief that knowledge could be pursued without considering 
religious limits or implications is fully understood. Most pressing amongst those issues 
facing the Muslim world are the ethical implications of modem technologies such as 
those posed by genetic engineering, which he describes as “the intmsion of modem 
medicine into the very fabric of human life,” as well as the “rapid deterioration o f the 
environment” caused by the “modem,” industrialized world, problems with which he 
believes the rest of the world is also struggling to come to grips. For Nasr the ultimate 
solution to the spiritual and material damage caused by this creeping nihilism is to return 
to the basics of Islam to seek out “an ethics based upon the Islamic religion and not 
simply a rationalistic philosophy which would create an ethics that would have no 
efficacy amongst the vast majority of Muslims.”
Although one may find a certain synergy between the Islamic and post-modem responses 
to the narratives o f modernity and the Enlightenment, and the “disenchantment” of the 
world they have brought about, the fundamental difference in their respective solutions to 
the perceived problems, one any serious analysis of political Islam must take into
134 ‘Abduh, quoted in Euben, 108.
135 Hossein Nasr, 52 ,241.
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consideration, is Islam’s ultimate belief in absolute truth and its subsequent rejection of 
individualistic subjectivism. Using the metaphor of the mosque to explain the 
implications of this belief, Hossein Nasr writes:
The most central architectural symbol of Islam, the mosque, is a building 
with a space in which all elements of subjectivism have been eliminated. It 
is an objective determination of the Truth, a crystal through which radiates 
the light o f the Spirit. The spiritual ideal of Islam itself is to transform the 
soul o f the Muslim, like a mosque, into a crystal reflecting the Divine 
Light.137
Despite the fairly consistent presence in Western philosophy and society o f skepticism 
towards the central tenets of Enlightenment thought and their (in)ability to respond to the 
metaphysical needs of human beings, one cannot overlook the enduring impact of the 
theories and methods derived from the Enlightenment on the foundations of 
contemporary Western political thought. As Hansen points out, in Western social 
sciences, this impact is manifested in “rationalism,” the belief that “social science 
theories should generate falsifiable hypotheses about the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables,” an approach to scholarship that, by its very nature, excludes 
consideration of subject matter incapable of being reduced to a tangible variable, such as 
religious beliefs, which are often reduced in these analyses to more easily explainable
1- >o
material variables. Halliday also touches on this issue when he laments the use of 
“inflatedly ‘scientific’ methodologies,” which he believes “have served to preclude other 
forms o f discussions within the discipline, notably on the role of values [and I would add 
religion], and the linkage between domestic and international politics.”139 Hence much of 
the scholarship on political Islam views these movements as using religion to rally 
support for movements otherwise focused on more worldly issues such as foreign 
occupation, poverty, or political alienation.
136 Ibid., 245.
137 Ibid., 216.
138 Hansen, 9.
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Another manifestation of this tendency can be seen in the persistence o f rationalist 
approaches to study political Islam based on a Weberian notion of “instrumental 
rationality,” which has the paradoxical effect of viewing Islamist movements as rational 
in the sense the they may use effective means to attain their ends, though irrational to the 
extent that their religious, political, social and economic agenda is incompatible with 
Western assumptions of what constitutes legitimate ends. From this perspective, the 
mainstream analyses of political Islam “portray the Islamic fundamentalist as the 
paradigmatic irrational rational actor.”140 Kubalkova argues that by treating religious 
organizations as acting in accordance with rational choice theory, social scientists, in 
particular those belonging to American IR, have misunderstood the “strength o f passion 
which may imbue religious organization and the various ways in which this passion may 
compensate for a lack of material capability, the latter being another pillar o f the 
American IR thought.” Pointing out the challenge which belief poses to rational choice 
theory, Kubalkova writes: “At the most fundamental levels of a believer’s existence, it 
means following the dictates (not choices) o f conscience, for conscience has no choice 
but to follow belief.”141
4. Conclusion
By examining several of the principal narratives and assumptions upon which much of 
mainstream IR theory is based through the prism of a variety of critical perspectives, I 
have highlighted in this chapter some of the discipline’s limits vis-a-vis the study of 
political Islam. In doing so, I intended to contribute to the increasingly vibrant efforts of 
scholars and activists (both secular and religious) to “de-center” the West, a necessary 
precursory step to the eventual prying open o f a theoretical and methodological space 
within IR, and the western social sciences in general, in which religious political 
movements can be seriously considered. Like Foucault, I am convinced o f the existence 
o f an intimate relationship between power and knowledge, a relationship that reaches its 
zenith once a theory loses its contingent status and instead comes to be accepted as
140 Euben, 24.
141 Kubalkova, 685.
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“common sense,” as has been the case with the modem rationalist paradigm and 
associated narratives o f the state, modernity and the Enlightenment. When this happens,
theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what 
can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest. Those 
who swim outside these safe waters risk more than simply the judgement 
that their theories are wrong; their entire ethical or moral stance may be 
ridiculed or seen as dangerous just because their theoretical assumptions 
are deemed unrealistic.142
In this sense, the dominant narratives, concepts and assumptions considered in this 
chapter can be seen in terms o f the “power intellectual” component of Said’s definition of 
discourse, in which he argues that discourse is not merely an example of political power 
“in the raw,” but rather “is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds 
of power,” including “power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment),” and 
“power moral (as with ideas about what ‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand 
as ‘we’ do).”143 The latter two components of the discourse and their interaction with the 
former, “power intellectual, ” will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
In the next chapter, I will examine in greater detail the principal ways in which these 
mainstream IR concepts and narratives impact, via the modem rationalist approach, the 
study of political Islam.
142 Smith, 74.
143 Said, 1978, 12.
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Chapter Two: The Impact of the “Modern Rationalist” Approach on the Study of 
Political Islam
In order to preserve in political science the freedom of spirit to which we have become 
accustomed in mathematics, I have been careful not to ridicule human behaviour, neither 
to deplore nor condemn, but to understand.
-Benedict de Spinoza1
Thus far, I have outlined some o f the ways in which the principal International Relations 
concepts and the narratives from which they are derived, when accepted uncritically limit 
analyses o f political Islam to essentialist and oversimplified assumptions o f the origins, 
raison d ’etre and political, economic, and social agendas of Islamist movements. The 
state-centric nature of IR, in which the state is assumed to be European/Western in nature 
(i.e., sovereign, secular, synonymous with nation and endowed with a monopoly on 
violence), its epistemological roots in positivism and its belief in the universal relevance 
and applicability of the European developmental model and understandings of modernity 
and rationality have all helped define what types of research questions, methods and 
theories have been deemed acceptable within the discipline. For these reasons, despite the 
increasing salience of alternative theories and methods within IR, too little headway has 
been made in understanding religious-based political movements and their potential to 
impact (from a non-security perspective), as well as be impacted by, the international 
system.
When research into political Islam (as opposed to “terrorism”) is actually carried out, 
analysis is often skewed by the modem rationalist approach, which, as explained in the 
previous chapter, is sustained by the mainstream IR/Westem social sciences narratives of 
the central concepts discussed above. In this chapter, I will discuss the two principal ways 
in which this approach impacts analysis of political Islam: 1) through “ideologization of 
terror” analyses, which view political Islam through “the lens of the ‘fundamentalist
1 Quoted in the introduction to Giles Kepel, The Roots o f  Radical Islam (London: Saqi Books 2005).
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threat”’ and 2) through analyses which view political Islam as an anti-modem reaction to 
various socioeconomic or political developments. I will argue that, in both types of 
analyses, political Islam is viewed in orientalist terms, as an irrational, backward 
phenomenon and therefore undeserving of serious investigation by political scientists. As 
in Chapter One, and in an attempt to add a dose of necessary nuance to the argument, 
these sections will be followed by an overview of the various alternative approaches to 
the study of political Islam that have developed largely over the last decade to correct 
what has been seen as the biases innate within both the orientalist and modem-rationalist 
approaches. Most prominent amongst the wide range of alternative methodologies that 
have been employed in the study o f Islamist movements in recent years are multiple 
modernities theory, social movement theory, post-modernism and hermeneutics. Yet, as 
with the IR narratives discussed in the previous chapter, it will be argued here that despite 
the recent proliferation in alternative approaches to the study of political Islam, the 
mainstream discourse remains largely unchanged, as will be demonstrated later in 
Chapters Four and Five.
1. “Ideologization of Terror” Analyses
In “ideologization of terror” analyses, which view political Islam through “the lens o f the 
fundamentalist threat,” disparate Islamist movements are often conflated by virtue of the 
tactics some employ to attain their respective ends. By dismissing issues o f context (geo­
2 Burgat, xvi.
3 See for example: John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism 
(London: Pluto Press, 2000); Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Avi Dieter and Daniel L. Byman, “Israel’s Lessons for Fighting 
Terrorists and their Implications for the United States” Saban Analysis P aper  no 8 (March 2006); Steven 
Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002); Dore 
Gold, Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Washington, DC: 
Regnery Publishing, 2003); Yevgeny M. Primakov, A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the 
Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); John Kelsay, Arguing the Just 
War in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How  
the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1987); Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism: Is One 
Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?” (Washington, DC: International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism 1999); Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: H ow Democracies Can Defeat 
Terrorist Networks (Noonday Press, 2001); Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, The Case fo r  Democracy: 
The Power o f  Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Jessica Stem, 
The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Angel Rabasa, 
Ungovemed Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (RAND Corporation, 2007).
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political, economic, cultural, religious), these analyses fail to comprehend the diverse 
nature of Islamist groups, both in substance and demands. As they are more interested in 
the strategies and tactics employed by Islamist movements than with the origins and 
development of the movements themselves, these analyses are generally written from a 
security perspective, where the subject that needs to be secured is the “democratic” and 
“free” world, which must be protected from the object responsible for its lack of security: 
the fanatical Islamist who will go to any length to destroy its freedom. In this section, I 
will analyze the three most prominent ways in which the “ideologization of terror” 
paradigm impacts the discourse of political Islam, providing concrete examples from 
academic literature on the subject. In subsequent chapters, the discursive impact will be 
viewed from a wider perspective, focusing on the written and spoken pronouncements on 
political Islam of American politicians and the pundits and think-tanks that influence 
them.
1.1 “Ideologization o f Terror ” Analyses: Dominant Security Focus
The first way in which subscription to the “ideologization of terror” paradigm affects 
analysis of political Islam is its overwhelming focus on the West’s security. One o f the 
most damaging, though often inconspicuous, ways in which this literature affects the 
study of political Islam is by setting the parameters of acceptable subject matter in the 
field o f International Relations (IR). With the recent proliferation of journals, 
departments, conferences and literature dedicated to the study of “terrorism,” analyses of 
political Islam based outside the security studies paradigm run the risk of being 
marginalized. Further reflection on this point, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
as it involves consideration o f the separate but related issues of funding, internal politics, 
and disciplinary “gatekeepers.” From a discursive perspective, viewing political Islam 
within a “global security” framework is problematic insofar as questions of motivation 
end up being seen as peripheral to the more important issue of (the West’s) security, 
which must be achieved at all costs. As one prominent Israeli analyst puts it: “motives 
are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most analysts fail to recognize 
this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as logical or necessary aspects of
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terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are empirical regularities associated with 
terrorism. More often they simply confuse analysis.”4 Marc Grossman, former U.S. 
Under-Secretary of State, concurs, urging those who seek to analyze the September 11th 
attacks on U.S. soil not to consider root causes like the stalled Israeli-Palestinian “peace 
process.” Issues of motivation, according to Grossman, are “totally irrelevant to the 
question of pluses or minuses in the Middle East peace process.”5 Motivations should be 
bracketed and removed from consideration; in their place should be an unadulterated 
focus on “objective” factors, like the tactics and strategies employed by these movements 
to achieve their desired ends.
Emily Hunt, a fellow at the centre-right think-tank The Washington Institute for Near 
East Studies, concurs with Ganor’s analysis, arguing that Israel’s policies towards 
“Islamist terrorism” should serve as an example for the United States, as Israel has been 
able to demonstrate that such terrorism is “not caused wholly or even mostly by the target 
nation’s policies.” Although Hunt concedes that “certain actions may stoke the flames o f 
radicalism,” in the end, it is “a flourishing ideology that preaches Muslim supremacy, 
justifies attacks on civilians, denies the rights of women and non-Muslims and seeks to 
impose itself in the Middle East and beyond.”6 In this analysis, Islamist movements are 
viewed as backward, violent and misogynistic and therefore beyond rational analysis 
(i.e., the type that would necessarily entail consideration of the history o f the movements, 
as well as the context in which they act). Karsh is similarly dismissive of the need to take 
seriously the motives of Islamist movements that use violence as a means to attain their 
desired ends, and instead relies on an orientalist vision of the Muslim world as essentially 
unchanging and violent and hence unable to emerge from its age-old “jihad for a 
universal Islamic empire,”:
Contrary to widespread assumptions, these attacks, and for that matter 
Arab and Muslim anti-Americanism, have little to do with U.S. 
international behaviour or its Middle East policy. America’s position as 
the pre-eminent world power blocks Arab and Islamic imperialist
4 Gan or, 6.
5 Quoted in Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 55.
6 Emily Hunt, “Concessions Will Not Defeat Terrorism,” New York Newsday, 24 July 2006.
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aspirations. As such, it is a natural target for aggression. Osama bin Laden 
and other Islamist’s war is not against America per se, but is rather the 
most recent manifestation of the millenarian jihad for a universal Islamic 
empire (or umma).1
Analyses like Karsh’s are dismissive of the need to consider motives when analyzing the 
type o f terrorism allegedly targeted by the “war on terror”. Jackson laments the various 
“histories,” overlooked to promote a particular reading of developments:
the record of American involvement in the politics o f the Middle East — 
its support for Israel, its military bases in the Arabian Peninsula, its 
alliances with despotic regimes, its murky dealings with the Taliban and 
the Mujahaddin before them, its oil politics; the history and context o f al 
Qaeda’s decade-long struggle against American policy in the region; the 
global context of state failure and breakdown, arms trading (America 
being the world’s largest dealer of weapons) and increasing levels of
• oviolence and disorder...
There is no need to contextualize the Islamist movements’ actions, assumed to be based 
on an irrational worldview, precluding the maintenance o f any real grievances, which are 
the privilege o f “rational” actors only: the United States and its “coalition of the willing.”
Underlying these ideologization of terror analyses is the assumption that it is pointless to 
look to the history of Western imperialism in the region or at current Western support for 
brutal dictators to better comprehend the actions of these movements, as all o f this is 
mere rhetorical justification for an unfounded hatred of the West. Dore Gold’s Hatred’s 
Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism claims to trace the 
roots of the violent tactics used by transnational and national Islamist movements while 
completely ignoring the specific religious, social and political contexts in which these 
movements have developed. It is a perfect example of this tendency. In it, he contends:
People do not just decide spontaneously that they are going to hijack an 
aircraft, crash it into a building, and commit mass murder (and take their 
own lives) because o f some political grievance or sense of economic 
deprivation. No, there is another critical component o f terrorism that has
7 Karsh, 234.
8 Jackson, 158.
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generally been overlooked in the West: the ideological motivation to 
slaughter thousands of innocent people.9
And what is that ideology? The ideology of “martyrdom and its rewards in the afterlife,” 
as if this concept can be viewed outside the religious texts ( e.g. Qur ’an and hadith) and 
the long tradition of Islamic teachings and reflections on the subject, or without taking 
into consideration the socioeconomic and political context in which these movements 
have developed. Without this context, Islamist movements are seen as having lifted the 
concepts of “martyrdom” and “jihad” directly from the Quran and instrumentalized them 
by carrying out suicide missions against the West with the economic, military and 
“ideological” (read “martyrology”) support of such “forces” as the Wahabbis o f Saudi 
Arabia, or the Iranian “mullahs.” Further, it is often argued that these movements would 
not have developed at all were it not for the support o f these mysterious and perilous 
forces.10.
In these analyses, it is assumed one should ignore any attempt by “terrorist” groups to 
justify their actions in terms of material, non-religious motives such as past and 
contemporary cultural, economic and military imperialism. Peter Bergen argues along 
similar lines that material motives are often undermined in these essentialist analyses, 
such as western economic and military support for the Israeli occupation o f Palestine and 
other oppressive client states, or over a century of Western interventions in the region to 
overthrow popular governments in favor of governments more amenable to U.S. interests 
.When considered at all, these analyses tend to attribute to al Qaeda solely cultural or 
religious motives. In a passage in which he derides this type of analysis, Bergen, one of 
the few scholars to have ever interviewed bin Laden, concludes:
In all the tens o f thousands of words that bin Laden has uttered on the 
public record...[h]e does not rail against the pernicious effects of 
Hollywood movies, or against Madonnna’s midriff, or against the 
pornography protected by the US constitution...[B]in Laden cares little 
about such cultural issues. What he condemns the United States for is 
simple: its policies in the Middle East ...The hijackers who came to
9 Gold,6.
10 Gold; Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail o f  Political Islam (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004).
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America did not attack the headquarters of a major brewery or AOL-Time 
Warner or Coca-Cola, nor did they attack Las Vegas or Manhattan’s West 
Village or event the Supreme Court. They attacked the Pentagon and the 
World Trade Center, pre-eminent symbols of the United States’ military 
and economic might. 11
In analyses like the ones criticized by Bergen, contextual facts are seen as negligible, or
at best “empirical regularities associated with terrorism.” At bottom is the assumption
that —  even without these pretexts — there is something threatening about this region
where “freedom and democracy has skipped” over the decades it was busy spreading
12around other regions of the world, and a modem West embodies all that it lacks.
Scholars and policymakers who subscribe to this paradigm advertently or inadvertently 
ignore the fruits o f extensive research carried about by academics such as Robert Pape, 
author of “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” In this important 
work Pape demonstrates from interviews and data collected that 95% of terrorist attacks 
carried out across the world from 1980 to 2004 were irredentist in nature, meaning they 
were largely concerned with “redeem[ing] land ruled by non-Muslims or under 
occupation.”13 For example, Pape shows that of the 41 suicide attacks undertaken in 
Lebanon against French, American and Israeli targets from 1982 to 1986, only 8 were 
actually perpetrated by “Islamist fundamentalists”; the rest were carried out by leftist 
political or Christian groups. Pape’s study shows that motives are indeed central to 
understanding and addressing issues of “terrorism,” and that the ideology of political 
Islam and concepts such as “martyrdom” and “jihad” are often marginal to understanding 
why the tactic o f terrorism is chosen by particular movements at particular junctures in
14time.
11 Quoted in Jackson, 56.
12 Gold, 246.
13 “Understanding Islamism,” International Crisis Group, no. 37 (2 March 2005): 3
14 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic o f  Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 
2005).
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1.2 “Ideologization o f  Terror” Analyses: Conflation o f  Islamist Movements
Not only is context and motivation ignored in most analyses, but so too is substance, 
which explains the second way in which analyses are impacted by the “ideologization of 
terror” paradigm. Since these movements and organizations are seen solely in terms of 
the threat they pose to the West, it is deemed unnecessary to attempt to understand their 
particular histories, paths o f development and ideologies on their own terms. So it is that 
Hamas, an irredentist political Islamist movement with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, 
whose raison d'etre lies in its effort to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine and thus 
preserve a vital Muslim waqf, can be thrown into the same category as the Front 
Islamique du Salvation (FIS), a domestically-oriented Algerian political Islamist party 
with roots in the country’s nationalist movement, which sought to create an Islamist state 
in its own country via non-violent means; or al-Jama’a al-islamiyya (“the Islamic 
Group”), an Egyptian Jihadi15 organization influenced by the philosophy of Sayyid 
Qutb16 and largely concerned with removing “impious” leaders from power in Egypt; or
1 7  I QA1 Qaeda, a messianic global network, which combines Salafi and Qutbist elements m 
its violent struggle against both external and internal enemies. In this context theological 
differences that distinguish Shi’a and Sunni Islamist movements from one another can be
15 By Jihadi, I mean “those activists committed to violence because they are engaged in what they conceive 
to be the military defence (or, in some cases, expansion) o f D ar al-Islam (the “House o f  Islam”— that area 
o f the world historically subject to Muslim rule) and the ummah against infidel enemies.” “Understanding 
Islamism,” International Crisis Group no. 37 (2 March 2005): 18.
16 In particular, by his definition o f  the term jahiliya, as developed in his most famous book Signposts. In 
this booik he argues that the term, previously understood to describe the pre-Islamic Arabian age o f  
ignorance, marked by unbelief and barbarism, could also be employed to describe the state o f  contemporary 
Muslim societies. Qutb used this theory to argue that it was an obligation for all true Muslims to oppose the 
governments o f  these corrupt and immoral states. In Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Giles Kepel 
(Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, 1990).
17 I use the term global here to describe the Jihadi movements that largely developed in the 1990s, under the 
guidance o f  Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qaeda group and which are engaged in an “international military 
struggle against governments and Western representatives and institutions in the Muslim world, and other 
parts of the world,” and which are “transnational in identity and recruitment; global in ideology, strategy, 
targets, economic transactions, and network organizations.” John Esposito and Natana DeLong-Bas, 
“Modem Islam,” in God’s Rule: The Politics o f  World Religions, ed. Jacob Neusner (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2003), 252.
18 By Salafi I mean those groups that are influenced by the 1 at e-nineteenth and early twentieth century 
reform movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, which “emphasized restoration 
o f  Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the Quran and Sunnah, rejection o f  the authority o f  later 
interpretations, and maintenance o f the unity o f  ummah. Prime objectives were to rid the Muslim ummah o f  
the centuries-long mentality o f  taqlid  (unquestioning imitation o f precedent) and stagnation and to reform 
the moral, cultural, and political conditions o f Muslims.” Esposito and DeLong-Bas, 275.
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overlooked.19 Rather than consider some of the complex ways in which a shared 
epistemology, as well as similar recent political and economic experiences, in particular 
vis-a-vis the Muslim world’s relations with the West, have led to a convergence in 
several key elements o f their respective agendas, these analyses focus on what they 
consider the principal tie that binds such diverse movements: their adherence to “jihad” 
as an ideology as well as tactic. Lack of nuance in many of these analyses also accounts 
for their failure to consider the various debates within and between prominent Islamist 
movements regarding such central issues as the proper definition and implementation of 
jihad, as well as disparate views on the validity of the nation-state as an organizing
70principle as opposed to the trans-national Muslim ummah.
This tendency that leads policymakers involved in assessing Islamist movements within a 
threat paradigm to deem it unnecessary to study the internal dynamics of Islamist 
movements is illustrated in a shocking report by Jeff Stein, National Security editor at 
Congressional Quarterly. Stein recounts asking various law enforcement officials and 
members o f Congress in prominent roles in overseeing and executing the “war against 
terror” whether they could identify the characteristics that distinguish Sunni and Shiite 
elements of the Iraqi insurgency, as well as the theological differences between Islamist 
movements such as Hizbollah and Hamas. Respondents — including Willie Hulon, chief 
of the FBI’s new National Security Branch, Terry Everett, seven-term Alabama 
Republican and vice chairman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Technical and 
Tactical Intelligence, and Representative Jo Ann Davis, a Virginia Republican who heads 
a House intelligence subcommittee charged with overseeing the C.I.A.’s performance in
19 For a good description o f  some o f these differences, see Bernard Rougier, “The Sunni Islamists’ 
Changing Agendas: The Sunni-Shia Rivalary,” Le Monde Diplomatique, January 2007.
20 See for example Ian Black’s article, “Revisionist message from prison cell shakes al-Qaida colleagues,” 
The Guardian, 27 July 2007, in which he describes the work o f  a prominent Egyptian Islamist Sayid Imam 
al-Sharif, 57, founder and first emir (commander) o f the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organisation, whose 
supporters assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and later teamed up with Osama bin Laden in 
Afghanistan in the war against the Soviet occupation. According to Black, Sharif is involved in a growing 
movement to challenge the theological basis for violent jihad through religion. Also, see Jacqueline Kay 
and Fouzi Slisli, “A liberal logic: reply to Fred Halliday,” Opendemocracy.com, 8 December 2006, who 
point out the different stances on jih a d ’ taken by groups like Hamas and Hizbollah, as opposed to 
international jih adi organizations like al-Qaida. In regards to the issue o f  internal challenges to the Islamist 
belief in the need to reunite the umma at the expense o f  a focus on domestic politics, see Maha Azzam, 
“Islamism revisited,” International Affairs 82, no.6 (2006), 1119-1132.
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recruiting Islamic spies and analyzing information — were largely clueless and even
91“dumbfounded” by the questions. Such ignorance led to similar gaffes amongst 
prominent politicians such as Rahm Emanuel, chairman of the Democratic Caucus and 
therefore the fourth-highest ranking Democrat in the United States House of 
Representatives, who mistakenly referred to the “House o f Saud” as a “Shiite 
government.”22 Even a veteran analyst such as Mathew Levitt, who in his book Hamas: 
Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad acknowledges a distinction 
between the Islamist movements Hamas and A1 Qaeda, still evidences the underlying 
belief that the only method capable of analyzing the various Islamist movements in the 
Middle East today is that which employs the threat paradigm and hence focuses solely on 
the movement’s tactical and strategic use o f political violence to further its goals, rather 
than on its political platform, raison d ’etre, historical development, or the religious, 
political, social and economic factors behind its recent rise to prominence in Palestine. As 
Levitt argues, Hamas poses a “multilayered threat” to the West in that it is “founded on 
deep hatred for American and the West” and hence “directly contributes to the rabid anti- 
Americanism spreading throughout the region.”23 As Levitt fails to consider seriously the 
reasons the Hamas leadership and its supporters have publicly and privately stated for 
their antipathy towards the United States — most importantly the overwhelming 
economic, military and political support the Israeli state receives as the United States’ 
number one recipient o f foreign aid —  one must assume that he believes the movement is 
unworthy of the type of in-depth analysis reserved for legitimate political movements, 
driven by more than irrational hatred and antiquated religious values.
Those engaged in this type of analysis do not need to delve into detail, as they assume 
that these movements share the common characteristics of being anti-modem (because 
they combine religious and political agendas) and outside the realm of acceptable politics 
(because they pose an existential threat to the modem, secular, although not necessarily 
democratic, states they oppose) and thus do not merit the type of analysis that
21 Jeff Stein, “Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite?,” New York Times, 17 October 2006.
“  Real Time with Bill Maher (http://www.crooksandliars.eom/Media/Play/21930/1/reaI-time-overtime- 
092807.wmv).
23 Levitt, 7.
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“legitimate,” in other words secular, pro-Western, and non-violent, political movements 
recieve. As U.S. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld put it, “extremists” and “those 
promoting freedom” conduct themselves differently on the battlefield, which he admits is 
increasingly asymmetric in military capability. “While our side puts its men and women 
at great risk by taking care to obey all the laws of warfare, the other side deliberately 
targets civilians...[W]hile our side is measured by exact standards, the other side is 
measured by no standards at all and is never held to account.”24 Or as Natan Sharansky, 
the former Soviet Jewish dissident and Israeli politician whose book The Case for  
Democracy is attributed with greatly influencing the second term Bush administration’s 
policies towards the Middle East, argues, there is no comparison “between those for 
whom human life is held in the highest value [“the world of democracy”] and those for 
whom human life is merely an instrument to reach certain political aims [“the world of 
terror”].”25 These rhetorical flourishes overlook the fact that the West’s violence vis-a-vis 
the peoples of the Middle East have resulted in far more casualties than actions carried 
out by “terrorists” against the West.26
By viewing Islamist movements and governments solely within a security paradigm, the 
various non-violent forms of collaboration that take place among and between these 
movements/governments are often overlooked. For example, in the Bush administration’s 
attempts to discredit the Iranian regime’s role in neighboring Iraq, it is has focused solely 
on Iran’s alleged support o f various Iraqi Shiite militant groups, which the United States 
claims have be responsible for “terrorist” attacks on American military forces in Iraq as
24 Donna Miles, “Rumsfeld, Pace Cite Challenges, Progress Against Extremists,” American Forces Press 
Service: Washington, 2 August 2006.
25 Sharansky, 240.
26 For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the two most important fronts in the “war on terror,” 3,700-5,000 
people a year and 655,000 people overall have been killed respectively, in comparison to the 1,000-7,000 
people who die yearly at the hands o f  “terrorists.” Marc Herold, “A Dossier on Civilian Victims o f  United 
States' Aerial Bombing o f  Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting” and “A Day-to-Day Chronicle o f  
Afghanistan's Guerrilla and Civil War, June 2003 -  Present” (http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/); and, 
referring to the study conducted by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School o f  Public Health on Iraqi 
casualties, David Brown, “Study Claims Iraq’s “Excess” Death Toll Has Reached 655,000,” The 
Washington Post, 11 October 2006; Jackson, 92. It must be said that the accuracy o f  this number has been 
challenged by other academics and journalists. See, for example, a study by reporters Neil Munro and Carl 
Cannon, writing for the National Journal, which found that Lancet study was “marred by grave flaws,” 
including “unsupervised Iraqi survey teams, and survey samples that were too small to be statistically valid. 
Jeff Jacoby, “Iraqi Casualties: The Lancet’s Overblown Figures,” International Herald Tribune, 15 January
2008.
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well as its allies, both Iraqi and foreign. Putting aside questions of legitimacy regarding 
the United States’ own presence in Iraq, Vali Nasr, for example, has pointed out that this 
focus on Iran’s alleged support for terrorism in Iraq overlooks the number of ways Iran 
has peaceably engaged its western neighbor, including the fact that: “[l]ast year, over one 
million Iranians travelled to Iraq on pilgrimages, and there is more than a billion dollars a 
year in trading between the two countries. But the Americans act as if  every Iranian
77inside Iraq were there to import weapons.”
For the sake of parsimony in this self-referential analysis it is easier to simply label all 
these groups “fundamentalists” or just plain “terrorists.” In doing so, security-based 
analyses inevitably overlook the various non-violent ways in which these movements’ 
alternative worldviews constitute and effect social movements, state-society relations, 
inter-state relations, and are themselves affected by historical/contemporary, 
oppressive/permissive relationships with other states/nations/peoples.
1.3 “Ideologization o f Terror” Analyses: The Use o f “Double Standards”
The third way in which these analyses are affected by the “ideologization of terror” 
framework is the inevitable distortion of facts that results from the polemical nature of 
the terrorism discourse. These distortions inevitably result in what Noam Chomsky refers 
to as “double standards,” or rhetorical devices employed by those responsible for creating 
and sustaining the hegemonic discourse of the “war on terror” to distinguish between 
what they perceive as their own humane, and even moral, strategies and tactics and the 
“barbarian” ones of their adversaries. As Cyra A. Choudhury argues, this discursive 
device is used as a means not only to justify particularly grim elements of the “war on 
terror” that might be difficult for the “civilized” world to countenance otherwise, but also 
as a way to construct or consolidate U.S. national identity, similar to the way in which the 
idea o f the backward, violent and irrational Oriental other was employed during the 
imperial era, as discussed in Said’s Orientalism. In the case of the Iraq war, a central
27 Vali Nasr quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, “Shifting Targets: The Administration's Plan for Iran,” The New  
Yorker (8 October 2007).
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component o f the “war on terror,” this device has been used to “construct the U.S. as 
ontologically civilized, humane, reasonable, and innocent in opposition to Iraqis who 
resist the U.S. as terrorists and insurgents —  which can be read as barbaric, irrational,
7ftuncivilized, and a priori culpable.” Again we see the use of dichotomous reasoning: to 
achieve its policy goals, the civilized West, in this case the United States, uses 
diplomacy, rational discussion and debate, “carrots and sticks,” and, as a last resort, 
“conventional warfare,” in which (and here the manifold Orwellian constructions are 
rolled out) “smart bombs,” “precision-guided munitions,” “surgical strikes,” target its
7Qenemies, not civilians, although admittedly its actions may incur “collateral damage.” 
The Islamist terrorist, on the other hand, uses “unconventional warfare,” to conduct 
indiscriminate, barbaric, bloody, violent acts of aggression against civilians to instill fear 
in the population to attain his political goals. The message is clear: acts carried out by 
Western governments are humane, moral and within the confines o f international law, 
whereas those carried out by “terrorists” are inhumane, immoral and unlawful. This use 
o f the label “terrorism” to distinguish between “their” and “our” violence, is not a neutral 
act but one with “serious political and social consequences.” As Jackson points out, 
because o f the history and significance of the term, the “effect of naming” in this instance 
is particularly powerful “because to ‘call an act of political violence terrorist is not 
merely to describe it but to judge it’.”
In a statement demonstrating the double standards often espoused or supported by 
Western commentators and policy makers, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, in a ceremony commemorating the terrorist attack by the militant Zionist 
organization Irgun on the British-run Hotel King David in Jerusalem 60 years ago, 
insisted that the attack against the British must be distinguished from similar attacks by 
Islamist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Netanyahu tautologically maintained that this 
distinction should be made because the Israeli actions were carried out by “freedom
28 Cyra A. Choudhury, “Comprehending ’Our’ Violence: Reflections on the Liberal Universalist Tradition, 
National Identity and the War on Iraq,” Muslim World Journal o f Human Rights 3, no. 1 (2006), 2.
29 For a good brief history o f  the distinction made between the West’s “rational” use o f  force and that 
employed by the “barbarians” o f the world, including contemporary 
“terrorist” organizations, see Tom Engelhardt, “Collateral damage: The Contemporary Barbarism o f  Air 
Power,” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2006.
30 Rubenstein 17, quoted in Jackson, 23.
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fighters,” and were therefore “legitimate military action[s],” while the latter were carried 
out by “terror groups,” and therefore constituted “terror actions.” Netanyahu, like others 
who employ double standards in their analyses of terrorism, found it unnecessary to
31 •explain the criteria used to make these distinctions. Another example can be found m 
the widely divergent language used to describe the European Jewish men and women 
who moved to Israel to help the Jewish state militarily “defend” its homeland, often using 
means that violate international law and widely accepted ethical values, and their 
Muslim counterparts who opt to join what they view as the legitimate Palestinian 
“resistance” to the Israeli occupation of their homeland, and which have also employed
33illegal and unethical means in their efforts. Despite the similarity in motives and 
outcomes of their respective actions, media treatment of the former often comes from a 
place of admiration, using terms and phrases such as “solidarity,” “defense,” “love o f 
homeland,” and “morale boost” to describe the actions of these young people who 
sacrifice comfortable lives in Europe for the Jewish state, whereas in the case of the 
latter, coverage involves harsh judgment, where prevalent terms and phrases o f “jihadi,” 
“terrorist,” “fugitive,” “murder,” and “Europe’s threat to the West,” describe young men 
derided alternatively as deranged sociopaths or calculating aggressors, often seen as 
having betrayed the benevolenct Western countries that have provided they and their 
famailies with refuge and the potential, if not always reality, of safe and prosperous 
lives.34
31 Ned Parker and Stephen Farrell, “British Anger at Terror Celebration,” The Times, 20 July 2006.
32 For example, Israel was accused o f violating international law in its armed conflict with Lebanon in the 
summer o f 2006, where its actions resulted in 1,109 Lebanese deaths (the vast majority o f  whom were 
civilians), 4,399 injured Lebanese, and an estimated 1 million displaced Lebanese. According to a Human 
Rights Watch report, the high death toll was due to “Israel’s frequent failure to abide by a fundamental 
obligation o f  the laws o f  war: the duty to distinguish between military targets, which can be legitimately 
attacked, and civilians, who are not subject to attack. This was compounded by Israel’s failure to take 
adequate safeguards to prevent civilian casualties.” “Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon 
during the 2006 War,” Human Rights Watch 19, no. 5E (September 2007). Jan Egeland, the UN 
humanitarian chief, criticized Israel’s use o f 90% o f its cluster munitions in the last three days o f  the 
conflict as “shocking and immoral.” Mark Turner, “UN condemns Israeli strategy as ‘immoral’,” Financial 
Times, 30 August 2006.
33 In particular the targeting o f civilians and indiscriminate use o f violence in places like Israel, Afghanistan 
and Iraq.
34 On Jewish volunteers for the Israeli Army see: Jeevan Vasagar, “When it comes to firing the gun, it’s a 
massive shock. It's what you don't see in the movies,” The Guardian, 23 November 2006; Stephen Farrell, 
“British volunteers answer army’s call,” The Times, 7 August 2006. Both stories pertain to British Jews 
who, along with thousands o f  non-Israeli Jews around the world, joined the Israeli army around the time o f  
the armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon in August 2006; On Muslim volunteers for the Palestinian
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For Chomsky, this type of analysis is problematic insofar as it undermines the notion of 
universality, the “idea that we apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to 
others,” a concept Chomsky believes is vital to healthy relations between states. In 
particular, Chomsky is interested in the hypocrisy displayed by Western politicians 
when it comes to defining and labeling terrorist acts. To substantiate his point, he cites 
several examples in contemporary political history where the United States refused to 
label as terrorism those acts that would otherwise fall into that category merely because 
the perpetrator o f the crime in question was either the U.S. government or a close ally 
or client state. In the 1980s, for example,
the period described by leading academics and journalists in the field as 
the ‘decade of ‘state terrorism,’ of ‘persistent state involvement,’ or 
‘sponsorship’ of terrorism, especially by Libya and Iran, acts committed 
by the US government [and its allies/clients] which could also have been 
seen as ‘state terrorism’ or ‘sponsorship’ were overlooked...35
These included: the United States’ role in backing state terror throughout Latin 
America, which began in the 1960s but reached its zenith in the 1980s during U.S. 
President Ronald Regan’s “war on terror”; the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which 
resulted in the deaths of close to 18,000 Lebanese, Palestinians and Syrians; and in 
1985, “the year many Americans believe to be the ‘worst’ year for terrorism because of 
the highjacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship in October of that year by a Palestinian 
terrorist group led by Abu Abbas,” the U.S. government was involved in several state- 
sponsored terrorist acts in the North African/Middle East region, including: Shimon 
Peres’ bombing of Tunis, killing 75 Palestinians and Tunisians, “expedited by the 
United States and praised by the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, though 
unanimously condemned in the UN Security Council as an “act of armed aggression” 
(the United States abstained); and Peres’ “Iron Fist” operations directed against what
“resistance,” see Sam Knight, “‘Diary o f British jihadi’ unearthed in Pakistan,” The Times, 8 August 2005; 
Nick Britten, “What turned two happy teenagers into hate-driven suicide bombers?” The Telegraph, 2 May 
2003; Sarah Lyall, “What Drove 2 Britons to Bomb a Club in Tel Aviv?” New York Times, 12 May 2003; 
and Daniel Pipes, “Europe’s Threat to the West,” New York Sun, 18 May 2004. All o f  these stories pertain 
to two British citizens who carried out a suicide attack on a bar in Tel Aviv.
35 Noam Chomsky, “Terror and Just Response,” Znet, 2 July 2002.
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the Israeli high command alleged were “terrorist villagers” in occupied Lebanon, “total 
casualties unknown in accord with the usual conventions.”
All these atrocities, according to Chomsky, fall within the category o f state-supported 
international terrorism, if not the more serious war crime of aggression. The problem 
with the way the United States and its allies view terrorism is not the definition per se, 
with which Chomsky largely agrees (which, according to the U.S. Army Manual, is the 
“calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, 
or ideological in nature...through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear”), but rather 
the blatant double standards involved in applying the definition. As Chomsky argues, 
when the “wrong agents” are implicated in state-supported international terrorism, “we 
often discover that terrorist atrocities are not fully effaced, but rather praised.”37
One need only look to the case of Luis Posada Carriles, a Cuban exile accused of 
involvement in the terrorist attack on Cubana Airlines Flight 455 on Oct. 6, 1976, which 
resulted in the deaths of all 73 people aboard. The Bush administration has fought 
extradition attempts by the Venezuelan and Cuban governments who wish to try Carriles, 
a former C.I.A. operative and U.S. Army officer, for the crime. The Cuban exile, arrested 
in Miami in 2005 after entering the country illegally, is being held temporarily in a 
detention centre in Texas on an immigration violation, as the government has been 
reluctant to press the terrorism charges that could keep him in jail more permanently. In 
this case, the fact that the terrorist was a former C.I.A. operative and U.S. Army officer 
whose actions were committed against an “enemy state” meant Carriles was a “wrong 
agent” and thus subject to a different legal regime than that reserved for individuals 
involved in terrorist acts whose political agenda is at odds with that of the U.S. 
government. As Roseanne Nenninger Persaud, sister of one of the victims of the Cuban 
Airlines attack, put it: “He [Carriles] should be treated like bin Laden. If this were a plane
36 Chomsky, “Terror and Just Response,” 2002.
37 Ibid.
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full o f Americans it would have been a different story.”38 And, one could add, if  Carriles 
were a Muslim it would have also been “a different story.”
Fred Halliday is also critical what he sees as the West’s myopic understanding o f 
terrorism in the context of the “war on terror,” although he is more interested in 
uncovering its historical dimensions than exposing contemporary examples of double­
standards. In his article, “Terrorism in historical perspective,” Halliday urges Western 
politicians and analysts not to see the movements, governments and peoples o f the 
Middle East as having a monopoly over modem forms of unlawful, unconventional 
violence, but rather to acknowledge that “historically, the continent of Europe pioneered 
political violence on a world scale, developed modem industrial war, and led in 
developing those particular instruments of modem political action and control: genocide, 
systematic state torture, and terrorism.”39 As Halliday points out, the term “terrorism” 
was first employed to refer to the violence of the French state under the leadership o f 
Maximilien Robespierre (Head of the Committee on Public Safety and Revolutionary 
Tribunal) in the period following the revolution, known as the “Reign o f Terror” (1793- 
1794), when thousands of “enemies o f the state” were put on trial and guillotined. The 
term was used in a similar sense by the Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky in a book 
published in 1921, ominously entitled In Defense of Terrorism,40 It was not until 20th 
century nationalist movements in places like Ireland, Armenia, and Bengal that both the 
term and the political act came to be associated with non-state actors. According to 
Richard Jackson, this discursive shift is the result of the “strategic and repetitious usage” 
of this definition by “government officials, the media and many academics” over the last 
40 plus years.41
In examining the double-standards employed in the “war on terror” discourse, what 
becomes clear is the lack of quantifiable evidence to substantiate the high level of 
hysteria regarding the imminent “threat” of Islamist terrorism and the disproportionately
38 Mark Lacey, “Castro Foe with C.I.A. Ties Puts U.S. in an Awkward Spot,” New York Times, 8 October 
2006.
39 Fred Halliday, ‘Terrorism in historical perspective,” Opendemocracy.com (22 April 2004).
40 Ibid.
4'Jackson, 23.
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harsh United States/Western policy responses. For example, despite all the rhetoric, a 
2007 Europol study on terrorism in the European Union found that of the 498 incidents of 
terrorism that occurred in the eleven EU countries last year, only one resulted in death (an 
attack perpetrated by the Basque separatist group ETA, which committed 136 o f the 
terrorist acts during this period), and, most shockingly, that Islamist groups were 
responsible for only one of the 498 incidents.42 Jackson has also criticized the hype 
surrounding the “threat,” pointing out that “in the last thirty-five years terrorism has 
resulted in no more than about 7,000 fatalities per year for the entire world, even 
including the year 2001,” a mere “fraction of the deaths caused by “ordinary” crime 
(there are 10,000 gun murders per year in America alone), which in turn, is dwarfed by 
the fatalities attributed to automobile accidents, disease, natural disasters and even 
suicide.”43 To put it even more bluntly, Jackson says statistically people are more likely 
to die by chocking on their lunch than in a terrorist attack.
Perhaps underlying the double standards in these analyses, and a point overlooked by 
most critical studies of the terrorism discourse, is a modem rationalist understanding of 
what constitutes legitimate politics. As discussed in Chapter One, according to the 
mainstream Western narrative of the state, the post-Westphalian political consensus 
regarding acceptable forms of economic, political and military organization were based 
on a very time-and-space specific understanding of the territorially bound nation-state, 
whose government, it is assumed, maintains a monopoly over all legitimate forms of 
power and violence as expressed within and between state boundaries. As we have seen 
with the Islamic critique, this Westphalian conception of the state has often been derided 
by Islamists as false and imposed, hence providing these movements with a rationale to 
reject their respective governments, which have accepted these false constructs, as the 
sole and legitimate possessors and implementers of violence. For the Enlightenment- 
oriented world-view of the West, violence is acceptable so long as it is perpetrated by 
legitimate actors: states. As Crooke points out:
42 Kristoffer Larsson, “A Neglected Report from Europol,” Counterpunch (21 April 2007).
43 Jackson,5-6.
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It has not been the case that western Governments abhor violence per se: 
Iraq, Afghanistan and now Lebanon attest to that; but we see that the 
Westphalian structure o f nation states as the only framework for the 
“legitimate” use of violence. States may practice violence; but when 
movements use it, it seems to threaten traditional certainties —  the same 
traditional certainties that underpin the Enlightenment. At bottom, 
movements such as Hamas seem to challenge our Westphalian certainties. 
O f course for Islamists recent history carries a different message. The 
nation state has none of the benevolent associations that we couple to the 
Enlightenment. For most Arabs the drawing of national boundaries was 
recent; was imposed —  with few benevolent associations and little 
“enlightenment.”44
By viewing “terrorism” through the modem rationalist lens based on false distinctions of 
what “they” are, and what “we” in turn are not, the “ideologization o f terror” analyses 
profoundly distort and misunderstand the Islamist movements they seek to explain.
2. Anti-M odern, Reactive Analyses
The second, and related, way in which the modem rationalist perspective impacts 
analysis of political Islam is, as described in Chapter One, by assuming that those who 
join these movements do so in reaction to some radical socioeconomic or political 
development to which there are few, or no, alternatives.45 Similar to the “ideologization 
of terror” analyses, the modem rationalist analyses also assume that because Islamist 
movements operate outside the parameters of acceptable politics, there is no need to 
understand them as political movements with legitimate histories, demands and unique 
development trajectories. In this section, I will briefly discuss the origins of this type of 
analysis, reflect on its impact on the contemporary study of political Islam, and, finally, 
look at alternative approaches to the study of political Islam, many of which are still 
confined to the margins of the discipline, and hence have had little or no impact on the 
mainstream discourse, as will become apparent in subsequent chapters.
44 Crooke, xi.
45 Euben, 23.
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Karl Marx was one of the first political theorists to develop a theory of reactive religious 
activism, as he believed that religion was evoked by members of society on the verge o f 
undergoing significant economic and political change due to revolution. Marx cites 
several examples to substantiate his argument that during these moments o f revolutionary 
crisis, people “anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service.” Amongst 
those examples are the French Revolution of 1789 - 1814 which “draped itself 
alternatively as the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire,” and Martin Luther, who 
“donned the mask of the Apostle Paul.”46 In addition, Marx provided a materialist 
explanation of the enduring importance of religion to the masses that is so well known it 
has become cliche; his “opium of the masses” argument has shown no sign of losing its 
sway over academics interested in explaining religion within a socioeconomic, 
structuralist framework.
One could also trace the intellectual roots of the theories employed by many 
contemporary writers on political Islam to the renowned French sociologist Emile 
Durkheim. As Edmund Burke III explains, writers who employ what he refers to as the 
“Durkheimian approach” begin with the idea that the “integration o f societies rests on a 
shared consciousness, the disruption of which causes anomie, individual disorientation, 
and eventual conflict.”47 In a sense, anomie was to Durkheim what revolutionary change 
was to Marx, a state of “normlessness” which exists in times of rapid social change, when 
existing rules, habits and beliefs no longer hold and alternatives have not yet arisen. 
Durkheim believed that during such a period, “society is temporarily incapable of 
exercising its regulative function, and the lack of constraints imposed on human 
aspiration makes happiness impossible.”48
The reactive religious analysis, originally developed by political theorists like Marx and 
Durkheim, is often employed by contemporary political scientists interested in
46 Marx, 1998.
47 Edmund Burke III, Orientalism and World History: Representing Middle Eastern Nationalism and 
Islamism in the Twentieth Century,” Center fo r  Global, International and Regional Studies. Reprint Series 
(1 August 1998), 20.
48 Robert Alun Jones, Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four M ajor Works (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1985), 95.
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understanding and explaining more contemporary examples of political Islam. As might 
be expected o f those who view religious movements as reactions to Western modernity, 
these contemporary writers often view political Islam as an other, one with the potential 
to threaten the international order in general, and Western civilization in particular, a 
view whose essence and potential impact would most likely have disturbed the original 
proponents of this analysis. In seeing Islamist movements as other, these analyses are 
also heavily influenced by orientalist trends, although they avoid the label because their 
focus is ostensibly no longer on the anti-modem, irrational, violent Arab/Muslim in 
general, but only on those Arab/Muslims who have rejected modernization/ 
Westernization and the associated political, economic and social processes. Yet their 
orientalist roots are often exposed in the ‘‘temporal” components of their analyses, which 
rely on an understanding of “modernity” specific to the West’s historical development, 
which they use a prototype of progress against which to compare the agenda and actions 
of Islamist movements. This tendency is best exemplified in Efraim Karsh’s Islamic 
Imperialism: A History in which he admonishes “Islam” for not having followed the 
West’s lead in “shedding” its adherence to a dangerous combination of “religious 
universalism” and “political imperialism.”49 According to Karsh, “[b]y the eighteenth 
century the West had lost its religious messianism. Apart from in the Third Reich, it had 
lost its imperial ambitions by the mid-twentieth century,” whereas “Islam,” in the form of 
Islamist movements, “has retained its imperialist ambition to this day.”50 Furthermore, 
Karsh asserts that during a period in which other formerly colonized peoples developed 
distinct notions of nationalism through which independent and sovereign nation-states 
could be realized, in the Middle East the people “were indoctrinated for most o f the 
twentieth century to consider themselves members of ‘One Arab Nation’ or a universal 
‘Islamic umma’ rather than patriots o f their specific nation-states,” a recognition that 
would have presumably made them more “modem,” and hence more like “us.”51
Like “ideologization of terrorism” analyses, the reactive religious perspective tends to 
sacrifice substance, context and diversity in the name of theoretical parsimony and
49 Karsh, 6.
50 Ibid., 6.
51 Ibid., 6.
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ideological consistence. As such, these analyses tend to fall into the “confrontational ist” 
camp, which, as defined by Gerges, are scholars and politicians who 1) tend to “lump all 
activist Islamists under the monolithic rubric of “Islamic fundamentalists,” 2) argue that, 
in practice, Islam and democracy are antithetical,” and 3) argue that “like the Communist 
totalitarians, "Islamic fundamentalists’ are intrinsically anti-democratic and deeply anti- 
Western, and invariably target the West.” The list of authors, whose work is considered 
here, while not exhaustive, is meant to reflect a wide-range of social science disciplines 
(e.g. Comparative Politics, International Relations, Sociology, Anthropology, Political 
Economy, and Middle East [area] Studies) and political perspectives. The disciplinary 
diversity demonstrates the discourse’s ubiquitous nature. And while the academic 
component of the discourse tends to be more nuanced than that found in political, media 
and think-tank genres, some of it can be just as essentialist and sensational, as will 
become clear in Chapters Four and Five. One can view the numerous writers influenced, 
consciously or not, by reactive religious perspective as falling somewhere along a 
spectrum from those who view Islamism as antithetical to the central precepts o f 
modernity to those that view Islamism ultimately as a modem phenomenon. Those 
belonging firmly on the latter side of the spectrum include such scholars as Fred 
Halliday, John Esposito, and Graham Fuller, whose ideas will be discussed in the section 
on “Challenges to the Anti-modem, Reactive Analyses,” along with alternative non­
reactive approaches, including “new social movement theory,” post-modern and 
hermeneutic approaches.
Samuel Huntington fits comfortably on the anti-modem side of the spectrum, as he 
adheres to the perspective that Islamist movements are comprised of young, alienated 
individuals who have struggled to find a place for themselves in a society radically 
transformed by the various processes associated with “modernization.” In Clash o f  
Civilizations, Huntington makes ominous predictions about the future of world politics as 
a result o f the growth in popularity of movements that have developed in reaction to the 
effect of modernity on their societies. His argument is centered on the conviction that 
lack o f a Muslim "‘core” to act as mediator between the other nations comprising the
52 Gerges, 21.
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Islamic civilization raises the probability of a “fault line” conflict between Muslim and 
non-Muslim cilivisations. This probability increases if aspiring Muslim core states
C'l
continue to compete to provide assistance to their “besieged coreligionists.” Not 
surprisingly, the most common critique of Huntington is his “essentialist” and 
“Orientalist” understanding of the cultures and “civilizations” of the world.54
Pointing out that most recruits for Islamist organizations in countries like Egypt, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan (in the 1970s) and Saudi Arabia and Algeria (in the 1990s), were 
drawn from the universities and often came from middle-class backgrounds, Huntington 
insists that one o f the most important factors in determining the radicalization of these 
students was the “dramatic” migration of rural habitants to the cities in the 1970s and 
1980s. Precisely how the “disproportionately large number of the best-educated and most 
intelligent young people in their respective populations” was affected by the “crowded 
and often primitive slum areas” of the urban centers, which grew at “dramatic rates” in 
the 1970s and 1980s, is left unexplained.55 Huntington goes on to list the specific aspects 
of modernization that he believes have led people in this region to fundamentalism:
Like other manifestations o f the global religious revival, the Islamic 
Resurgence is both a product of and effort to come to grips with 
modernization. Its underlying causes are those generally responsible for 
indigenisation trends in non-Westem societies: urbanization, social 
mobilization, higher levels of literacy and education, intensified 
communication and media consumption, literacy and education, and 
expanded interaction with Western and other culture.56
Beyond this compact list, there is little attempt to elaborate what Huntington views as the 
principal factors underpinning the causal relationship alluded to in his analysis, which 
views the various developments associated with “modernization” as responsible for 
instigating a desire amongst an extremely diverse group of individuals to join 
“fundamentalist” Islamist movements. In this Durkheimian analysis, such explanation is
53 Huntington, 312.
54 See Lavina Rajendram explains in her article “Does the Clash o f Civilizations Paradigm Provide a 
Persuasive Explanation o f  International Politics after September 11th?,” Cambridge Review o f  
International Affairs 15, no. 2 (July 2002): 217-232.
55 Huntington, 113.
56 Ibid., 114.
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deemed unnecessary; the notion that religious movements arise in response to some form 
of traumatic social or economic process is upheld as fact.
In his concluding ruminations on the probability of a “clash of civilizations” in the near 
future, Huntington again considers the role modernity has played in creating the “sheer
cn
chaos” that characterizes many parts of the world today. Although Huntington believes 
modernization has generally enhanced the material well-being of all civilizations, he 
wonders if  it has failed to achieve similar success on the moral level. Implicit in his 
comments on the matter is a belief that the ensuing chaos can be attributed to the decline 
o f Western power since the West is assumed responsible for the spread o f human rights 
and other “moral and cultural dimensions” of modernity that, as evidenced by the 
proliferation in ethnic and religious violence, failed to take hold to the extent previously 
anticipated.58 As Davutoglu argues, this analysis is based on a stages-of-growth 
understanding of history that places the West in the position of the furthest evolved of 
civilizations, hence demonstrating “a Western self-perception based on a 
subconsciousness of being the subject of history: the West has a mission to lead and 
specify history and therefore has the legitimate right to develop necessary strategies 
against the Rest [who] are supposed to be the object of the specified flow o f history.”59
Huntington’s conclusion is that the potential “real clash” will, in fact, not be between 
civilizations (despite the title of his book), but between “Civilization and barbarism.”60 
Although his definition of barbarism is not made explicit, one must assume it refers to 
those peoples and movements that have eschewed Western models of development and 
instead developed in reaction and opposition to the great advances of modernity in its 
cultural and moral dimensions. Considering his views on the imminence of a “clash”
57 Huntington refers in his book to the “sheer chaos paradigm,” in which he includes: “a global breakdown 
o f law and order, failed states and increasing anarchy in many parts o f the world, a global crime wave, 
transnational mafias and drug cartels, increasing drug addiction in many societies, a general weakening o f  
the family, a decline in trust and social solidarity in many countries, ethnic religious, and civilizational 
violence and rule by the gun prevalent in much o f the world.” Huntington, 321.
58 Ibid., 321.
59 Davutoglu, in Esposito, 175.
60 Huntington, 321.
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between Western and Islamic civilizations, and his modem rationalist view of Islamic 
resurgence, one presumes that Islamist movements and states are central amongst these.
Although the “clash of civilizations” thesis aroused the most controversy when 
elaborated by Huntington, it was actually the Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis who 
first introduced the concept in his essay, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Here Lewis 
developed his argument of reactive religion and advised the West on how to address it:
It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far 
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that 
pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations —  the perhaps 
irrational but surely historic reactions of an ancient rival against our 
Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide 
expansion o f both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not 
be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction 
against that rival.61
In his warning to the West, Lewis’s assessment of Islamist movements becomes evident: 
they are irrational, anti-modem and reactive. In addition to their continued engagement in 
what Lewis describes as an “ancient rivalry” with the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage, 
the Islamist’s inherent backwardness, as well as Lewis’ adherence to a “stages” reading 
o f history, is made clear by the author’s assertion that the Islamist’s age-old rivalry is 
now manifested in an opposition to the West’s “secular,” and hence modem, “present.”
Lewis reiterates this argument in his latest work, The Crisis of Islam, in which he outlines 
the origins and development of the relationship between the Western and Muslim worlds 
and provides his explanation for the birth and growth of anti-Western sentiment in the 
latter. Contrary to what one might assume from his description of Islamist movements, in 
this book Lewis asserts that Islam does not necessarily tend towards theocracy as a style 
of government, and that the emergence of Islamist movements demonstrates the effect of 
worldly events on the Muslim populations, rather than proving anything inherent within 
the religion. This understanding may distinguish Lewis’ analysis from the essentialism of
61 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots o f  Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, quoted in Edward 
Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 572.
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the “clash” paradigm, although not from the reactive, or modem rationalist one. The crux 
of Lewis’ argument is that support for Islamist movements in the Muslim world grew 
over the last several decades as a result o f a series of emotive responses to events that 
changed the international system and the Muslim world’s place in it. First was a sense of 
“humiliation: the feeling o f a community o f people accustomed to regard themselves as 
the sole custodians of God’s truth...who suddenly find themselves dominated and 
exploited by those same infidels and, even when no longer dominated, still profoundly 
affected in ways that change their lives, moving them from the true Islamic to other 
paths.” Once humiliated, Muslims subsequently felt frustrated, as the numerous 
remedies they turned to, “most of them imported from the West,” failed to alleviate their 
predicament. The third emotion Lewis believes the Muslim world experienced was a 
“new confidence and sense of power,” a result of the 1973 oil crisis which proved to 
Arab and West alike how powerful a tool control over the price and supply o f oil could 
be. The “resulting wealth, pride, and self-assurance” were accompanied by another 
emotion: “contempt.” With their newfound wealth, Muslims began travelling more and 
exploring the Western world. Soon these “visitors” concluded that what they witnessed in 
Europe and America was the result o f “moral degeneracy and consequent weakness of 
Western civilization,” characteristics they loathed.
In addition to attributing these developments in the Muslim world over the past several 
decades to the rise of Islamist movements, Lewis believes another important factor can be 
found in Muslims’ reactions to the various effects of modernization on their societies, a 
hypothesis shared by many students of political Islam who employ a Durkheimian 
approach. As Edmund Burke observed, these writers believe in the “familiar phrase, 
modernization causes revolution.”64 Altering his original “clash” thesis, Lewis argues 
instead that Islamist movements pose the greatest threat, not to the West, but to “false and 
renegade Muslims who rule the countries o f the Islamic world and who have imported 
and imposed infidel ways on Muslim peoples.”65 That these infidel ways have made their
62 Lewis, 16.
63 Ibid., 17.
64 Burke III, 20.
65 Lewis, 103.
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way to the Muslim world is testament to “excessive modernization” in their countries, 
which they view as “a betrayal o f their authentic Islamic values.”66 Still, like Huntington, 
Lewis fears the potential of these movements to eventually threaten the security of 
inhabitants o f the “free world,” as they persuade a growing number o f Muslims to accept 
their views and leadership. While America may be their first target, Lewis believes other 
parts of the world will also be vulnerable to their violent tendencies, including Western 
Europe, now home to a large and rapidly growing Muslim community, and other 
“neighbours of Islam” such as Russia, China and India, which might prove “less
fV7squeamish” than the United States in exerting their power against Muslims.
In his book The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967, 
Fouad Ajami develops the standard Islamism as anti-modem reaction argument, citing 
the various events to which Muslims have reacted, of which the 1967 Six Day War 
against Israel figured most prominently. Ajami believes this war, in which Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria were defeated by the fledgling Middle Eastern super-power, prompted the Arab 
world to reflect on the declining strength and viability of its governments and the 
ideologies on which they were based, and to consider possible alternatives. In the decade 
following the 1967 defeat, Ajami argues, the Muslim world experienced a great sense of 
disillusionment with the world erected by the “post-World War II nationalists,” a world 
defined and controlled by pan-Arab doctrines and the ideology o f secularism. In fact, 
Ajami believes much of the Arab world never really understood the nationalism, pan- 
Arabism and secularism of the elites, and that “the separation that the Arab intellectual 
made between Arabism and Islam was not made by the less educated citizen; for the 
latter, the two were overlapping, almost identical forces.” Whether or not they understood 
the true nature of their governments, the 1967 defeat was proof to many Arab citizens 
that the type of government their countries’ elites had opted for had profoundly failed 
them, so they turned to religion for salvation. “The shock of the military defeat created a 
deep need for solace and consolation, and Islam provided the needed comfort.”69
66 Lewis, 103.
67 Ibid., 127.
68 Ajami, 16.
69 Ibid., 71.
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While the elite’s programs for “modernization” may have achieved some degree of 
popular acceptance prior to the 1967 defeat, as time went on, the “glaring gap between 
the claims of authenticity and the realities of everyday life” widened and the masses
7ftbegan to question the sincerity o f their governments. What developed in the end were 
societies with “acute cultural dualism,” where elite claims of development were 
increasingly exposed as hollow. During this period religious movements were able, once 
again, to stake their ground, as Islam’s “comparative advantage” lies in its ability to 
“assert itself and its uniqueness at a time when technology is seemingly blurring the 
distinctions between cultures, when models of development tantalize people with
71promises that in the end they fail to deliver.” The fact that Islam was evoked during 
these trying times was not a testament to the enduring power of religious beliefs in the 
Arab world, according to Ajami, but rather an example of how prevalent was the desire
77“to reassure oneself that the ground is solid, that the world is intact.” For Ajami, Islam 
served as an opium for the masses, which became more addictive the greater the sense of 
defeat the Arabs experienced, and the more alienated they became from the increasingly 
modem societies that surrounded, but did not encompass, them.
Martin Kramer argues along similar lines, that the persistent attraction o f Islamist 
movements, despite the best efforts of Arab governments to repress them over the last 
several decades, can be attributed to their ability to capitalize on feelings of alienation 
and discontent amongst various sectors of society unable to find their place in a landscape 
profoundly altered by “modernization” programs. In defiance o f the predictions of 
Western pundits who had sounded the death knells for “fundamentalist Islam” on several 
occasions over this period, Kramer argues that the appeal of these movements was so 
strong they were able to outlive both the doubts of Western opinion and the repression of 
their respective governments. “Its straightforward solution to the complex crisis of state 
and society spoke directly to the poor and the young, the overqualified and the
70 Ibid., 206.
71 Ibid., 207.
72 Ibid., 208.
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underemployed, whose numbers were always increasing faster than their opportunities.” 
Citing the case o f Iran, and exposing the orientalist roots of his modem rationalist 
analysis, Kramer argues that the goal o f Islamists is not only to reject “the existing order” 
by turning against all things foreign, but to reject “politics — the pursuit of the possible 
through compromise” altogether, implying that their innate irrationality and inability to 
adapt to change (attributes associated with tradition as opposed to modernity) precluded 
them from engaging in modem (meaning Western) politics.74 The irony, of course, is that 
governments contested by Islamist movements during this period, including the Shah of 
Iran (overthrown in the 1979 Islamic revolution cited in this example), were no more 
inclined to “compromise” than their Islamist counterparts, a fact that challenges Kramer’s 
understanding of what constitutes legitimate “politics” and indeed modernity in general.
While many the above authors have employed the Durkheimian approach to describe 
Islamist movements as reactions to modernity, Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan 
employ a similar approach to describe political Islam as a reaction to postmodemity, 
although the language and concepts employed in descriptions of the “postmodern” period 
in many ways parallel those used by the authors cited above to describe “modernity.” In 
their essay “Islam, globalisation and postmodemity,” the authors explain the difference 
between a postmodern and traditional society in dichotomous terms. Whereas the former 
“promotes a culture based on youth, change and consumerism... emphasizing] noise, 
movement and speed, “ the latter emphasizes “quiet, balance” and discourages change. At 
the points where these societies meet, conflict is inevitable.75 “Islamic fundamentalism” 
is one response to this conflict; it reflects the fact that people in traditional religions are 
“concerned about the pace of change and what this will do to the next generation, people 
genuinely worried that their culture and traditions which have held for a thousand years
7 f\will now be changed and even be in danger of being wiped out.” Although the entirety 
of the Muslim world may not be seduced by Islamist movements, that many will has the 
effect of polarizing much of the region between those influenced by what Akbar and
73 Martin Kramer, “Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power,” M iddle East Quarterly (June 
1996), 37-49.
74 Ibid., 39.
75 Akbar and Donnan, 12-13.
76 Ibid., 13.
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Donnan refer to in orientalist terms as the “emotions of the bazaar,” which “reduce the 
Muslim response to anger and passion” and the “more reflective, more sophisticated 
Muslim scholar and statesman or stateswoman,” in other words, what Mamdani has 
referred to as the “good Muslims and bad Muslims” distinction.77 Unfortunately, 
according to Akbar and Donnan, the former’s response to globalization (read: reaction) 
tends to be the one which receives more international attention in the media, which leads
70
to an even greater “disjunction” between the West and Muslim world.
Benjamin Barber argues along similar lines in his Jihad vs. McWorld, that in the anarchic
70 *world of today, “wild capitalism” (McWorld) has delivered to most of the world 
increased productivity alongside greater levels of inequality and “Jihadic fundamentalism 
spreads its antimodem message, sowing fear and nurturing chaos, hoping to bring both 
democracy and capitalism to their knees.”80 Although in the Afterword to the 2003 
edition Barber insists that the term “Jihad” is not used to single out Muslims for criticism, 
but rather as a general label that refers to all “parochial”81, “irrational”82, identity-based 
ideologies/movements that, together with the forces of McWorld, limit the chances of a 
democratic future for the world based on freedom and equality, the ffont-cover picture of 
a woman wearing a niqab and holding a can of Pepsi says otherwise.83 Regardless of 
whether or not Barber includes developments in Rwanda, Bosnia, and East Timor in his 
Jihad category, thus altering the meaning generally associated with the term in the West, 
it is clear that he adheres to the modem rationalist paradigm in viewing Islamist 
movements as developing in reaction to one or another processes o f modernity.
77 Mahmood Mamdani, “The Politics o f Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” London Review o f  
Books, 8 March 2007.
78 Akbar and Donnan, 17.
79 “Wild Capitalism” is a situation in which sovereignty is “shifted to the domain o f  global corporations and 
the world markets they control” and away from individual and state sovereignty. This situation is 
characterized by, among other things, monopoly capitalism, corporate manipulation o f  information, and 
absence o f any real choice. Barber, 296.
80 Ibid., xxiii.
81 Ibid., 298.
82 Ibid., 297.
83 Ibid., 299.
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In his Islam, the Middle East, and the New Global Hegemony, Simon W. Murden also 
argues from a political economy perspective that the rise of “Islamic revivalism,” like 
that o f other religious “revivalisms” o f the past few decades (including Hindu, Christian 
and Buddhist), has been a reaction to cultural forms of Western imperialism that 
accompanied late-20th-century globalization. According to Murden, “Islamic revivalism” 
developed to fill the sociopolitical vacuum created by the lack of a “global-level theory of 
opposition to the new globalization.” These movements were often based on religious 
doctrines that were “backward-looking moral prescriptions about the role o f women, the 
education of youth, the nature of personal responsibility, the punishment o f democracy, 
and the definition of the outsider.” In other words, “religious revivalism was
o r
antiliberal.” And, like many of the other authors surveyed here, Murden ultimately 
believes that if  the Muslim world is to survive in the globalized world, it will have to 
reject this strain of “antiliberal” religious activism which can “only perpetuate
backwardness and failure,” and instead embrace “globalized modernity,” an act which,
86Murden concedes, entails “Westernization to some extent.”
While the authors discussed thus far view the rise in popularity of political Islam as a 
dependent variable, capable of being explained by a set of independent variables which 
individually or in combination are responsible for provoking a set o f reactions that 
inevitably lead to this phenomenon, Aziz al-Azmeh seems at times to dismiss political 
Islam altogether as a unit of analysis, arguing that all of the academic excitement 
concerning the rise o f political Islam can be attributed to orientalist scholars who 
overemphasise the importance of the subject.87 According to al-Azmeh, rather than 
“illuminate reality,” these analyses end up “widening the gap between the rich, dominant 
North and a South defined by particularlism, exoticism and barbarity.”
84 Murden, 10.
85 Ibid., 10.
86 Ibid., 205.
87 While the current discussion o f al-Azmeh’s work covers his analysis in the first half o f  his book, because 
o f the somewhat contradictory stance he adopts in the second half, I will also consider al-Azmeh’s work in 
the subsequent section on alternatives to anti-modem, reactive analyses. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and 
Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), 43.
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Although al-Azmeh claims to be above the type of discussions engaged in by the 
misguided or malevolent groups he critiques, I include his work in this section because 
on occasion he slips into the type of analysis he so criticizes. When he does address this 
alleged non-issue, it becomes obvious that he actually does hold an opinion, indeed a 
strong one, on the subject, thereby contradicting his argument and seemingly validating 
political Islam as a subject worthy of analysis. Al-Azmeh first criticizes the leaders of 
Islamist groups for manipulating the religion to further their own political interests, then 
goes on to discuss why so many Muslims have been seduced into following them. While 
claiming that he does not intend to deal with the “economic and social crises that have led 
to acute tensions, a broad social mobilization and the development of utopian movements 
that are called Islamist,” al-Azmeh in fact does just that: deals with them and with
OO
political Islam. In another section the Marxist roots of his epistemology are made 
apparent, as he again advances the argument that political Islam is a reaction to certain 
material factors which promises but fails to “assuage hunger, create employment or 
resolve social crises.” Yet, while the “ordinary Muslim asks for bread,” all the Islamist 
can offer is faith, which will “not relieve his hunger for long, for it is the opium rather 
than the sustenance, administered, by the state or by sections of society, in a revival of 
the collapse of public and private values (emphasis added).”
Although their analyses may differ in the precise periods of history they see as having 
played the most decisive role in affecting the development of contemporary Islamist 
movements, the authors reviewed in this section all base their analyses on Durkheimian 
or Marxist theories of reaction. Whether revolution, poverty, colonization, modernity, 
postmodemity, failure, or defeat, these authors consider some factor most responsible for 
catalyzing the reaction that results in widespread support for political Islam. They all 
adhere to modem rationalist discourse and therefore share a belief in direct causal 
relationship explanations that invariably view contemporary Islamist movements as a 
reaction to something.
88 Ibid., 54
89 Ibid., 56.
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2.1 Challenges to Anti-Modem, Reactive Analyses: Modem Analyses
In his essay “Orientalism and world history: Representing Middle Eastern nationalism 
and Islamism in the twentieth century,” Edmund Burke III criticizes John Esposito for his 
explanation of political Islam as a reaction to modernity, rather than viewing it “as a 
manifestation of an alternate form of modernity.” If the history of Islamism is described 
as a series of “responses” to various events and developments, these events and the 
subsequent responses to them become mutually exclusive categories, rather than aspects 
o f the same historical developments, which are, instead, co-constituting. In doing this, 
Esposito “mislocates the actual historical relationship o f Islamism to nationalism and 
modernisation.”90 While acknowledging the debilitating effects o f Orientalism on both 
the colonized and colonizer, Burke argues, contrary to Said, that nationalism as it 
developed in the Muslim world was not so much an answer to or way of rebuking 
Orientalism as it was a product of the same sociopolitical and philosophical 
developments that led to the latter’s development as the hegemonic approach to 
understanding, describing, and dominating the Arab world in the West. According to 
Burke, just as Arab nationalists co-opted many of the concepts associated with 
Orientalism, in particular those related to “modernity” and “progress,” in order to subvert 
the idea and practice of Orientalism, so too have Islamists adopted several o f the central 
tenets o f nationalism in order that they may one day replace it with their own ideology 
and system of governance. The origins of Islamist movements are therefore to be found 
in modernity rather than tradition. On this point Burke concurs with Zubaida, who 
similarly argues that by accepting the nation-state model, constitution, republic and 
notion of democracy, and using these ideas to engage civil society in a political struggle 
against what it believes is an unjust and unrepresentative government, Islamism is a form 
of “populist nationalism with ‘Islam’ as the identifying emblem of the common people
90 Burke III, 495.
103
against the ‘alien’ social spheres in their own country which had excluded and 
subordinated them.”91
Despite expressing his belief that Islamic fundamentalism is a “defensive-cultural 
worldview related to the disruptive effects and dislocations growing from modernization 
processes,” Bassem Tibi’s analysis in The Challenge o f Fundamentalism: Political Islam 
and the New World Disorder eschews the formative conclusions o f reactive religious 
analysis. The bulk of his argument is concerned with proving the modem origins of 
Islamist movements in order to substantiate his final plea regarding the need for the 
creation of “international morality based on a cross-cultural foundation” in which Islamic 
ethics could have a place.92 Tibi refutes the analyses of much of mainstream literature 
which view “Islamic fundamentalism” as a renaissance of religious belief, explaining 
instead that his own research has shown that the “fundamentalist” is primarily an “activist 
and political man, homo politicus, not a man o f religion or o f beliefs, not a homo 
religious.”93 Like al-Azmeh, Tibi sees in these movements not so much a desire to reject 
modernity and return to a glorified, pre-modem Islamic past, as the hope that they can co­
opt certain aspects of modernity as a means o f gaining political power. According to this 
argument, Islamists “view modernity in a way that favors their own purposes, expecting 
to adopt its techno-scientific achievements while dismissing its ‘corrupt’ worldview.”94
S. N. Eisenstadt also believes that one can decipher modem aspects of Islamist 
(“fundamentalist”) movements, coexisting, often without conflict, alongside “anti­
modem” or “anti-liberal” ones. Most prominent among these modem aspects are their 
Jacobin tendencies, including the belief of many of the fundamentalist movements in the 
“primacy of politics, albeit in their case, religious politics — or at least of organised 
action — guided by a totalistic religious vision to reconstruct society, or sectors
91 Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the M iddle East 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 33.
92 Bassem Tibi, The Challenge o f  Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Order (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1998), 214.
92 Ibid., 76.
94 Ibid., 81.
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thereof.”95 In their Jacobin “revolutionary components,” internationalist tendencies, and 
totalizing theories of societal transformation, Eisenstadt sees many parallels with 
communism. “The similarity with communist movements lies in the project to establish a 
new social order, rooted in the revolutionary universalistic ideological tenets, in principle 
transcending any primordial, national, or ethnic units and new socio-political 
collectivities.”96 In contrast to the essentialist analyses o f those writers who describe 
Islamist movements as inherently opposed to modernity, Eisenstadt believes they have 
developed out of circumstances
which attest to the continual reinterpretation, reconstruction of the cultural 
program of modernity of the construction of multiple modernities and of 
multiple interpretations of modernity; to attempts by various groups and 
movements to reappropriate modernity and redefine the discourse of 
modernity in their own new terms; and more crucially, to the de- 
Westemisation of modernity, to the attempt of depriving the West from
07monopoly o f modernity.
Citing the example of the Iranian revolution to make a similar point, Halliday argues that, 
like the Islamist leaders of other movements, the Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the 
Iranian revolution, employed rhetoric “derived from a modem and Western populist and
QQ
revolutionary vocabulary.” Like al-Azmeh, Halliday makes known his frustration with 
postmodernists and essentialists (whom he too believes to be more alike in their 
assessments of political Islam than either would care to admit) for not believing in the 
applicability o f “universal categories of analysis and ethics to different religious and 
political communities.”99 For Halliday, only through the use of these universal modes of 
analysis can one properly understand the context in which Islamist movements have 
developed and necessarily work. Furthermore, while Islamists may speak a great deal 
about rejecting Western norms and Enlightenment based concepts, in reality they find 
themselves “grappling with similar problems and use similar instruments, of which the
95 Shmuel N . Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129, no 1. (Winter 2000): 610.
96 Ibid., 600.
97 Ibid., 609.
98 Fred Halliday, Two Hours that Shook the World: September 11th, 2001, Causes and Consequences 
(London: Saqi Books, 2002), 131.
99 Ibid., Two Hours, 2002, 130.
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modem state and the resources of the modem economy are central.”100 Most obvious 
amongst these is the colossal gap that exists between rich and poor in most Middle 
Eastern states. According to Halliday, one o f the primary goals o f Islamist movements is 
to address these stark inequalities and, through championing the cause of the 
dispossessed, carve a space for themselves within the political landscapes of their 
countries. Yet, the point “post-modernist friends of resistance too easily forget” is that the 
Islamist movements are not the first in the region to agitate against the inequalities which 
modernity breeds, as nationalist, socialist, populist and communist movements have long 
contested Western hegemony in these regions.101
Like Ajami and Esposito, Halliday believes that one can trace the roots of many 
contemporary Islamist movements to the failure of their nationalist/socialist predecessors. 
For example, in Egypt, the Islamic revival can be traced to the “trauma of 1967 at the
i n'yrealization of the failure o f Nasser’s socialist experiment.” In Algeria similar 
developments took place over two decades later when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
—  an Islamist party which Halliday claims also gained popularity on a platform that 
criticized the failures of the nationalist party in power National Liberation Front (FLN)
—  subsequently won a majority in local and parliamentary elections on this platform. 
Halliday’s analysis veers from that of his modem rationalist counterparts in his belief that 
these movements are, in effect, no different in their ideological make-up from that of the 
nationalist parties they seek to replace. The fact that these movements are so often 
discussed as if  they belong to unique analytical categories, argues Halliday, is a sign of 
how misguided have been those who study the Middle East in their understanding of 
nationalism. Halliday believes the culprit o f this misguided analysis to be “perennialism,” 
an ahistorical view of the past which attempts to discover or locate “that fixed point, that 
definition o f identity, or land, or correct speech, or food,” and which overlooks how 
certain elements of the past are recmited to substantiate and legitimize national 
identity. However, if one starts with a “modem” (versus perennial) view of the
100 Ibid., Two Hours, 2002,131.
101 Ibid., 131.
102 Fred Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2000), 43.
103 Ibid., 54.
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nation,104 skeptical of the existence of any ideal types of nationalism,105 the shared 
patterns of development o f world nation-states become easier to recognize. For example, 
in each case there has been “a state-promoted history of nationalism, a concern with 
official versions o f the past and o f current identity, a diversity of identities and ethnicities 
within countries and involving transnational links, and most importantly of all a process 
of constant change and redefinition.”106
Once nationalism is understood in these universal terms, one can assume that the same 
analytical tools employed to understand political developments in one nation can be used 
to understand those of another. While Halliday acknowledges that real differences do 
exist between the various regions and “cultural field(s)” of the world, he believes they are 
nonetheless all affected by modernity, a development which “imposes a common format 
on states and on the ideologies and movements associated with them.”107 Thus Halliday 
argues along similar lines as al-Azmeh, that Islamist movements are by default modem 
movements because they develop within societies that, whether through force or positive 
exchange, have been affected by modernity. That this is the case, Halliday argues, can be 
witnessed in the rhetoric employed and demands made by contemporary Islamist 
movements who have inherited, or co-opted, the themes which defined their nationalist 
predecessors: “anti-imperialism, dependency, cultural nationalism, hostility to
1ORmonopolies, [and] solidarity of the oppressed peoples of the world.”
104 In contrasting modernism with perrenialism, Halliday argues that the former “sees the ways in which 
over time definitions change, using parts o f  the past, but selecting according to present needs and 
combining with elements from other cultures.” Ibid., 54.
105 As Halliday points out, even the Western European nation has itself recently been exposed to increased 
criticism by a range o f  diverse identities and ethnicities who have generally been excluded from previous 
definitions o f  these ideal nationalisms. Ibid., 51.
106 Ibid., 51.
107 Ibid., 53.
108 Ibid., 149.
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2.2 Challenges to Anti-Modem, Reactive Analyses: “New Social Movement Theory ” 
Analyses
Like the critiques o f the mainstream reactive, anti-modem analysis above, those that 
employ “new social movement theory” are often critical of “culturalist” and “essentialist” 
analyses that tend to “explain the societies of the Maghreb and Middle East in reference 
to an Islam which is eternal and unchanging.”109 Like Euben, these authors seek to study 
the movements of the Muslim world within a “transcultural theoretical context,” yet they 
are more concerned with practical and logistical issues than philosophical. For example, 
in understanding the context in which Islamist movements develop (the ways in which 
the context facilitates or hinders their development, and the strategies they employ to 
mobilize and organize supporters) these studies tend to draw on the work of Sydney 
Tarrow, Charles Tilly and Eric Hobsbawm (as opposed to Weber, Durkheim, Foucault or 
Said), neo-Marxist social scientists and historians whose work Edmund Burke III 
believes has “provided us with a much more complex and richly informed understanding 
of the behavior of the crowd and of the ideology of social protest.”110
Considering the diverse array of social movements that developed over the past two 
centuries o f modem state building and consolidation in the West, Tarrow elaborate what 
he believes is a universal approach to the study of contemporary social movements, 
placing primary importance on political opportunities and constraints. Acknowledging 
that these two factors alone cannot entirely “explain” social movements, Tarrow argues 
that “they play the strongest role in triggering general episodes of contention in which 
elites reveal their vulnerability, new social actors and forms of conflict appear, alliances 
are struck, and repression becomes sluggish or inconsistent.”111 According to Tarrow, one 
can only predict the final shape these movements assume, as well as their relative
109 Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule, 35.
1.0 Burke III, 20.
1.1 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 199.
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strength, by considering factors such as the “forms o f mobilization they employ, their 
meanings and identities, and the social networks and connective structures on which they
119build.” Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule argue that this type of analysis can, and should, 
be employed to better comprehend the origins and nature of all contemporary social 
movements, not merely those that have emerged in the West/North. It is possible, they 
believe, to make transcultural comparisons because there are no fundamental ontological 
differences between social movements from various parts of the world. Furthermore, they 
argue the potential of this approach to correct the deficiencies and bias of orientalist 
analyses —  which generally fail to contextualize Islamist movements and take into 
consideration the larger picture of oppression and contention that characterizes the
Muslim world in which they developed —  and thus render them comparable to
* * . 11^  movements in other parts of the world with similar experiences.
Lisa Wedeen similarly criticizes mainstream analyses of political Islam like 
Hungtington’s for essentializing Muslim cultures and societies, and thus denying them 
any historical context which would acknowledge the ways in which their development 
has been impacted by various historical processes and power relations. Wedeen also 
criticizes the “Clash” thesis for its view of Muslim communities as monolithic, 
hermetically-sealed entities, immune from the normal “cross-fertilization” of ideas and 
practices which take place between other religious, cultural and political communities of 
the world. Like the authors discussed in the above section on Modem Analyses, Wedeen 
also believes Islamist movements share much with other social movements of the world. 
For example, Wedeen argues that one could trace the origins of the contemporary 
Islamist movements to the 1970s when Arab governments began implementing neo­
liberal economic reforms which required a retraction of the state from the public sphere, 
leaving large segments of the population feeling unprotected and vulnerable. This 
context, generally associated with the processes o f globalization, is not particular to the 
Muslim world, and neither were the claims of the movements which developed in this 
context. Although the form these movements took was religious in nature, they were not
112 Ibid., 200.
113 Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule, 42.
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inherently anti-modem. Wedeen substantiates this argument by listing several modem 
attributes of these movements, such as their belief in the efficacy of bureaucratic 
institutions and their commitment to democratic norms and procedures.
Yet where Wedeen’s analysis differs from the Modem Analyses is in her rationale for 
pointing out convergences between Islamist movements and other social movements in 
the world, based more on her desire to substantiate her argument regarding the universal 
dynamics o f social movements than to prove the extent to which these ideologies, lacking 
in originality, are actually based on Western Enlightenment-derived ideas and concepts. 
In particular, Wedeen believes that Islamist movements share two key similarities with 
other contemporary social movements:
a) they resuscitate, invent or construct an essentialist understanding of 
political identity based, at least in part, on ascription; and, b) although they 
have important antecedents, they have emerged as a potent contemporary 
political force at the same time that international market pressures have 
weakened the economic sovereignty of states and undermined their role as 
guarantors of citizens’ welfare.114
Despite the materialist undertones o f her argument, Wedeen insists her purpose is not to 
establish a direct causal relationship between economic hardship and a rise in support for 
Islamist movements, although she acknowledges the two are “intimately connected.”115 
Echoing the theoretical assertions of Tarrow, that the most successful movements are 
those which “link inherited understandings to the imperative for activism,” Wedeen 
explains the purpose of her essay: to examine how economic factors, political 
opportunities, identity formation and transformation, discourse, and mobilization 
strategies all affect timing, strategies and form adopted by social movements in the 
Middle East, just as in the rest of the world.116
1.4 Wedeen, 55.
1.5 Wedeen argues that although it maybe be difficult to establish a causal relationship between economic 
suffereng and political Islamist movements, one could still acknowledge “that fundamentalisms are 
intimately connected with material conditions and dissafection without arguing that such conditions fully 
explain the appeal o f  fundamentalist ideas.” Ibid., xx.
1.6 Tarrow, 2001.
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In Jihad: the Expansion and Decline o f Islamism, Gilles Kepel focuses on three principal 
aspects o f new social movement theory to explain the “sudden expansion” of Islamist 
movements over the last twenty-five years: resource and human mobilization, structure of 
opportunities, and framing of meanings and identities. For example, while
thacknowledging the existence of Islamic movements throughout the 20 century, o f which 
he includes the Tablighi Jamaat of India, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and the 
Association of Algerian Ulemas, Kepel contends that it was not until the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, when petro-dollars from Saudia Arabia began pouring into the countries of 
the Muslim world, that these movements developed the strength and conviction necessary 
to attract widespread support.117 As opposed to the modem rationalist analyses, many of 
which point to the 1967 war as the watershed event in the development and rising 
popularity of Islamist movements in the region, Kepel regards the 1973 Arab oil embargo 
as the most influential event for the development of Islamist movements in the region, so 
much so that he devotes an entire chapter to the chain of events and alliances formed as a 
result o f the embargo.118 According to Kepel, the story really begins in 1973, when the 
newfound power of the Gulf States, which had profited handsomely from the oil 
embargo, essentially triggered a shift in the balance of power in the Arab world towards 
this region. Their economic status, coupled with the decline in ideological power o f Arab 
nationalism in light of the 1967 defeat, left Saudi Arabia in a propitious position. The 
Wahabbi government promptly took advantage of this position to begin spreading its 
ascetic version of Islam throughout the region. By funding the Muslim World League and 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Saudi Arabia was able to influence the 
political and religious agendas of the Muslim world. Kepel points out that their objective 
in this regard was “to bring Islam to the forefront of the international scene, to substitute 
it for the various discredited nationalist movements, and to refine the multitude of voices 
within the religion down to the single creed of the masters of Mecca.”119
117 Kepel cites the case o f  Pakistan to exemplify the depth o f the impact o f remittances on the national 
economies o f  other Muslim states: “In Pakistan in the single year 1983, the money sent home by gulf 
emigrants amounted to $3 billion, compared with a total o f $735 million given to the nation in foreign aid.” 
Ibid., 71.
1,8 While Chapter Three, “Building Petro-Islam on the Ruins o f Arab Nationalism” is entirely devoted to 
tracing the Saudi petro-dollars to Islamic movements in the Muslim world, this theme is revisited at several 
points throughout the book. Ibid..
119 Ibid., 70.
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In an analysis that shares much in common with the “ideologization of terror” analyses 
discussed above, Kepel argues that even more important than its funding o f political 
institutions such as the Muslim World League and the OIC was the Saudi’s role in setting 
up financial institutions across the Muslim world. This action had a major impact on the 
development of Islamist movements in the region. One of the most prominent amongst 
these initiatives was the formation of the Islamic Development Bank in 1973, under the 
auspices o f the Saudi-controlled OIC. The Bank, which became operational in 1975, 
financed several development projects in the poorest Muslim countries. In addition to 
their influence over more formal financial institutions like the Development Bank, Saudi 
Arabia wielded great influence over the Islamic banking and finance system which began 
to emerge in the 1970s. This influence was achieved through two distinct methods: first 
via direct funding of various lending schemes; and second, and more indirectly, through 
its influence over those making deposits and investments in the system, many of whom 
were part o f the new middle classes who had earned their money working in the booming 
Saudi economy and had subsequently come under the influence of the Saudis’ 
notoriously strict Whabbi version of Islam. By 1995, with over 144 Islamic financial 
institutions worldwide, the Islamic banking system had clearly made its mark on the 
Muslim world. Kepel argues that the significance of this development to the growth and 
strength o f the Islamist movements should not be underestimated. The radical Islamist 
saw this system as “a golden opportunity to establish a war chest outside the control of
190the established regimes and use it to finance their overthrow.” According to Kepel, 
Saudi-directed funding was particularly important to the development of fundamentalist 
organizations in Egypt and the Sudan.
In addition to focusing on what Tarrow has described as “dimensions of opportunity” and 
the mobilization of “external resources,” Kepel develops a case around another new 
social history concept, namely “cross-border diffusion.” As Tarrow contends in his 
Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, diffusion is probably 
the oldest form of transnational politics. Citing the example o f the reformation, when
120 Ibid., 9.
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Calvinist “saints,” Puritan immigrants and exiled Catholic priests carried contentious
ideas and practices across the borders o f several European countries, Tarrow defines the
term as “the communication of movement ideas, forms of organization, or challenges to
similar targets from one centre of contention to another.” Kepel utilizes this concept,
albeit without reference to Tarrow, to substantiate his argument regarding the effects of
the Iranian revolution (1979) on Muslim communities around the world. According to
Kepel, like the French and Bolshevik revolutions which preceded it, the Iranian
revolution “held out great hopes for those in other countries who sympathized with its 
122goals.” Among the diverse group o f sympathizers which spanned the globe, Kepel 
includes Iranian students in France, who tried in vain to organize immigrant North 
African workers to join a “Khomeini-inspired jihad against the ‘satanic’ West”; young 
militants from Southeast Asia, certain communist countries and Western Europe, inspired 
to make the pilgrimage to Tehran, and even to convert to the Shiite faith; and young 
intellectuals in Senegal who had studied in Iran and returned to their native country to 
“shake up” the traditional Islam of the Senegalese brotherhoods, whose rituals they 
believed had deviated from the guidelines of the Quran.
In his book Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, John K. 
Cooley develops a similar argument, focusing on the effects of resource mobilization and 
cross-border diffusion on what he views as the international Islamist terrorist network, 
personified by Osama bin Laden. Cooley’s argument is based on the concept of 
“blowback,” or what he refers to as the continuing “shock waves,” of U.S. efforts to 
mobilize, train and fund Muslim men to fight a “jihad” against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, as proxy to its own interests in the region. Cooley’s argument is essentially 
that a lack o f foresight and bad foreign policy on the part of U.S. governments from 
Carter to Clinton are largely to blame for the radicalization of movements, both national 
and international, across the Muslim world which were created by Afghan holy warriors 
who returned from the Central Asian battlefield to their own countries (or neighboring 
ones) ready to continue the fight on other fronts. To illustrate the extent of the CIA-
121 Tarrow, 186.
122 Kepel, 132.
123 Ibid., 130.
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sponsored training programs for Afghan warriors, much of which was carried out in 
collaboration with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), Cooley 
enumerates the more than 60 skills that were passed on during this period, including “ the 
use of sophisticated fuses, timers and explosives; automatic weapons with armor-piercing 
ammunition, remote-control devices for triggering mines and bombs (used later in the 
volunteers’ home countries, and against the Israelis in occupied Arab territory such as 
southern Lebanon).”124
According to Cooley, the guerrilla wars and terrorist actions that took place in Algeria, 
Egypt, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir and the Philippines in the 1990s were made possible 
due to this skills training and mobilization of funds made available as a direct result of 
the United States’ proxy war in Afghanistan. In addition to the large sums of money 
funneled through the CIA’s “Black Budget” and investments from rich Arab sheikhs, 
kings and financiers, much of these funds came from the lucrative sale o f a “vast tide of 
drugs” which began to flow out of Pakistan and Afghanistan to Europe, the Americas and 
the Far East, in the 1980s, and which, by the 1990’s, turned into a steady flow of opium, 
morphine base and refined heroin. While perhaps not the kind of cross-border diffusion 
or opportunity structures Tarrow had in mind when writing Power in Movement, 
Cooley’s well-documented account certainly adds a new dimension to the contentious 
movement theories o f new social historians, especially those focused on transnational 
movements.
As opposed to the modem analyses discussed in the previous section, those developed by 
writers who employ new social history/social movement methods are primarily interested 
in process rather than final outcome. Their works, especially those o f Kepel and Cooley, 
are overflowing with extremely well-researched/documented details, almost to the point 
of redundancy, in order to prove that the creation and eventual form adopted by these 
movements was by no means inevitable. Whether they believe globalization, the 
declining economic independence o f Arab/Muslim majority states, Saudi financing, the
,i4 Cooley, 34. 
125 Ibid., 126.
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influence of the Iranian revolution or CIA training and funding — or a mixture of some
or all o f these elements — explained the rise in Islamist movements during the 20 years
that spanned the late 1970s to the 1990s, the works of these authors testify to the belief
that Islamist movements are not some type of aberration, unique to the Muslim world,
which can only be explained in terms of essentialist notions of religion and history. As
students of social movements, they are interested in identifying the “processes through
which contention arises in different milieu and how its intersection with different forms
of mobilization, identity creation, organization, and opportunities and constraints creates
1 26social movements and major cycles of contention.”
All the authors discussed in this section share the view that Islamist movements, even if 
responding to the effects of certain aspects of modernity on their societies, are not 
inherently anti-modem. Most make the important distinction between the modem 
dispositions of these movements and their denunciation of the equating o f modernization 
with Westernization in the various programs instituted by the governments they oppose. 
Although they may reject certain aspects of these modernization programs, such as the 
secularization o f politics, the majority of Islamist movements, according to these authors, 
support modem economic systems, modem technology, modem institutions and systems 
of governance (including the actual structure o f the nation-state itself), and most employ 
modem political rhetoric to define and justify their struggles. Although the narrative of 
the origins of contemporary Islamist movements, as told by several of these authors, is 
similar to that o f their reactive religious counterparts (e.g., that these movements have 
developed in reaction to the failures of a variety o f what they view as imported 
ideologies, including socialism and nationalism), they do not believe this fact necessarily 
renders these movements anti-modem by nature. They are modem because they have 
developed in a context of globalized modernity, and despite their reliance on religion to 
explain, justify, or mobilize support for their respective movements, they remain, 
consciously or subconsciously, within the socioeconomic and political landscape that 
characterizes the modem world.
126 Tarrow, 197.
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2.3 Challenges to Anti-Modern, Reactive Analyses: Postmodern Analyses
While the arguments discussed in the previous section have developed in opposition to 
what have been perceived as essentialist and orientalist elements of reactive analyses of 
political Islam, the literature in this section tends to be critical of both essentialist 
analyses which view Islamists movements as backward and anti-modem, as well as those 
analyses which view Islamist movements solely in terms of a Western-defined modernity. 
Instead the scholars whose work is included in this section look to postmodernism as “a 
more friendly environment than modernism” in which to understand and explain both the 
raison d ’etre o f Islamist movements and their resurgence across the Muslim world in
127recent years.
Roxanne L. Euben, whose work is discussed in Chapter One, draws on postmodernist and 
critical theories to challenge mainstream analyses of contemporary political Islam to 
situate the subject within what she describes as a “transcultural theoretical context.” To 
do this, Euben engages the work of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), a highly influential 
Islamist thinker whose ideas were fundamental to the creation of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, as well as to a great many other Islamist movements, and compares his 
perspective on subjects at the heart of Enlightenment thought, such as modernity, 
rationalism, liberty and equality, with those of various Western critical philosophers who, 
she argues somewhat counterintuitively, share much in common with the Egyptian writer
170
and activist. In her book, Euben critiques analyses of political Islam derived from what 
she describes as a “modem rationalist discourse,” in which modernity is defined largely 
in terms of the advancement of rational systems of organization in economy, politics and
1 TOsociety at the expense of “traditional” systems. While Enlightenment philosophers 
such as Marx and Weber, whom Euben credits for first developing the “rationalist 
paradigm,” recognized the “costs and contradictions” of modernization, their work, she 
argues, has nonetheless “functioned within Western thought to sustain the assumptions
127 Martin Forward, Muhammad: A Short Biography (Oxford: Oneworld, 1998), 129.
128 Euben, 13.
129 Ibid. Western political philosophers she includes in this comparison are: Charles Taylor, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Robert Bellah, Hannah Arendt, Richard John Neuhaus, and Daniel Bell.
130 Ibid., 22.
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that ‘‘modem rationalism” is defined in terms o f the erosion of religious and traditional 
models of meaning, identity, and authority, and that the movement from the “traditional” 
to the “rational” defines not just the advancement of Western history, but the entry of all
i  *>1
cultures into the modem world.” According to Euben, this type of analysis limits the 
extent to which movements working outside the Western-defined trajectory of 
modernization can be understood on their own terms.
Amongst the analyses Euben criticizes are those developed by authors such as Daniel 
Lemer, who argues that Islamist movements derive the bulk of their support from the 
frustrated, overqualified and underemployed sectors of society whose expectations for 
progress have not been met by governments implementing modernization programs, and 
Michael Fischer, who employs a Barrington Moore style of class-based sociological 
analysis to the study of Islamism, which views the phenomenon as a response to the 
erosion o f tradition in Muslim societies. Euben is also unconvinced by those who view 
Islamism as a last resort for Muslim political activists, filling the political vacuum left in 
the wake o f other tried and failed ideologies such as liberalism, nationalist socialism, and 
quasi-liberal dictatorship. It is not that she believes these types of analyses have nothing 
to offer to a deep understanding of political Islam, but rather that their unquestioned / 
unacknowledged grounding within a very specific, Western mode of thought has limited 
their ability to ask the types of questions that Euben believes are vital to understanding 
movements based on a worldview, or “system of ideas,” that fundamentally differ from 
those adhered to by the Western scholars who develop these analyses. According to 
Euben, “[t]o recognize the corruption of Middle Eastern elites, the authoritarianism of 
Middle Eastern regimes, the high national debts and low rates of employment is to say 
much about political, social, and economic conditions in the Middle East, some about the 
alienation that can accompany certain structural changes,” although this type o f analysis 
says “substantially less about the particular draw of fundamentalism itself as opposed to
1 "I?any other system of ideas.”
Despite their many differences in worldviews and theoretical foundations, Euben is
convinced that the critical philosophers whose work she considers in her book share
much in common with Islamists: namely, their shared fear of the potential ramifications
of the modernity-induced crisis of humanity “due to a rupture with tradition, the dual
rejection of theology and teleology inaugurated by Enlightenment rationalism, and the
subsequent diminishment of meaning—in authority, morality, and community—that that
1rejection is said to entail.” While Euben tends to agree with modem analyses which 
argue that “because modernity is global, so is fundamentalism”134, she also sees in their 
movements the postmodern desire to renounce the epistemological foundations on which 
modernity is based, Enlightenment rationalist epistemology in particular. In a concise 
summary of her argument, Euben writes:
Given these arguments, it becomes clear that fundamentalist critiques and 
movements and sensibilities are not premodem, although they certainly 
draw upon and reinterpret ideals located in a “Golden Past.” Nor are they 
antimodem, although they cohere around a repudiation o f many central 
epistemological assumptions constitutive o f post-Enlightenment 
modernity. Like postmodernism, fundamentalists’ paradoxical relationship 
to modernity represents an attempt to move beyond modernity in a way
11C
that is simultaneously parasitic upon it.
Yet, despite their similarities, Euben points out that the Islamist’s desire to “re-establish” 
those “foundational meanings necessary for living and living well” which have been 
ruptured by modernity renders their sociopolitical agendas ultimately at odds with those 
of most postmodernists (although not necessarily with critical thinkers like Taylor and 
MacIntyre, who also share this desire) who maintain a persistent skepticism of 
foundations.
Bobby Sayyid, too, sees in the relationship between Islamism and modernity an 
insurmountable paradox, most obviously as exemplified by their dependency on modem 
technology to disseminate what many consider an anti-modem message. Also, in a way 
similar to Euben’s and the modem analyses discussed above, Sayyid recognizes Islamists
133 Ibid., 124.
134 Bruce Lawrence, Defenders o f  God (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 3, quoted in Euben, 161.
135 Euben, 166.
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internalization and co-option of several modem political concepts (e.g., in their views on 
the potential o f revolution to make lasting political and economic change, people as 
political agents, the power o f political mobilization and organization) even in their 
struggle to overcome what they see as the evils of the “modem”/Western political 
system. Yet, like Euben, Sayyid’s recognition of this fact does not lead him to 
conclude that Islamism is simply a modem ideology, no different in substance and intent 
than, say, nationalism or socialism. Sayyid avoids this conclusion because he feels it 
would be tantamount to accusing Islamists (who claim to reject some of the principle 
tenets of Western modernity) of false consciousness, a claim Sayyid emphatically does 
not want to make. To get around this paradox, Sayyid proposes an alternative way of 
conceptualizing Islamism which would appreciate their postmodern desire to “decenter” 
the West, or “disarticulate the West from modernity” by deconstructing the meta­
narrative that has equated modernity with the West, while at the same time 
acknowledging Islamists’ desire to replace this meta-narrative with one of their own 
making. The Islamist interest in re-establishing foundations, or their own “regimes of 
truth,” which Sayyid describes as meta-narratives, does not necessarily signify their 
desire to revert to tradition or reject modernity; instead it proves their “attempt to speak 
from another centre, outside the orbit o f the West.” 137
In anticipating potential rebuttals from those who argue that the Muslim world could not 
possibly give birth to postmodern movements when the region has yet to become fully 
modem, Sayyid contends that Muslim states have in fact undergone processes of 
modernization, even if they were experienced as imposed. According to the meta­
narrative o f modernity, modernization could only have begun in the West, because only 
there were the prerequisite conditions necessary to catalyze the process. Yet, as Sayyid 
argues, and as described in the previous chapter, in the Muslim world, because of 
colonialism, imperialism and Western hegemony, states under “Kemalist” systems of 
governance underwent similar processes of development, albeit imposed rather than 
organically developed. According to Sayyid, Kemalism reflected a rejection by Muslim
136 Sayyid, 106.
137 Ibid., 120.
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leaders of traditional meta-narratives in favor of Western, or “modem” ones. Islamism, 
on the other hand, developed in opposition to what it conceived to be an imposed meta­
narrative. Sayyid compares this rejection to what Nietzsche describes as the “original” or 
“ancient” nihilism, which occurred during humanity’s “transition from pre-moral to 
moral culture.” As opposed to the more-ffequently-referred-to account of European 
nihilism, “original nihilism” was not so much an “incredulity towards meta-narratives” as 
the original recognition by humans of their powerlessness in relation to the potential for 
“political subordination” at the hands o f other humans.139 Whereas before this recognition 
man had already witnessed his vulnerability at the hands of nature, only after he had 
suffered as a result o f political subordination did he come to realize the “most desperate 
embitterment against existence.” 140 According to Sayyid, many postmodernists focus 
solely on Nietzsche’s description of European nihilism, which explains postmodemity in 
the West. By considering the experience of colonized Muslims in the context of 
Nietzsche’s concept of “original nihilism,” Islamists, like their “original nihilist” 
counterparts, can be seen to express “incredulity towards meta-narratives” not as a result 
o f “self-criticism but as a result o f a confrontation with a more powerful meta-narrative 
which judges the meta-narrative o f the ‘natives’ not to be a meta-narrative.”141
In developing a “peripheral account of postmodemity,” Sayyid also seeks to undermine 
the analyses of political Islam whose only reference to postmodemity is in the context of 
a reactive argument, in which these movements are seen as incapable of coping with the 
realities of an increasingly postmodern world. For example, Sayyid criticizes the work of 
Akbar Ahmed for viewing postmodemity as a state in which the periphery plays no part, 
except as “spectator.” Similar to other writers on postmodemity (e.g., Giddens, Lyotard, 
etc.) Ahmed
simply reinstates the conventional duality between the postmodern and 
Islam, so that while we in the West play with the new possibilities created
138 Ibid., 115.
139 Jean-Francois Lyotard describes post-modernity, which he compares to Nietzsche’s European nihilism, 
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by the ending of the old certainties of modernity, Muslims who cannot 
bear the world without foundations retreat into ‘ancient’ myths — they 
search for a rock upon which they can base their identity.142
This position is shared by Ahmed Achrati who worries about a tendency within 
postmodern analyses to remain within the safe confines of dichotomous reasoning on 
Islam. He too feels that postmodernism’s claim to reject “ethicopolitics and 
ethnocentrism” signifies the possibility of a more hospitable context in which to study 
Islamist movements.143 Achrati’s discussion o f Derrida’s work on Arabo-Islamic 
hospitality is an example of how a postmodern approach can nonetheless lead to a 
“variation on the very ethnocentrism which deconstruction is supposed to displace.”144
Despite several points of convergence, particularly in their views o f essentialist and 
orientalist accounts of Islamist movements, the analyses of the authors in this section 
fundamentally differ from their modernist counterparts in their belief that even if the 
writings, proclamations and actions of Islamist leaders/movements take place within a 
modem context, and modem concepts and methods of political mobilization and action 
are employed, one cannot overlook their underlying message and intent, which entails a 
rejection of not only certain aspects of modernity such as secularism, but of the entire 
Enlightenment-derived foundation on which Western notions of “modernity” rest. These 
writers are more interested in the content of Islamist speech than they are in form or the 
medium of delivery. For Euben, this view does not signify the impossibility of cross- 
cultural comparison, although she does believe this comparison must entail like units. In 
other words, she believes the most fruitful comparisons would be those that consider 
Islamist thought in relation to strains of Western political thought which also question the 
political and epistemological hegemony of Enlightenment foundations, and are similarly 
weary o f a future lacking in transcendental morals and values. For Sayyid, it means 
developing a new paradigm capable of understanding the worldview o f another centre 
which exists completely outside the “orbit o f the West.”145
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2.4 Challenges to Anti-Modem, Reactive Analyses: Hermeneutic Analyses
Writers whose work could be considered under the “hermeneutic” rubric146 share much in 
common with the other approaches considered in the “Challenges to Reactive Islamist 
Analyses” section. Like the Modem and “New Social Movement Theory” analyses, 
hermeneutic approaches also reject “essentialist” readings of political Islam based on a 
dichotomous understanding of the relationship between modernity and tradition, and 
shaped by a latent Orientalism whose distortions o f Muslims and Arabs date back to the 
colonial period. Similar to postmodern analyses, the hermeneutic approach acknowledges 
the possibility that even though Islamist movements have developed in the context of 
certain political, social and economic developments associated with globalization and 
“Westernization” and experienced by other developing, former colonized states, they may 
still speak from a legitimately unique and autonomous space, based on an epistemology 
and worldview entirely distinct from that o f the West. Although the specific approach 
adopted to study political Islam by those influenced by hermeneutics is varied, they share 
a common faith in the “semiotic approach to culture, an approach that, as Clifford Geertz 
describes it, takes culture as a context, an “interworked system of construable signs” in 
terms o f which social events may be rendered intelligible.”147 In order then to develop a 
“thick” description of Islamist movements, these approaches find it necessary to first 
decipher the “system” of signs responsible for molding and regulating the environment in 
which their political agendas, tactics and strategies are devised. As a result, and in 
opposition to the “Ideologization of Terror,” Reactive and Modem analyses, the scholars 
whose work are included here tend to base their research on interviews with Islamists, 
important documents, charters and declarations produced by Islamists organizations, and 
the religious and philosophical texts which Islamists cite as their principle influences.
Drawing on the work of Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer and other hermeneutic 
philosophers, Euben employs the “dialogic model” to the study of political Islam, which 
she explains is based on the belief that “understanding emerges from a dialogue in which
146 including Tamimi, Gerges, 2007, Hroub, Burgat, Euben, Saad-Gharoyeb and Kepel.
147 Euben, 12-13.
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participants attempt to cross divides of meaning by acknowledging and appropriating 
their own prejudices within language that evolves to accommodate and ultimately 
transform disparate understandings into mutual intelligible meanings.”148As discussed 
earlier, Euben employs this approach to point out the many points of convergence 
between Western critical thought and the ideas of the influential Islamist leader and 
philosopher Sayyid Qutb, particularly on issues of modernity, ethics and morals. By 
challenging positivist epistemology’s “monopoly of truth,” this method also seeks to 
overcome theories of incommensurability based on the idea that cultural phenomenon can 
be “locked away in hermetically sealed boxes o f meaning.”149 Euben is convinced this 
method will enable her not only to arrive at a more in-depth understanding of the 
meaning of Islamist thought, but also to understand the increasing appeal of Islamist 
movements to broad segments of the Muslim world.150
Azzam Tamimi’s account of the origins, development and agenda of the nationalist 
Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas is another example of a hermeneutic approach to 
the study of political Islam. Having focused his research on one case study, Tamimi has 
an easier time avoiding the pitfalls o f “Ideologization of Terror” analyses which tend to 
conflate disparate Islamist movements with one another. Although the single-case study 
is not inherently immune to essentialist tendencies (as evidenced by Mathew Levitt’s 
“confrontationalist” book on Hamas), the fact that Tamimi chooses as the basis of his 
research mostly first-hand sources (including interviews with prominent Hamas leaders, 
important Hamas documents, religious and philosophical concepts that Hamas leaders 
cite as major influences on the movement, and the political and socioeconomic context of 
the movement) points to a very different type of analysis with different aims. By focusing 
on the specific, yet rooting the specific in a universal Islamic philosophy that the 
movement claims to be guided by, Tamimi disputes many of the facile assumptions and 
conclusions of mainstream analyses o f political Islam.
148Ibid., 37.
149 Euben, 48.
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In one example of his attempt to foreground the specific in the context o f the universal, 
Tamimi compares Hamas to other branches of the Ikhwan (brotherhood) movement from 
which it derived. Although Hamas, like the other Ikhwan movements, was originally 
“concerned principally with the education and training of their members and supporters 
so as to shield them from what they deemed to be alien and hostile ideologies and socio­
political trends,” its focus shifted from a spiritual to a more nationalist agenda as a result 
o f dynamics internal to the Palestinian situation.151 Most important o f these internal 
dynamics was the increasing frustration of the Palestinian population at the inability of 
their leaders, largely in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to adequately 
confront the Israeli occupation. As Tamimi puts it, “[t]he population under occupation
152felt abandoned and under siege, more than ever before.” Ultimately a traffic accident, 
in which an Israeli military truck crashed into a van, killing 4 Palestinians from the Gazan 
refugee camp Jabalya, led to a major shift in strategy.
In another challenge to mainstream analyses, Tamimi questions the monolithic 
understanding of “jihad,” often referred to as “holy war,” in mainstream Western 
analyses. The problem for Tamimi is not that jihad is an unimportant concept for 
Islamists, but that it is overemphasized in Western depictions of political Islam. These 
analyses rely on an essentialist description of jihad that betrays a deep misunderstanding 
of the central tenets of Islam as a religion and an ignorance of Islam’s socio-historical 
development. According to Tamimi:
there is nothing whatsoever in the Islamic sources that describes war as 
holy. The rendering of the word jihad into ‘holy war’ has more to do with 
the history of Christianity in Europe than with the teachings or the history 
o f Islam. The term “holy war” is a European Christian invention dating 
back to around AD 1096, when Rome began to preach a “Holy Crusade” 
to free the Holy City of Jerusalem from the clutches o f heretics and 
infidels.153
151 Ibid., 31.
152 Ibid., 51.
153 Tamimi, 176.
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Defending his analysis of jihad as a largely defensive mechanism within the religion, 
Tamimi writes: “The earliest appearance of the word jahada or jihad  in the revelation of 
the Qur’an was associated with the struggle of the nascent Muslim community against 
oppression. Jihad was a struggle for the freedom for the community to worship according 
to their monotheistic faith and for the right to invite others to embrace it.” Furthermore, 
he argues that qualities such as “patience” and “self-restraint” were also considered noble 
acts worthy of ‘ jihad” status, and “for which God promised the highest of rewards in the 
Hereafter,” a fact often overlooked by authors who seek to create a sense of anxiety and 
fear in their audience in order to gamer their support for their confrontationalist 
policies.154 As to the question of “martyrdom” in Islam, although Tamimi explains that 
most Islamic scholars believe that the sacrifice o f one’s life is acceptable when fighting 
injustice or oppression, he points out the many discrepancies in exegesis of the relevant 
religious texts on the proper use and form of these “martyrdom operations.” Apart from 
Palestine, where the principal religious authorities all view these operations as “noble 
act[s] o f sacrifice for the sake of God,” the attitude o f scholars and religious institutions 
has varied.155 While “no-one denies the existence of the concept o f self-sacrifice as it is 
explicitly defined in the Quran and the hadith,” according to Tamimi:
a number of establishment scholars, representing government-controlled 
religious institutions in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have argued that 
martyrdom operations are illegitimate. Some of these deem such actions to 
be acts of suicide because o f the certainty of death. Others oppose them 
because they violate the Islamic code of war, through the indiscriminate 
killing of innocent civilians including children.156
Unlike “Ideologization of Terror,” Reactive and even Modem analyses, Tamimi also 
seeks to understand the epistemology of the movement by considering its religious, 
philosophical and historical references on their own terms, not as reactions to or facets of 
an Enlightenment-derived Western modernity, nor as elements of the Islamists’ arsenal of 
politically expedient tools to challenge the opposition. For example, rather than coming 
to the easy conclusion that Hamas’ opposition (shared by a majority of Islamist
154 Tamimi, 175.
155 Tamimi, 181.
156 Tamimi, 183.
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movements, Muslim scholars and jurists over the past century) to the existence o f the 
Israeli state is a testament to its inherent anti-semitism or irrational hatred of Israel’s 
American patron, Tamimi explains the importance of the religious concept of Ummah:
The movement regards Israel as nothing but a colonial enclave planted in 
the heart of the Muslim world whose effect is to obstruct the revival of the 
Ummah, the global Muslim community and to perpetuate Western 
hegemony in the region. Another consideration is that Palestine is an 
Islamic land that has been invaded and occupied by a foreign power. It 
would contravene the principles of Hamas’s Islamic faith to recognise the
1 cn
legitimacy of the foreign occupation o f any Muslim land.
He further tempers this position by pointing out that Hamas has never been opposed to 
the right o f Jews to live in Palestine as they had for thousands of years, but rather to their 
presence there as an occupying power. Bearing this point in mind, Hamas’ support for 
“hudna,” or cease-fire agreement, with the Israelis is not an example of how Hamas 
instrumentalizes religious concepts to avoid an uncomfortable compromise (the position 
of many observers of the Hamas movement) but rather a negotiating tool delineated by 
Islamic jurisprudence and used throughout Muslim history to maintain the peace between 
Muslims and antagonistic parties.
To explain Hamas’ use of the language and concept of the hudnah, he cites an historical 
reference shared by most Muslims of the truce agreed upon by Salah Al-Din Al-Ayyubi 
(Saladin), twelfth century Kurdish Muslim political and military leader from Tikrit, and 
the leader o f the third crusade, Richard the Lionheart.
The truce, which marked the end of the Third Crusade, lasted for a period 
o f three years and three months. During this period, the Crusaders 
maintained control of the coast from Jaffa to Acre and were allowed to 
visit Jerusalem and to conduct commerce with the Muslims. In addition, 
the reference is also frequently made to the first hudnah ever in the history 
o f Islam. Known as Al-Hudaybiyah, the name of the location on the 
outskirts of Mecca where it was concluded, this agreement saw the 
suspension of hostilities between the Muslim community under the
1 SftProphet’s leadership and the Meccan tribe of Quraysh.
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Despite the obvious importance of grasping Islamic epistemology to the understanding of 
Islamist movements, Tamimi also constantly reminds his readers of the vital role played 
by the specific socioeconomic and political context in which Hamas has developed. For 
example, when discussing the demands of the Palestinian Ikwhan (predecesors to Hamas) 
in the 1987 Intifada, which were “not confined to demands for the end of the occupation. 
They went further, also demanding the abolition of the state o f Israel,” he qualifies what 
again might be construed as an overly “militant” or “anti-semitic” stance, this time by 
providing an insight into the backgrounds of the protesters: “[m]ost o f the demonstrators 
had been refugees, and their real homes were not the squalid and wretched UN camps of 
Gaza or the West Bank but the hundreds of towns and villages that once stood where 
Israel exists today.” 159 This insight should shed light on the motives o f Hamas, an 
endeavor, as we have seen, the “Ideologization” analyses believe is irrelevant to the study 
of Islamist movements.
On the issue of the role of Saudi petro-dollars in spreading Islamist sentiment across the 
Muslim world throughout the 1970s and 1980s, an argument made in exclusively 
materialist analyses of political Islam, Tamimi points out that this could not be the case; 
as Saudis and other Gulf leaders claim, Islamism was actually imported into their 
societies via the influential Ikhwan movements, rather than vice versa. Burgat has 
similarly criticized these assumptions, arguing that the “vast majority of Islamists 
supported Riyadh’s Iraqi enemy, conclusively proving the limits of Saudi authority over 
the Islamists.”160 Furthermore, Burgat believes one would have to completely overlook 
the fact that “the corrupt regime o f the guardians of the Islamic holy places are on the 
blacklist o f many Islamist movements” in order to convincingly argue that Saudi Arabia 
is “the ‘conductor’ o f the world Islamist ‘orchestra,’ a role that the Saudi princes have 
probably dreamed of,” but, according to Burgat, “today has no relationship to reality.”161
Like Tamimi, Burgat also believes that the only way to avoid the orientalist stereotypes 
of the mainstream discourse on political Islam is to approach the subject from what
159 Tamimi, 53.
160 Burgat, 23.
161 Ibid., 23.
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amounts to a hermeneutical approach (although neither author uses that term), which 
entails a knowledge of the history and cultures of the states and regions in which these 
movements have developed, of how these particular developments have been affected by 
international dynamics, including colonialism, globalization and neo-imperialism, and, 
perhaps most importantly, a knowledge of Arabic so that firsthand sources can be used to 
provide a more profound understanding of the movements’ raison d ’etre. As Burgat puts 
it: “Islam is, above all, what a majority of Muslims say it is. In reality, it is therefore 
Islamist individuals who have created Islamism, rather than the other way around.” In 
order to understand then what the majority o f Islamists say about Islamism, one has to be 
able to speak their language, both literally and metaphorically. In other words, he or she 
must be open to deciphering the system of “construable signs” that shape and regulate the 
Islamist’s worldview. Much of Burgat’s own analysis is derived from interviews with 
prominent Islamists from Egypt and Tunisia, academic and journalistic sources from the 
region, and literature written by Islamist themselves.
More often than not, according to Burgat, analyses of political Islam are based on 
conjecture rather than fact, a result of the analyst’s over-reliance on secondhand sources, 
themselves often distorted. If it is true that “[i]n order to communicate with any sort of 
interlocutor, you do not approach his or her neighbors, and definitely not his or her 
enemies. It is far more effective to talk in person and preferably to make eye contact,” 
than why, asks Burgat, “is this generally not the case when discussing Islamism?” 
Even when analysts do decide to consult Islamists themselves, generally the most radical 
and inarticulate amongst them are chosen for comment, hence confirming the 
author’s/audience’s stereotypes. According to Burgat:
The least repulsive expressions of Islamism are therefore systematically 
ignored, replaced by people viewed as more ‘authentic,’ and certainly 
more in keeping with the unconscious expectations o f public 
opinion....When the television channels claim that they are aware of the 
essence o f the Islamist movement, they often elect to concentrate on its 
most frustrated fringes — the highly conservative peasants of remote rural 
areas in Egypt or young people in the suburbs o f Algiers who have been
162 Ibid., 19.
163 Ibid., 23.
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expelled from university—without locating them in the social and cultural 
context o f which they are the product.164
Were Burgat’s approach followed by other scholars of political Islam, they might come to 
similar conclusions regarding Islamists’ views on vital issues such as modernity, 
secularism, democracy and the potential for a more peaceful and nuanced relationship 
with the West. As opposed to Reactive analyses, for example, Burgat believes his 
approach will enable students of political Islam to see that Islamists are not so much 
renouncing values of modernity as they are “rewrite[ing].. .the terminology of the 
symbolic system of Islam, a fact which helps to extend the reach of such modernisation 
rather than to interrupt it or obstruct its progress.”165 Burgat discusses the Islamists’ 
approach to women’s rights, often a major cause for concern amongst Western liberals 
when considering the compatibility of “Islam and democracy.” According to Burgat, the 
rising number o f women joining Islamist movements is an indication of how Muslim 
women are increasingly seeking out alternative ways to articulate their struggle for 
greater rights in the political and private realms, as opposed to relying on a Western 
paradigm often seen as manipulative and culturally insensitive.166 Rather than see the two 
processes as mutually exclusive, Burgat encourages the perspective that the “dynamics of 
gender re-empowerment have been pursued from within the process of re-Islamisation 
itself.”167
Burgat is also critical of reactive and traditionally orientalist analyses whose essentialist 
views of Islam lead to the belief that Islamists are incapable of change. Burgat believes 
this view is derived from a perspective that focuses too heavily on the “emblematic 
slogans” of Islamists rather than their “characteristics,” which are actually “extremely 
diverse and, as a result o f development policies, they are affected by a constant dynamic
]64 Ibid., 16.
165 Ibid., xvi.
166 On the point o f  manipulation, Burgat writes: “The blind and unconditional support o f  Western observers 
can be compared with the heightened resentment o f the Islamist activists who are well aware o f  the vital 
role that this group plays in stirring the hostility o f  the West, which regards them as a guarantee for the all- 
repressive option. All the regimes that are threatened by the Islamist upsurge have encouraged the 
emergence and the development o f  a rash o f feminist movements that rarely have any social foundation.” 
Ibid., 146.
167 Ibid., 145.
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i fixof change/’ Tamimi is equally critical of analyses which ignore the drastic changes that 
have taken place both in the political agenda and strategies adopted by the Islamist 
movement Hamas. In discussing the movement’s Charter, Tamimi writes:
Hamas’s political discourse on these [position of Hamas regarding Jews, 
the existence of the state of Israel, as well as appropriate military strategy 
and tactics for the “resistance”] and other issues has evolved significantly 
since its Charter was first published in the summer of 1988. The Charter 
has been both problematic and embarrassing and has been cited more by 
the critics of the movement than by its spokesmen.169
Like Tamimi, Burgat also places a good deal o f importance on context in understanding 
the types of strategies and tactics adopted by Islamist movements. In contradistinction to 
scholars like Gilles Kepel, who, according to Burgat, view all acts of violence carried 
about Islamist movements within the “paradigm of Tslamist violence’,” Burgat believes 
it is necessary to understand the violence o f the regimes these movements are up against. 
Whereas in the “West, analysis is increasingly replaced by the discourse of embattled 
regimes,” in actuality in places like Algeria and Egypt, the governments perpetrate most 
of the violence to which Islamist movements are merely responding.170 When context is 
lacking and speculation rife, the types of oversimplifications found in Reactive and even 
Modem analyses are inevitable. As Burgat puts it:
To see in the process of re-Islamisation only the negative effects of what 
some regard as an error o f political conduct, and others see as an economic 
crisis, a repressive conjuncture or foreign manipulation (by the Saudis or 
the Iranians and also, for the less scrupulous, by the United States), is to 
overlook the essential ingredients (the plurality, the ambivalence, the 
historicity and the dynamics) of a political movement. All the 
interpretative keys needed to decipher a complex logic are missing. There 
is in all this a risk of courting a double impass: a methodological impasse 
for those who provide analysis and a political impasse for those who feed 
decision-making.171
168 Ibid., 19.
169 Tamimi, 7.
170 Burgat, 14.
171 Ibid., 22.
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Were these analytical pitfalls to be avoided, Western academics, journalists, and 
politicians alike would be able to isolate and address the very real political and economic 
issues that plague the Middle East and impact state-society relations, many caused by 
Western governments themselves, and perhaps see in Islamist movements potential 
partners for a more peaceful future in which a “consensual modernity” is attained, based 
on mutual respect if  not always agreement. To do this would require that
national political actors [become] capable of abstracting themselves from 
the instinctive membership of their own symbolic universe and accepting 
the legitimacy of a formula which uses symbolic resonances other than 
those with which they are familiar; in this way they recognise the 
commonality of modernity, beyond the specific countries which have
• 172expressed its content.
Fawaz Gerges’ book the Journey o f the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy, despite being 
located within the security-focused, “Islamist violence” paradigm, can in some ways be 
considered representative of a “hermeneutic” approach in that it also takes into 
consideration first-hand accounts, important philosophical and religious texts, as well as 
of the historical, political and economic context in which the diverse group of Islamist 
movements Gerges considers have developed. As a result of listening to the Islamists “in 
their own words” he develops an analysis that diverges in many ways from the Reactive 
and even Modem perspective and tends to share more in common with the post-modem 
analyses, in particular in his implied belief in the possibility that Islamists speak from a 
centre located completely outside the West. For example, in a passage in which he draws 
a comparison between the West’s inability to understand the 1979 Islamic revolution and 
its similar misapprehension of contemporary Islamist movements, Gerges appears to both 
grasp and take seriously the way in which Iranian Islamists themselves perceived the 
nature of their struggle with the United States/West:
[u]nlike those from Marxist and socialist critics, the Islamist attack on the 
United States did not focus only on class division, racism, and injustice.
Rather, it rejected the basic idea of what America at its best represents. It 
was a spiritual critique every bit as profound as Galileo’s conflict with the 
Inquisition over the position of the sun in the universe. If we do not bring
172 Ibid., 185.
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ourselves to understand the moral and spiritual mission that drives today’s 
jihadists we will remain forever baffled at the “irrationality” of their 
speech and the “insanity” of their actions.
In accepting the possibility of a genuinely alternative (to the Western) worldview as the 
basis for Islamist political thought, Gerges’ analysis also takes seriously the Islamist 
claim that material factors alone cannot explain their reasons for pushing for an 
alternative agenda:
O f the dozens o f 70s-era activists I spoke to, nearly all regularly cautioned 
me against the Western tendency to explain the rise of Islamism in purely 
socioeconomic and political terms. Such explanations, they felt, distorted 
and trivialized what their movement was all about: a spiritual and moral 
quest to halt, not merely to moderate, the secularization of society. It could 
not be understood as “a developmental crisis.” “We did not sacrifice the 
flower o f our youth, the best years of our lives, in prisons to get jobs and 
earthly rewards. Our aim is to please God. The West cannot comprehend 
our spirituality and religiosiosity as long as it is blinded by 
materialism.”174
Gerges concedes that the “[t]he depth of Islamic spirituality, the extent of its reach into 
daily life, would be hard for even fundamentalist Christians to comprehend,” let alone a 
secularist or atheist for whom religion plays a limited or non-existent role in day-to-day 
living.
Like the other hermeneutic analyses, Gerges also distinguishes between the wide variety 
of Islamist movements in existence, including what he calls the “local and global 
jihadists,” the former including the Lebanese Hizbullah, Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad and 
al-Jama’a al-Islamiya, the latter al Qaeda and lone jihadists, generally young men
17Sgalvanized into action by their anger at U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.
To substantiate this position, Gerges references “dozens of interviews, sermons, and 
lectures” o f Hizbollah’s spiritual founding father, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, in 
which he rejected the al Qaeda claim that the suicide bombings o f 9/11 were religiously
173 Gerges, 2007, 144.
174 Ibid., 35.
175 Ibid., 229.
132
sanctioned, concluding later that “[t]he majority o f Islamists and jihadists” believe 9/11
176“was a catastrophic blunder.” According to Gerges, the majority of Islamist also 
oppose the use of terror tactics in what they otherwise deem a legitimate resistance 
against foreign occupation, condemning the killing of civilians in Iraq, including
1 nn
diplomats and government employees. Unlike the “ideologization of terror” analyses, 
Gerges also acknowledges the role of motives in discussing use of violence as a tactic 
employed by Islamists, quoting approvingly a member of al-Jama’a al Islamiya who 
defensively argues: “[w]e were not bom with a violent gene. We were not inherently 
violent. Our violence was a product of a political vision, specific conditions, and
178circumstance.” The equation, according to Gerges, could be changing, though, as an 
increasingly significant segment o f the Muslim population becomes incensed by the 
United States’ aggressive policies vis-a-vis the Middle East, a feeling which could 
translate into greater levels of violence should the U.S. government decide to continue 
along the current policy trajectory for the region.
3. Conclusion
In this chapter I have demonstrated the two most prominent ways in which the IR/social 
science meta-narrative has impacted mainstream analyses of political Islam: through the 
tendency o f scholars to view political Islam within the “ideologization of terror” 
framework, and through their proclivity to view political Islam as an anti-modem 
reaction to various socioeconomic or political developments. In both instances, substance 
is sacrificed in the name of theoretical parsimony, and ovemsed, essentialist, and often 
racist stereotypes replace reasoned analysis. Another common feature o f these 
approaches is their tendency to say more about the authors’ visions of the West, which is 
generally their physical and epistemological location, than about the subject they claim to 
be analysing. In other words, political Islam’s role in the academic discourse discussed 
here is similar to that of the Oriental other in Edward Said’s seminal work, and is 
similarly used as a benchmark by which to view the West’s modernity, rationality and
176 Ibid., 224.
177 Ibid., 257.
178 Ibid., 293.
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humanity. Despite the variety of alternative approaches to the study of political Islam 
discussed here, all of which challenge the orientalist assumptions of Reactive analyses, 
the tendency within non-academic genres of the discourse continues to be to view 
Islamist movements via the modem rationalist paradigm derived from the mainstream 
IR/social science narratives of such central theoretical concepts as the “state,” 
“sovereignty,” “modernity,” “rationality,” etc.
In order to understand the persistence and impact of this new form of Orientalism, which 
regards political Islam, rather than Islam, the Arab world, or the “Orient” in general, as 
the West’s perennial other, on U.S. relations with the Muslim world, one must first 
consider the “power political” component of the discourse. In order to do so the next 
chapter will explore the history of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, paying particular 
attention to the relationship between the development of U.S. power in the region post- 
World War II and the attendant development o f mainstream American orientalist 
perspectives of the region. The chapters that follow will consider the ways in which this 
dynamic relationship between “power intellectual” and “power political” have impacted, 
and been impacted by, the perceptions of policy and opinion makers in the United States 
with regards to political Islam.
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Chapter Three: A Brief History of the Development of “American Orientalism”7
It is quite common [today] to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak 
o f changing the map o f  the Middle East, as i f  ancient societies and myriad peoples 
can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. But this has often happened with the 
“Orient, ” that semi-mythical construct which since Napoleon’s invasion o f  Egypt in 
the late eighteenth century has been made and remade countless times.
-Edward Said2
Language has always been the companion o f empire.
-Antonio de Nebija3
As has been argued thus far in the thesis, the principal components o f Orientalism as 
they relate to the interdependent and pernicious relationship between knowledge and 
power that defined the European colonial relationships with the Middle East/Muslim 
world continue to affect the perceptions and actions o f the West, and particularly the 
United States. The persistence o f orientalist stereotypes in “modem rationalist” 
analyses o f political Islam, and in “ideologization o f terror” and anti-modem, reactive 
analyses in particular, as described in the previous chapter, is a vivid reminder o f the 
legacy o f European colonialism and the impact it has had on Americans’ 
understanding of, and relations with, the Muslim world. In this chapter I will consider 
the origins and development of the “power political” component o f this unique strand 
o f Orientalism, proving the continued relevance o f Said’s seminal book.
Certainly Said was selective in the works he chose to analyze, as his critics have 
claimed, and no doubt Orientalism had the ironic effect o f portraying the “West” in 
the same monolithic light that he sought to dispel when looking at the “East.” Yet it is 
farfetched to argue that Orientalism is “a work o f malignant charlatanry in which it is 
hard to distinguish honest mistakes from wilful misrepresentations”4, or that it has 
restricted the discipline o f Middle Eastern Studies by creating an overly “pro-
1 Borrowed from the title o f  Douglass Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the M iddle 
East since 1945  (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003).
2 Edward Said, “A W indow on the World,” The Guardian (2 August 2003).
3 Nebrija was the author o f  the first published book o f  grammar o f  a modem European language. 
Quoted in Todorov, 123.
4 Robert Irwin, quoted in Bamaby Rogerson, “For Lust o f  Knowing: the Orientalists and their Enemies, 
by Robert Irwin, U nwise Men in the East,” The Independent, 2006.
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Islamic”5 academic environment, limited by the “nationalization” o f history, or stifled 
by a McCarthyite culture o f fear in which scholars engage in self-censorship so as to 
avoid punishment for politically incorrect analysis.6 Often lost in these criticisms is 
the very nuance these authors accuse Said o f lacking.
Regardless o f the criticisms that could justifiably be leveled at his work, particularly 
concerning scope, it seems implausible to deny Said’s impact in bringing attention to 
the intricate ways in which the power/knowledge nexus has impacted the study o f the 
Middle East, as well as to the manifold interactions between the construction, 
accumulation and consolidation o f knowledge on the region and the W est’s political, 
economic and military relations with it. Many o f  these critiques, by concentrating “on 
the scholarly high ground o f linguistics, philology and history” where Said’s thesis 
was most vulnerable, tend to ‘throw the baby out with the bath water’ by overlooking 
the much stronger aspect o f his critique concerning “the swamp ground o f opinion- 
makers: all the half-educated journalists, diplomats, administrators, artists, film­
makers and popular historians who have entered the field,” some o f whose less- 
nuanced contributions to the orientalist discourse will be discussed in the last two 
chapters o f this thesis.7
Said’s theory o f Orientalism is based on “the assumption that the Orient is not an inert 
fact o f nature,” but rather a synthetic, Western construct which has served as a 
consistent benchmark o f inferiority against which Europeans have judged their own
o
superiority. Through the essentialized “description” of the colonized Orient, the 
anthropologist, sociologist, philologist, or policy maker
could bring the Orient closer to Europe, thereafter to absorb it entirely 
and —  centrally important —  to cancel, or at least subdue and reduce, 
its strangeness and, in the case o f Islam, its hostility. For the Islamic 
Orient would henceforth appear as a category denoting the 
Orientalists’ power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their 
history as history.9
5 Joshua Teitelbaum and Meir Litvak, “Students, Teachers, and Edward Said: Taking Stock o f  
Orientalism,” trans. Keren Ribo, MER1A Journal 10, no. 1, Article 2 (March 2006).
6 See for example Henry Munson, “Intolerable Tolerance: Western Academia and Islamic 
Fundamentalism,” Connection  5, no. 3 (1993).
7 Rogerson.
8 Said, 1979 ,4 .
9 Ibid., 87.
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Orientalism has continued to limit the space in which the Muslim other (this time in 
the guise o f “Islamic fundamentalist”) is able to exist as an assertive subject to be 
understood and engaged, rather than a subservient object to be judged and controlled. 
As Todorov has argued, the pursuit o f knowledge about the other will always be 
oppressive so long as his/her subjecthood is denied. “[UJnless grasping is 
accompanied by a full acknowledgement o f the other as subject, it risks being used for 
purposes o f exploitation, o f “taking”; knowledge will be subordinated to power.”10In 
order to comprehend the persistence of orietnalism, albeit in its new guise, one must 
first understand its origins and development in the “New World” which mirrors, in 
many ways, its development in the “Old,” a subject Said so eloquently assessed in his 
book. As M. Shahid Alam contends, “what makes this repackaged Orientalism new 
are its intentions, its proponents, and the enemy it has targeted for destruction.”11 The 
various components of this “repackaged Orientalism” will all be examine in the 
following sections.
1. American Orientali: Early Years
Although the focus o f Said’s seminal book is largely on Orientalism’s development 
and impact on 18th and 19th century colonial Europe, he concludes the book with a 
discussion of its insidious spread into the American psyche as U.S. interest in the 
Arab world has increased. In the section “Orientalism Now,” Said argues that “since 
World W ar II, and more noticeably after each o f the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arab 
Muslim has become a figure in American popular culture, even as in the academic 
world, in the policy planner’s world, and in the world o f business very serious 
attention is being paid to the Arab.” This had largely to do with a shift in the balance 
o f power in world politics, with power moving away from the old European imperial 
powers —  Britain and France —  and towards the increasingly economically and 
militarily dominant United States. As Said writes, “a vast web of interests now linked 
all parts o f the former colonial world to the United States, just as a proliferation o f 
academic subspecialties divided (and yet connected) all the former philological and
10 Todorov, 132.
11 M. Shahid Alam, “A Repackaged Rationale for Dual Control o f  the Middle East: Israel, the US and 
the N ew  Orientalism,” Counterpunch.org (14 July 2006).
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1 ?European based disciplines like Orientalism.” The American Orientalist was more 
likely to take the guise o f an “area specialist” than a philologist or anthropologist, yet 
his role was largely the same: to put essentialized and distorted knowledge o f the
1 "Xregion “at the service o f government or business or both.”
Yet despite the seeming ease with which the orientalist methodologies and theories 
were transferred from the “Old” to the “New” World, the process was not always 
smooth sailing, as Americans’ knowledge (even distorted) o f the Middle East was 
much more limited than that o f their European counterparts. What little knowledge 
the Americans had o f the Middle East in 1776 was most likely derived from two 
seminal books then popular amongst the literate classes at the time: the King James 
Bible and Scheherazade’s A Thousand and One Arabian Nights. This was hardly 
surprising, considering the lack o f commercial and diplomatic exchange between the 
United States and the region. This situation began to change towards the middle o f the 
next century though, when the “Middle East began to loom larger on America’s 
diplomatic and cultural horizon during what Mark Twain called 'the Gilded Age,' not 
only because United States missionaries sought to save more souls, but also because 
United States merchants sought to expand trade.”14
By the 1870s, American businessmen were purchasing half o f Turkey’s opium crop 
for resale in China and selling everything from warships to kerosene to the Ottoman 
Empire. Yet increased commercial ties with the Middle East did not, unfortunately, 
lead to expanded knowledge. In fact, it seemed the more contact Americans made 
with the people o f the Middle East, the more distorted their view o f them became, a 
fact undoubtedly related to the asymmetric power relations between the United States 
and regional powers. Remarking on his admiration for British efforts to spread 
Western “civilization” to the darkest comers o f the world, U.S. President Theodore 
Roosevelt, who believed the United States must play its part in shouldering “the white 
man's burden,” confessed privately in 1907 that “it is impossible to expect moral, 
intellectual and material well-being where Mohammedanism is supreme.”15
12 Said, 1979, 285.
13 Said, 1979, 285.
14 Little, 14.
15 Little, 15.
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The orientalist vision o f the Middle East became more entrenched as U.S. 
involvement in the region expanded towards the end o f World War I. In a report 
commissioned by President Wilson in the summer o f 1919, General James Harbord 
advised that, should the United States decide to increase its involvement in the region 
in light of the demise o f the Ottoman Empire, it must be aware o f the nature o f the 
people it would confront, including the “bloodthirsty, unregenerate and revengeful” 
attitude of the “indolent and pleasure-loving Turk” and the “traditional lawlessness of 
migrating Kurds and Arabs,” whose desire for “reprisals for past wrongs will be 
strong for at least a generation.”16 This prescient report was noteworthy for 
elaborating the U.S. vision of the Muslim Middle East, a vision that would shape U.S. 
policy towards the region for decades to come.
The orientalist perception generated and sustained by politicians to explain U.S. 
exceptionalism and justify certain foreign policy decisions necessitated by its position 
in the world found a helpful ally in the media. Douglas Little eloquently describes the 
popular culture version o f Orientalism that fed off of, but also fed into, the discourse 
on the Muslim world being consolidated in policy-making circles:
Grounded in a Social Darwinistic belief in the racial inferiority o f 
Arabs, Kurds, and Turks, sustained by an abiding faith in the 
superiority o f the United States, Orientalism American style became a 
staple o f popular culture during the 1920s through such media as B 
movies, best-selling books, and mass circulation magazines. 
Hollywood blockbusters such as The Sheik (1921), the Thief o f  
Baghdad (1924), and Beau Geste (1926) propelled Rudolph Valentino, 
Douglas Fairbanks, and Ronald Colman to stardom, while reinforcing 
popular stereotypes o f the Arabs as a culturally backward, sexually 
depraved, and congenitally violent people.17
Popular magazines, such as National Geographic and works published by the 
American Oriental Society (founded in 1842) which often carried accounts o f 
travelers to the region, reinforcing this image by featuring stories conveying the 
notion o f a “widening political and cultural gap between Occident and Orient in the
1 ftMiddle East.” In popular culture as in politics, the “Orient’s” backwardness
16 Little, 17.
17 Ibid., 17.
18Ibid., 18-19. An article published in December 1927, titled “East o f  Suez to the Mount o f  
Decalogue,” discussed the “fatalistic and irresponsible Arabs” who wandered the Sinai Desert as 
childlike camel jockeys shunning Western technology and embracing Mohammeden superstition.”
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fascinated Americans and was a benchmark by which to judge their own progress. As 
Fuad Sha’ban writes:
There was something about the primitive state o f the Oriental, 
especially the Bedouin society that appealed to American travelers. 
Perhaps the Arab o f the desert was a reminder o f the past innocence o f 
America before the advent o f political, cultural and industrial maturity.
In a sense the Arab provided an outlet, an escape to the world of 
romance and simplicity ... The desert setting and the simple, primitive 
life o f Muslims, especially the Bedouins, made them particularly 
attractive to the traveler. In his eyes they were the direct descendants 
o f Ishmael, retaining all the wild nature, purity and simplicity 
associated with that original prototype.19
Through such popular films, magazines and orientalist travel accounts o f the peoples 
and cultures o f the Middle East did Americans become familiarized with the region.
2. American Orientalism: Post-World War II
It was not until WWII that the U.S. government would quantitatively expand its 
presence in the Middle East, and with this expansion, develop the need for more 
extensive information on the region. As Said argues, once:
Cairo, Teheran, and North Africa were important arenas o f war, and in 
that setting, with the exploitation o f [Middle Eastern] oil, strategic, and 
human resources pioneered by Britain and France, the United States 
prepared for its new post-war imperial role.
Not the least aspect o f this role was a “cultural relations policy,” as it 
was defined by Mortimer Graves in 1950... For what was clearly at 
stake, Graves argued (to very receptive ears) was the need for “much 
better American understanding o f the forces which are contending with 
the American idea for acceptance by the Near East. The principal o f
OC\these are, o f course, communism and Islam.”
Little concurs with Said’s assessment o f  the United States’ post-WWII increased 
projection o f power in the Middle East, pointing out in particular the role played by 
the region’s large reserves o f “black gold” at a time when United States demand for 
the vital substance was outpacing domestic supply. “[WJithin ten years of V-J Day,”
1; Fuad Sha’ban, Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought (Durham, NC: Acorn Press, 1991), 185- 
186 .
20 Said, 1979, 295.
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“the nature o f U.S. interests in the Middle East had come into sharp focus, as had the
'J1policies that U.S. officials deemed necessary to promote and protect them.”
As the hot wars o f WWII faded into memory and the United States’ attention turned
to the emerging “communist threat,” the entire state-system came to be viewed
through the prism o f the Cold War, neatly divided between allies and enemies.
Muslim states and movements, like their counterparts in other parts o f the world, were
22
judged according to which side of the dividing line they were perceived to fall into. 
Arab nationalists who challenged the status quo were variously labeled “Marxists,” 
“fundamentalists,” or “terrorists,” in an effort to undermine the legitimacy o f their 
demands for greater independence for the region vis-a-vis the West, as well as to 
justify periodic intervention in the region to either prop up unpopular pro-Western, 
anti-leftist regimes, or, if  necessary, destabilize or overthrow governments deemed to 
be in opposition to U.S. interests in the region.
In order to justify this type o f intervention in the region, a convincing enemy other 
had to first be rhetorically constructed, which meant the demeaning dichotomies 
originally deployed a century or more earlier to justify European colonialism were 
dragged out o f the Western imperial closet and reused. It is within this context that 
one should view Dwight Eisenhower’s memoirs, in which he questioned, in 
traditional orientalist style, the rationality and maturity of the Egyptian nationalist 
movement. In one telling passage, Eisenhower accused Gamal Abdel Nasser o f 
forsaking Britain’s “modem program of independence for countries once under part 
of the Empire,” in favor o f “virulent nationalism and unreasoning prejudice,” in which
•j'y
there was “evidence o f Communist meddling.”
Arab nationalism was also seen as a threat by many American academics who 
adopted what they believed was a “pragmatic” stance on the issue, arguing 
movements like Nasser’s could only be accepted by the West i f  they became less 
radical and more amenable to U.S. interests in the region. As one prominent British 
Orientalist working in the United States at the time put it, the Arab world will not be
2J Said, 1979, 308.
Robert Springborg, “The Need for a Machiavellian, Not an Idealistic Uncle Sam,” London M iddle 
East Institute Publication  (August, 2006).
23 Little, 27.
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able to improve its situation until its “nationalism is prepared to come to terms with 
the West.”24 By the time o f Eisenhower’s presidency, the view o f  Arabs as irrational 
and naive, and thus unduly susceptible to outside (communist) control, was already 
beginning to seep into the collective American psyche. In 1958, two years after 
Nasser seized the Suez Canal, in an event that seemed to confirm all the nightmare 
scenarios o f U.S. officials, Eisenhower sent U.S. Marines to Lebanon to support a 
pro-American regime facing opposition from Nasserite dissidents. In a strategy 
deliberating session, Eisenhower warned the National Security Council that “the 
underlying Arab thinking” was entrenched in “violence, emotion and ignorance.”
Although Said thought its roots could be traced to WWII, it was the October 1973 
Arab-Israeli war that he believed had the greatest impact on a newly-minted American 
brand of Orientalism which would later come to shape the way Americans viewed the 
rise o f political Islam in the Middle East. After the war,
the Arab appeared everywhere as something more menacing.. .He is 
seen as the disrupter o f Israel’s and the West’s existence, or in another 
view o f  the same thing, as a surmountable obstacle to Israel’s creation 
in 1948. Insofar as this Arab has any history, it is part o f the history 
given to him (or taken from him: the difference is slight) by the 
Orientalist tradition, and later, the Zionist tradition 27
And as was typical with its European predecessor, in American Orientalism Arabs 
were seen as incapable o f representing that past, or present for that matter. Said gives 
the example o f the 1973 New York Times Magazine series o f articles on the 1973 war, 
in which the two sides o f the conflict were presented. The Israeli narrative was 
represented by an Israeli lawyer, “the Arab side by an American former ambassador 
to an Arab country who had no formal training in Oriental studies,” an act that calls to 
mind Marx’s statement regarding peasants in the Eighteenth Brumaire: “they cannot 
represent themselves; they must be represented.”
24 Quoted in Said, 1979, 321.
25 Little, 27.
26 As Said argues, prior to WWII, ‘T h e American experience o f  the O rient... was limited.” A s a result, 
“there was no deeply invested tradition o f  Orientalism, and consequently in the United States 
knowledge o f  the Orient never passed through the refining and rearticulating and reconstructing 
process, whose beginning was in philology study, that it went through in Europe.” Said, 1979, 290.
27 Said, 1979, 286.
28 Said, 1979, 293; Karl Mark, Eighteenth Brumaire (London: Electric Book Co., 2001).
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In a way, the Palestinian struggle for self-determination (and against an occupation 
originally imposed by the former mandate/colonial system and subsequently 
supported by the West, and the United States in particular) could be seen as a 
microcosm o f the Arab world’s wider political and ideological struggle against 
Western neo-imperialism. Likewise, Western representations o f the individuals and 
movements involved in this struggle have also been emblematic o f the general 
orientalist narrative o f the Arab/Muslim world, which began to firmly take root on 
American soil during this period. As with the Palestinian, the Arab in general was
90
either a “stupid savage, or a negligible quantity, morally and even existentially.” 
Both were backward, fanatical, violent and incapable o f change, whereas the Israelis, 
constructed in the discourse to form the most eastern outpost o f Western 
“civilization,” were portrayed as modem, adaptable, intelligent and moderate. The 
Palestinians were merely obstacles, blocking Israeli attempts to “make the desert 
bloom”; “they were inconsequential nomads possessing no real claim on the land 
therefore no cultural or national reality.”30
These same stereotypes came to form part of the more general discourse on the 
Arab/Muslim world beyond Palestine, partially as a result of the Israeli 
propaganda campaign to convince the West, and the United States in particular, 
of their shared fate as partners in the same civilizational struggle against a 
violent and unenlightened Arab/Muslim world. According to Alam,
Once they had succeeded in creating Israel, the Zionists knew that 
its long-term survival depended on fomenting wars between the 
West and Islam. Zionism has pursued this goal by its own wars 
against Arabs and, since 1967, a brutal occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza; but equally, it has pulled all the stops to convince 
the United States to support unconditionally Israel’s depredations 
against Arabs.31
The year 1973 heralded a change in the West’s perception of the Middle East for 
another reason: the oil embargo of the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC), which targeted any state that supported Israel in
29 Ibid., 305.
30 Ibid., 286.
31 M. Shahid Alam, “A Repackaged Rationale for Dual Control o f  the Middle East: Israel, the U S and 
the N ew  Orientalism,” Counterpuncln.org (14 July 2006).
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its conflict with its Arab neighbours (i.e., the United States and its Western 
European allies). At the time OAPEC members raised oil prices 70-100%, 
effectively quadrupling them, and damaging, albeit temporarily, the economies 
of the targeted states.32 This act led to a preponderance of references to scheming 
Arab oil sheikhs, with cartoons appearing everywhere depicting them “standing 
behind gasoline pump[s]...their sharply hooked noses, the evil mustachioed leer 
on their faces,” an image persisting today in the form of the shady Saudi prince 
using his excessive amounts of money to pay for, interchangeably, prostitutes or 
weapons for Islamist extremists. According to Said, this period witnessed a 
proliferation of orientalist books and articles published on Islam and the Arabs 
that “represent(ed) absolutely no change over the virulent anti-Islamist polemics 
of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.”34
The framing of the events of 4 November 1979 by the U.S. media helped to 
consolidate the discourse of the backwards, irrational and violent Muslim/Arab. 
It was on this day that enthusiastic student participants in the Iranian revolution 
occupied the American embassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage, 
providing over a year’s worth of news fodder for an increasingly sensationalist 
U.S. media in its portrayal of all issues related to Islam and/or the Middle East. 
The fear-mongering headlines these events inspired, such as Time magazine’s 
“An Ideology of Martyrdom,” or Newsweek’s “Iran’s Martyr Complex,” and 
typically orientalist editorials such as the Wall Street JournaPs on 20 November 
1979, lamenting the decline of Western influence in the region and the 
subsequent “receding civilization” it engendered, would not seem out of place in 
the post-9/11 media environment.35 For Gerges, the 444 days period in which the 
hostages were held transformed the way Americans perceived the threat 
emanating from the ‘Orient’. “It was under the impact of the Iranian revolution, 
then, that Islamism replaced secular nationalism as a security threat to U.S. 
interests, and a fear of a clash between Islam and the West crystallized in the 
minds of Americans.”36
32 Nicolas Sarkis,” OPEC’s Influence,” Le M onde Diplomatique, May 2006.
33 Said, 1979, 286.
34 Ibid., 286.
35 Said, 1997, 84.
36 Gerges, 43.
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Focusing on the revolution’s impact on the ‘“reality producing’ cultural system” 
that affects not only the way Americans perceive Iran as a “monolithic, 
unchangeable, eternally anarchic place,”37 but also the way in which U.S. foreign 
policy towards the country is created, implemented and justified, Adib- 
Moghaddam argues that the mainstream narrative of the events of 1979 must be 
seen within the context of “the epistemology of US representations of the ‘other’, 
into the cultural apparatus that has been able to take the ‘West’ (embodied by 
‘America’) as a starting point for-and Endziel of- civilization.”38 For Said, the 
(representations of the Iranian revolution in the U.S. media were emblematic of 
the “sustained diet of information” it fed the American public about the Muslim 
world in general, “about a people, a culture, a religion- really no more than a 
poorly defined and badly misunderstood abstraction- always, in the case of Iran, 
represented as militant, dangerous, and anti-America,” and in this sense served a 
vital role in constructing a threatening other against which the U.S. could define 
itself as exceptional.39
This era also witnessed the establishment of ties that would prove enduring 
between academia and the state regarding the study of the Middle East, thus 
mimicking another facet of European Orientalism. In one of many examples 
provided to substantiate this development, Said discusses the case of Monroe 
Berger, professor of sociology and Near Eastern studies at Princeton and then 
president of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), who wrote a report at 
the behest of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1967 entitled 
“Middle Eastern and North African Studies: Developments and Needs.” 40 Said is 
especially critical of the praise Berger lavished on the Middle East programs and 
research centres established with funding allocated by the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (which Said calls “a directly Sputnik-inspired initiative”),
3715
38
39 Said, 1997, 83.
40 MESA was created in 1966 as a joint initiative between the nongovernmental social science 
organisations Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and American Council o f  Learned Societies 
(ACLS), under the leadership o f  Monroe Berger and with the funding from the Ford Foundation, with 
the purpose o f  establishing an umbrella organization for “all those interested in the scholarly study o f  
the M iddle East, regardless o f  their disciplinary affiliations.” Lockman, 128.
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which he viewed as a breach of academic freedom and evidence of the 
instrumentalization of knowledge for power. Said points out what he views as the 
orientalist assumptions littered throughout Berger’s analysis of the state of 
Middle Eastern studies in the United States, as evidenced in this passage:
The modern Middle East and North Africa is not a centre of great 
cultural achievement, nor is it likely to become one in the near 
future. The study of the region and its languages, therefore, does 
not constitute its own reward so far as modern culture is concerned 
.... The contemporary Middle East, thus, has only in small degree 
the kinds of traits that seem to be important in attracting scholarly 
attention, (emphasis added)41
Here Berger fails to define the criteria by which he distinguishes “modern 
culture” from its assumed opposite, “traditional” culture, nor what constitutes a 
“great cultural achievement”; he does not need to. He assumes everyone reading 
the report will understand that the Middle East is a culturally backward region, 
and thus undeserving of any substantial analysis.
Said goes on to argue that Berger’s ideas and attitude toward the Middle East were 
indicative o f a larger trend transforming the discipline at the time and evidenced by 
the preponderance o f one-size-fit-all “scientific” approaches, which entailed: “its 
conversion from a fundamentally philological discipline and a vaguely general 
apprehension o f the Orient into a social science speciality.” This transformation meant 
that the orientalist need no longer “master the esoteric languages o f the Orient; he 
begins instead as a trained social scientist and 'applies' his science to the Orient, or 
anywhere else.” This is the specifically American contribution to the history o f 
Orientalism, which came to view the existence o f the Oriental other not as a religious 
or civilizational threat, as it had been viewed for centuries in Europe, but rather as an 
“administrative issue,” a matter for policy makers. Hence the need for the “social 
scientist and the new expert, on whose somewhat narrower shoulders was to fall the 
mantle o f Orientalism.”42
41 Monroe Berger, The A rab World Today (New  York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964), 140, quoted 
in Said, 1979, 288.
42 Said, 1979, 290.
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Lockman concurs with this assessment o f the roots of American Orientalism, and 
provides further evidence to substantiate the points raised by Said nearly three 
decades earlier. For example, Lockman points out that federal funding for the study o f 
Middle Eastern languages and cultures rose significantly in the late 1960s and 1970s 
as the Defense Department became “increasingly alarmed” by developments in the 
region, including the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent oil embargo, and the 1979 
Islamist revolution in Iran. With increased federal funding came the proliferation of 
Middle East studies centers at some o f the nation’s most prestigious universities, a 
phenomenon “closely linked to Cold War policy-makers’ heightened need for reliable 
knowledge about critical regions of the world.”43 In the absence o f adequately 
qualified American scholars capable o f leading these new programs, European 
scholars such as the English Orientalist H.A.R. Gibb and the Viennese Gustave von 
Grunabaum were recruited to head the Middle East Studies Centers at Harvard and 
UCLA respectively, bringing with them their European orientalist methodologies and 
theories.44 Many o f these European scholars were happy to make the transition from a 
traditionally academic study o f the Middle East to one more policy oriented and 
aligned with national interests. According to Gibb, the Orient “was now much too 
important to be left to the Orientalists alone; it had become necessary to have 
Orientalists and social scientists work together to produce knowledge about the 
Middle East and Islam that was not only more comprehensive but also o f more use to 
policymakers.”45
Although scholars such as Bernard Lewis would continue to carry the torch o f 
European Orientalism in the United States, their essentialist, civilizational-based 
approaches to the study o f the Middle East soon gave way to a new paradigm, de 
riguer at the time for explaining the economic and social “backwardness” o f Third 
World countries: “modernization theory.” As discussed in previous chapters, this 
approach is premised on the belief that “modernization” is a unilinear process 
entailing several stages o f economic and social developments in which traditional 
societies, conceived as “essentially rural, agricultural, authoritarian and based on 
personal and oral modes o f communication,” would eventually transform into modem
43Ibid., 129.
44 Ibid., 126.
45Ibid., 129.
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societies, conceived as “urban, industrial, literate, participatory and based on 
communications through various mass media.”46 By focusing on contemporary issues 
relating to what they saw as the economic underdevelopment and political and social 
stagnancy o f the states that comprised the Middle East, adherents to the 
“modernization” paradigm differed from traditional Orientalists who still tended to 
view “Islamic civilization during its ‘classical age,’ i.e., before its long decline set in,” 
as their “primary object o f study.”47
Despite their divergent descriptions of the inferior other, defined in “temporal” terms 
in the “modernization” paradigm and “spatial” and “ethical” terms in Orientalism, 
both approaches shared a dichotomous reading o f the Middle East, one which lent 
itself to the imperialist, and later neo-imperialist, designs o f governments seeking to 
gain control over peoples they deemed less advanced. As in the case o f Orientalism, 
“modernization theory” was used to justify Western intervention in Middle Eastern 
states in order to facilitate their “modernization,” or what in earlier times would have 
been referred to as their “civilization.”
It took Middle Eastern scholars more than a decade longer than their colleagues in 
other regional studies departments to begin to openly question the potentially 
damaging impact o f government, in particular Defense-related funding on the 
integrity o f their work and, even more importantly, on the Middle Eastern peoples and 
societies at the “receiving end o f American global power.”48 Even though most U.S. 
scholars o f the Middle East and Islam were no doubt researching issues unrelated to 
policymaking, or were divergent in their views o f U.S. foreign policy, as Lockman 
points out, “it remains true that in a range o f disciplines and fields —  perhaps most 
notably political science and those area studies fields which, like Middle East studies, 
focused on key arenas o f the Cold War —  scholarly agendas were often influenced by 
the needs o f the ‘national security state’ to which the Cold War had given birth.”49 
And even after the discipline caught up with its African, Asian and Latin American 
regional studies counterparts, by recognizing the pernicious effects o f government 
funding and adopting more critical methodologies in their studies, most Western
46 Ibid., 136-137.
47 Ibid., 139.
48 Ibid., 146.
49 Ibid.
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scholars o f the Middle East seemed no closer to understanding the contemporary 
cultures, social and political systems and worldviews o f the peoples o f the region than 
were their orientalist predecessors.
Just as the orientalists and “modernization theory” approaches to the study o f the 
Middle East prohibited an understanding o f developments that could disturb the 
central presuppositions on which their theories/methodologies were based, Marxist 
and political economy approaches, originally seen as antidotes to mainstream 
orientalist approaches, were also unable to accommodate regional developments that 
challenged their rigid ideologies. As a result, some o f the major transformative events 
o f the decade, including the rise o f political Islam, went undetected by pre-eminent 
scholars in the field. According to Lockman, this oversight was due to the 
“teleological vision o f historical progress shared by both liberal modernization theory 
and classical Marxism and traceable back to the Enlightenment era, which posited 
secularization as the inexorable wave o f the future.”50
3. American Orientalism: Post-Cold War
As with the development European Orientalism, which occurred in tandem with the 
increased European colonial power over the region, Said saw the more policy-focused 
American orientalist discourse in the 1960s and 1970s as part o f the United States’ 
increased political and military hegemony over the Middle East, a point Lockman’s 
research seems to bear out. A series o f Middle East crises —  the 1956 Suez Canal 
crisis, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and the 1979 Islamic revolution —  led 
successive U.S. governments to re-evaluate the country’s policies towards the region, 
a process which necessitated the expertise o f Middle East scholars. While the basic 
framework o f U.S. interests (based on oil, Israel and containment o f the USSR) 
remained unchanged from the 1940s through the 1990s, over time U.S. officials came 
to believe that those interests could no longer be secured through what was seen 
increasingly as an ineffective policy driven by a combination o f “covert action and 
modernization theory, occasionally punctuated by military intervention.”51
50 Ibid., 173.
51 Little, 309.
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With the fall o f the Soviet Union the United States increasingly came to see itself as 
the bearer the mantle o f the new world order, a vision that led to a bolder Middle East 
policy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided the United States with the perfect 
pretext in which to assert its newfound status. As Stephen Chan points out, although 
the “[t]he Cold War had been won in the symbolic moment when the Berlin Wall 
came down,” it was during the first Gulf War that American, and through them 
Western, “values were deemed to have met their first post-Cold War test, and passed.” 
In this context, Francis Fukuyama’s reflections on the “end o f history” would provide
a leitmotiv for the triumphalism that followed the victories o f the Cold 
and Gulf War. Following Hegel, history had ended with its own 
consummation, and liberal democracy had not only won but had 
established itself as the best possible government, as the best possible 
result o f political history moving inexorably to this point.52
Yet celebration was subdued as American foreign policy makers and analysts paused 
to contemplate the actual significance o f this “end o f history” and with it the 
emergence o f the proverbial “last man” who “inhabited the achievement o f liberal 
history.”53
At this point the seeds o f an entirely new foreign policy were planted, in anticipation 
o f what Fukuyama, combining Hegelian and Nietzschean images and concepts, 
described as the “first man” o f a new history. In a book written in 1992, three years 
after his celebrated article was published in The National Interest, Fukuyama argued 
that the “new ‘first men,’ deprived and uncomfortable in the historically realized 
world, would not exhibit the historically conditioned and civilized attributes o f desire 
and reason —  they would thereby be ‘bestial’...In their desire for recognition the 
slaves would rise against the masters and restart history.”54 In this Durkheimian view 
o f the “anomie” which would result from the definitive end o f one era and the 
emergence o f another, it was the Islamist/”fundamentalist” who would rise as the 
“first man” o f this new history, capable o f threatening the Western liberal order that 
had risen from the ashes o f the Cold War.
52 Steven Chan, Out o f  Evil: New International Politics and O ld Doctrines o f  War (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2005), 27.
53 Ibid., 27.
54 Ibid.
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According to this analysis, although the seeds had been sown for a foreign policy 
capable o f dealing with this new “threat,” it would not be until Bush Jr. was elected to 
the White House that they would actually be harvested. Yet one should be cautious in 
attributing the emergence o f political Islam as a perceived threat in the eyes o f U.S. 
foreign policy makers, scholars, and media to one specific date or event. As Fawaz 
Gerges points out, political Islam entered Western government’s threat radar in the 
1970s, first with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (described in the Muslim world in 
religious terms as the “Ramadan war,” in contrast to the war that preceded it in 1967, 
which was fought in the name o f Arab nationalism), then culminating with the 1979 
Islamic revolution in Iran and the ensuing hostage crisis, which “shocked many 
American officials into viewing Islam as a threat to Western interests.”55 It was the 
latter event that actually led to Islamism replacing secular nationalism as the U.S.’ 
principal adversary in the region, at least on the rhetorical level. In fact, the hostage 
event and how it was presented by American politicians and media had such a major 
impact on the American psyche that it may have altered the outcome o f the 1980 
presidential elections, as many Americans rejected what they perceived as President 
Jimmy Carter’s failure to deal effectively with the crisis.
Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, made it a point to emphasize his anti-Islamist 
credentials from the beginning, calling Libyan President Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi a 
“barbarian,” claiming that “Libyan terrorism was part o f a worldwide Islamic 
fundamentalist movement,” and that “Muslims were reverting to their belief that 
unless they killed a Christian or a Jew they would not go to heaven.”56 Yet despite the 
rhetoric, the Regan administration’s policy showed that, within policy making circles 
at least, the world was still seen through Cold War lenses. Throughout much o f the 
Reagan administration, U.S. foreign policy was more concerned with fighting the 
communist “Evil Empire” than with fighting Islamic “extremism,” as evidenced by 
Reagan’s support for the Islamist mujahadeen’s war to end the Soviet occupation o f 
Afghanistan. In addition, the “symbolic import” o f the revolution to Muslims was 
lost on most Western audiences, “namely that the limitations created by the
55 Gerges, 1999, 41.
56 Ibid., 70.
57 George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the M iddle East (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1990), 227; Mahmood Mamdani, G ood Muslim, B ad Muslim: America, the C old  War, and the 
Roots o f  Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2003).
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hegemonic pretensions o f Western culture over a society to which it was alien could 
be superseded.”58
According to Gerges, Islamists were not seen as representing a “coherent, viable 
threat to the stability o f the international order” until the end of the 1980s, a period in 
which the world witnessed the demise o f the Soviet Union and the concomitant rise o f 
political Islam as a potential challenge to the secular, pro-Western dictatorships that 
largely characterized the region.59 Although succeeding presidents George Bush and 
Bill Clinton, would come to define U.S. policy towards political Islam in more 
concrete terms, both were still firmly rooted in the “accomodationist” camp, thus 
avoiding the “clash of civilizations” paradigm and, at least rhetorically, promoting an 
“awareness o f the fluid, ambiguous, and splintered nature o f Islamic revivalism.”60
Yet it would be a mistake to see the policies o f these presidents towards political 
Islam as monolithic and unchanging. Both tended to adopt more accomodationist 
policies only when the circumstances suited U.S. security and strategic interests (e.g., 
Bush’s support for Afghani mujahedeen to overcome the Soviet enemy, Clinton’s 
initial covert support for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria when they 
looked politically ascendant). Likewise, both adopted more confrontationalist policies 
when they were deemed necessary to promote or protect those same interests (e.g., 
Bush’s support for the Algerian government’s crackdown on the FIS when it looked 
like the government was gaining the upper hand, Clinton’s continued blind support 
for the government o f Egypt despite knowledge o f its repressive measures to crush the 
Islamist opposition; Clinton’s labeling the Islamist states o f Iran and Sudan 
“international outlaw,” “terrorist,” and “rogue” states, with all their policy and public 
opinion implications).
58 Burgat, 13.
59 Gerges, 1999 ,71 .
60 Ibid., 35. According to Gerges, “confrontationalists” are those that believe that Islamists are 
comparable to “Communist totalitarians” in that they “are intrinsically antidemocratic and deeply anti- 
Western, and invariably target the West.” Ibid., 21. Gerges includes within this camp scholars such as 
Bernard Lewis, Giles Kepel, Samuel Huntington and Daniel Pipes. On the other side o f  the academic / 
policy divide are what Gerges refers to as “accomodationists,” or those who “distinguish between the 
actions o f  legitimate Islamist political opposition groups and the tiny extremist minority.” 
Accomodationalists reject the political Islam -a s- monolith construct and instead see the resurgence o f  
political Islam as a potential opportunity to create more reformist and representative governments in 
the region, and believe that “dialogue, diplomacy, and reconciliation with Islamists” are ultimately 
more effective policies than confrontation. Ibid., 59. Scholars such as John Esposito, Graham Fuller 
and Leon T. Hadar can be included amongst their ranks, according to Gerges.
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Perhaps Clinton’s most enduring legacy regarding the discourse o f and foreign policy 
towards political Islam, as we shall see later in this chapter, was his administration’s 
attempts to define its policy as based on the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” distinction, 
where the former consists o f governments described as “moderate” and “liberal,” 
euphemisms pro-Westem regimes, including such states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Turkey, Pakistan, and Malaysia and the latter is assumed to represent the “most 
effective threat so far to the regional order.”61 Although the presence o f this Islamist 
“threat” defined Clinton’s stance towards both Iran and Iraq throughout his 
presidency, it was not yet perceived as great enough to transform his administration’s 
Cold War inspired “dual containment” policy into a more aggressive one.62
Yet soon this “Cold War-style focus on containing America’s mortal enemies” came 
to be seen as an “ideological straightjacket” incapable o f protecting U.S. interests in 
the new millennium. For Chan, the dramatic shift in United States policy towards 
the region occurred under the first George W. Bush administration (2000-2004) when 
the Donald Rumsfeld “neocon hawks” o f the Defense Department “ascended” over 
the Colin Powell moderate conservatives o f the State Department to develop and 
implement a doctrine o f “full-spectrum dominance,” predicated on the belief “that 
unanswerable technology, coupled with unanswerable speed (the latter facilitated by 
technology), would leave any enemy devastated, breathless and unable to keep up.”64 
As Chan points out, this was a new era:
Unlike the post-Dulles Kennedy/Healey/Schmidt era, the doctrine was 
no longer merely to contain an enemy, to give up on the idea of 
victory, to have a safe world based on mutual deterrence and, to that 
extent, mutual respect, but to dominate the world and to impose 
Western if  not United States values upon it. Unlike [Samuel] 
Huntington’s proposed limits —  a line drawn to exclude or isolate the 
Islamic world —  Rumsfeld proposed to dominate the Islamic world as 
well.65
61 Ibid., 109.
62 Little.
63 Ibid., 313.
64 Chan, 87.
65 Ibid., 87.
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In remarks to the American Society o f News Editors three weeks into the Iraq war, 
Vice President Dick Cheney confirmed this perspective, employing orientalist 
stereotypes to describe the enemy (read: violent, irrational, fanatical and unbound by 
territorially defined state borders) and justify the shift:
[W]e cannot always rely on old Cold War remedies o f containment and 
deterrence. Containment does not work against a rogue state that 
possesses weapons o f mass destruction and chooses to secretly deliver 
them to its terrorist allies. Deterrence does not work when we are 
dealing with terrorists who have no country to defend, who revel in 
violence, and who are willing to sacrifice their own lives to kill 
millions o f others.66
Despite attempts to transform the United States’ military strategy to suit the new 
millennium environment, defense spending looked as if  it was trapped in a time warp. 
As one commentator put it:
If Rip Van Winkle had fallen asleep in the Pentagon's budgeting office 
20 years ago and awoke today, his first reaction would be that nothing 
had changed... Rip would start scratching his head, however, when he 
discovered that the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself had 
imploded more than 15 years ago and that Washington now spends 
almost as much on its military power as the rest of the world combined 
and five times more than all its potential enemies together.67
Noam Chomsky has argued that these policy and strategic shifts may have been more 
style than substance, as the idea that U.S. leaders have the prerogative to resort to 
“unilateral use o f military power” to ensure “uninhibited access to key markets, 
energy supplies, and strategic resources” is one that has been shared by all 
administrations. Even Madeline Albright, Secretary o f State under President Clinton, 
has acknowledged “every President has a position much like the Bush doctrine in his 
back pocket, but it is simply foolish to smash people in the face with it and to
/TO
implement it in a manner that will infuriate even allies.” Perhaps not surprisingly, by 
the 1990s, Bill Clinton was spending more on defense than had been proposed by his
66 “Vice President Cheney Salutes Troops: Remarks by the V ice President to the American Society o f  
N ews Editors,” Office o f  the Vice President, 9  April 2003.
67 Richard K. Betts, “A  Disciplined Defense: How to Regain Strategic Solvency,” Foreign Affairs 
(November/December 2007).
68 Noam Chomsky, F ailed States: The Abuse o f  Pow er and the Assault on D em ocracy  (New York:
Henry hold and Company, LLC, 2006), 86.
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Republican predecessor.69 Upon closer examination o f Clinton’s record in office, in 
many ways, his administration’s policies vis-a-vis the Muslim world were as ruthless 
as those o f the Republicans’ counterparts who either preceded or followed him. He 
did nothing to lift the harsh sanctions targeting Iraq first implemented by George H. 
W. Bush, responsible, in some estimates, for the deaths o f close to one million Iraqis,
• 7fthalf o f them children, is a perfect, albeit gnm, illustration o f this point.
One could also look to Clinton’s policies towards the Palestine-Israel conflict, which 
hardly improved on those o f his Republican predecessor. As Chomsky points out,
matters proceeded through the 1990s, as Israeli settlement and 
integration o f the territories proceeded steadily, with full United States 
support. In 2000, the final year o f Clinton’s term (and Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak’s), settlement reached its highest peak since 
1992, striking further blows at the possibility o f a resolution of the 
conflict by peaceful diplomatic means.71
Clinton’s policies vis-a-vis Israel in the first year o f the 2000 Intifada also conformed 
to the status quo. Despite the fact that “according to the IDF accounting, the ratio o f 
Palestinian to Israeli deaths was almost twenty to one in the first month o f the Intifada 
(seventy-five Palestinians, four Israelis),” Clinton still decided to go through with 
“largest deal in a decade for military helicopters; there were no constraints on use, the
77Pentagon informed journalists.”
Another prominent example is Clinton’s missile attack on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical 
plant in Sudan in 1998 on the pretext that the plant was a chemical weapons factory 
linked directly to Bin Laden, alleged mastermind o f the terrorist attacks on United 
States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania two weeks earlier. Described by former U.S.
7<j
Attorney General Ramsey Clark as “crime under international law” , the attack 
flattened Sudan’s principal pharmaceutical manufacturing plant which produced up to
69 Betts.
70 The severity o f  the problem was evidenced by the resignation o f  Denis Halliday, U .N . administrator 
o f  the oil-for-food program in 1998 to protest the ravages the sanctions were continuing to inflict on 
Iraqis. Halliday complained, “W e are in the process o f  destroying an entire country” and denounced the 
sanctions as “nothing less than genocide.” James Bovard, Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, 
Justice and P eace to Rid the World o f  Evil (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003).
71 Chomsky, 2003, 180.
72 Ibid., 181.
73 “Attack on Sudan political, says former U .S. official,” The Guardian, 23 September 1998.
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90% o f the nation’s medical products, resulting in the long run in what a 
representative o f one leading international Sudanese humanitarian relief organization 
described as the suffering and death o f “tens o f thousands of people —  many o f them 
children.. .from malaria, tuberculosis, and other treatable diseases.”74
Others, like Paul Rogers, argue that a second, and equally important, structural shift in 
policy occurred in 2006, during Bush’s second term in office, when the president 
approved the Pentagon’s “Long War” defense doctrine, as elaborated in its 
quadrennial defense review, the third o f a series o f reviews mandated by Congress 
during the Clinton era.75 This new doctrine, with its proposed astronomical budget of 
$439.3 billion, close to 45% more than the budget Bush inherited from Clinton in 
200176 and matching peak figures o f the mid-1980s Cold War, seemed to combine the 
more sordid elements o f  the “full-spectrum dominance” doctrine with those o f the 
Cold War defense doctrines that preceded it. In line with the previous Bush defense 
doctrine, the primary focus o f the “Long War” doctrine remained the “war on terror,” 
with the underlying goal being to maintain United States pre-eminence in world 
affairs.77 Similar to previous defense doctrines promulgated by Presidents Eisenhower 
and Nixon, this doctrine was heavily focused on covert military actions, and on 
enlisting the support o f foreign governments and their militaries to fight some o f the 
war’s principle battles. And, similar to Cold War defense thinking in general, the 
Bush Doctrine was also driven by the overriding need to justify and maintain a 
colossal military budget whose survival in the post-Cold W ar environment was 
looking increasingly tenuous. As Stephen Holmes has argued,
[bjecause Americans have sunk so much o f their national treasure into
a military establishment fit to deter and perhaps fight an enemy that
74 Jonathan Belke from the Near East Foundation writing in the Boston Globe, 22 August 1999.
75 The term “Long War” appears to have been first used publicly by President Bush in his 2006 State o f  
the Union speech when he said: “Our own generation is in a long war against a determined enemy.” 
White House, State o f  the Union (31 January 2006) and later in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review  
Report (QDRR) o f  the United States Department o f  Defense in which it was used in the title o f  the 
subsection on the war’s long term goals: “Fighting The Long War.” It was also used in the R eview ’s 
preface where it states: “The United States is a nation engaged in what w ill be a long war.” Defense 
Department, Quadrennial D efense Review Report (6 February 2006).
76 This figure doesn’t include additional resources specifically devoted to the ongoing wars, as such 
demands are handled mainly through supplementary requests. During 2006, these are expected to total 
$120 billion; the Bush administration is currently planning an initial request o f  $50 billion for 2007, 
which is significantly larger than the entire defence budget for the United Kingdom. Paul Rogers, ‘T h e  
World as a Battlefield,” Opendemocracy.com  9 February 2006.
77 Rogers.
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has now disappeared, they have an almost irresistible inclination to 
exaggerate the centrality o f rogue states, excellent targets for military 
destruction, [above] the overall terrorist threat. They overestimate war 
(which never unfolds as expected) and underestimate diplomacy and
'yo
persuasion as instruments o f American power.
70As the attempt to implement this semantic shift from the “war on terror” label to the 
more epic sounding “Long War” suggests, this doctrine hopes to emulate that o f its 
Cold War predecessor, particularly by reconstituting the Manichean lens through 
which the battles o f the Cold War were viewed. As Paul Rogers puts it, the doctrine 
aims to achieve its goals in the context o f two core factors:
The first is obvious: the determination o f the United States to remain 
the world leader. This was repeated in Bush's State o f the Union 
address on 31 January, and is very much reflected in the Pentagon's 
review.
The second is the representation o f the new security paradigm as the 
“long war,” a phrase that has crept into Pentagon-speak over the past 
two years and is now being used as a pithy successor to the “cold war” 
as encapsulating the United States defense outlook...The term is 
hugely convenient in that it simplifies everything into a “them and us” 
global confrontation, awarding the current adversary the same role that 
the Soviet Union occupied between 1946 and 1991. The implication is 
that the United States is again engaged in a major confrontation in 
which it deserves sustained support, and that it is as unacceptable to be 
“against” the long war as it once was to be “against” the cold war.80
Richard Jackson has similarly discussed the centrality o f the Cold War analogy to the 
“war on terror” discourse, arguing that the principal effect o f references to the “good 
war mythology” has been “to (re)contextualise the events in a military or ‘war’
Oj
narrative, which then makes a military-force-based response appear normal.” 
Although there is a tendency within the IR literature on this new phase in American 
politics to focus solely on the visible manifestations o f the “war on terror,” e.g., the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the strategic dimensions o f American oil 
policy; the operation and organization o f terrorist cells around the
78 Stephen Homes, The M atador’s Cape, America's Reckless Response to Terror (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 71-72.
79 It is not yet clear whether this attempt has been successful as the mainstream discourse continues to 
employ the “war on terror” label more often than not.
80 Rogers.
81 Jackson, 44.
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world; international security dimensions o f counter-terrorism; new 
homeland security measures such as law-enforcement cooperation and 
immigration control; and the Bush administration’s ‘public diplomacy’ 
initiative in the Middle East,
Jackson believes it impossible to understand the full significance o f  these fundamental 
policy shifts without considering the role o f language in fostering an environment o f
o->
“consent or at least acquiesce” within the American population. The “war on terror” 
has not only been characterized by its tangible components, e.g., new policies (both 
foreign and domestic), institutions, agencies, etc., created to execute and oversee the 
“war,” but also by the intangible elements, which Jackson refers to as the “set o f 
assumptions, beliefs, forms o f knowledge and political and cultural narratives,” which 
have enabled the realization o f the tangible elements.84 For Jackson, the former “war 
on terror” would not be possible “without an overarching rationale or set o f guiding
Off
assumptions” underpinned by the latter.
Regardless o f whether one can pinpoint the precise moment in which this policy shift 
occurred vis-a-vis the Middle East, clearly the Middle East in general, and the “threat” 
o f Islamic “fundamentalism” in particular, have come to occupy a central position in
Off
U.S. economic, strategic and military/defense policy, both foreign and domestic. 
What is less clear, however, is the role played by the intangible elements o f the “war 
on terror,” the “overarching rational or set o f guiding assumptions” referred to by
82 Ibid., 8.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 16.
85 Ibid., 8.
86 Although this thesis is largely concerned with the foreign policy implications o f  the discourse o f  the 
“Islamist threat,” it is important to point out the several domestic policy implications as well. Perhaps 
most important among them has been the passage o f  the “Patriot Act” in the aftermath o f  the 
September 11th attacks and its renewal in 2006. The Patriot Act dramatically expanded the authority o f  
U.S. law enforcement to fight “terrorist acts” in the United States. According to Amnesty International, 
“U SA  Patriot Act threatens the rights protected in the US Constitution and international documents, 
such as the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the Convention against Torture, and the Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms 
o f  Racial Discrimination.” Most o f  those arrested in the United States under the Patriot Act have been 
Arab or Muslim. The United States military prison at Guantanamo Bay has held more than 500 “enemy 
combatants” from over 40 countries who the government claims are al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, 
for more than five years. Amnesty International, in addition to several other international human rights 
organizations and activists, including the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, have called 
the situation in Guantanamo “a human rights scandal” in a series o f  reports. “Comission on Human 
Rights, 60th Session (15 March-23 April 2004): The Human Rights Scandal o f  Guantanamo Bay,” 
Amnesty International (20 April 2004).
158
Jackson. In other words, what is the role played by the discourse o f political Islam 
(and the “terrorist threat” too often wrongly associated with it) in U.S. policymaking 
in general, and more specifically, in its attempts to increase its hegemonic position in 
the Middle East? Is this discourse, the subject o f Chapters Four and Five o f this thesis, 
merely a post-facto rhetorical device o f politicians to justify an interventionist foreign 
policy vis-a-vis the region?
For Said, the relationship between orientalist discourse and colonial rule was more 
complex:
To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization o f colonial rule is 
to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by 
Orientalism, rather than after the fact. ... [Sjince the middle o f the 
eighteenth century there had been two principle elements in the 
relation between East and West. One was a growing systematic 
knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge reinforced by the 
colonial encounter as well as by the widespread interest in the alien 
and unusual, exploited by the developing sciences o f ethnology, 
comparative anatomy, philology, and history; furthermore, to this 
systematic knowledge was added a sizable body o f literature produced 
by novelists, poets, translators, and gifted travelers. The other feature 
o f  Oriental-European relations was that Europe was always in a 
position o f strength, not to say domination. There is no way o f putting
on
this euphemistically.
Just as the 19th and 20th century colonial endeavors o f the European empires were 
enabled by the fruits o f orientalist scholarship and discourse, themselves enabled by 
the (superior) positioning o f its creators to the objects o f their studies, so too, I would 
argue, has doctrinal change under the Bush administration been facilitated by 
American Orientalism, which has served to both distort knowledge o f the Muslim 
other and reinforce potentially destructive elements o f American national identity. Yet 
the seeds o f  Orientalism, having blown across the Atlantic upon the collapse o f the 
European empires and lodged themselves in U.S. soil, could not have taken root had 
the ground been infertile. It was the development o f the United States as a world 
superpower in the aftermath o f WWII and its discovery o f strategic and economic 
interests in the Middle East fertilized the ground in which the discourse flourished.
87 Said, 1979, 40.
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4. American Orientalism: September 11th and the Peak of United States Empire
Although Bush’s security doctrine found its raison d ’etre in the ruins o f the 
September 11th attacks, it was first conceptualized years earlier by members of a 
conservative think tank that would soon become synonymous with the “neocon” 
label: the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). In 1997, several neocon 
hawks who came to play prominent roles in the current Bush administration, 
including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, joined with 
likeminded pundits and academics to form an organization whose mission was to 
devise a more aggressive foreign policy to secure the United States’ role as the 
world’s sole superpower. In regards to political Islam, the idea was to challenge the 
cautious approach taken by previous administrations that had led, in their minds, to a 
situation where Islamist movements, backed by “rogue” regimes like Iran and Sudan, 
were gaining popularity across the Muslim world, partially as a result o f U.S. 
appeasement.
At the heart o f the Project lies the belief that the best way to ensure the United States’ 
continued military, political and economic pre-eminence, on which the well-being of 
the entire world is predicated, is through the spread o f liberal democracy to parts o f 
the world left untouched by the post-Cold War third wave o f democratizations. This 
belief is based on a spin-off o f the “democratic peace theory,” which holds that 
because (liberal) democracies do not go to war with one another, democratization 
should be a policy priority o f democratic states as the best way to ensure a peaceful 
international system. In this sense, “[t]he neo-con argument is concerned not with 
relations among potentially warring states, but with class or group dynamics within a
oo
single state that may spill over and affect others,” most importantly, Western 
democracies.
Although on the surface there is nothing radical about their seemingly Wilsonian 
agenda, at the level o f implementation and enforcement the neocons begin to veer 
away from their less unilateralist predecessors. As the self-professed neocon journalist 
Irwin Stelzer argues, neo-conservatism differs from Wilsonianism insofar as
88 Stephen Holmes, “Futurology,” London Review o f  Books 28, no. 19 (5 October 2006).
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subscribers to the latter ideology tend to believe that democracy and freedom can 
spread by “relying on the persuasive powers o f the multinational institutions such as 
the League o f Nations,” whereas neocons believe this goal can only be achieved by 
“deposing dictatorial regimes that threaten American security and world order —  
using military force if  all else fails; they would follow regime change with nation- 
building; and they would rely on varying ‘coalitions o f the willing,’ rather than on the
OQ
United Nations.” Although these more militant and unilateralist strains o f thinking 
may have been present in American political thought prior to the rise o f the neocons, 
“[d]uring the Cold War, such ambitions were kept partially in check by Soviet 
power,” a situation altered by “the emergence o f a unipolar world [which] has allowed 
them to flourish.”90
This updated, and somewhat warped version o f Roosevelt’s strain o f nationalism also 
includes a strong “moral” component, as two o f its subscribers, David Brooks and 
William Kristol, explained in an article they penned for the Wall Street Journal. They 
described the ideology as a mixture between “a neo-Reaganite foreign policy o f 
national strength and moral assertiveness abroad.”91 Anatol Lievan describes the 
neocon foreign policy as a volatile mix o f “American idealism and American 
Realpolitik,” combined with a good dose of “messianic American civic 
nationalism.” In his book, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy o f  American 
Nationalism, Lievan argues that the form o f American nationalism that influenced the 
country’s post-9/11 foreign policy is more akin to that found in pre-1914 Europe than 
anything one is likely to encounter in the “developed” world today. To illustrate his 
point, he cites the examples of: “Germans before 1914 who believed that ‘Germany 
may heal the world’ with its particular mixture o f legal order, technological progress 
and spirit o f organic, rooted ‘culture,’ and ‘community’ (Gemeinshcaft)”; Russian 
universalist nationalism under the tsars, which held that “Russia, was heir to the 
Christian empire o f Rome and Constantinople”; and post-revolutionary France, in 
which French nationalism embodied the view that the French state represented “the
89 Irwin Stelzer, The Neocon Reader (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 9.
90 Betts.
91 W illiam Kristol, “What A ils Conservatism,” Wall S treet Journal, 15 September 1997.
92 Anatol Lieven, Am erica Right or Wrong: An Anatom y o f  American Nationalism  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
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heritage of the Enlightenment with regard to liberty, democracy and progress and
O'}
[therefore had] the right to spread these ideals to other nations.”
This characteristic has enabled the Bush administration somewhat successfully to 
present its “imperial plans...on the one hand, as part o f a benevolent strategy o f 
spreading American values o f democracy and freedom; on the other, as an essential 
part o f the defense not o f an American empire, but o f the nation itself.”94 Yet Li even 
is quick to point out that this understanding or rhetorical manipulation o f American 
nationalism is not unique to neoconservatives, but one rooted in the “American 
Creed” itself. It is this shared belief in America’s uniqueness and almost God-given 
role to spread freedom and democracy, or “modernity,” throughout the world that, no 
matter how “imperfectly democracy may be practiced at home and hypocritically 
preached abroad,” sets the parameters for U.S. foreign policy, rendering the United 
States’ “indirect empire post-1945 closer to the Dutch in the East Indies in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than the British in India.”95 Hence the focus in 
the “long war” doctrine on the United States’ foreign “partners,” rather than viceroys 
and the like.
It is not difficult to see how even what appears to be a positive self-identity, based on 
a seemingly noble heritage o f “democratic, legal and individualist beliefs and 
principles on which the American state and constitution is founded,” at least in the 
eyes o f scholars like Lieven committed to Enlightenment principles, can actually have 
negative ramifications for the United States in its relations with states deemed to 
contradict the “American Creed” or “American Thesis” on which this identity is 
based.96 For in order to consider oneself the beacon o f modernity and democracy, 
there must be, lurking in the darkness, the archetypal antithesis: the traditional, 
autocratic, irrational other that needs to either be assimilated or destroyed. One can 
see political Islam occupying the space o f other in the “American Thesis” today.
For Lieven, this “American Creed” comprises only one, albeit vital, part o f American 
national identity. There is another, less conspicuous and even more potentially
93 Ibid., 34.
94 Ibid., 3.
95 t
162
destructive side to American identity that also plays a defining role in U.S. policy 
making: the “American Antithesis” that “stems above all from ethnoreligious roots.” 
The most prominent o f the ethnoreligious strains o f nationalism to affect U.S. foreign 
policy today, according to Lieven, are fundamentalist Protestantism, and the Christian
07Zionist lobby , as well as the pro-Israel lobby which they support, all o f whom, 
incidentally, have members and supporters within the tight-knit group o f  neocons 
responsible for setting the PNAC agenda. As Lieven points out, while a vital part of 
the American Creed “has long been the belief that the United States epitomizes the 
triumph of modernity in economics, technology and culture as well as in its 
democratic arrangements,” the United States is also home to by far “the largest and 
most powerful forces in conservative religion in the developed world.”98 As Kevin 
Phillips put it, this religious element “has embraced cultural antimodemism, war 
hawkishness, Armageddon prophecy, and in the case o f conservative fundamentalists, 
a demand for governments by literal biblical interpretation.”99
The existence o f this “radical” religious “antithesis” has led to various paradoxes 
within U.S. foreign policy, as well as to the perpetuation and fortification o f a 
particular brand o f American Orientalism. According to Gerges, “Islam is seen by 
many Americans as a hostile culture and a threat to their interests and cultural 
values,” as a result o f the state’s “religious origins,” as well as how this component o f 
the “American Antithesis” has come to perceive “the historical conflict between 
Christians and Muslims, a confrontation that has been transmitted and popularized 
through generations by history, literature, folklore, media, and academic 
discourse.”100
Lieven claims that although only 7-10% o f Americans support the Christian Right, 
comprised o f various stripes o f evangelical Protestants, its strength is not “so much in 
numbers but in relatively greater social and political commitment: high rates o f voter 
turnout, willingness to agitate over particular issues, readiness to make personal
97 As Walter Russell Mead points out, “American Protestant Zionism is in fact significantly older than 
the modem Jewish version; in the nineteenth century, evangelicals repeatedly petitioned U.S. officials 
to establish a refuge in the Holy Land for persecuted Jews from Europe and the Ottoman Empire.” 
Walter Russell Mead, “God’s Country?” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2006).
98 Mead.
99 Phillips, 100.
100 Gerges, 1999, 8.
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sacrifices o f time and money, and concentration in politically strategic regions.”101 
Furthermore, the power o f the fundamentalists, like that o f other highly motivated 
minority groups, has been magnified by the abysmally low voter turnout in U.S.
1 ftOelections. Their impact on the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections is significant. 
According to Walter Russell Mead, Protestant evangelicals comprised close to 40% of 
George W. Bush's total vote in 2004. Among white evangelicals, Bush received 68% 
o f the national vote in 2000 and 78% in 2004.103 Evangelicals have also played a 
major role in congressional elections, with the number o f self-identified evangelicals 
in Congress having increased from less than 10% of the membership in both houses in 
1970 to more than 25% in 2004.104 Their high concentration in important 
governmental institutions such as the Pentagon during the Bush administration have 
also ensured their disproportionate influence over defense-related foreign policy.105
As Lieven points out, there are four principal ways in which Christian evangelicals 
impact U.S. foreign policy, in general, and the Muslim world, in particular:
1) By impacting U.S. policy towards multilateral institutions such as the 
U.N., which, at the extreme end, are seen to embody the antichrist in 
millenarian beliefs.106 Mead argues, though, that American evangelicals, not 
as hostile to humanitarian and human rights agendas, differ on this issue with 
their “fundamentalist” counterparts, who view any work o f this kind as 
completely futile.107 What evangelicals do oppose are any “grand designs and 
large-scale development efforts” such as those embodied in and pursued by 
multilateral institutions like the U.N. They generally prefer grass-roots and 
faith-based initiatives, as these are easier to micromanage according to central 
religious tenets o f the evangelical faith.
101 Lieven.
102 Lieven, 141.
103 As Mead points out, there was a disparity in voting patterns between white and black evangelicals 
resulting in a majority o f  African American evangelicals continuing to vote Democratic. Mead.
104 Ibid.
105 Michael L. Weinstein and Reza Aslan, “N ot So Fast, Christian Soldiers” The Los Angeles Times, 22 
August 2007.
106 Millenarian beliefs hold that Christ's return will precede the establishment o f  the prophesied 
transformation o f  the world from a place full o f  corruption, evil and war, and that all human efforts to 
build a peaceful world before that time are generally futile.
107 As Mead explains, fundamentalists see “an absolute gap between those few souls God has chosen to 
redeem and the many he has predestined to end up in hell,” and see very little manoeuvring space in 
which mere mortals can change that situation. Mead.
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2) By influencing development o f an “ecology o f fear” in the United 
States that leads to a wider culture o f national paranoia and aggression.
3) By embedding within the national psyche a Manichean view o f the 
world in which America’s enemy is viewed as “no less than Satan, and Satan 
can only be defeated if,” in the words o f Lieutenant General William Boykin, 
a Pentacostalist appointed in 2003 as Deputy Under-Secretary o f Defense for 
Intelligence, “we come against him in the name of Jesus.”108
4) Along with the Manichean view o f the world, where a proverbial line 
is drawn in the sand separating the United States’ friends from foes, is a 
corresponding belief that enemies cannot be negotiated with, only vanquished. 
“Since the enemy is thought o f as being totally evil and utterly unappeasable, 
he must be totally eliminated.” 109 This view is espoused in the Bush security 
doctrine as “full spectrum dominance.”
Although these factors have played a far greater role in defining the politics o f the 
current Bush administration than in past governments, they were also very much 
present throughout the Cold War, when the existential enemy confronted by the 
United States was communism rather than political Islam. As Lieven points out, the 
Cold War “perpetuated and strengthened the long-standing messianic, paranoid and 
Manichean strands in American nationalism.” 110 Yet, as Chan argues, belief in the 
polarized dichotomies inherent in this ideology did not necessarily entail the sacrifice 
o f more material, or “worldly” interests. On the contrary, it often served as a rationale 
for furthering those interests. It was in the context o f the Cold War, after all, that the 
“military-industrial-complex,” which continues today to heavily influence America’s 
political and security landscape, was largely erected and consolidated, as the 
“construction o f discourse to justify confrontation” with the “Evil Empire” led to the 
“constant armament and latest generation armament” which would help the United 
States stay “ahead o f an enemy also racing to become more sophisticated and more 
highly technologized than the United States military.” 111 And, as the recent book by 
former senior presidential aide David Kuo contends, the instrumentilization o f a
Lieven, 148.
109 Ibid., 148-149.
110 Ibid., 150.
,n  Chan, 12.
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biblical notion o f “enemy” by the Bush administration may also have more to do with
1 19realist power politics than the influence o f the Christian Right.
While Republicans have been most influenced by this Cold War-induced Manichean 
view o f the world, Democrats have proved quite adept at using “scares,” whether o f 
Soviet military might (against the two Eisenhower administrations) or o f continuing 
Russian influence over the countries o f the former Soviet Union (under the Clinton 
administration) to justify maintaining a robust military. Nor have the Democrats 
proven a desire or will to shake this worldview or the policy tools which come with it 
in the transformed international environment o f the post-Cold War era, as will be 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters. In the “war on terror,” Democrats’ political 
discourse and strategies have lacked a “serious alternative strategy” to the Islamist 
“threat” paradigm developed by Bush and his neocon supporters.113
Another central component o f ethnoreligious antithesis can be found in the United 
States’ unbridled support for Israel which, according to Lieven, has largely to do with 
the rise o f  the Christian Right and its support for Israel. This claim is supported by 
other experts on U.S. domestic politics, including Nancy Roman, director o f the 
Council on Foreign Relations’ Washington Program, who argues that the evangelical 
community in the United States has a “huge influence on foreign policy.” Michelle 
Goldberg, author o f Kingdom Coming: The Rise o f  Christian Nationalism, concurs 
that a significant strain o f conservative Christianity is working not only to undermine 
fundamental American rights and freedoms, but, on the foreign policy front, in 
support o f  Israeli “irredentist” policies that encourage the proliferation o f settlements 
in occupied territories.114
Although the standard claim made by most U.S. policymakers in defense o f their 
disproportionate support for the state o f Israel is that this is a natural alliance
112 In his book Tempting Faith: an Inside S tory o f  P olitical Seduction, Kuo speaks dism issively o f  the 
role played by the Christian in Bush’s foreign policy decisions, arguing: “National Christian leaders 
received hugs and smiles in person and then were dismissed behind their backs and were described as 
ridiculous, out o f  control, and just plain goofy.” Quoted in Julian Borger, “Aid says White House 
mocked evangelicals,” Guardian , 14 October 2006.
1,5 Chan, 150.
114 Richard Allen Greene, “Evangelical Christians Plead for Israel,” BBC News, Washington, 19 July
2006.
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considering Israel is the “only democracy in the Middle East,” this line has become 
increasingly difficult to sustain in the face o f markedly undemocratic Israeli actions, 
in particular, the continuing occupation o f the West Bank and Gaza Strip. One 
therefore must consider possible alternative explanations for the asymmetric support 
the United States bestows on the state. Like Said, Lieven believes the underlying 
reason for their support has less to do with Israel being a “bastion o f democracy,” than 
it does with the more insidious, orientalist view shared by many American politicians 
that Israel is actually “an island o f Western civilization in a sea o f savagery.” Indeed, 
as he points out, the use of “democracy” in this context “sometimes seems more a 
contemporary version o f the nineteenth-century use o f the word “civilization” than a 
reference to actual behavior.”115 As an example, Lieven cites a March 2001 speech 
given by Oklahoma Republican Senator James Inhofe in which he quoted a passage 
from Mark Twain regarding his travels through “a desolate Palestine” to prove the 
point that Israel truly was, as Golda Meir put it, a “land without a people for a people 
without a land,” and, in taking this desert land to make it bloom, the Israeli people had 
much in common with the American pioneers who too had no choice but to sacrifice 
the lives/livelihoods o f native inhabitants to make way for this great project in 
“civilization.”116 Vice President Dick Cheney used more recent events to compare 
Israel’s civilisational struggle with the Arab/Muslim world with that o f the United 
States’ “war against terror.” In remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC) 2006 Policy Conference commending Israel’s “patience,” 
“moral courage, and decisive action” in the face o f Palestinian “terrorism,” Cheney 
explained that the United States and other “civilized nations” must maintain such
117qualities to win the “war on terror” against the barbarian enemy.
There is also the religious aspect o f  America’s “love affair” with Israel that, according 
to Lieven, can be traced back to the “Old-Testament-centered religion o f the 
American Protestant tradition” o f the early settlers, who viewed America as God’s
1 I o
“chosen nation” similar to Israel’s self-identity. From this perspective, evangelical
115 Lieven, 179.
116 Ibid., 180.
117 Richard Cheney, “Vice President's Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006  
Policy Conference,” White House News and Policies  (7 March 2006).
118 Although Lieven points out that this “love affair’’ hasn’t always been this idyllic, and has often 
“been tempered down the generations though by the “snobbish” tradition o f  “W ASP anti-Semitism
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support for the Israeli state is rooted in the belief that the Jewish people have fulfilled 
biblical prophesies by defying all odds to reclaim their rightful place in Israel. The 
fact that they have survived periodic persecution, some o f biblical proportions, 
throughout the centuries in order to realize their destiny only reinforces this belief. 
Melanie Phillips concurs, arguing that one can trace America’s view o f itself as 
“God’s New Israel” back to the American Revolution, when the nation hailed George 
Washington “as the American Moses” and King George III o f Britain was portrayed 
as “Pharaoh in his chariot.”119 Correspondingly, evangelicals are as enthusiastic in 
their antipathy towards the Arab world as they are in their support for the Jewish state, 
as they “see in the weakness, defeats, and poverty o f the Arab world ample evidence 
that God curses those who curse Israel.”120 As Phillips points out, the metaphor o f the 
biblical Nebuchadnezzar o f Babylon, his destruction of temples in Jerusalem and the 
subsequent conquest o f Judah, is often deployed by Christian evangelicals to justify a 
more aggressive U.S. foreign policy towards those movements deemed to be bent on
191the destruction o f Israel or Western civilization.
In addition to this deep-seated Orientalist vision of the Arab world, and 
correspondingly distorted vision o f America’s own sanctimonious history, there is 
also an apocalyptic component to the evangelical Christians’ unbridled support for 
Israel. This component is explicitly described in the book by John Hagee, founder o f 
the Christian lobbying group Christians United for Israel, Jerusalem Countdown: A 
Warning to the World. In this book Hagee insists that the Bible predicts the invasion 
o f Israel by Russian and Arab armies who will subsequently be destroyed by God. 
This event will serve as the prelude to an existential struggle over Israel, fought out 
between China and the West, and led by the Antichrist who will appear in the form o f 
the head o f the European Union. The final battle o f this struggle will be fought at 
Armageddon, an actual place in Israel, and will precipitate the second coming of 
Christ. According to Hagee, 40 million Americans support his views, rendering this
199movement a lobbying force to be reckoned with in Washington. Most recently his 
organization, along with AIPAC, has been lobbying the Bush administration to adopt
(directed mainly against the East European Jewish immigrants who arrived in the United States from 
the 1880s on, rather than the longer-established Germans and Sephardim).” Lieven, 188.
119 Melanie Phillips, Londonistan  (London: Encounter, 2006), 129.
120 Mead.
121 Phillips, 129.
122 Greene.
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a more hawkish stance on Iran, which it accuses o f “pos[ing] a nuclear threat to the
1 'y'y
state o f Israel that promises nothing less than a nuclear Holocaust.”
Yet the millenarianist Christian right comprise only one, albeit vital, component o f the 
American antithesis, which, combined with unyielding belief in the “American 
Creed” and its perceived duties and obligations, have proven highly combustible, 
especially in regards to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Middle East. According to 
Lieven and several other reputable commentators on U.S. foreign policy, another 
perhaps equally important component o f this antithesis is the pro-Israeli lobby. 
Although Lieven’s analysis is more concerned with explaining why the lobby has 
found such ripe ground in the American political landscape than with describing the 
actual history and dynamics o f this relationship, the recent proliferation o f scholarship 
on the issue provides more than enough evidence to substantiate Lieven’s claim that,
as in the case o f Serbia and powerful Pan-Slavist sections o f pre-1914 
Russian public and official opinion, so in the case o f Israel important 
sections o f U.S. opinion (by no means only Jewish) have over the past 
half century come to view the United States and Israel as almost one 
country, so tightly identified with each other as to transcend America’s 
own identity and interests.124
Although the pro-Israeli lobby claims support from across the political spectrum, it 
has particularly strong ties with the neocon strain o f the Republican Party, especially 
those associated with the PNAC agenda. In fact, several o f the Project’s founders 
have served on the influential Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs’ (JINSA) 
board o f advisers, including Vice President Dick Cheney, former U.S. Ambassador to 
the U.N. John Bolton, former chair o f the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board Richard 
Perle (forced to step down in March 2003 although he maintained his membership on 
the board at the request o f Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld125), and former 
Deputy Secretary o f Defense Paul Wolfowitz. A central mission o f the Institute is to 
promote the idea amongst American policymakers that Israel’s and the U.S.’ national 
security interests are one and the same, and that “the only way to assure continued 
safety and prosperity for both countries is through hegemony in the Middle East —  a
123 Bill Berkowitz, “Iran: The Religious Right’s N ew  Bugbear,” Inter Press Service, 15 March 2007.
124 Lieven, 188.
125 Michael Massing, “The Storm Over the Israel Lobby,” New York R eview  o f  Books 53, no. 10 (8 June 
2006).
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hegemony achieved with the traditional cold war recipe o f feints, force, clientelism 
and covert action.”126
Beyond potential ethno-religious explanations for their support o f the state o f Israel, 
much o f the rationale behind the prominent Israeli security foreign policy 
recommendations put forward by both groups can be attributed to a longstanding 
belief amongst American policymakers: Israel’s strategic location in the heart o f the 
Middle East, its unique historic development, and its tendency to view itself more as 
belonging politically, socially, and even epistemologically to the West than to the 
region where it is located renders it the perfect U.S. ally in the region. As the JINSA 
mission statement puts it: “The inherent instability in the region [Middle East] caused 
primarily by inter-Arab rivalries and the secular/religious split in many Muslim 
societies leaves the future o f the region in doubt. Israel, with its technological 
capabilities and shared system o f values, has a key role to play as a United States ally 
in the region.” 127
One need only look at the composition JINSA’s fifty-six member-board (half are U.S. 
generals and admirals) to understand how intertwined JINSA’s interests are with 
those o f important elements o f the U.S. government. In addition to openly stated 
ideological and strategic reasons to justify increased U.S. support for Israel, other, 
more covert, explanations for JINSA members’ enthusiastic support include material 
ones. It is no coincidence, for example, that “almost every retired officer who sits on 
JINSA’s board o f advisers or has participated in its Israel trips or signed a JINSA 
letter works or has worked with military contractors who do business with the
I 9Q
Pentagon and Israel.” From a purely economic standpoint, it makes sense to support 
a state that spares no expense when it comes to purchasing, developing and marketing
126 Jason Vest, “The Men from JINSA and CSP,” The Nation  (14 August 2002).
127 “JINSA M ission Statement: JINSA’s Major Agenda Items,” Available from http://www.jinsa.org/ 
about/agenda/agenda.html
128 Other members o f  the JINSA board include Stephen Solarz, a former New  York congressman, Eric 
Cantor, the only Jewish Republican in the House, “who in 2002 was named the ch ief deputy majority 
whip— part o f  the ongoing Republican program to lure pro-Israel dollars from the Democrats,” and 
Stephen Bryen, a neoconservative who served under Richard Perle in Ronald Reagan's Pentagon and 
who is now a defence contractor. Massing.
129 Jason Vest, “The Men From JINSA and CSP,” The Nation  (14 August 2002).
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the latest high-tech weapons and military equipment for its perpetual conflict with
I ™neighboring states and continued occupation o f Palestinian land.
JINSA, along with many PNAC members, also forms part o f a large and powerful 
network o f pro-Israeli, neoconservative organizations comprised o f individuals with
I
conspicuously “incestuous” links to one another. This issue will be explored later in 
the discourse on political Islam amongst policy and opinion makers, in which many of
i 'X'ythese individuals figure prominently. At the centre o f this lobby, which, according 
to Mearsheimer and Walt, holds a disproportionate and damaging sway over 
American foreign policy, is The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC).133 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a 
neoconservative think tank created in 1985, has Martin Indyk, AIPAC’s current 
research director, as its first director. WINEP’s Board o f Advisers includes Paul 
Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, a resident fellow now at the neoconservative American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI), and Joshua Muravchik, a neocon and adjunct scholar at the 
WINEP. Also sitting on the Board is Michael Rubin who worked in the Pentagon’s 
Office o f Special Plans before becoming a political adviser to the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq and the editor o f The Middle East Quarterly, published 
by the Middle East Forum. The Middle East Forum is “a think tank dedicated to 
fighting terrorism, countering Islamic extremism, and promoting pro-Israel views on
130 For more on the economics o f  the U.S.-Israel “special relationship,” see Naomi Klein, The Shock 
Doctrine: The Rise o f  D isaster Capitalism, (London: Allen Lane, 2007).
131 Former CIA political analysts Kathleen and Bill Christison describe as “frighteningly insidious” this 
network o f  “proliferating boards and think tanks, whose membership lists are more or less identitical 
and totally interchangeable.” “The Bush Neocons and Israel,” Counterpunch (6 September 2004).
132 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephan M. Walt, The Israel Lobby , (New York: Farrar Straus, and 
Giroux, 2007), 14. Although the authors point out that “other special interest groups have managed to 
skew foreign policy” before, they stress that “no lobby has managed to divert it as far from what the 
national interest would suggest.” According to Mearsheimer and Walt, the lobby’s aims are: to weaken 
or overthrow Israel’s enemies, provide Israel with a “free hand” to deal with the Palestinians, and 
encourage the U S government and military to do “most o f  the fighting, dying, rebuilding and paying.” 
Massing.
133 The organization was founded in the 1950s by a Canadian-born former journalist named I. L. Kenen 
with funding from various Jewish groups. With an annual budget o f  $47 million, a staff o f  200  
lobbyists, and 100,000 grass-roots members, its not hard to see why AIPAC, the leading organization 
in the pro-Israel lobby (which includes the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish 
Congress, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Conference o f  Presidents o f  Major American Jewish 
Organizations) commands such a captive audience on Capital Hill. One o f  the most important 
achievements o f  the lobby is its ability to secure around $ 3 billion a year in foreign aid for Israel, more 
than that received by any other state. Glen Frankel, “A Beautiful Friendship? In search o f  the truth 
about the Israel lobby’s influence on Washington,” Washington Post, 16 July 2006, W 13.
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college campuses” founded by Daniel Pipes134, “an energetic neoconservative whose 
views seem extreme even within that world,” who also happens to be an adjunct 
scholar at the Washington Institute and a regular contributor to The New York Sun. 
The Sun is co-owned by Bruce Kovner, chairman of the AEFs board o f trustees, and 
by the money manager Roger Hertog, a trustee o f  both AEI and WINEP.
As Rashid Khalidi points out in his book Resurrecting Empire, the pro-Israel 
credentials o f the neocon core responsible for developing the Bush administration’s 
agenda for American Middle East policy can be traced to a report written in 1996 by a 
study group sponsored by the Israeli think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic 
and Political Studies, for the newly elected right-wing Israeli Prime Minister 
Benyamin Netanyahu and written by many o f the same influential actors who would 
later work on the PNAC agenda. The primary author o f the report was Perle, who 
“has long been the chief guru among the neocon hawks,” and who is closely 
associated with Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, the former number two and three 
officials at the Pentagon, as well as I. Lewis Libby136, former Chief o f Staff to Vice
1 ^ 7President Cheney. In addition to Perle, the study group included Feith and David 
Wurmser, who served as special assistant to John Bolton, then Undersecretary o f State 
for Arms Control and international security, together with other influential figures in
1 Wthe neocon core.
According to Khalidi, the advice this group gave the hawkish Netanyahu was:
robust and muscled, and much o f it has since been mirrored in the 
policies o f Ariel Sharon, Netanyahu’s successor as head o f the Likud 
Party: abandon the peace process with the Palestinians (the term peace
134 In 2002, Pipes created a Web site called Campus Watch, which “reviews and critiques” Middle East 
studies programs in North America “with an aim to improving them.” Initially, Campus Watch 
encouraged students to take notes on lectures by professors critical o f  Israel, with the goal o f  
“exposing” them on the MEF Web site, but this feature was dropped after it was widely condemned as 
a form o f  McCarthyism. M E Fs work on campuses parallels that o f  AIPAC's own college advocacy 
program.
135 Massing.
136 Libby was forced to resign form his position as C hief o f  Staff to the V ice President in October 2005  
after being indicted by a federal grand jury for his role in the cover-up o f  the leaking o f  an undercover 
CIA agent’s name in revenge for her husband’s criticism o f  the President’s manipulation o f  intelligence 
in the lead-up to the Iraq war.
137 “Full Text: United States v. Libby Indictment,” Washington Post, 28 October 2005.
138 Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the 
M iddle East (London: I. B. Taurus, 2005), 50.
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process was placed in quotes throughout the report); adopt the right of
“hot pursuit” against the Palestinians; “roll back” threats; abandon the
principle o f “land for peace” in favor o f “peace for peace”; and adopt the
policy o f “peace through strength.” Most relevant to the Middle East
policies o f the United States were the report’s recommendations
regarding Iraq, Syria, and Iran that its authors and their likeminded1associates later championed in their official positions in Washington.
And in a passage that could have been lifted straight out o f President Bush’s 2002 
Security Doctrine, although written five years before, “the report says a ‘clean break 
with the past’ can be achieved by ‘reestablishing the principle o f pre-emption, rather 
than retaliation alone and by ceasing to absorb blows to the nation without
 „  5 5?  140response.
One could see the U.S. invasion and occupation o f Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush 
administration’s refusal to enter into direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear 
program and overall aversion towards a diplomatic settlement o f that crisis, its entire 
“war on terror,” its unequivocal support o f Israel in its economic and military siege o f 
Gaza follow Hamas’ takeover o f the Gaza Strip on 15 June 2007,141 and its July 2006 
invasion o f Lebanon,142 both of which have entailed numerous violations o f 
international humanitarian law143, all within the context o f the neocon and pro-Israel 
lobby agenda to drastically reconfigure the Middle East to make it more amenable to 
United States and Israeli interests: ideological, strategic and material. In regards to the 
material interests underpinning the decision to invade and occupy Iraq, former 
Treasure Secretary Paul O’Neil explained his surprise at realizing plans “were already 
being discussed to take over Iraq and occupy it— complete with disposition o f oil
139 Ibid., 50.
140 Ibid., 53.
141 “Aid Agencies: Humanitarian Crisis Looms in Gaza,” Aljazeera.com, 18 July 2006; “Economic 
siege o f  Gaza Leading to Humanitarian Crisis Report,” Palestinian Centre fo r  Human Rights, 2 July
2007. Tim McGirk, “Hamas Beats Israel’s Gaza Siege,” Time M agazine, 23 January 2008.
142 W hile Israel defends its actions in Lebanon as defensive operations geared towards eliminating the 
“terrorist” threat emanating from its northern borders and orchestrated by Hezbollah, which it claims 
was fighting a proxy war on behalf o f  Iran and Syria, much evidence has come to light indicating that 
the Israeli incursion was planned months in advance o f  the Hezbollah action, and that the Israeli 
government was merely waiting for a pretext to enter Lebanon and carry out its plan to incapacitate 
Hezbollah once and for all. See: Seymour Hersh, “Watching Lebanon,” The N ew  Yorker, 21 August 
2006. Noam  Chomsky, “On the US-Israeli Invasion o f  Lebanon,” A l Adab, 19 August 2006.
143 These include: excessive use force, indiscriminate bombing, targeting civilians and civilian facilities 
and collective punishment o f  entire populations. See the following reports: “ICRC gravely concerned 
about humanitarian situation in Gaza,” International Committee o f  R ed Cross P ress Release, 13 August 
20061, and “Deliberate destruction or 'collateral damage'? Israeli attacks against civilian infrastructure,” 
Am nesty International Report, 23 August 2006.
173
fields, peacekeeping forces, and war crimes tribunal— carrying forward an unspoken 
doctrine o f preemptive war.”144
Khalidi shares Lieven’s analysis that one o f the primary goals o f the neocon agenda 
has been to forge or reinforce the civilisational link between Israel and the United 
States. He points to the section in the 1996 “clean break” report that promotes:
the perception o f a complete identity o f Israeli and American interests 
in the Middle East” by stressing “the importance o f a “shared 
philosophy o f peace through strength,” “continuity with Western 
values,” and Israel cooperating “with the U.S. to counter real threats to 
the region and the West’s security.” It advises Netanyahu to use 
language “familiar to the Americans by tapping into themes o f 
American administrations during the Cold War which apply well to 
Israel.”145
Gerges shares the belief that Israel’s and the United States’ policies have become 
increasingly intertwined over the years, although he attributes this development to 
skilful political maneuvering o f Israeli politicians to define the parameters for the 
“battle against Islamic fundamentalism” and enlist U.S. support in this battle by 
“portraying it [Islamic fundamentalism] as a larger-than-life enemy.”146 As an 
example, he cites the numerous references by former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to 
the “Islamic peril” in an attempt to convince Americans that “Iran is posing the same 
threat as Moscow in the good old days,” as well as the statement by former Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres that “[a]fter the fall o f Communism, fundamentalism has 
become the greatest danger o f our time.” 147
Although one could argue convincingly along the lines o f Gerges in America and 
Political Islam that the influence o f Israeli perceptions and needs on U.S. foreign 
policy decisions vis-a-vis the Middle East has been a constant over the past several 
decades for strategic, material, as well as ideological reasons, it appears that this 
influence and the subsequent convergence o f  United States and Israeli foreign policy 
and discourse regarding the Muslim/Arab world in general, and political Islam
144 Maijorie Cohn, Cowboy Republic: Six Ways the Bush Gang Has Defied the L aw  (Sausalito, CA: 
PoliPointPress, 2007).
145 Khalidi, 53.
146 Gerges, 1999, 53.
147 Ibid. 53.
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specifically, has reached its zenith under the George W. Bush administration. That 
this support emanates not only from the corridors o f U.S. political power, but also 
from the American population at large is demonstrated by recent polls showing that 
Americans increasingly accept that Israel and the United States share not merely 
common values, but a common perception o f their “enemies” as well.149
The potential explanations for this development are manifold, but chief among them 
is the ideological commitment to Israel o f principal members o f the neoconservative 
cabal, as described above, that has been at the heart o f the Bush administration policy 
machine. According to Lieven, at this junction the pro-Israeli policies resulting from 
lobbying efforts o f this “powerful mix o f the Christian Zionists and the Israeli radical 
fundamentalists and nationalists and their supporters in the U.S.” meet with the 
rhetoric o f “democratization o f the Middle East that the clash between the American 
thesis and antithesis reaches its greatest, its most enduring, and its most dangerous 
proportions.”150 It is at this intersection that a strange group o f bedfellows meet: 
messianic neoconservatives in search o f a new post-Cold War raison d ’etre, 
milleniarianist Christians hoping to accelerate the “second coming,” Zionist 
Americans willing to sacrifice U.S. interests in an effort to create a militarily 
unrivalled Israeli state, and old school orientalists taking advantage o f the opportunity 
to gain a new lease on life for their worn-out theories.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the origins and development o f American 
Orientalism, focusing on the post-World War II period in general, and the post-
thSeptember 11 period in particular. It was argued here that just as European 
Orientalism reached its nadir at a time when European power projection in the region
148 Ibid.; Frida Berrigan and William D. Hartung, “U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to 
Israel: U .S. Aid, Companies Fuel Israeli Military, A World Policy Institute Issue Brief,” World P olicy  
Institute (20 July 2006).
149 According to the findings o f  a recent Gallup Poll, “following the election o f  Hamas as the 
Palestinian Authority’s ruling party, Americans...[have become] increasingly sympathetic toward the 
Israelis. Americans believe the United States should not give any financial aid to the Palestinians, and a 
plurality says the United States should conduct diplomatic relations with the Palestinians only i f  they 
recognize Israel as a nation.” Jeffrey Jones, “Expectations o f  Middle East Peace Drop Following 
Hamas Victory: Growing Sympathy towards Israelis evident,” The Gallup P o ll (13 February 2006).
150 Lieven, 208.
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was at its greatest, so too has American Orientalism taken root during an era o f 
increased American hegemony. Though its “intentions,” focused now on controlling 
the Middle East via proxy rather than direct rule, its “proponents,” the relatively 
recent, though firmly established pro-Israel, neocon network, and targeted “enemy,” 
Islamists rather than Arabs and/or Muslims in general, have changed, the overall 
impact o f American Orientalism is essentially the same as that o f its earlier European 
counterpart: to construct and reinforce the U.S. vision o f itself as superior and 
uniquely placed to dominate its enemy. As Mahmoud Mamdani argues, the discourse 
which sustains such an identity has been characterized by the “demonization o f Islam 
and its equation with terrorism” and, in its orientalist understanding o f political Islam, 
“questions whether a historically grounded modernity is even possible in the 
postcolonial world.”151
The next two chapters o f this thesis will consider the construction and maintenance o f  
this essentialist discourse, keeping in mind its intellectual and political origins.
151 Mamdani, 169.
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Chapter Four: Construction of the “Savage” Islamist Other in the “War on 
Terror” Discourse
We thrash, curse fo r air 
As our strangler declares, look 
How violent the Arab 
Haiku for the Head Locked, Zein El-Amine1
Perhaps the Project for a New American Century’s neocon agenda would have come 
to exercise overwhelming influence on the Bush administration even in the absence of 
a dramatic event to help catalyze the interventionist reaction. But there is no doubt 
that the September 11th attacks on U.S. soil provided an opportunity for the realization 
o f this agenda, as it provided the proponents o f this ideology with their first test case. 
Yet there was one obstacle that blocked the way to the agenda’s full implementation - 
the Bush administration’s “full-spectrum dominance” doctrine was devised to deal 
with the traditionally conceived enemy that was bound within a fixed geo-political 
space, but the enemy the U.S. was now allegedly confronted with was a nebulous and 
stateless one that defied all traditional labels. In the end, though, this issue proved to 
be little more than a temporary stumbling block, for the administration soon found 
ways to link this “existential threat” to tangible identities and territories that could 
easily be targeted and, eventually even dominated, chief among them Afghanistan and 
Iraq, despite the difficulties encountered by the administration in finding any credible 
evidence linking the latter with the identified enemy.2 The ease with which this 
transition was made was in part due to the great extent to which members o f the Bush 
administration, many with extensive Cold War experience, were able to tap into the 
Manichean strategic conceptualizations and language from the United States’ drawn 
out conflict with the “Evil Empire.” As Holmes argues, the Cold War was a major 
influence on the administration’s “mental alchemy, the ‘reconceiving’ o f an
'y
impalpable enemy as a palpable enemy.”
Though Afghanistan, because o f the Taliban’s refusal to give in to US demands to 
deny refuge to Osama bin Laden and his organization A1 Qaeda, was the first actual
1 Rami El-Amine, “Anti-Arab Racism, Islam, and the Left,” Left Turn 22 (October/November 2006).
‘ R ice, 81; For a comprehensive examination o f  the manipulation o f  intelligence in the lead up to the 
Iraq invasion in order to manufacture the appearance o f  a link between A1 Qaeda and Saddam Hussein 
as a pretext for the invasion o f  Iraq, see Cohn, 13-14.
3 Holmes, 106.
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target in the United States’ declared “war on terror,” it was its invasion o f Iraq that 
served as “pilot project” to realize the goals elaborated in the PNAC agenda o f 
unchallengeable US global hegemony in the Middle East.4 In the words o f Michael 
Ledeen, the 2003 “resident scholar in the Freedom Chair” at the American Enterprise 
Institute [AEI] and “long a fixture among right-wing foreign-policy activists”5: 
“Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little 
country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.”6 
Unfortunately for the PNAC agenda, Iraq was a country whose past as the world’s 
“cradle o f civilization” and contemporary reality at the time o f invasion could not 
possibly have been any further removed from this disdainful description. Nonetheless, 
it was hoped that once the dust had settled from the “constructive chaos” wrought at 
the behest o f an American-led invasion, a completely transformed, oil rich Iraq, made 
in the United States’ image, only inferior and hence docile, could be used as the new 
Middle East base from which the world’s super power could project its political, 
military, economic and ideological might and thereby convince the governments o f 
neighboring states, as well as the political movements that challenged them, to abide 
by the rules set by and for the protection and promotion o f U.S. and Israeli interests in 
the region.7 In proclaiming its desire to bring “democracy” and “freedom,” in other 
words western “civilization,” to the Iraqi people, the Bush administration implicitly 
located “Iraq and Arab Muslim society in what McClintock (1995) has referred to as 
‘anachronistic space: prehistoric, atavistic and irrational, inherently out o f place in the 
historical time o f modernity’,” and at the same time reinforced its own self-identity as
o
a modem, rational, tolerant, progressive, and indeed “exceptional” state.
In this chapter I will look at the construction and maintenance of the discourse on 
political Islam and the vital role it has played in encouraging the necessary level o f 
acquiescence on the part o f the American public and political opposition to enable the 
Bush administration to execute the various policies associated with the “war on 
terror,” including the invasions and occupations o f Afghanistan and Iraq, regardless o f 
the extent to which some o f these patently contradict the stated values and principles
4 Lockman, 248-249.
5Ibid., 248.
6 Ledeen, quoted in Lockman, 248.
7 Ibid.
8 Zine, 3.
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in the name o f which this war has purportedly been fought. As Richard Jackson has 
pointed out, from its inception, the Bush administration’s presentation o f  the enemy in 
the “war on terror” as somehow exceptional both in their actions and motivations 
provided the US government with the necessary justification to employ equally 
unconventional, and in many cases illegal, methods in its attempts to capture and 
punish them, even if  this meant violating international agreements like the Geneva 
Conventions, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, as well as domestic legislation such as the U.S. War Crimes 
Act.9 “This discursive construction provides policy-makers with a great deal o f 
flexibility. It allows them to reconstruct the September 11, 2001 attacks as acts o f 
war, but without conferring the commensurate legitimacy or status on the terrorists.”10
Although I will be leading with a discussion o f the texts and speeches o f prominent 
policy-makers and opposition leaders, this is not meant to imply their privileged 
position in a hierarchy o f genres, nor their more decisive impact on the “context” 
when compared to the academic (as discussed in Chapter 2), media or think-tank 
components. On the contrary, I would argue that the relationship between the various 
genres of this discourse is interdependent and cyclical, and hence the choice o f which 
genre to lead with is actually quite arbitrary. In addition, though much o f the analysis 
articulated here can be generalized to apply to visual media genres such as popular 
films, documentaries, and literature, which have no doubt impacted popular 
perceptions o f the Islamist other, as the focus of this book is on the relationship 
between the discourse and US foreign policy decisions I have instead chosen to focus 
only on those genres o f discourse that have had the most direct and visible impact on 
the opinions o f prominent decision-makers in the government.11 In order to elucidate
9 For a detailed explanation o f  the various ways in which the “war on terror” has violated both 
domestic (US) and international law, see Cohn.
10 Jackson, 39.
11 For a good summary o f  orientalist stereotypes in popular US films and cartoons see the report by the 
Islamic Human Rights Report, “The British media and Muslim representation: the ideology o f  
demonisation.” (http://www.ihrc.org/) A lso see American Arab Anti-Discrimination League, “Media 
Monitoring Team” (http://www.adc.org/index.php?id=T43). There is also Said’s “Covering Islam,” 
which is a bit dated in terms o f  the examples provided, but not in analysis, has analysis o f  both print 
and visual news media in regards to orientalist portrayals o f  Islam/Muslims. Jack Shaheen’s Reel B ad  
Arabs: H ow H ollyw ood Vilifies a People  (Brooklyn, NY: Interlink Publishing Group, 2001) provides a 
good summary o f  the persistent and prolonged vilification o f  Arab peoples in mainstream Western 
m ovies and Tim Jon Semerling’s Evil Arabs in American Popular Films: O rientalist Fear (Texas: 
University o f  Texas Press, 2006) offers an insightful analysis o f  the role o f  orientalist depictions o f  
Muslims and Arabs in popular American films as well as documentary coverage o f  9/11.
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the intricacies o f the discursive tools and processes involved in the construction o f 
this discourse, I will employ Mutua’s “savages-victims-saviors” metaphor, which will 
be described in greater detail in the following section.
1. Understanding the “Savage” Islamist Other Construct in the “War on Terror” 
Discourse
Although it would be deemed unacceptable to describe the enemy Americans 
confronted in the post-9/11 period in pre-Enlightenment, Islamophobic terms, a lesson 
Bush discovered soon after his clumsy use of the term “crusade” to describe the 
nature o f this “war” caused an uproar both at home and abroad, there was an already 
well-established repertoire o f acceptable orientalist language that the president and 
others involved in the creation and maintenance o f the discourse on the Islamist 
“threat,” could tap into to explain a more militant U.S. policy towards the region, in
19 tHgeneral, and political Islam, in particular. As Little points out, September 11
marked the culmination o f America’s uneasy encounter with the
Middle East during the preceding 200 years. The image o f an alien and
barbaric Islam that had been so deeply ingrained in U.S. popular
culture from nineteenth-century ballads to Disney’s Aladdin came to
life in the autumn o f  2001 as CNN beamed into America’s living
rooms video o f A1 Qaeda guerrillas training for jihad in their Afghan
base camps and small but jubilant groups o f Palestinians in Gaza1 ^cheering news o f the carnage at ground zero in lower Manhattan.
And just as had occurred with the discourse o f those institutions that propped up, 
often inadvertently, the European imperial powers from the late eighteenth to 
twentieth centuries, so too did the American political, intellectual, and media elite 
converge in their descriptions o f the other at a time when U.S. hegemony in the 
Middle East seemed imminent. In doing so, they managed to “subordinate” the 
“foreign reality” o f that other and render it more amenable to manipulation and 
control. And, as was the case in imperial times, from these “willful perspectives”
12 Peter Ford, “Europe Cringes at Bush ‘crusade’ against terrorists,” The Christian Science M onitor, 
19 September 2001.
13 Little, 314.
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various conclusions could be expected to follow, “including that imperialism is a 
benign and necessary thing.”14
The numerous reports, articles and speeches produced by the neocon network in the 
aftermath o f the September 11th attacks helped facilitate the administration’s attempts 
at framing the discourse o f the Islamist-terrorist other.15 Put off by the overt 
collaboration o f academics with government agencies engaged in fighting the 
communist enemy throughout the Cold War, and disappointed with U.S. foreign 
policy in general towards the Middle East over the last two decades, many serious 
scholars o f the Middle East/Muslim world, with extensive experience in and 
knowledge o f  the region and Islamist politics in particular, greeted with cynicism the 
hype surrounding this new “war” against an ill-defined enemy whose real threat to the 
U.S./West was dubious at best.
Into the gap that opened up between the politicians who were engaged in devising 
policies to address the new “Islamist threat,” and the scholars capable o f explaining 
the complex dynamics o f these movements, as well as the elaborate histories o f the 
region that produced them, stepped representatives o f the various think-tanks that had 
become an integral part o f the U.S. policymaking landscape since they first began 
proliferating in the 1970s.16 These privately funded organizations, which are largely 
independent o f higher education institutions though often maintain close relations 
with government agencies, churned out the type o f easily digestible and over­
simplified analysis that suited the Bush administration’s Manichean worldview. 
Despite the existence o f dissenting voices offering a more nuanced analysis o f the 
growing appeal o f political Islam and potential explanations for the resentment and 
rage that had come to characterize large segments o f the world’s Muslim population
thby the time o f  the September 11 attacks, these tended to be drowned out in the 
clamor o f pro-“clash o f civilizations” voices emanating from the think-tanks and 
columns o f popular pundits across the U.S.. As Lockman points out:
14 Said, Los Angeles Times, 20 July 2003.
15 For example, President George W. Bush has appointed over a dozen people from AEI to senior 
positions in his administration. AEI claims that this is more than any other research institution. In 
addition, V ice President Dick Cheney was formerly a member o f  the Board o f  Trustees, another link 
between the Institute and the Bush administration. “Right Wing Watch: Right Wing Organizations,” 
People fo r  the American Way, http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx7oidM456).
16 Lockman, 214-242.
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It is striking that the great bulk o f the “talking heads” who appeared on
television to offer their opinions on...issues relating to the Middle East and
US policy towards it seemed to come not from academia but from among
professional public pundits, from people associated with think tanks or with
one o f the public policy schools, and from retired military personnel.
Whatever their knowledge (or lack thereof) o f the languages, politics,
histories and cultures o f the Middle East, these people spoke the language
and shared the mindset o f the Washington foreign policy world in a way few
university-based scholars did. They were also used to communicating their
perspectives in effective sound bites, whereas academics were often put off
by the ignorance and political conformism of much (though by no means
all) o f American mass-media journalism and its tendency to crudely
oversimplify complex issues and transform everything (even war) into a11form o f entertainment.
The fact that there was a compliant mainstream media willing, perhaps for its own 
reasons, including protecting and promoting the financial interests o f the corporations 
that now own a majority o f media outlets in the U.S., to provide a public forum to
1 fthelp consolidate the discourse also helped matters. According to a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, the Bush administration spent close to $1.6 
billion on 343 contracts with public relations firms, advertising agencies, media 
organizations and individuals between 2003 and the second quarter o f 2005, which 
shows just how vital the media’s contribution to the “war on terror” discourse was to 
the Bush administration.19
In addition to its attempts to frame the discourse through public relations blitzes, the 
Bush administration developed strong ties with several “military analysts”, whose 
extensive military experience, it was assumed, made them well-suited for the type of 
objective and in-depth analysis o f the status and effectiveness o f “war on terror” 
associated policies that the major news outlets appeared to be seeking. Instead, as a 
New York Times investigation revealed, the CVs o f  many o f the more than 150 
analysts the Bush administration came to rely on for rosy assessments o f progress
17 Ibid., 248-249.
18 For a good analysis o f  how corporate interests impact the mass media, see Edward S. Herman & 
Noam Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy o f  the M ass M edia  (London: 
Vintage, 1994). For an analysis more specifically related to corporate media’s coverage o f  the Middle 
East in recent years, see: Norman Soloman’s “The Military-Industrial-Media Complex: Why war is 
covered from the warriors’ perspective,” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), Extra! 
(July/August 2005).
19 Christopher Lee, “Prepackaged N ew s,” The Washington Post, 14 February 2006.
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made in the “war on terror” showed that they were seriously lacking in the objectivity 
department. According the investigation, these “analysts”, who were tapped for their 
expert insight on tens o f thousands o f occasions by mainstream television and radio 
stations across the United States, were actually lobbyists, senior executives, board 
members or consultants on some o f the United States’ largest defense corporations, 
many o f which are “part o f the vast assemblage o f contractors scrambling for 
hundreds o f billions in military business generated by the administration’s war on 
terror.”20 Considering the competitive nature o f the defense market, “in which inside 
information and easy access to senior officials are highly prized,” it comes as no 
surprise that the investigation’s conclusion remarked on the high probability that the 
views o f many o f these “military analysts” were biased as a result o f their “vested” 
interests “in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.”21
As with dissenting voices stemming from the academic and think-tank worlds, 
unorthodox analyses within mainstream media have tended to be systematically
marginalized, censored, or completely ignored. As one journalist put it: “[t]o write
*■ 22 with any nuance about Islamists for an American audience is to invite controversy.”
With its policy warriors, subservient media and intellectual infrastructure in place, the 
Bush administration was now confronted with a difficult task: to define a threat 
terrible enough to justify an all out war on those states, groups and individuals 
deemed to threaten the stability o f the new international order— in other words the 
“first men” o f the post-Cold War history—and at the same time maintain its image as
9^the world’s beacon o f democracy, rationality, human rights and freedom. The Bush 
administration lost no time in filling the “void o f meaning” that emerged in the 
aftermath o f the September 11th attacks, constructing a coherent image o f the enemy
20 David Barstow, “Behind Military Analysts, the Pentagon's Hidden Hand,” The N ew  York Times, 20 
April 2008.
o !Ibid-
"  Ken Silverstein, “Parties o f  God: The Bush Doctrine and the rise o f  Islamic democracy,” H arpers 
M agazine (March 2007). In this article he recounts the attempts o f  editors at the Los Angeles Times, 
where he was a staff reporter, to censure sections o f  a story he had written on the Hezbollah’s history 
and rising popularity in Israel that portrayed Israeli and U.S. involvement in Lebanon in a negative 
light.
23 As discussed in Chapter 3, Fukuyama described the “first men” o f  the new post-Cold War world 
order as “deprived and uncomfortable in the historically realized world, [they] would not exhibit the 
historically conditioned and civilized attributes o f  desire and reason —  they would thereby be 
‘bestial’ ...In  their desire for recognition the slaves would rise against the masters and restart history.” 
Chan, 27.
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other that threatened the stability and future o f not only the U.S., but western 
civilization as a whole.24 It then proceeded to argue that the only way to overcome 
this enemy would be through a war targeting not only those individuals responsible 
for the crime, but the underlying ideology, culture, and even religion (at least those 
interpretations o f Islam it disapproved ol) in which their acts were incubated.
However, as Jackson has argued, this did not have to be the case. The attacks could 
have been otherwise described as egregious criminal acts or even crimes against 
humanity, to be dealt with via the institutions and mechanisms o f international law, 
rather than within the narrow confines o f what the late international law scholar Joan 
Fitzpatrick referred to as an “armed conflict paradigm.” As was seen in Chapter 
Two, their human impact was smaller in scale than other destructive events in recent 
history, either natural or manmade, and which have not received a fraction o f the 
attention accorded to the 9/11 attacks. As for the issue o f national security, “terrorism 
ranks far below state repression, small arms proliferation, organized crime, illegal 
narcotics, poverty, disease, [and] global warming” when it comes to objective threat 
assessments.26 Even if  the “terrorist threat” were as profound as the Bush 
administration has claimed, there is nevertheless a growing skepticism amongst 
prominent defense experts that a conventional military response is the most effective 
way to confront it. According to Richard Betts,
With rare exceptions, the war against terrorists cannot be fought with 
army tank battalions, air force wings, or naval fleets -- the large 
conventional forces that drive the defense budget. The main challenge 
is not killing the terrorists but finding them, and the capabilities most 
applicable to this task are intelligence and special operations forces.
The fact that the Bush administration chose to describe them as “acts o f war” was a 
sign that it was determined to orchestrate a discursive shift- one which would 
legitimize, i f  not necessitate the response o f all out war. And though a new language
24 Jackson, 31.
25 Joan Fitzpatrick, “Speaking Law to Power: The War against Terrorism and Human Rights,” 
European Journal o f  International Law  4, no. 2 (April 2003).
26 Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse,” 
Government & Opposition  42, no. 3 (2007): 394-426.
27 Betts.
28 See, for example, the arguments for alternative framing o f  the attacks put forward by Richard 
Jackson, 38; and George Soros, “A  Self-Defeating War,” Wall Street Journal, 14 August 2006.
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was constructed to facilitate this shift, it borrowed as much as it added to the tradition 
o f American Orientalism. It is perhaps its deep-seated roots in American, and more 
generally western, history, that the discourse took on a life o f its own so quickly, as it 
resonated with the worldview o f so many Americans, regardless o f their political 
affiliations. It is for this reason that the discourse o f Democratic politicians and (neo) 
liberal influential pundits and think-tanks will also be considered in this chapter.
In order to fully grasp the various contours o f the Islamist threat discourse, it is 
helpful to employ what Makau Mutua has described as the “savages-victims- saviors” 
(SVS) metaphor, a “three dimensional prism,” which he uses to explain the discursive 
strategy behind the “universal” human rights regime. Mutua sees this regime as 
serving as a mechanism of control in' the West’s attempts to maintain cultural and 
political hegemony in the world, akin to the role served by the mission civilatrice in 
the colonial era, and whose purpose is to judge and denigrate, and ultimately 
transform, the norms and practices o f non-European societies by allegedly neutral, 
though manifestly Eurocentric, standards. Although Mutua’s work is concerned with 
these issues as they relate to the discourse of the international human rights regime, 
one can also see the relevance o f this metaphor when considering the discourse of 
political Islam in the West, and in particular as it is manifested in the U.S. post-
fL
September 11 . According to Mutua, the human rights corpus that was 
institutionalized in the aftermath o f WWII, “has its theoretical underpinnings” in the 
Western colonial attitudes o f the 19th century- in particular their belief in the 
necessity o f an imperial mission to civilize the other and to convert other societies 
into inferior versions o f the same.29 The underlying assumption o f the human rights 
corpus, and, as I have argued throughout this book, o f the social sciences in general, 
has been the modem rationalist notion o f human history, which views “human 
development... as a linear and vertical progression o f the dark or backward races from 
the “savage” to the civilized, the pre-modem to the modem, from the child to the
<>A
adult, and the inferior to the superior.”
The first dimension o f the “savages-victims-saviors” (SVS) prism “depicts a “savage” 
and evokes images o f barbarism,” and although the “savage” metaphor is generally
29 Mutua, 205.
30 Ibid., 213.
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used to describe a state, Mutua argues the “real savage” implied by the metaphor goes 
beyond the superficiality o f geo-political space to the actual culture that underpins
' j  i
that state and, which is seen to be a “deviation” from various “universal” values. In 
the case o f the “war on terror,” deployment of the metaphor is somewhat hampered by 
the fact that the identified barbarian was not clearly associated with one state or 
another. But, as we have already seen with the rhetorical justification for the various 
stages o f the war, including the invasion and occupation o f Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
Bush administration was able to find a way around this minor inconsistency, and 
eventually was able to identify and describe a tangible enemy— the Islamist “terrorist” 
(including, though by no means limited to A1 Qaeda, and a dizzyingly long list o f 
other Islamist movements that have been conflated with it)— and “radical” Islam, the 
religion/ideology/culture alleged to sustain it.
In the process of defining the “savage” (as well as the “victim” and “savior,” as will 
be demonstrated in the next chapter) various discursive tools are employed. Chief 
among these is the reductive, modem rationalist approach, which, as demonstrated in 
Chapter Two, affects the discourse in two important ways. First, through the 
“ideologizaiton o f terror” paradigm, in which political Islam is viewed solely within a 
security framework, where analysis o f a movement’s tactics or strategies, in particular 
the use o f political violence/ “terrorism,” is privileged over a more in-depth 
understanding o f the context in which the tactic (political violence) is chosen. This 
approach results in what Mamdani calls the “depoliticization o f violence,” where 
focus is overwhelmingly placed on the tactics employed by these movements, as 
opposed to their motivations or desired ends, which often include, contrary to 
mainstream opinion, very “rational” “cultural demands, in addition to political ones 
(nationalist, anti-imperialist and even ‘democratic’).” Also lost in these analyses is a 
nuanced understanding o f the various theological and political debates surrounding 
the proper interpretation and strategic value o f the use of indiscriminate violence, and
31 Ibid, 203.
32 Mamdani uses this term to describe what he views as the essentialized portrayal o f  the Darfur 
conflict by western media, politicians and NGOs, which he describes as a “voyeuristic approach” that 
“accompanies a moralistic discourse whose effect is both to obscure the politics o f  the violence and 
position the reader as a virtuous, not just a concerned observer... Whatever its analytical weaknesses, 
the depoliticisation o f  violence has given its proponents distinct political advantages.” Mahmood 
Mamdani, “The Politics o f  Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” London R eview  o f  Books (8 
March 2007).
33 Burgat, xvi.
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suicide bombing in particular, as well as o f the potentially “rational” reasons this 
tactic may be privileged over others in attempts to realize a diverse range o f political 
and social goals.34 Secondly, through viewing political Islam solely as “a reflex 
reaction to certain political or socio-economic circumstances,” this method o f analysis 
starts from the assumption that Islamism is an inherently violent, backward ideology 
developed in reaction to the West, either its perceived “power” or “weakness,” or to 
one or another social or economic development associated with western 
“modernization,” like the retraction o f the state or urbanization. As will be 
demonstrated in the following sections, these reductionist analyses squander the 
opportunity to develop a more substantive understanding o f Islamist movements’ 
histories, religious and ideological trajectories o f development, as well as possible 
explanations for their sustained wide-spread appeal.
2. U.S. Policy-Makers Construct the “Savage” Islamist Other in the “War on 
Terror” Discourse
In this section I will examine the role of politicians in constructing the “savage” 
Islamist other in the context of the “war on terror” discourse. While this section will 
focus primarily on prominent members o f the Bush administration who served as 
rhetorical and ideological architects on the “war”, it will also examine the discourse o f 
prominent Democrats who played a role in constructing and sustaining the neocon 
discourse.
2.1 Construction o f  the “Savage” Islamist Other in the “War on Terror” Discourse: 
Republican Discourse
In a press conference given four days after the September 11th attacks, in which 
President Bush urged Americans to be cautious, but otherwise continue with life as 
normal, the President delineated the exceptional nature o f the enemy by describing 
them as “a group o f barbarians,” which “have declared war on the American 
people.” The following day in an interview with MSNBC’s Tim Russert on Meet the 
Press Vice President Dick Cheney similarly described the enemy, though this time
34Tamimi.
35 George W. Bush, “President Urges Readiness and Patience: Remarks by the President, Secretary o f  
Sate Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft at Camp David, Thurmont, M D,” White House 
News and Policies, 15 September 2001.
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broadening the enemy’s alleged target to include not only the “American people,” but 
the entire “civilized” (read: western) world, hence laying the foundation for the 
promotion o f a “clash of civilizations” framing of events. When asked whether 
Cheney believed there were any international laws that might “prohibit us” from 
tracking down and immobilizing the alleged master-mind o f the attacks, Osama bin 
Laden, Cheney replied in the negative, insisting that the “civilized world” would 
understand that the U.S. had to do what was necessary to deal with the “group of 
barbarians” that was “threaten(ing) all o f us.” Later, in response to a journalist’s 
question regarding alleged instances o f torture at the U.S. military prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cheney defended the prison and employed a more creative 
adjective to describe the enemy and justify the exceptional (and illegal) treatment he 
would receive at the hands o f the U.S. military: “The important thing here to
‘j ' j
understand is that the people that are at Guantanamo are bad people.” Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld similarly attempted to construct the war in terms that 
would allow for the extraordinary tactics the U.S. government planned to employ: 
“this conflict, this campaign, this so-called war, [is] notably different from 
others...this new war will be a conflict ‘without battlefields and beachheads,’ in short, 
an unconventional war.”
Then Attorney General John Ashcroft chimed in with statements elaborating the 
exceptional nature o f the enemy, describing it as a threat not only to U.S. national 
security, but to all o f western civilization, again reinforcing the dichotomous 
“us”/”them” divide. In a speech to Congress in which he presented the 
Administration’s “Mobilization against Terrorism Act” Ashcroft declared: “On one 
side o f this line are freedom’s enemies, murderers o f innocents in the name o f a 
barbarous cause. On the other side are friends o f freedom.” He further implored 
Congress to “act to strengthen our ability to fight this evil wherever it exists, and to 
ensure that the line between the civil and the “savage,” so brightly drawn on 
September 11, is never crossed again.” In describing the enemy as “barbarian,” a 
term o f classification first used by the ancient Greeks to delineate themselves from all
36 Richard Cheney, “The Vice President appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russet.” White House 
News and Policies, 16 September 2001.
37 Fox News, 13 June 2005. Emphasis my own.
38 Donald Rumsfeld, 7 October 2001, quoted in Jackson, 39.
39Ashcroft, 24 September 2001, quoted in Jackson, 49.
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necessarily inferior non-Greeks, and demarcating the line between enemy and victim 
in civilizational terms, Ashcroft and Bush and the rest of the administration, perhaps 
inadvertently, evoked the European imperial era when this distinction was used to 
justify control over the “inferior races”. The actual impact of this language was “to 
create conditions for abuse and torture against terrorist suspects: if  they are animals, 
barbarians and ‘savages’ then they have no ‘human’ qualities and no human rights 
and can be treated as animals without regret or pity.”40
Just as the Bush administration was quick to extrapolate the threat posed by the 
enemy from one solely concerning the U.S., to one that threatened the entire 
“civilized world,” so too did it move to broaden its description o f the enemy from the 
one organization that was accused o f orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, A1 Qaeda, to all 
Islamist movements deemed to pose a threat to the interests and stability o f the 
“civilized world”. In doing so, the Bush administration resorted to the 
“ideaologization o f terror” discursive tactic. Accordingly, all Islamist movements who 
have engaged in acts o f political violence, regardless o f the contexts in which these 
acts were committed, came to be described as movements whose principal ideology 
was one which “excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing o f innocents.”41 To 
convince the public o f the accuracy o f this categorization, the administration began to 
repeat overly-simplistic and inaccurate statements regarding the links between various 
Islamist movements as a means to convince the public of the importance o f 
confronting this menacing threat, which was at once everywhere, and nowhere- a sort 
o f cancer (employing biological metaphors) that could only be cured through a harsh 
and sustained military attack against the enemy, followed by a good dose o f westem- 
style “modernization” shock therapy to ensure against its future return. It is in this 
context that Bush argued in his 2002 State o f the Union Address:
thMost o f the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11 were 
trained in Afghanistan’s camps, and so were tens o f thousands o f 
others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods o f 
murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout 
the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning. [...]
A terrorist underworld—including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah,
40Ibid., 49.
4l“National Security Council (2006) Strategy for Winning the War on Terror,” N ational Security 
Council, 2006.
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Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed— operates in remote jungles and 
deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities.42
This tendency to conflate such disparate Islamist movements in the “war on terror” 
discourse, was demonstrated again in a recent speech by President Bush to the 
American Legion Convention in which he attempted to win over his audience of 
(mainly WWII) veterans with the oft-used, and historically inaccurate43 (in terms o f 
the definition o f the term elaborated by experts of fascism such as Hannah Arendt, 
Renzo de Felice, Stanley Payne and Robert Paxton), label: “Islamic fascists,” a term 
used to evoke memories o f the “Great War”- a war which many Americans, and much 
o f the rest of the world, remember as legitimate and just and in which the Americans 
(again according to subjective memory) played an “indispensable role.”44 The purpose 
o f the fascist analogy is not to facilitate a clearer and more in-depth understanding o f 
the true nature o f this perceived “threat,” but rather to obfuscate by making a 
simplistic (and inaccurate) historical parallel which, because o f its headline-grabbing 
nature, actually disguises the lack of detailed and thorough analysis available to 
substantiate the argument implicit in it. As Jackson points out, the use o f this 
comparison “establish[es] American understanding o f the events [“war on terror”] as 
part o f a long and heroic struggle against totalitarian and murderous ideologies such 
as fascism and communism”45
In this same speech Bush also attempts to link together otherwise independent events 
that have occurred in various places throughout the Middle East over the past three 
decades, into one coherent chronology that points to the development o f a monolithic,
42 Bush, 29 January 2002, quoted in Jackson, 110.
43A s Durand has argued, none o f  the Islamist movements that Bush lumped together under the term 
meet the criteria for fascism as traditionally defined by fascism experts. “It is true that Muslim  
fundamentalist movements exhibit certain traditional features o f  fascism: a paramilitary dimension, a 
feeling o f  humiliation and a cult o f  the charismatic leader (although to a relative degree, and scarcely 
comparable with the cults o f  the Fiihrer or the Duce). But all the other fundamental ingredients o f  
fascism — the expansionist nationalism, corporatism, bureaucracy and the cult o f  the body -  are 
generally lacking in Islamism. Stephen Duran “Warlike Policies Based on the Politics o f  Fear: The lie 
that is 'islamofascism ”’ Le M onde Diplomatique, November 2006. For further critiques regarding the 
historical inaccuracy and motivation behind use o f  the term by the Bush administration see, Trudy 
Rubin, “Islamo-facism label emotional, misleading” Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 August 2006; Juan 
Cole, “Rumsfeld Accuses Critics o f  Appeasement o f  Fascists” Informed Comment, 30 August 2006; 
David Ignatius “Towards a definition o f  Islamic fascism ,” D aily Star, 19 August 2006; Uri Avnery, 
“Muhammad’s Sword Why did Pope Benedict utter these words in public? And why now?” Gush 
Shalom, 26 September 2006; Fouzi Slisli and Jacqueline Kaye, “A  liberal logic: reply to Fred 
Halliday,” Opendemocracy.com, 8 December 2006.
44 Jackson, 42.
45 Ibid, 57.
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violent Islamist movement, whose raison d ’etre, it would appear, is nothing more than 
to destroy western civilization:
Extremists in Iran seized American hostages. Hezbollah terrorists 
murdered American troops at the Marine barracks in Beirut and 
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Terrorists set o ff a truck bomb at the 
World Trade Center. A1 Qaeda blew up two U.S. embassies in East 
Africa, and bombed the USS Cole. Then came the nightmare o f 
September the 11, 2001, when 19 hijackers killed nearly 3,000 men, 
women, and children.46
For Bush, regardless o f their sectarian, theological, ideological, historical and 
strategic differences these groups are all linked by their “rigid conviction [read 
backwards- modem convictions are dynamic] that free societies are a threat to their 
twisted view o f Islam.”47 Bush’s monolithic view o f Islamist movements was further 
confirmed in a speech made in April 2007, in which he implicitly compares such 
dissimilar individuals and groups as westem-bom and raised “global jihadis,” Shiite, 
Sunni and secular Baathist resistance movements as well as their “irredentist jihadi” 
counterparts in Iraq, Taliban and other tribal movements in Afghanistan, with a 
terrorist incident that may or may not (it is difficult to tell as the Algerian government 
is notorious for its lack of transparency in its investigations o f “terrorist” attacks) 
have been carried out by an “internal jihadi” movement in Algeria (e.g. Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) or Salifist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)).48 
According to Bush, the “enemy”
views the world as a giant battlefield, and will strike wherever they can.
The killers who behead captives and order suicide bombings in Iraq are 
followers o f the same radical ideology as those who destroy markets in 
Afghanistan; or they set off car bombs in Algeria, and blow up subway 
trains in London. The men who attacked Iraq's parliament last week swear 
allegiance to the same terrorist network as those who attacked America on 
September the 11th, 2001.49
46 Bush, 29 January 2002, quoted in Jackson, 110.
47 Bush, 31 August 2006.
48 Algeria’s military dictatorship has systematically imprisoned, tortured and killed its Islamist 
opposition ever since the 1992 presidential elections, in which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was 
poised to win. Burgat; Rober Malley, The Call from  Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn 
to Islam  (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1996). For a concise description o f  the various types 
o f  Islamist and Jihadi movements that exist, see International Crisis Group.
49 George W. Bush, “President Bush Visits East Grand Rapids, Discusses Global War on Terror,” 
White House News and Policies, 20 April 2007.
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Similarly unconcerned with understanding the varied worldviews, theological, 
philosophical and political agendas o f the Islamist movements considered by the Bush 
administration to pose a threat to the “civilized world,” Rumsfeld argued in an 
interview with U.S. News & World Report’s Linda Robinson that: “The terrorist 
threat against the United States is now defined as ‘Islamist extremism’— not just al 
Qaeda. The Pentagon ...identifies the ‘primary enemy’ as ‘extremist Sunni and Shia 
movements that exploit Islam for political ends’ and that form part o f a ‘global web o f 
enemy networks.’”50 Again, there is no attempt to explain the precise criteria used by 
the Pentagon to judge exactly which Sunni and Shia movements “exploit Islam for 
political ends,” nor the criteria used to distinguish between these movements and 
those that merely use Islam for political ends, which, one would assume from the 
more provocative verb employed here, would be considered legitimate by the 
Administration. And finally, it fails to provide the criteria by which movements are 
judged to belong to this “global web o f enemy networks.” This is yet another instance 
o f the use o f imprecise language to alarm and obfuscate, rather than explain and 
enlighten- the presumed purpose o f these types o f journalistic interviews with 
government sources.
U.S. Secretary o f State Condoleezza Rice employed the same reductionist logic in 
testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, employing as well what 
Mamdani refers to as the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” rhetorical distinction, in which 
the former is assumed to be “modem” and westernized, and the latter “radical, 
uncompromising, and bent on a continuous rejection o f the West”51:
On the one side, you have extremist forces -- Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and 
Iran -- in fact, Iran, the state that is most responsible for supporting those 
extremist forces; and on the other side o f the ledger, you have young 
reformist governments like Lebanon, the Government o f Iraq and of course 
the positive forces in the Palestinian territories like Mahmoud Abbas, but 
you also o f course have states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan and the 
Gulf states.52
50 Linda Robinson, “Plan o f  Attack: The Pentagon has a secret new strategy for taking on terrorists—  
and taking them down,” U.S. News & World Report, 1 August 2005.
51 Mamdani, pp; Mesari, 238.
52 Condoleeza Rice, “Iraq: A N ew  Way Forward: Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee,” Secretary o f  State Condoleeza Rice, 11 January 2007.
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In these analyses contextual facts, which may go some way towards explaining the 
hostility o f these movements/states to the U.S. and its clients in the region, such as 60 
years o f Israeli occupation o f Palestine, and with it o f the third most holy site in 
Islam- the A1 Aqsa mosque, with overt western (in particular U.S.) political, military 
and economic support and/or complicity, more than 20 years o f Israeli occupation o f 
Lebanon, decades o f economic and military support for other oppressive client states 
in the region, over a century’s worth o f western interventions to overthrow popular 
governments in favor o f governments more amenable to US interests in the region 
(e.g. overtly in Egypt, 1882; Iraq, 1920; Syria, 1925; Iran 1953; Afghanistan, 2002; 
Iraq, 2003 and numerous other covert examples ), are seen as negligible, or, at best, 
according to Boaz Ganor, “empirical regularities associated with terrorism.”
The use o f the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” rhetorical distinction as evidenced in 
Condoleezza Rice’s statements, and used throughout the statements and speeches o f 
other members o f the Bush administration, serves a similar function to the dual­
pronged conceptual approach to the native other adopted by the Spaniards upon their 
“discovery” and colonization o f America as described by Tzvetan Todorov in The 
Conquest o f  America. As Todorov explains, the native other was seen either in terms 
o f what he shared in common with the Spaniard, and hence as a human being, though 
only in-so-far as he was capable o f complete assimilation, or in terms o f his absolute 
difference, which was “immediately translated into terms o f superiority and inferiority 
(in this case, obviously, it is the Indians who are inferior),” and which invited 
conquest. In both instances though, as in the case o f the good Muslim/bad Muslim 
distinction, which is also grounded in an identity-based “egocentrism,” “the existence 
o f a human substance truly other, something capable o f being not merely an imperfect 
state o f oneself,” is denied.54 From this example it is clear that the criteria for falling 
on our side in this “war” is unrelated to the level o f commitment or respect a state or 
movement has for the principles o f democracy, freedom, equality, or any other o f the 
lofty political and social ideals this administration has oft referred to in its attempts to 
justify its foreign policy decisions, but rather it is linked to the capacity and desire o f 
the Muslim other to assimilate to our way o f  doing and being.55
53 Ganor,
54 Todorov, 42.
55 See recent Amnesty/Human Rights Watch Reports for evidence o f  this.
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This idea is reinforced in President Bush’s 2007 State of the Union Address in which 
he commends the “progress” made in states like Lebanon, where the largely secular, 
pro-westem Cedar Revolution “drove out the Syrian occupiers and chose new leaders 
in free elections,” U.S. occupied Afghanistan, where the general population “defied 
terrorists and elected a democratic legislature,” and even war-torn Iraq, where the 
“Iraqi people” voted in a transitional government in 2005 which went on to adopt “the 
most progressive, democratic constitution in the Arab world.”56 Not only are the 2006 
Palestinian legislative elections, in which Hamas, a party whose internal politics have 
been described by a respected think-tank as “democratic centralism with an Islamist 
twist,” came to power through an internationally recognized democratic process, not 
mentioned as a development that has impacted “progress” in the region, but all o f the 
movements blamed for attempting to break this “democratic wave” happen to be 
Islamist movements, which, Bush insists, are fighting out of “fierce reaction” to the 
“desire for liberty” expressed by the majority o f good Muslims in the region.57 In this 
context, Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shi’ia Islamist movement, which developed in 
resistance to Israeli occupation o f southern Lebanon from 1982-2000 and to advocate 
on behalf o f Lebanon’s historically disenfranchised Shi’ia Muslim community 
(though it now commands broad support from various segments o f Lebanese society), 
and which pursues a nationalist agenda, is compared to the messianic, global A1 
Qaeda, “other Sunni extremists” and “Shi’ia death squads” operating in Iraq.55 The 
underlying assumption o f such comments is that there is no need to actually elaborate 
the characteristics these movements share in common, or how they differ - they are all 
Islamist movements and it is therefore assumed that they are all violent, opposed to 
democracy and, in general, antithetical to “progress”.
In a speech he gave at the National Endowment for Democracy headquarters on 
“Islamic radicalism,” President Bush elaborated on the various differences that 
delineate a “barbarian” movement from legitimate political parties that have a natural
56 George W. Bush, “President Bush Delivers State o f  the Union Address,” White House News and  
Policies, 23 January 2007.
57 “After Mecca: Engaging Hamas,” International Crisis Group (28 February 2007).
58 According to Hezbollah leaders, the movement only operates within the borders o f  Lebanon unless 
attacked from outside, therefore demonstrating its national agenda, which sets it apart from 
transnational Islamist movements such as Al-Qaeda. For Nasrallah’s statements on this issue, see: 
Seymour M . Hersh, “Annals o f  National Security: The Redirection,” The N ew Yorker, 5 March 2007.
194
right to participate in the political system. In another frequently used analogy with 
historical resonance for the American people, Bush claimed that, like the communists, 
these “militants” are doomed to failure because o f the “inherent contradiction” within 
their ideology. Bush went on to argue that “by fearing freedom—by distrusting 
human creativity, and punishing change, and limiting the contributions o f half the 
population—this ideology undermines the very qualities that make human progress 
possible, and human societies successful.”59 In his reliance on dichotomous reasoning, 
Bush’s statement is predicated on the assumption that Islamist movements cannot be 
“modem,” at least not according to his understanding o f modernity, as they are 
deemed to be inimical to democracy, freedom and change, regardless o f whether or 
not the facts on the ground contradict this view.60 Bush goes on to argue the only 
“modem” aspect o f these movements “is the weapons they want to use against us. The 
rest o f their grim vision is defined by a warped image o f the past— a declaration o f 
war on the idea o f progress, itself.” Yet the modem people o f the world should not 
despair as “those who despise freedom and progress have condemned themselves to 
isolation, decline, and collapse. Because free peoples believe in the future, free 
peoples will own the future. . . .”61
The Bush administration’s description o f the enemy and the “war on terror” does not 
seem to have been affected by tactical and strategic losses on two o f the war’s central 
battlefields: Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the fact that U.S./coalition forces appear to 
be losing many aspects o f these battles, even judging by their own terms o f success 
(e.g., the number o f American/coalition military casualties has remained consistent 
on average, the failure to locate and bring to justice many of the leading figures o f A1
59 George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” 
White H ouse News and Policies, 6 October 2005.
60 See for example the reluctance o f  Western governments and analysts to take seriously changes made 
in Hamas’ position regarding the possibility o f  accepting a Palestinian state solely in the W est Bank 
and Gaza, with its capital in East Jerusalem, giving up on earlier hopes as expressed in its founding 
Charter to regain all o f  historic Palestine, which would include present day Israel as well. See: Khaled 
Hroub, Hamas: A B eginner’s Guide (New  York: Pluto Books, 2006). There has been a similar 
reluctance on the part o f  Western politicians and analysts to recognize the consistently democratic 
participation o f  movements like Hezbollah and Muslim Brotherhood in government and civil society  
activities in Lebanon and Egypt respectively. See: John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: 
Understanding Centrist Islam,” H arvard International Review  24, no. 4 (Winter 2003); On Hezbollah: 
Mohammed Ben Jelloun, “Hezbollah’s Democratic Demands,” Swans Commentary (15 January 2007) 
and Lara Deeb, “Hizballah: A  Primer,” M iddle East Report Online, 31 July 2006; Reinoud Leenders, 
“How U N  Pressure on Hizbullah Impedes Lebanese Reform,” M iddle East R eport Online, 23 May
2006.
61 George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” 
White H ouse N ews and Policies, 6 October 2005.
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Qaeda and the Taliban, including Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the failure to 
bring security and stability to these countries-even if  only for the sake o f promoting 
U.S. economic and strategic interests there, and the failure to definitively replace their 
own forces with local military and police forces- even if  only to placate an 
increasingly frustrated and war-weary American public and Congress), the Bush 
administration has remained steadfast in its commitment to the “savage” enemy 
discourse. Four years after his “mission accomplished” speech, Bush continued to 
argue that in order to win the “war on terror” the American people first needed to 
understand the true “nature o f the enemy.” In contrast to the United States, which 
was founded on “universal” values o f “freedom” and the “natural rights o f men and 
women,” the system of governance the enemy would like to establish throughout the 
Middle East is a tyrannical one, based on oppression and violence. Bush further 
elaborates on the enemy’s belief system, which is diametrically opposed to “western,” 
“modem” political ideology, explaining: “They believe you should not be able to 
worship freely. They believe that young girls should not go to school. They’ve got a 
perverted sense o f justice. They believe in the use o f violence to achieve their 
objectives. Their stated objectives, their stated goals are to spread their totalitarian
( \ Xview throughout the Middle East. That’s what they want to do.” Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld took the discourse, and with it, justification for the 
continued occupation o f Iraq, one step further arguing that the enemy’s ultimate goal 
is to spread this barbaric, totalitarian system not only across the Middle East, but to all 
those lands that were at one time under Muslim rule, “from Spain to the Philippines.” 
Following the standard protocol, no evidence was provided to substantiate these 
claims.64
Similar to the academic analyses o f  Huntington, Lewis and Ajami, the latter two o f 
whom have advised President Bush on Middle East policies,65 on the rise o f “Islamic 
fundamentalism” as discussed in Chapter Two, the Bush administration has employed
62 Michael T. Klare, “Losing the War on Terrorism: Our Incompetent Commander-in-Chief,” 
TomDispatch, 8 January 2006. For statistics on the conduct and impact o f  the two wars to date, see 
Seumas Milne, “The War That Can Bring Neither Peace nor Freedom,” The Guardian, 5 February 
2008; and “Afghanistan: Decision Point 2008,” The Senlis Council (6 February 2008).
63 George W. Bush, “President Bush D iscusses Global War on Terror,” White House News and  
Policies, 6 April 2006.
64 Editorial, N ew  York Times, 4 August 2006.
65 Zachary Lockman, “Critique from the Right: Neo-conservative Assault on Middle East Studies,” CR: 
The N ew Centennial Review  5, no. 1 (2005): 63-110,
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the modem rationalist approach when arguing that there is no need to understand the 
specific theological, socio-political, and economic agendas or worldviews o f Islamist 
movements, nor the specific endogenous and exogenous factors that have impacted 
their development, instead gross generalizations can be employed under the pretext 
that there is nothing more to understand about these movements apart from the fact 
that they are headed by backwards, violent fanatics who prey on the poor and 
alienated of their societies. As a National Security Council document put it: these 
movements recruit “from populations with no voice in their own government and see 
no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the 
existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse 
political vision based on violence and destruction.” Not only in this patronizing 
assessment is the agency of adherents to these movements completely denied, but so 
too are all possible explanations for the political violence that these groups may 
engage in, apart from their lack o f an alternative democratic outlet for their 
frustration, which is, in any case, later dismissed as a mitigating factor: “The failures 
the terrorists feel and see are blamed both on others and on perceived injustices from 
the recent or sometimes distant past. The terrorists’ rhetoric keeps wounds associated 
with this past fresh and raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.” The use o f 
the qualifying adjective “perceived” in this instance is meant to deligitimize both the 
actual experience o f “injustice,” and the “wounds” inflicted by it, often at the hands of 
the U.S. government or its clients in the region, on the part o f  Islamists, as well as 
whatever actions they may take to address these “injustices.”66
Anyone looking for a nuanced understanding o f the reasons why the Islamist agenda, 
in contrast to that o f the secular political opposition, resonates so strongly with large 
segments of the Muslim world today would be hard pressed to find what they are 
looking for in any o f the polemical statements or speeches made by the members o f 
the Bush administration or prominent leaders o f the mainstream opposition. In 
addition to compressing all o f the diverse Islamist movements o f  the world, with all o f 
their diverse goals, strategies and tactics into a monolithic whole, the administration 
has defined this whole only in terms o f its tactics, with no attempt to understand or 
differentiate between long-term goals, worldviews, and strategies. Rather, Islamists 
are defined as “ideologues,” yet the substance o f this ideology is never discussed. The
66 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” National Security Council (September 2006).
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only information the public is given about the Islamist belief-system is that it is 
fundamentally different and opposed to “our” own. Whereas
“We believe in human rights and human dignity and minority rights and 
rights for women and rights to worship freely. That’s what we believe. We 
believe in a lot o f rights for people. These killers don't. They have a narrow 
view of life. They have taken a great religion and converted it to their own 
vision. They have goals; they want to drive us out of parts o f the world. 
They want the free world to retreat so they can topple governments. They 
want to be able to do in parts o f the world that which they did in 
Afghanistan—take over a government; impose their negative, dark vision on 
people. ... This is—this is their vision, and they would like—they would 
like to see that vision spread. Make no mistake about it, this is a war against 
people who profess an ideology, and they use terror as a means to achieve 
their objectives.”67
There is no attempt here to explain exactly what is this “ideology” professed by the 
“killers.” The audience here is implicitly instructed to believe the only ideology 
adhered to by these movements is one based on the desire to kill and terrorize 
westerners. Here we see a rhetorical attempt here to conflate the belief system o f this 
monolithic Islamist whole with the tactics it has adopted to promote its alleged 
agenda. Employing a manifestly simplistic tautological argument, the audience is told 
nothing about that agenda, except that it is different from “our” own. This is precisely 
the “ideologization o f terror” that Burgat refers to.
2.2 Construction o f  the “Savage” Islamist Other in the “War on Terror” Discourse: 
Democrat Discourse
As tempting as it may be for some to attribute the formulation and maintenance o f this 
discourse solely to the hawkish, neo-conservative, evangelist or pro-Zionist strain of 
the American Republican party, the contributions and analysis o f prominent members 
o f the Democratic Party have proven just as prone to essentialist analysis. Democratic 
Senator and presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton added to the chorus o f politicians 
lining up to defend “American values” o f freedom and democracy against the 
barbarian enemy, arguing: “These principles that we just so easily talk about - 
democracy, tolerance, rule o f law, individual rights-they are the bedrock that has 
sustained our societies. It is precisely those values that we share that are under attack 
from the radical Islamist extremists. Their ideology disdains our liberal democratic
67 Bush, 3 August 2005.
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values and seeks to destroy all that we hold dear.” Again we see no attempt to define 
who “they” are. This monolithic Islamist bloc referred to in the discourse is just as 
likely to be the “global jihadi” A1 Qaeda, fighting to rid the Muslim world o f all 
western influence, as it could be Hamas or Hezbollah, nationally based Islamist 
political parties that are more concerned with protecting (in the case o f Hezbollah) or 
achieving (in the case o f Hamas) the sovereignty o f the states in which they are 
located: Lebanon and Palestine respectively.
This point was reinforced in comments made by Senator Clinton during a keynote 
address at Yeshiva University in which she stressed the importance o f maintaining the 
“special” relationship between Israel and the U.S.: “If Americans did not understand it 
before 9-11, it is abundantly clear now that we must stand beside Israel and make it 
clear we guarantee Israel’s security.. . .  In defeating terror, Israel’s cause is our cause. 
The evil o f terrorism, a burden long suffered by Israelis, threatens to rip apart the 
fabric o f  the Middle East. And our effort fighting terrorism there is akin to our effort 
fighting terrorism everywhere.” Implicit in this statement are three points: first, that 
Israel’s and the United State’s futures are strategically, if  not existentially, linked; 
second, that it is their “terrorism” — the terrorism o f “Islamist extremists,” that 
threatens the existence and stability o f Israel and the rest o f the Middle East 
(regardless o f the fact that, in terms of sheer numbers, hundreds o f thousands more 
Palestinians and other Arabs and Muslims in the region have been killed, injured, and 
displaced over the past several decades by our (Israeli and American) violence, than 
Israelis and Americans have been killed or injured by their (Muslim/Arab) violence); 
and, third, that all o f these “extremist” movements are linked by virtue o f their shared, 
and irrational (or anti-semitic) hatred of Israel, and o f US/westem civilization. Again, 
there is no need for specifics or context in this type o f discourse as it is assumed that 
the audience knows exactly who the “evil” terrorists that threaten Israeli and U.S. 
security are. The facts o f occupation, cultural, military and economic imperialism are 
completely peripheral to this construction.69
68 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Excerpts from Remarks o f  Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton German 
Media Prize Dinner,” Senator H illary Rodham Clinton Speeches, 13 February 2005.
69 Quoted in Kristen Lombardi, “Hillary Calls Israel a ‘Beacon’ o f  Democracy: Excerpts from Senator 
Clinton’s Hanukkah Dinner Speech,” The Village Voice, 11 December 2005.
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Massachusetts Senator and former presidential candidate John Kerry offers a similar 
analysis in arguing that: “at the core o f this conflict is a fundamental struggle o f ideas. 
O f democracy and tolerance against those who would use any means and attack any
70target to impose their narrow views in a world no longer safe for diversity.” And 
although he goes on to reject the “clash of civilizations” paradigm as a lens through 
which to view the “conflict,” he insists there is a “clash” nonetheless, though not as 
much between civilizations as between “ideas,” which, as used in this context, seems 
inextricably linked to the culture that underpins the movements allegedly guided by 
them. On the one side, according to Kerry, you have those who hold modem ideas 
which encompass the “hopes o f humanity” against those who hold backwards ideas, 
based on “dogmatic fears o f progress and the future.”
Even though Senator Barak Obama, another leading candidate for the Democratic 
primaries, has been a vocal critic o f the Iraq war and has urged diplomatic rather than 
military solutions to the various issues troubling the U.S. in the Middle East today, in 
a speech to the AIPAC’s Chicago/Midwest regional forum Obama showed he was just 
as capable as his Republican and more mainstream democratic counterparts in 
perpetuating the discourse on political Islam. Similar to Senator Clinton, Obama’s 
first rhetorical move was to implicitly justify the United States’ “special relationship” 
with Israel by implying cultural similarities between the two states. Discussing his trip 
to Kiryat Shmona, a town situated close to Israel’s border with Lebanon, Obama 
evokes images o f  a suburban town to which the average American could relate:
Our helicopter landed in the town o f Kiryat Shmona on the border. What 
struck me first about the village was how familiar it looked. The houses and 
streets looked like ones you might find in a suburb in America. I could 
imagine young children riding their bikes down the streets. I could imagine 
the sounds o f their joyful play just like my own daughters. There were cars 
in the driveway. The shrubs were trimmed. The families were living their 
lives.71
He then goes on to contrast this idyllic suburban image with the destruction caused by 
a Hezbollah Katyusha rocket to one of the homes in the town, hence evoking the
70 John Kerry, “UCLA Address Promises More Effective War on Terrorism,” R onald W. Burkle Center 
fo r  International Affairs, 27 February 2004.
71 “Prepared text o f  Barack Obama's speech for the AIPAC foreign policy forum,” Sun Times News 
Group, 2 March 2007.
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civilized/barbarian binary. Nowhere in this discussion of the havoc wreaked on Israeli 
lives by Hezbollah are mitigating facts presented. There is no mention o f  the fact that 
for every Israeli civilian who died in the conflict, over twenty-five Lebanese civilians 
were killed by indiscriminate Israeli bombing -- over one thousand in total, a third o f 
them children. Nor is there any mention o f the indiscriminate death and destruction 
caused by Israel’s use o f cluster bombs in civilian areas, in contravention o f 
international law, and which continue to harm Lebanese lives even half a year after 
the cessation o f hostilities, and which even the Bush administration has criticized. It 
is clear from the description that the issue Obama has with Hezbollah is not the 
violence it has employed to attain political ends, as it is clear to anyone with even a 
cursory knowledge o f the history o f Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbors that 
Israel is no novice when it comes to employing violence to achieve political aims, 
though with much more far-reaching and devastating consequences as a result o f its 
superior military capabilities, but that Israel was somehow more justified in its use o f 
violence because Israelis, in the typical Israeli-influenced orientalist construction 
described by Said, are ultimately more like us, both in civilisational and ontological 
terms. Hezbollah is one further example o f the irrational and violent nature o f that 
disparate group o f Islamist movements seen to be threatening the Western way o f life, 
amongst which he includes al-Qaeda and Hamas as well as Iran.
It is as a result o f this dichotomous reasoning, and in it the position o f Israel and 
Islamist movements respectively, that Obama finds nothing wrong in recommending 
such blatantly double-standards when it come to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While he insists the U.S. should “never seek to dictate 
what is best for the Israelis and their security interests,” he goes on to argue in favor 
of an intransigent U.S. policy vis-a-vis Hamas, which, despite having successfully 
implemented a 16 month cease fire, called off only after the Israeli military’s shelling 
of a Gaza beach resulted in the deaths o f 8 civilians, including 3 children,74 and 
having agreed to form a unity government in February 2007 with Fatah, the party they
72 “Israel/Lebanon: Deliberate destruction or “collateral damage?” Israeli attacks on civilian  
infrastructure,” Am nesty International (23 August 2006).
n  “United States: Cut O ff Cluster Munition Sales to Israel,” Human Rights Watch (January 29, 2007).
74 “Israel Faces Criticism Over Gaza Beach Shelling,” ABC N ew Online (11 June 20060.
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defeated in undisputed legislative elections only one year earlier, hence 
demonstrating Hamas’ flexibility and capacity to cede to regional and international 
pressure, should be told that “this is not good enough.” In this dichotomy, the 
Israelis are viewed as civilized and hence capable o f autonomous thought and action 
whereas the U.S. must “tell” Hamas what to do, because, it is assumed, they are 
incapable o f rational action otherwise. Again, and without substantiation or further 
explanation, Obama explains the reason for this distinction: Israel is the United 
States’ “stalwart all[y]”. As a result, the “conflicts o f the Middle East” should not be 
seen as “rooted primarily in the actions o f ’ Israel, but rather as the result o f the 
“perverse and hateful ideologies o f radical Islam.”
The contribution to the discourse on political Islam of prominent Democrats is not 
surprising when looked at in the context o f comments made by Democratic House 
Representative Silvestro Reyes, who was appointed in December 2006 to the post o f 
Chairman o f the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which highlight 
the amount (or lack) o f time and effort the party deems necessary to invest in 
developing a more comprehensive understanding o f the various Middle Eastern 
Islamist movements- even those they allegedly find threatening. In an interview with 
the Congressional Quarterly, Reyes displayed an unabashed lack o f knowledge o f the 
numerous theological and political differences that exist between various Islamist 
movements, including obvious and embarrassing mistakes he made in labeling A1 
Qaeda a Shi’ia movement and Hezbollah, Sunni.78 This seemingly innocuous gaffe 
committed by the individual selected to head one o f the most important congressional 
committees in relation to the “war on terror,” and whose job it is to assess vast 
quantities o f material concerning various Middle Eastern Islamist movements, 
actually points to a more insidious reality regarding the Democrat’s lack o f desire to 
develop o f an alternative, and perhaps more nuanced, approach to political Islam.
75 Tim Butcher, “Hamas and Fatah Agree Unity Government Deal,” The D aily Telegraph , 10 February
2007.
76 Obama, 2 March 2007.
77 Barack Obama, “Transcript: Senator Barack Obama’s Speech,” The International H erald Tribune, 
18 March 2008.
78 Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington, “Middle East questions stump Democrats' intelligence 
overseer,” The Guardian, 13 December 2006.
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3. U.S. Journalists Construct the “Savage” Islamist Other in the “War on 
Terror” Discourse
For a plethora o f reasons, including, as discussed above, the financial interests o f the 
major corporate owners o f mainstream American media, which are often more 
concerned about alienating the advertisers they depend on for a substantial portion of 
their revenue than getting a story right, the shared cultural and political references of 
the media and political elite, as well as the shared ability o f both to be swayed by the 
lobbying campaigns o f powerful interests which could threaten their financial and/or 
public credibility, the mainstream U.S. media has often played the role o f both 
transmitter and purveyor o f orientalist stereotypes throughout the history o f U.S. 
involvement in the Middle East. In this section I will focus specifically on the role o f 
particularly influential pundits who have facilitated the creation and/or perpetuation o f 
the modem rationalist and orientalist discourse on political Islam in the context o f the 
“war on terror”. As Hansen argues, the relationship between politicians and media in 
constructing and sustaining a discourse is neither unidirectional nor stagnant, which 
makes it difficult to attribute full responsibility to one party or another. What is 
certain, however is that “it would...be extremely unlikely- and politically unsaw y- 
for politicians to articulate foreign policy without any concern for the representations 
found within the wider public sphere as they attempt to present their policies as 
legitimate to their constituencies,” which is why it is important to turn our attention
IQnow to “representations” o f the “savage” enemy in the media.
Although most popular pundits stayed within the framework o f acceptable orientalist 
language in the days following the 9/11 attacks, one notoriously outspoken right wing 
journalist, Ann Coulter, decided to do away with PC etiquette in favor o f  vitriolic 
diatribe. Echoing the sentiments o f former Secretary of State Dulles, another well- 
known American who chose to side-step the formalities o f the United States’ 
infamously politically correct culture in favor of more forthright approach when he 
declared: “For us [Eisenhower administration] there are two sorts o f people in the 
world: there are those who are Christians and support free enterprise and there are the
79 Hansen, 7.
203
OA
others” , Coulter, in her first post-9/11 column, urged the Bush administration to
O |
“invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity.”
Pulitzer Prize winning, leading neocon journalist Charles Krauthammer opted to stay 
within the acceptable limits when he criticized the “moral obtuseness” o f those who 
sought to understand the root causes o f the September 11th attacks in an opinion piece 
written for the Washington Post. “This is not a time for agonized relativism,” 
Krauthammer argued, “or, obscenely, for blaming America first. This is a time for 
clarity. At a time like this, those who search for shades of evil, for root causes, for 
extenuations are, to borrow from Lance Morrow, Too philosophical for decent
OA
company.’” Robert Kagan and William Kristol, co-founders o f PNAC and regular 
writers for the neoconservative publication the Weekly Standard, agreed with the 
“grand and clear vision for American foreign policy” set forth by the President, and 
urged policymakers, every time they see evil, to “to call it by its name.”83 And while 
the Islamist terrorist was the enemy, it was clear to many o f these pundits that the 
“endless tyranny and intolerance” o f the Arab world was the real culprit behind the 
barbarian acts.84
In an article written close to a month after the attacks on the World Trade Center, 
Daniel Pipes, the neocon pundit who founded the McCarthyesque organization 
“Campus Watch,” which encourages students to spy on and publicly expose 
professors who they believe exhibit anti-American or anti-Israeli tendencies in the 
class room, has described events as confirming not a “clash o f civilizations,” but
Of
rather a “clash between civilization and barbarism.” In alarmist tones, Pipes argued 
not only were these “enemies” o f civilization to be found in the mountains o f Tora
80 Related by former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in a recorded interview for the Dulles 
Oral History Project, Princeton University Library; cited in Roger Morgan, The United States and West 
Germany, 1945-1973; A Study in Alliance Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 54.
81 Ann Coulter, “This Is War,” National Review, 12 September 2001.
82 Charles Krauthammer, “Voices o f  Moral Obtuseness,” Washington Post, 21 September 2001, 
reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Iraq War Reader. History, Documents, 
Opinions (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 281.
83 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Lost in the Wilderness,” Weekly Standard, 22 April 2002.
84 Charles Krauthammer, “Three Cheers for the Bush Doctrine,” Time (7 March 2005).
85 Daniel Pipes, ‘T w o  Declarations o f  War,” Jerusalem Post, 10 October 2001. Although Pipes started 
out his career as an academic, having received a PhD from Harvard in 1978 in medieval Islamic 
history, I have used the ‘pundit’ label to describe him because he has never secured a permanent 
academic position and he has made more o f  a name for him self writing polemical articles for a various 
right-wing newspapers and journals, including the one published by his own think-tank, Middle East 
Forum, than he ever did in his capacity as an academic. Lockman, 254-257.
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Bora and the dark streets alleyways o f southern Beirut and Nablus, but also on the 
United States’ own soil. In another article revealing his Islamophobic tendencies, 
Pipes warns Americans to be vigilant o f all Muslims, not only self-declared Islamists 
as, one assumes, it is Islam itself that is antithetical to western civilization:
There is no escaping the unfortunate fact that Muslim government 
employees in law enforcement, the military, and the diplomatic corps 
need to be watched for connections to terrorism, as do Muslim 
chaplains in prisons and the armed forces.
Muslim visitors and immigrants must undergo additional background 
checks. Mosques require a scrutiny beyond that applied to churches, 
synagogues and temples. Muslim schools require increased oversight 
to ascertain what is being taught to children.86
Pipes who has “acquired a reputation in Muslim-American circles [and beyond] as 
“Islamaphobe” and “Muslim basher,” has also demonstrated his predilection for the 
“ideologization o f terror” approach by consistently conflating diverse Islamist 
movements and denying the necessity, or indeed possibility, o f nuanced analysis o f 
the world views, rationales, or agendas o f these movements.87 In one article in which 
he attacks those scholars seeking to go beyond static and essentialist analyses of 
Islamist movements and who instead believe in the importance o f assessing each one 
on its own merits, and who see in these movements the potential for dynamic change 
and democratic participation, he writes in regards to Hamas and Hezbollah:
These organizations are important elements of the Islamist movement 
that seeks to create a global totalitarian order along the lines o f what 
has already been created in Iran, Sudan, and in Afghanistan under the 
Taliban. They see themselves as part o f a cosmic clash between 
Muslims and the West in which the victor dominates the world.88
As with all o f the “ideologization o f terror” and modem rationalist analyses, Pipes 
sees no need to substantiate his accusations with any messy facts - it is enough to say 
that both Hezbollah and Hamas are members o f this monolithic “Islamist movement” 
with its “global totalitarian” agenda. It is presumed the reader will understand and
86Daniel Pipes, “The War’s Most Agonizing Issue,” Jerusalem Post, 22 January 2003.
87 Lockman, 255.
88 Daniel Pipes, “Can Hezbollah and Hamas B e Democratic?” N ew York Sun, 22 March 2005.
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trust the self-proclaimed “expert” on political Islam regardless o f  the glaring lack o f 
proof to substantiate his argument.
Norman Podhoretz, editor in chief o f Commentary, the standard-bearer o f Jewish 
“neoconservatism,”89 and a “highly influential adventurer in the world of 
neoconservatism,” described the high stakes at risk in the “war on terror” as being 
“nothing less than the survival o f Western civilization, to the extent that Western 
civilization still exists, because half o f it seems to be committing suicide.”90 Echoing 
the discourse increasingly employed by the political establishment, Podhoretz 
defended the Bush administration’s doctrine o f pre-emption as a necessary “military 
strategy” that, when combined with its “political strategy o f democratization,” could 
save “Western civilization” from the threat of “Islamofascism.”91 Despite the fact that 
many o f his fellow neoconservative ideologues have recently reneged their support 
for the Bush doctrine after witnessing its grave failures in the first phases o f its 
implementation, Podhoretz has remained steadfast in his commitment to it, arguing 
that it is imperative that the U.S. see this “war” through in the same way, and evoking 
the WWII and Cold War analogies, it led the worldwide struggles against Nazism and 
Communism to “to a victorious end.”92
Writing for the Weekly Standard, a prominent neoconservative publication, which is 
supported by a $3 million annual subsidy from Rupert Murdoch and considered one 
of the most “successful political magazines” in the U.S., Stephen Schwartz, the 
journalist who has claimed credit for creating the “islamofascism” neologism, has 
added generously to the modem rationalist discourse on political Islam and to support 
for the Bush administration’s policies towards Islamist movements/states. Schwartz 
opens his article “What is ‘Islamofascism’?” with an acknowledgment that “political 
typologies should make distinctions, rather than confusing them” and that the term
89 Lockman, 172.
90 Joseph Rago, “Unrepentant N eocon,” Wall Street Journal, 12 August 2006.
91 Norman Podhoretz, “Norman Podhoretz responds to critics o f  his June 2007 article "The Case for 
Bombing Iran." Commentary (7 August 2006).
92 For example, both Richard Perle and Kenneth Adleman, two leading neo-conservatives, recently 
attacked the Bush administration’s policies vis-a-vis the Middle East in an article penned by David 
Rose entitled “N eo Culpa,” Vanity Fair (January 2007). A lso, Francis Fukuyama, the notorious neocon 
who wrote the famous book The End o f  H istory  made an about-face in an essay he wrote for the N ew  
York Times M agazine in 2006 in which he announced the end o f  the “neoconservative Moment” and 
argued for the demilitirization o f  the “war on terror”
93 Scott M e Connell, “The W eekly Standard’s W ar Murdoch’s mag stands athwart history yelling, 
‘Attack!’,” The American Conservative (21 November 2005).
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“islamofascism” should therefore “be employed sparingly and precisely,” yet goes on 
to do exactly the opposite through the course o f his article.94 Applying the term 
liberally to movements and states as varied as: “Saudi-financed Wahhabis, the 
Pakistani jihadists known as Jama'atis, and the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood...Hezbollah in Lebanon and the clique around President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in Iran,” Schwartz’s only attempt to justify his use o f the term is 
through tautological and simplistic argument. For example, in explaining the 
relevance o f the term for the groups he has delineated, Schwartz writes: “The 
indicated movements should be treated as Islamofascist, first, because o f their 
congruence with the defining characteristics o f classic fascism, especially in its most 
historically-significant form—German National Socialism.”95 One would assume in 
the following paragraphs the journalist, in the interest o f presenting a coherent and 
cogent argument, would first elaborate on the various components o f “classic 
fascism” and then go on to provide readers with specific examples that prove some 
sort o f correspondence between the principle characteristics o f these movements and 
fascism. Instead, what we get is a typical modem rationalist assessment o f these 
movements: “AI Qaeda is based in sections o f the Saudi, Pakistani, and Egyptian 
middle classes fearful, in the Saudi case, of losing their unstable hold on prosperity— 
in Pakistan and Egypt, they are angry at the many obstacles, in state and society, to 
their ambitions. The constituency o f Hezbollah is similar: the growing Lebanese Shia 
middle class, which believes itself to be the victim o f discrimination.”96
The reader is meant to be convinced that these disparate Islamist movements can all 
be classified as fascist based on Shwartz’s belief that they are comprised o f members 
o f the middle class who are fearful o f their diminishing socio-economic status, unable 
to realize their ambitions in life, or members o f a section of society that has become 
obsessed by their (irrational) “belief’ that they are the victims o f institutionalized 
discrimination. Later in the article, Shwartz adds to the mix the notion that fascism, 
in its German and Italian manifestations, is “imperialistic” by nature. “Islamofascism 
has similar ambitions,” he argues. The proof? “The Wahhabis and their Pakistani and 
Egyptian counterparts seek control over all Sunni Muslims in the world, while
94 Stephen Schwartz, “What Is 'Islamofascism'? A  history o f  the word from the first Westerner to use 
it,” Weekly Standard, 17 August 2006.
95 Ibid.
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Hezbollah projects itself as an ally o f Syria and Iran in establishing regional
07dominance.” Precisely what Wahhabi groups he is referring to, what statements by 
leaders o f these alleged movements have convinced him they are truly seeking 
“control over all Sunni Muslims,” and what statements/actions o f the Hezbollah 
leadership point to a common agenda with Iran and Syria, to “establish regional 
dominance” is left to the reader’s imagination.
By lumping all o f these movements together and making overly generalized 
statements about what elements o f the various domestic socio-economic or political 
developments they are reacting to, this article does nothing to fiirther either the 
reader’s understanding o f the worldviews or objectives of these movements, nor of 
why the term “islamofascism” is apposite. As with the statements made by politicians 
on this subject, it is assumed that Shwartz’s analysis is correct, regardless o f his level 
o f expertise (or lack of), on the subject, because o f  his location in space and time- e.g. 
a “modem” West, and the subsequent location o f the objects o f his analysis- e.g. a 
backwards East. In other words, these movements are “islamofascist” because 
Shwartz says they are. We should listen to Shwartz because he is an authority on the 
issue. He is an authority on the issue because he says he is.
Also implicit in the use o f the fascism analogy is the notion that although the West 
may have produced such violent and totalitarian movements in the past, they were 
aberrations within an otherwise progressive march towards a system o f humane and 
just governance. Furthermore, it is assumed that by supporting and/or engaging in the 
struggle to overcome fascism, the majority o f westerners demonstrated their rejection 
o f these remnants o f a provincial and un-enlightened past. It is in this instance that the 
“temporal” element o f the discourse becomes clear. In employing the fascism analogy 
the Islamist other is “articulated as an object in a time different from the self...as 
‘backward,’ ‘tribal,’ ‘savage,’ ‘barbarian,’ or primitive’- in other words, as less
QO
temporally developed.”
97 Ibid.
98 Hansen, 48.
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The temporal element o f the discourse is evidenced as well in much o f the media 
discussion around the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons debacle", which saw 
many “experts” on Islam ridicule what they described as the violent and atavistic 
reactions o f Islamists/Muslims (the two are often used interchangeably with the terms 
“fanatics” and “extremists” as well), who, as one journalist put it “seem to have not 
even a sense o f irony”- in other words, they are provincial and unsophisticated.100 As 
Krauthemer explains, even if  much o f the west’s history was marked by bloody 
religious wars, Jews and Christians “long ago gave it up. It is a is a simple and 
undeniable fact that the violent purveyors o f monotheistic religion today are self- 
proclaimed warriors for Islam who shout “God is great” as they slit the throats of 
infidels — such as those o f the flight crews on Sept. 11, 2001 -- and are then 
celebrated as heroes and martyrs.”101 Ignored here o f course are examples o f the 
West’s modem forms o f violence, even if  no longer officially committed in the name 
of religion (e.g. slavery, colonialism, the Cold War proxy wars, the death and 
destruction caused in the “war on terror” etc.), and contemporary religious violence 
perpetrated by non-Muslims and supported by western governments (e.g. the violence 
perpetrated by the Jewish Israeli state). This perspective is predicated on the stages- 
of-growth belief that in order to make Islam more compatible with the exigencies o f 
tie “modem” world, the religion would first have to undergo a “modem”
tansformation akin to the Protestant reformation. In other words, what is needed is a
10 ' )‘paradigm shift” within Islam. As one prominent author on the subject put it:
It can only help Islamic faith if  Islamic scholars begin to tackle the 
historical problems. This can still be dangerous for a Muslim today, 
just as a heterodox view was for a Catholic at the height o f the 
Inquisition or for a liberal Protestant in Calvin's Geneva.103
9 The Muhammad cartoons controversy arose in response to the twelve editorial cartoons, most o f  
ifhich depicted the M uslim prophet Muhammad, were published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands- 
losten on 30 September 2005. In response, Danish Muslim organizations held public protests and, 
sveral months later, the issue provoked outrage in other Muslim communities across Europe and 
cross the Muslim world.
10 Charles Krauthammer, ‘Tolerance: A  Two-W ay Street,” Washington Post, 22 September 2006.
11 Ibid.
“ Term originally made popular by Thomas Kuhn, quoted in Malise Ruthven, “Review: How to 
lnderstand Islam,” N ew York Review o f  Books 54, no. 17 (8 November 2007).
13 Hans Kung, Islam: P ast, Present and Future, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications Ltd., 2007), quoted in 
luthven.
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Martin Peretz, owner o f The New Republic, an influential neocon magazine with 
“muscular, pro-Israel, pro-interventionist US foreign policy” added his thoughts to the 
cartoon controversy in the true orientalist style that made him one o f Edward Said’s 
primary foes.104 For Peretz, the sense o f outrage experienced by many in the Muslim 
world who saw this event in the context o f the unabated assaults their peoples and 
lands have been subjected to ever since the region’s natural resources and geo­
strategic advantages were recognized as beneficial to western interests, was another 
example o f how a large portion o f the Muslim world shares in common with the 
“Palestinians,” a “fertile Arab imagination o f endless humiliation and endless 
revenge.”105 Similar to the modem rationalist and Orientalist ruminations o f Lewis, 
Huntington and Ajami, Peretz, in his analysis, has reduced the anger o f the 
Palestinians, and indeed o f all Muslims and Arabs across the region to an overactive 
“imagination” or a tendency to be get overemotional about issues o f which they have 
no rational understanding.
The “liberal hawk” and Pulitzer Prize winning journalist for the New York Times, 
Thomas Friedman, has been described by Lockman as a “less [than] subtle emulator” 
o f Bernard Lewis for his frequent reliance on cultural essentialisms and 
“dichotomization o f the west and the Arab world.”106 His proclivity towards 
patronizing analyses o f the region is evidenced in one article in which this American 
journalist, who has not resided in the region long enough to even learn Arabic, offers 
tips to President Bush on how to deal with the “Arabs” and “Muslims” whose 
diversity Friedman, using the same modem rationalist lens employed by academics 
like Lewis, Huntington and Ajami, reduces to a monolithic whole in order to explain 
phenomenon like “radical” Islamism using simplistic and authoritative statements to 
describe the “underestimated emotion” o f humiliation experienced by Arabs/Muslims
I  A -7
as a result o f the creation o f Israel. Again we see the attempt to explain all 
developments in the Middle East as irrational, “emotional” reactions (Arabs/Muslims
104 See Edward Said, Covering Islam, in which he quotes a particularly Orientalist statement from a 
Pertetz article in which he wrote: Israel has to deal with Arab countries in which there is no “cultural 
disposition for scientific and industrial takeoff. Alas, these are societies which cannot make a brick let 
alone a microchip. . ..  This widening gap will produce deep, perhaps intractable resentment against 
Israel.” Said, 1997, xxii.
105 Martin Peretz, “What Israelis Are Talking About: Frequently Asked Questions,” The N ew  Republic 
(3 January 2006).
106 Lockman, 218.
107 Thomas Friedman, “Mideast Rules to Live by,” New York Times, 20 December 2006.
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couldn’t possibly be capable o f independent action) to the realization that their 
“civilization” is in decline, in particular in relation to the West. In another article, with 
the dual purpose o f proving his extensive knowledge, and hence authority over, the 
Muslims he describes, Friedman lectures Western leaders to stop feeling guilty about 
pointing the finger at Islam as being responsible for, to use Mutua’s term, the Muslim 
world’s “deviation” from universal (e.g. western) values and norms, when attempting 
to explain the death and destruction cause by Muslims in Iraq and elsewhere. 
“Western leaders keep saying after every terrorist attack, ‘This is not about Islam.’ 
Sorry, but this is all about Islam. It is about a war within Islam between a jihadist- 
fascist minority engaged in crimes against humanity in the name o f Islam, and a
1 AO
passive Sunni silent majority.” Not only does Friedman find it unnecessary to 
substantiate such a sweeping statement, but in making such a claim he ignores the 
numerous pronouncements o f Muslim leaders, both Sunni and Shi’ite, condemning 
the sectarian fighting in Iraq, much o f which these leaders believe is stoked by the 
occupation rather than any perennial hostility between sects.109
Roger Cohen, another liberal columnist with a New York Times publication, the 
International Herald Tribune, agrees that westerners have to be less circumspect in 
defining the real enemy in the “war on terror,” which isn’t only those movements 
based on a “ ‘perversion’ o f Islam, a latter-day Fascist ideology,” but rather with the 
“deep-rooted movement o f Islamization,” which, in a typically modem rationalist 
analysis, he explains as developing in reaction to a whole litany o f negative
108 Thomas Friedman, “Silence and Suicide,” N ew York Times, 12 October 2005.
109 Some examples o f  prominent Muslim leaders condemning the sectarian fighting include: The Shi’ite 
Association o f  Muslim Scholars in Iraq, who have called for an end to the sectarian fighting arguing 
that it “[jeopardizes the Jihad and the Resistance”; Five prominent Sunni Islamist movements in Iraq 
that call themselves the “Sunni Resistance Organizations in Iraq,” who said it was only legitimate to 
target “those involved in the occupation”; The Syrian Sunni Islamist Sheikh Abd Al-Mun'im Mustafa 
Halimah Sheikh Abu Baseer Al-Tartousi, who said that “N o Islamic Scholar Has Ever Issued a Fatwa 
to Kill Shi'ites Merely Because They Are Shi'ites”; the Mufti o f  Saudi Arabia, Sheikh 'Abd Al-'Aziz 
Aal Al-Sheikh, who said: ‘T h e Sectarian Conflict Fulfils the Goals o f  our Enemies; and the Iraqi 
Sheikh Muzahem o f  Tikrit said the targeting o f  Shi’ites is a crime intended to undermine Iraqi unity.” 
“Sunni Sheikhs and Organizations Criticize Al-Zarqawi's Declaration o f  War Against the 
Shi'itesfM E M R I Special Dispatch Series, no. 1000, (7 October 2005). Also the July 2005 International 
Islamic Conference held in Jordan, included scholars from 40 countries and more than 170 religious 
leaders from the main Shia schools -  Ithna Ashari, Ismaili and Zaidi -  the four Sunni schools -  Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali -  as well as the Ibadi and the Zahir. All called to recognize the plurality o f  
Islam and condemn those movements that kill, issuing the statement that “unauthorized religious 
opinions encouraging violence against Muslims whom they accuse as infidels, and upholding and 
extolling acts o f  terrorism, whether directed against Muslims or non-Muslims, as not only illegitimate 
but an affront to all that Islam stands.” “The International Islamic Conference, Amman, JordanJuly 
2005,” The Institute o f  Ismaili Studies, N ew Archive (July 2005).
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developments in the region, including: “Repressive and corrupt one-party regimes, 
condoned by Washington in countries from Saudi Arabia to Egypt,” and which “left 
the mosque as the only significant platform for political opposition.”; “humiliation” 
experienced across the Arab world as result o f “Israel’s victories, America’s invasion 
o f Iraq, a history o f Western colonization, and the economic and cultural failings 
chronicled by the United Nations in successive Arab Human Development Reports” 
In this context, Cohen explains, “jihadists who embrace death over being demeaned 
are viewed as salvaging some vestige o f Arab and Islamic honor.” And finally, an 
“All-conquering Western modernism... [which] is widely rejected as an identity by 
young Muslims.”110
Although Friedman has been critical some elements o f the strategy adopted by Bush 
administration in its implementation o f the “war on terror” (e.g. its adoption o f a 
unilateral, as opposed to multilateral, approach), in general he has been supportive o f 
the administration’s motives, particularly in Iraq, which he sees as an attempt to 
“create one good example in the heart o f the Arab world o f a decent, progressive 
state, where the politics o f fear and tribalism do not reign.” 111 While Friedman is 
generally regarded as a supporter o f the Democratic Party, he has criticized those 
members of the party who fail to see the world in the same dichotomized terms as he 
does. In lamenting the defeat o f Senator Joe Lieberman by the upstart antiwar 
Democrat Ned Lamont in the 2006 Senate elections, Friedman voiced his opinion that 
too many Democrats failed to see that the biggest threat to “open societies today” is
119radical Islam. From these statements it is clear that Friedman sees political Islam is 
antithetical to “progressive,” democratic politics, and “open society” in general.
Friedman’s views on political Islam are even more evident in another article on the
T I
deleterious effects o f oil on the prospect for democracy in the region. In this article 
he argues that the only reason Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and Hamas in Palestine have done so well in recent elections, has to do with the 
lack o f space for truly “progressive secular parties” to develop rather than any
110 Roger Cohen, “ 10 reasons terror meets silence from Muslims,” International H erald Tribune, 26 
October 2005.
111 Thomas Friedman, “Time for Plan B ,” N ew York Times, 4 August 2006.
112 Thomas Friedman, “B ig Talk, Little W ill,” N ew York Times, 16 August 2006.
113 Thomas Friedman, “Addicted to Oil,” N ew York Times, 1 February 2006.
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inherent appeal o f the religious groups themselves.114 Echoing the oft-repeated mantra 
o f politicians, academics and media alike regarding the reasons for the growing 
appeal o f Islamist movements, Friedman argues: “The mosque became an alternative 
power center because it was the only place the government's iron fist could not fully 
penetrate. As such, it became a place where people were able to associate freely, 
incubate local leaders and generate a shared opposition ideology.” Friedman goes on 
to criticize the case the “liberal independent” presidential candidate, Ayman Nour, 
who was “thrown in prison as soon as the election was over” in Egypt, while 
conveniently ignoring the disturbing fact o f the thousands of Muslim Brotherhood 
members that were already languishing in prison at the time Nour was “thrown in,” 
though that is perhaps an understandable oversight considering the fact that neither 
the American press, nor American politicians, have accorded the Brotherhood victims 
o f Mubarak’s authoritarian regime a fraction o f the attention they have lavished on 
Mr. Nour.115
4. U.S. Think-tanks Construct the “Savage” Islamist Other in the “War on 
Terror” Discourse
Although one would expect a more nuanced analysis on political Islam in relation to 
the “war on terror” from the Washington based “think-tanks,” whose influence on the 
corridors o f power has been well documented, in reality we see more o f the same: 
orientalist stereotypes and essentialist analysis o f the type associated with the modem 
rationalist approach.116 And even in the current climate where skepticism is rife 
amongst the American population and politicians, especially amongst those members 
o f the Democratic Party elected to Congress in the 2006 midterm elections, in regards 
to the role o f the neocon network in setting the U.S. foreign policy agenda, the think- 
tanks which comprise this network continue to play an influential role. One need only
1,4 Friedman is referring here to the 2005 Egyptian parliamentary elections where the M uslim  
Brotherhood received 20% o f  the vote and the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections where 
Hamas won a majority o f  seats.
115 According to Sawasiyah, and Egyptian rights group associated with the Brotherhood, 3,245 
Brotherhood members were detained in 2007 alone. “Egypt arrests 29 Muslim Brotherhood members, 
leader calls for protests for Gaza Palestinians,” International H erald Tribune, 21 January 2008.
116 For a good analysis o f  the impact o f  three prominent, Washington-based think-tanks (American 
Enterprise Institute, Middle East Forum and Institute fore Near East Policy) on the corridors o f  power, 
see Brian Whitaker’s article, “US think-tanks give lessons in foreign policy,” The Guardian, 19 August 
2002. For an assessment o f  the incestuous relationship between U.S. foreign policy in the M iddle East 
and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, see Joel Beinin’s “Tel A viv ’s Influence on 
American Institutions: US: the pro-Sharon think-tank,” Le M onde Diplomatique, July 2003.
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look at the list o f invitees asked by Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY) in his new role as 
Chairman o f the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia to provide 
“expert” evidence to the Subcommittee’s February 2007 meeting on an important 
component o f U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, entitled: “Next Steps in 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process” for evidence that this is still the case. All three o f 
these, including David Makovsky o f WINEP, Martin Indyk, the former deputy 
director o f research at AIPAC and cofounder o f WINEP, and Daniel Pipes, are all 
core figures in the neocon network.117
One o f the earliest contributions to the discourse on political Islam emanating out o f 
the D.C.-based world o f think-tanks, was that o f Robert Satloff, director o f the 
WINEP. In his article “Terror against America: Assessment and Implications,” Satloff 
offered a detailed response to the soul-searching question that seemed to be in the 
minds o f every prominent pundit, politician, and think-tank personality in the weeks 
and months following the attacks: “why do they hate us?” It was clear for Statloff 
that the Islamist enemy:
hates the United States because o f who and what it is — the magazines, 
the television, and the music. They hate the American way o f life, 
especially the openness, opportunity, religious tolerance, and sexual 
equality that are hallmarks o f American society.. .Their rejection of 
American policies — the friendship with Israel, the military support of 
moderate Arab states, the remarkably selfless effort to find a negotiated 
solution to the region’s territorial and national disputes -- is derivative of 
their hatred for the United States..118
Again we see the picture o f the “savage” come clearly into focus. The enemy cannot 
be understood through rational analysis, because the enemy is irrational. How can one 
take seriously the grievances and demands o f an enemy that has forsaken the most 
fundamental “universal” values? According to this narrative, colonialism, the 
continued post-colonial exploitation o f natural resources, the Cold W ar (and post) 
interference in regional and national politics, support for the creation o f Israel and its 
continued occupation o f Palestine, American troops in Saudi Arabia- home to two o f 
Islam’s holiest cities, the American invasion and occupation o f Afghanistan and Iraq,
1,7 Daniel Pipes, “Testimony presented to the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia o f  the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee,” 14 February 2007.
118 Robert Satloff, “Terror against America: Assessment and Implications (Part I),” Policy Watch #557: 
Special Forum Report Washington Institute fo r  N ear East Policy  (19 September 2001).
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American sanctioned double-standards and hypocrisy in enforcing the human rights 
regime — all o f this is mere rhetorical justification for the enemy’s true agenda, 
which is to destroy the U.S., and the West in general, because o f its wealth and 
freedom. It goes without saying that this perspective is also an example o f the 
“ideologization o f terror” as the motives, historical context, ideological/political 
agenda o f the organization(s) under discussion are seen as peripheral.
Writing in his capacity as a fellow for the Hudson Institute, Stanley Kurtz argued 
along similar lines that there was no need to understand the anger in the Muslim 
world or the true nature and diversity o f Islamist movements, but rather that one can 
draw all the necessary conclusions about the motivations which drive these Islamist 
movements simply by looking at the “anguish” experienced by Muslim world as a 
result o f its inability to adequately blend “tradition” with elements o f “Western- 
influenced” “modernity.”119 As a result “It’s America itself’ that they “envy and hate 
-  our freedom, our power, our prosperity.” Michael Ledeen chimed in with his 
description o f “Islamist extremism,” both Sunni and Shiite, state and non state actors, 
arguing that they are against the U.S. because “we are the one truly revolutionary 
country on earth, which is both the reason for which we were attacked in the first 
place and the reason we will successfully transform the lives o f hundreds o f millions 
o f people throughout the Middle East.”120 WINEP’s David Makovsky added his 
agreement to the consensus arguing that the origins for these movements and their 
violence can found in civil-war ridden Lebanon in 1983, when 241 American 
servicemen were killed in an attack perpetrated by Hezbollah (though no mention o f
191the potential role U.S. participation in that conflict played in inspiring such an act ). 
According to Makovsky, “There is a fiery resentment among Islamic radicals o f all 
that America represents as a military, cultural and economic power and its focus on
119 Stanley Kurtz, “Getting to the Root: What’s really behind the terrorism,” The National Review  (3 
October 2001).
120 Michael A. Ledeen, “The War on Terror W on’t End in Baghdad,” The Wall Street Journal, 4 
September 2002.
121 As Ken Silverstein points out, much o f  the mainstream analysis on Hezbollah and 1983 attack on 
the U.S. Marine barracks overlooks potential mitigating factors such as the fact that a majority o f  
Lebanese viewed the Americans as a hostile military force “that had intervened in the civil war on 
behalf o f  Israel and its Lebanese Christian allies in the government.” Silverstein points out that “since 
1982, some 20,000 people in Lebanon, many o f  them Shiite civilians, have been killed by Israeli 
attacks, and Hezbollah’s militia is the only entity in the country that represents any type o f  credible 
deterrent force.” Ken Silverstein, “Parties o f  God: The Bush Doctrine and the Rise o f  the Islamic 
Democracy,” H arpers M agazine (1 March 2007).
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the individual at the center o f society. America is viewed by these radicals as a 
revolutionary power that is disruptive o f traditional Islamic society.”122
In a speech by Martin Kramer made to the Weinberg Founders Conference at the
Washington Institute, the WINEP Fellow editor o f Pipes’ Middle East Quarterly
argued that in addition to their “hatred for this country,” one should take into
consideration the fundamentalist’s “contempt,” which has more to do with U.S.
“weakness” than power. Kramer, who worked for fourteen years at the Tel Aviv
1based Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, argues that the 
“enemy” is full o f contempt for “the fact that America is so naively trusting of 
foreigners, that it gives everyone the benefit o f the doubt, and that it is willing to sell 
the very training needed to destroy it.” 124 The enemy the U.S. now faces may be 
backward, but we must not let that fact blind us from their ability to exploit our 
weaknesses, the argument goes. They know America well, as many o f them have 
lived in the country for years. In fact, their ideas o f “ ‘women o f paradise’ probably 
owes more to MTV than to anything they saw back in their dusty comer o f Saudi 
Arabia.” It is “their own familiarity with America [that] has bred a deep contempt, far 
more deadly than impotent rage.”
In an article for the rightwing Heritage Foundation, Kim R. Holmes praises the Bush 
administration for having made the semantic shift from the too narrowly defined label 
o f “war on terrorism” to the “struggle against global extremism”. Holmes argues that 
this shift is a positive development in that it is takes into consideration “America’s 
long-range strategic aims.” Although he acknowledges that the change in terminology 
will not have a major effect on the U.S. tactics or goals, at least not in the short run, 
he believes it could have an impact on the way Americans think about “the current 
conflict against radical Islamic terrorist groups.” Holmes expresses particular 
satisfaction with then Secretary o f Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s description of
122 David Makovsky, “Mideast Clerics Speak Out,” The Baltimore Sun, 30 September 2001.
123 The Dayan Center, which describes itself as “an interdisciplinary research center devoted to the 
study o f  the modem history and contemporary affairs in the Middle East,” is, as Zachary Lockman 
points out, named after the famous general and politician and known for its pro-govemment agenda as 
it is a “a key site where senior Israeli military, foreign policy and intelligence officials can interact with 
academics working on policy-relevant issues.” Lockman, 257-258.
124 Martin Kramer, “Regime Strategies in the Middle East: The Role o f  Islamism, Anti-Americanism, 
and Terrorism (Part I),” Weinberg Founders Conference (2001), reprint in War on Terror: The M iddle  
East Dimension, ed. R.B. Satloff (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002).
125 Ibid.
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America’s policies as a “global struggle against the enemies o f  freedom, the enemies 
o f civilization.” Still, he is critical o f the administration’s reluctance to be more direct 
in its language:
The Administration still appears to be squeamish about naming radical 
Islam by name. While it is true that America opposes any ideological 
group that employs terrorism, it also is true that we are, correctly, 
fixated on radical Islamic groups. We have hesitated emphasizing this 
fact in some o f our official public statements for fear o f offending 
innocent Muslims or alienating potential allies in Muslim countries.
Might something be wrong still with our stated policy if  we cannot 
articulate an obvious fact about our strategic aims? It's one thing to be 
tactically clever and not alienate innocent people or potential allies.
But it is another if  that reluctance blurs the reality of our objectives 
and confuses people—particularly Americans— about who our enemy 
really is and what really is at stake.126
John Fonte, a senior fellow with the neoconservative Hudson Institute, is equally 
unequivocal in his assessment o f the enemy that the “democratic world” is confronted 
by, and is similarly critical o f the government’s circumspection when it comes to 
defining the enemy.127 According to Fonte, the government should admit that the true 
enemy is not terrorism, but rather, and more specifically, “Radical Islam or militant 
jihad.” Laurent Marawiec, another senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, agrees with 
his colleague that this is “not a war “on terror,” it is a war on jihad,” and confirming 
Mutua’s point that the real enemy referred to in these analyses is not merely the 
specific state (or non-state, in this case) actor in question, but rather the 
culture/religion that underpins it, he argues that the underlying enemy is “an Islam 
that has, for all practical purposes, thrown its lot with the jihadis, or at least never 
clearly and practically distanced itself from jihad.” 128 The only way to overcome the 
threat posed by this violent and anachronistic enemy, according to Marawiec, is “to
1 9Qbring the Arab Muslim world into the modem era.” He goes on to compare what is 
described as this Herculean task to that which the Allied forces in WWII were 
confronted; not only to defeat the aggressors’ armed forces, but to “transform the
126 Kim R. Holmes, “What’s in a Name? “War on Terror” Out, 'Struggle Against Extremism' In,” The 
H eritage Foundation  (26 July 2005).
127 John Fonte, “Immigration, Assimilation, Liberal Democracy, and the War on Terror” Speech, UCLA 
Law School, 3 March 2006.
128 Laurent Murawiec, “The Wisdom o f  Benedict XVI: 1391 and 2006,” The Hudson Institute (21 
September 2006).
129 Laurent Murawiec, “A Post-Saddam Strategy for the War on Terrorism,” The Hudson Institute (15 
July 2003).
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vanquished so they would no longer pose a threat to their neighbors and the world at 
large.” Unlike some o f the other examples we have seen where the WWII analogy is 
used to evoke comparisons to the ultimate “just” war, Marawiec exposes his 
orietnalist roots even further by arguing that the comparison is somewhat inaccurate 
because the Muslim world is not as economically, culturally or politically advanced as 
either Germany or Japan at the time as it is neither “endowed with [the] rich 
institutional, cultural, and practical resources,” o f post-WlI Germany, nor does it 
enjoy a culture that is as “highly adaptive, willing and able to absorb innovations from 
the outside and assimilate them,” as was Japan at the time it too was saved from its 
own devices by the benevolence o f the Allied forces.
Shelby Steele, a research fellow at the Hoover Institute, also explains the limits, and 
by doing so also exposes his own orientalist roots, o f another historical comparison 
often evoked in the discourse: the Cold War/Communist analogy. Again conflating 
diverse Islamist movements such as Hamas, Hezbollah and A1 Qaeda, Steele argues: 
“The West is stymied [by these movements]...because it is used to enemies that want 
to live. In Vietnam, America fought an enemy whose communism was driven by an 
underlying nationalism, the desire to live free o f the West. Whatever one may think of 
this, here was an enemy who truly wanted to live, who insisted on territory and 
sovereignty. But Osama bin Laden fights only to achieve a death that will enshrine 
him as a figure o f awe. The gift he wants to leave his people is not freedom or even 
justice; it is consolation.”130 Again we see the frequent themes o f the discourse, most 
importantly the Islamist movement’s irrationality. Rather than state his opinion in 
frank manner though, Shelby, like many o f the other modem rationalists, couches the 
argument in seemingly neutral terms which do little to mask the dichotomous 
reasoning they imply. In this case, ideologies with western roots (e.g. communism and 
nationalism), and based on Enlightenment-derived principles and values such as a 
politico-geographically defined “territory,” which is linked to the notion o f 
“sovereignty” (as opposed to the Islamist’s notion o f sovereignty which is 
inextricably linked to Allah, as described in Chapter One) fill the “rational” side o f 
the binary pair. On the other side you have the “irrational” Islamist whose ideology is 
rooted in a cult o f death (whereas “rational” political ideology is aimed at improving
130 Shelby Steele, “White Guilt and Radical Islam,” H oover Digest, Research and Opinion on Public 
Policy  no. 4 (2006).
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and extending life), and which seeks to impart to its followers the “irrational” gift o f 
“consolation” (whereas the rational ideology pursues the lofty, and, according to this 
analysis, ideologically/culturally neutral and non-contingent, values o f “freedom” and 
“justice”).
In an article penned by Murawiec in which he praises what he views as the moral
tV»stance taken by Pope Benedict XVI’s when he quoted a 14 century Byzantine 
emperor on the inherent violent and inhuman nature of Islam, the Hudson fellow adds 
to the “ideologization o f terrorism” discourse by arguing that it is “the irrational 
nihilism o f modem jihad,” rather than any political or economic factors, which is 
behind the violence used by some (though from his argument the readers assumes all) 
Islamist movements, whereas the Pope, “in promoting a culture o f life, o f faith and 
reason,” represents the rationality and peacefulness o f the western half o f this binary 
equation.131 David Frum, a resident fellow at the neoconservative American 
Enterprise Institute as well as contributing editor to the National Review, has 
expressed similar sentiments in regards to Islamist movements (and states) arguing 
that Iran, Hezbollah and A1 Qaeda “all share beliefs that hark[ed] back to European 
fascism: Disdain for free inquiry and rational thought, a celebration o f death and 
murder, and obsessive anti-Semitism.”132
In an article supporting the U.S. invasion o f Iraq and prophesizing on the positive 
impact it will have on Islamist movements as diverse as Hezbollah, Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad, which, one is led assume from the argument, are all subsumed in the 
same category as they will be identically impacted by this stage o f the U.S. “war 
against terrorism,” Martin Indyk argues that the removal of Saddam Hussein will shift 
“the balance o f power in the Arab world...decisively in favor o f the more moderate 
[e.g. “good Muslim”] states o f Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia” and hence away 
from that nebulous network o f states that supports what Indyk sees as a monolithic, 
violent Islamist movement. And, as with all modem rationalist, not to mention 
patronizing orientalist, analyses, Indyk offers his advice to the Muslim world o f what 
steps should be taken to develop “a more tolerant model o f  Islam, one more 
reconciled to modernity.” With a similar air o f (unwarranted) authority, Indyk goes on
131 Murawiec, 2006.
132 David Frum, “How Bush Arrived at His Denunciation o f  Iraq and Co.,” American Enterprise  
Institute (22 January 2003).
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to urge Muslim leaders to put a halt to the “hatred and xenophobia now propagated 
through school and mosque,” though he provides no examples to substantiate such a 
broad allegation, and, finally, to “undertak[e] economic reforms that can provide 
meaningful employment and the hope o f a better future for their young people,” who, 
it is assumed, would otherwise join Islamist groups opposed to modernity and reform.
In yet another example o f the disdainful, and often patently inaccurate, statements 
made by American analysts o f political Islam, Joshua Muravchik, also a resident 
scholar at AEI, also compares groups as disparate as Hamas, Hezbollah and A1 Qaeda 
in an article where he argues against describing these movements as “nationalist” 
because both their origins and goals are actually transnational in nature.133 If 
Muravchik had gone on to consider some o f their theological and ideological 
characteristics that render the “nationalist” term inadequate in describing the 
worldviews and goals o f these movements, some o f which I myself have described in 
Chapter One o f this book, the argument might have been compelling. Instead, the 
author goes on to rehash old stereotypes about Islamic movements, monolithically 
perceived, which does more to expose his lack o f basic background knowledge o f 
these movements than to convince anyone o f the legitimacy o f his argument. For 
example, one would be hard pressed to find evidence in any o f the scholarly or serious 
journalistic literature written on Hamas or Hezbollah that either group “see 
themselves as part o f a global movement o f jihad,” or that these groups take “pride in 
being the brothers and comrades-in-arms o f the terrorists who attacked New York and 
Washington, London and Madrid, Beslan, Bombay, and Bali.” And it would be news 
to the leadership o f both movements that they are want to partake in constructing a 
“caliphate to rule over all o f the lands o f the Muslim empires o f the past—from 
Morocco and Spain in the west to the Philippines in the east, taking in the southern 
half o f Europe, the northern half o f Africa, and most of Asia.”134
133 Joshua Muravchik, “‘Disproportionate’ Criticism: Israel Will Not Back Down, and Europe Owes its 
Thanks,” American Enterprise Institute (31 July 2006).
134 To see more on Hamas’ stance on these issues see Ian Mather, “Al-Qaeda on defensive as bombs 
begin to backfire,” Scotland on Sunday, 13 November 2005; Hroub; Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, 
The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000). For more on Hezbollah’s position, see: Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, H ezbollah: Politics and Religion. 
(London: Pluto Press, 2001); Seymour M. Hersh, “Annals o f  National Security: The Redirection,” The 
N ew Yorker (5 March 2007); Deeb; Reinoud Leenders, “How UN Pressure on Hizbullah Impedes 
Lebanese Reform,” M iddle East Report Online (May 23, 2006).
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Kramer also conflates divergent Islamist movements in an article in which he assesses 
the dominant arguments that influence current western counterterrorism debates. 
Though he praises the French scholar Gilles Kepel for his immense reservoir o f 
knowledge on political Islam, facilitated by his fluency in Arabic, as well as for his 
savvy “media presence” which Kramer describes as “prolific, provocative, and 
photogenic” in the end he appears to have been won over by the non-academic 
analyses o f people such as Roland Jacquard, president o f the Paris-based International 
Observatory on Terrorism, who belong what Kramer describes as the “the gray genre 
o f the intelligence compendium.” The latter’s analysis differs from the former in that 
they believe Islamist movements are not on the wane as a result o f their failure to 
mobilize sustained support from the “the devout bourgeoisie” and “the masses o f the 
urban poor,” but rather are continuously conniving and thinking o f ways “to outdo the 
murderous performance o f September 11,” hence the United States is “left with no 
choice but to wage continuous war against every last redoubt o f extreme Islamism.” 
In this analysis, Islamist movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad will 
continue to succeed in their respective “jihads” as long as they remain “proxies o f 
regimes in a common struggle against Israel.” According to Kramer, these movements 
are in the same category as A1 Qaeda insofar as they desire to turn their “national 
causes into full-blown holy wars.”
As in the case o f the journalists and politicians who have been discussed in this
chapter, amongst think-tanks one also finds “liberal” institutions participating just as
fully in the construction and maintenance o f the discourse on political Islam as
exemplified in a 2006 article on U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Middle East written
by Kenneth M Pollack, Director o f the Research at the liberal Brookings Institution’s
1notoriously pro-Israel Saban Center for Middle East Policy. In it he employed the
135 Martin Kramer, “Islamist Bubbles: Beware the light at the end o f  the Islamist tunnel,” National 
Interest (Summer 2002).
136 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Grand Strategy: Why America Should Promote a N ew  Liberal Order in the 
Middle East,” Blueprint M agazine (22 July 2006). Haim Saban, former half-owner o f  the Fox Family 
Worldwide, emigrated from Israel to the US in 1966. Famously quoted by the New York Times on 5 
September 2004 for saying “I’m a one-issue guy and my issue is Israel,” Saban has played a prominent 
role in the pro-Israel lobby in the US, mostly through his work for the Democratic Party. Saban was 
apparently instrumental in the appointment o f  former AIPAC lobbyist Martin Indyk's appointment as 
US Ambassador to Israel in 1995. In 2002 Saban donated $13 million to start the new “Saban Center 
for Middle East Policy” at the Brookings Institution directed by Martin Indyk. Brookings was 
influential in setting the parameters o f  the debate in the lead up to the 2003 invasion o f  Iraq, which it 
supported, garnering roughly double the number o f  news citations and “expert” quotes over
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modem rationalist approach, describing Islamist movements as developing in reaction 
to various negative developments in the Arab world:
The Arab states’ economies are stagnant. Many have failed to diversify 
beyond oil and now suffer from crippling unemployment and 
underemployment. Many o f their citizens have retreated into religious 
revival, often o f particularly noxious new hues. Arab educational systems, 
meanwhile, produce graduates qualified to do little o f value to society. The 
problem is not just the predominance o f Islamic learning in their curricula, 
but a teaching method that reveres rote memorization and smothers creative 
thinking, interdisciplinary learning, and other entrepreneurial skills. 
Politically, the Arab autocracies have largely ossified into massive 
bureaucracies that provide virtually no services to their people, no outlets for 
them to express their grievances, and no hope for political action to address1 ^ 7their many difficulties.
As with the academic modem rationalist approaches discussed in Chapter Two, in 
seeing political Islam as a reaction to various socio-economic and political 
developments, analyses like Pollack’s tend to minimize the importance o f additional, 
and perhaps more complex, reasons people might actively (as opposed to reactively) 
join an Islamist movement, including theological, political, cultural and social factors.
5. Challenges to the Construction of the “Savage” Islamist Other in the “War on 
Terror” Discourse
While the examples provided in this chapter are representative o f the norm in regards 
to the construction o f the “savage” other in the “war on terror” discourse, alternative 
approaches, which take into consideration some of the more complex reasons 
individuals join or support Islamist movements, the numerous differences that 
distinguish prominent movements from one another, and the equally complex and 
diverse reasons some Islamist movements choose to employ violence to attain certain 
political or even religious ends, exist in all o f the genres discussed in this chapter. For 
example, the Washington Editor for Haper’s Magazine, Ken Silverstein, has gone 
further than most in his attempts to develop a nuanced understanding o f the manifold 
difference that distinguish Middle Eastern Islamist movements from one another. In 
one article he writes:
competitors such as Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation, and American Enterprise 
Institute. Grant Smith, “Israel Lobby Initiates Hispanic Strategy: ‘Invadimos a Iran,’” Institute fo r  
Research: M iddle E ast Policy  (10 April 2006).
137 Pollack.
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Today, there are dozens o f active Islamic political parties, both Shiite 
and Sunni, with diverse political and ideological agendas. Their 
leaders are certainly not liberal democrats, and some, like Hamas in 
Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, maintain armed wings. But it is 
not entirely accurate to describe them, as is frequently done in the 
United States, as fundamentalist or backward or even necessarily 
conservative. The new Islamic movements are popularly based and 
endorse free elections, the rotation o f power, freedom o f speech, and 
other concepts that are scorned by the regimes that currently hold 
power.138
Likewise, the Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh eschews 
the “ideologizaiton o f terror” paradigm as well by distinguishing between disparate 
Islamist movements and their varied political agendas and by actually interviewing 
prominent leaders o f the Islamist movements that are the subjects o f his research, such 
as Hizbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah. In one article he points out how the tension 
between the various Sunni Jihadi movements in Lebanon and their powerful patrons 
within and outside o f the country, and the Shiite Islamo-nationalist movement 
Hizbollah, threaten to ignite sectarian strife yet again in a state that is less than two 
decades removed from bloody civil war. In one passage in which the award winning 
journalist describes a conversation he had with the Hezbollah leader, Hersh writes: 
“Nasrallah’s aides told me that they believe he is a prime target o f fellow-Arabs, 
primarily Jordanian intelligence operatives, as well as Sunni jihadists who they 
believe are affiliated with A1 Qaeda.”139 Hersh also challenges the mainstream 
discourse by pointing out the significance o f history, in particular that o f US 
intervention and “clandestine operations,” many with Cold W ar “echoes,” to 
understanding the development, motives and tactics o f various Islamist movements.140
The think-tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has similarly produced 
more nuanced reports on political Islam, which avoid the monolithic and polarized 
analyses prevalent in the mainstream “war on terror” discourse. For example in an 
August 2005 report, Senior Associate Amr Hamzaway urges US and Western policy 
makers to recognize the great diversity that exists amongst Islamist movements as
138Ken Silverstein, “Parties o f  God: The Bush Doctrine and the Rise o f  Islamic democracy,” Harpers 
M agazine  (March 2007).
139 Seymour M. Hersh, “Annals o f  National Security: The Redirection,” New Yorker (5 March 2007).
140 Hersh.
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varied as Egyptian Jihad, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party and the 
Palestinian Hamas, and advocates the development o f unique policies to deal with 
each movement accordingly. By imputing violent motives to all Islamist groups, and 
marginalizing them in any attempts to promote democracy and human rights in the 
region, Hamzaway believes that Western governments risk alienating potential allies 
and squandering the opportunity to engage and strengthen those movements that share 
similar political values and aims. Instead, Hamzaway urges policy makers to 
recognize the “diversity o f the Islamist spectrum,” and pay more attention specifically 
to those elements that are committed to “nonviolence, pragmatism, and democratic 
procedures.”141
The International Crisis Group, though not a U.S.-based think-tank, has produced 
some o f the most thorough and coherent analyses o f Islamist movements, with 
similarly cogent policy prescriptions for the U.S. and western governments involved 
in the “war on terror”. Like Hamzaway, the ICG’s “Executive Summary” on political 
Islam also argues against the “sledge-hammer approach which refuses to differentiate 
between” divergent Islamist movements, whose differences the ICG report goes to 
great lengths to elaborate. Pointing out not only the differences between Sunni and 
Shiite Islamist movements, the authors o f  this report go on to explain the diverse 
manifestations o f Sunni Islamism, including “political,” “missionary” and “Jihadi” 
movements, providing brief histories as well as several contemporary examples o f 
each. The ICG report is also critical o f those analyses that employ the dichotomous 
“good Muslim/bad Muslim,” “moderate”/ “extremist” distinctions in place o f more 
thorough analysis, arguing that:
[t]he principle weakness o f this analytical distinction is that it fails to 
notice that the most important factor differentiating varieties o f Islamic 
activism is not so much the relative militancy or moderation with 
which they express their convictions, but rather the nature o f the 
convictions they hold. These include different diagnoses o f  the 
problems faced by Muslim societies, different views of Islamic law, 
and different conceptions both o f the appropriate spheres (political, 
religious, military) in which to act, o f the kinds o f action that are
,4,Amr Hamzawy, “The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists,” Policy Brief: Carnegie Endowment 
fo r  International Peace  no. 40 (August 2005).
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legitimate and appropriate, and accordingly entail divergent and often 
competing purposes. 42
Despite encouraging signs o f the development o f a counter-discourse capable o f 
challenging the construction o f political Islam as other in the “war on terror” 
discourse, as with the modem, post-modem and hermeneutic academic approaches 
discussed in Chapter Two, these perspectives have yet to gather enough force to 
actually trigger a “paradigm shift”.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the central role played by political Islam, the United 
States’/West’s current “savage” enemy other, in the U.S. discourse on the “war on 
terror,” focusing on the genres o f political statements, opinion pieces and think-tank 
reports in particular. In doing so I have demonstrated how this discourse, similar to 
that concerning the European colonial powers’ mission civilatrice, is based on an 
eurocentric and orientalist vision o f history that necessarily views religious 
movements, and Islamist movements in particular, as parochial, violent, intolerant and 
counter to progress. As argued in previous chapters, the epistemological roots can be 
traced back to the modem rationalist paradigm. In examining the details o f this 
discourse, through the lens o f the first component o f Mutua’s “savages-victims- 
saviors metaphor,” I have shown how this discourse forms part o f the “power 
political” facet o f Said’s definition o f discourse. In the next chapter I will demonstrate 
how both the “victim” and “savior” components are constmcted in the discourse on 
political Islam in the context o f the “war on terror,” thus completing the “power 
political” element o f the discourse analysis.
142 International Crisis Group.
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Chapter Five: Construction of the Innocent “Victim” and Angel “Savior” in the 
“War on Terror” Discourse
Oh ye Egyptians, they may say to you that I have not made an expedition hither for any 
other object than that o f abolishing your religion...but tell the slanderers that I  have not 
come to you except for the purpose of restoring your rights from the hands o f the
oppressors.
- Napolean Bonaparte, 2 July 17981
Once the “savage” Islamist other was firmly established in the discourse, the next stage 
for the proponents of the “war on terror” framing of events was to elaborate the nature of 
the savage’s “victims.” Islamists, despite what the discourse deems as their anachronistic 
nature, cannot be described as a threat in and of themselves. One must first be able to 
locate the Islamist’s “victims” in order to justify the waging o f a “war,” real or 
metaphorical, against them. In addition to the relatively (in terms of numbers used to 
justify military action against an enemy in the past) small number of individuals who 
perished in the enemy’s attacks abroad, as discussed in previous chapters, there are the 
hundreds o f millions of “victims” of Islamist oppression and violence in the Muslim 
world itself. These are “human being(s) whose ‘dignity and worth’ have been violated by 
the savage,” and are therefore “powerless, helpless innocent[s] whose naturalist attributes 
have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions” of the savage. It is up to the 
Western democracies, conceived of as beacons o f light, to save the “native” “victims” 
from the darkness into which the savage has plunged them. The “savior or redeemer” is 
the “good angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains and safeguards. The “savior” 
is the victim’s bulwark against tyranny.”
In the case of the U.S.-led “war on terror,” the “victims” of Islamist violence, both actual 
and prospective, include not only the entire American population and indeed all of 
“Western civilization,” but also all of those “good Muslims” who too have been
1 Quoted in Khalidi, 37.
2 Mutua, 203.
3 Ibid., 204.
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victimized by Islamist savagery. The “savior” is Western civilization itself, seen in this 
construct as “ontologically civilized, humane, reasonable, and innocent”; it is the natural 
“savior,”4 with “modernization” and “democracy” prescribed as generic cures for all 
associated ailments. In all cases, the “victim’s” absolute innocence is assumed, as is the 
corresponding guilt o f the perpetrator: the “savage” other. In this “discourse,” there are 
no innocent “victims” of the violence perpetrated by the leaders of the “war on terror,” 
since this ostensibly benign violence is committed with the sole purpose of avenging 
crimes committed against past innocent “victims,” or ensuring the future safety of all 
potential “victims.” All casualties that occur in the course of this benevolent war are 
referred to by the sterile, military euphemism: “collateral damage.” As Richard Jackson 
has argued, “in effect, there is here a veiled attempt to deny the quality o f ‘innocence’ to 
the “victims” of United States military actions because this would obscure the clear 
distinctions that the United States government wishes to maintain between the ‘guilty’ 
under attack and the ‘innocent’ Americans attacking them.”5
In this chapter I will examine the construction of the innocent “victim” and angel 
“savior” vis-a-vis the “savage” enemy and in the context of the “war on terror” discourse.
1. Understanding the Innocent “Victim” and Angel “Savior” Constructs in the 
“War on Terror” Discourse
In order to better grasp the nature o f the “victim-savior” construct and its relationship to 
the more general discourse o f political Islam in the context of the “war on terror,” I will 
consider again its hegemonic nature, focusing on its intertextuality and looking at its 
manifestation in various genres, including the writings/speeches of prominent policy 
makers, think-tanks and pundits. As with the “savage” component, I will consider the 
ways in which the “victim”/ “savior” constructions rely upon a foundation of 
Enlightenment-derived notions o f what constitutes “modernity” and hence legitimate 
political thought/systems, as well as orientalist stereotypes claiming to describe the “true”
4 Cyra Akila Choudhury, “Comprehending Our Violence: Reflections on the Liberal Universalist Tradition, 
National Identity and the War on Iraq, ” Muslim World Journal o f  Human Rights 3, no. 1 (2006).
5 Jackson, 83.
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nature of Muslims/Arabs. I will conclude by arguing that this discourse has had the effect 
o f reinforcing the U.S. identity as “ontologically civilized” and “innocent,” as opposed to 
the “savage” Islamist other, constructed “as barbaric, irrational, uncivilized, and a priori 
culpable.”6 In order to do this, it has also relied upon a dual conceptualization of the 
other: the “good Muslim,” seen as capable o f complete assimilation, and the “bad 
Muslim,” seen in terms of his absolute difference, hence necessitating his subjugation. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, in neither instance is “the existence o f a human substance 
truly other, something capable o f being not merely an imperfect state of oneself, a
•j
possible alternative.”
1.1 The “GoodMuslim” as Innocent “Victim”8
As with attempts to define the savage other, discursive attempts to delineate the (native) 
“victim” from the savage perpetrator often employ the moderate/”good Muslim” vs. 
extremist/”bad Muslim” rhetorical distinction. As Fawaz Gerges argues, when 
distinguishing between various Islamists movements, the American foreign policy 
establishment views “the good Islamists” as “apolitical” and “moderate,” although he 
attributes this to realpolitick decisions rather than issues o f identity and perceptions of 
ontological difference.9 The Clinton administration, well before 9/11, as Gerges pointed 
out, adopted a policy of aversion towards Islamist movements, not because o f their 
alleged violence, but rather because they were deemed to threaten the status quo that 
serves U.S. ideological and strategic interests in the region:
Like their predecessors, Clinton administration officials have vehemently 
criticized the use of violence and terrorism by certain Islamist groups. Yet 
they have not dared censure some o f America’s Middle Eastern allies, who 
habitually practice violence against their own population. In U.S. eyes, the 
good Islamists appear to be the ones who are apolitical; moderate and 
liberal Islam is also equated with the pro-Western regimes of Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Malaysia. The administration’s 
unwillingness to engage moderate Islamist elements seriously lies in the
6 Choudhury, 1-2.
7 Todorov, 42.
8 A combination o f  terms from Mahmood Mamdani’s Good Muslim Bad Muslim, and Mutua’s article.
9 Gerges, 1999, 4.
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fact that the latter represent the most effective threat so far to the regional 
order.10
In the context of U.S. “democratization” programs in the region, the “good Muslim”/ 
“bad Muslim” or moderate/extremist dichotomies are problematic for numerous reasons. 
Most importantly, they are a based on a faulty understanding of the principle tenets of 
Islam. As pointed out in the International Crisis Group’s rigorous report “Understanding 
Islam,” Islam, a religion of law, is “inherently concerned with governance and so [is] 
political in tendency.”11 Furthermore, as Islam provides believers with “blueprints]” for 
social interaction, complete with “legal prescriptions as well as moral injunctions,” even 
apolitical, “moderate” Muslims may be drawn to movements that seek a greater role for 
their religion in the management of everyday political, economic and social affairs. 
According to Kamal el-Said Habib, a former leader of the Egyptian Islamist movement al 
Jama’a al-Islamiya,
Islam is a complete way of life. It encompasses all personal, social, and 
political aspects. There is an organic link between Qtir’anic law, shariah 
and political authority. Although, on the whole, Muslim societies live by 
Qur’anic law, political power applies secular rules. There will be no 
security as long as political authority is not based on God’s sovereignty.
There will be no peace.
The inaccurate moderate/extremist dichotomy also masks the consistent role Islam has
played in political developments throughout the history of the Muslim world, such as the
anti-colonial struggles o f the early and mid-20tb century generally depicted in the West as
secular-nationalist in nature, even though often fought in the name of Islam (hence the
label mujahid, or holy warriors, for those who died, or were “martyred” in these 
1 %struggles). As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Western understanding o f Islamists
—  those seeking to reinforce Islam’s role in the public as opposed to solely private space
—  tend to rely on orientalist stereotypes, characterizing the Islamist as backward and 
violent. Ultimately, the greatest weakness of this type of dichotomous reasoning is in
10 Ibid., 109.
11 International Crisis Group.
12 Quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey o f  the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (New York: Harcourt, 
2007), 48.
13 Hourani; Burgat.
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overlooking more important, and often more complex factors that distinguish Islamist 
movements:
different diagnoses of the problems faced by Muslim societies, different 
views of Islamic law, and different conceptions both of the appropriate 
spheres (political, religious, military) in which to act and of the kinds of 
action that are legitimate and appropriate, and accordingly entail divergent 
and often competing purposes.14
The second rhetorical device used to distinguish the (native) ‘Victim” from the Islamist 
aggressor is the ubiquitous reference to the oppression of Muslim women. Expressing a 
sentiment prevalent throughout the discourse on political Islam, and particularly in the 
context o f the “war on terror,” one journalist betrayed her essentialized view of Islam in 
an article on “honor killings” which she described as part of the “inventory o f brutality” 
perpetrated by men against women in the “Muslim world,” and condemned “the savage 
fundamentalist Muslim oppression of women.” 15 As is the norm in these types o f 
analyses, this journalist chose not to provide any context to qualify this harsh 
generalization. According to the authors of a recent report by a New York-based 
international women’s organization which collaborates with grassroots women’s 
organizations in Iraq, such analyses do more harm than good for oppressed women in the 
region, as they overlook other non-religious factors often more important in creating and 
perpetuating women’s oppression.16 In their report on gender-based violence in post-U.S. 
invasion Iraq, the authors found that such assertions: “deflect attention from factors (such 
as politics, economics, and militarism) that influence the prevalence o f gender-based 
violence, and obscure the ways that United States actions have exacerbated conditions 
that give rise to violence against women.” Rather than a religious issue, the authors argue 
that violence against women in Iraq should be examined within the framework of gender, 
“a system of power relations whose number-one enforcement mechanism is the threat o f
17violence against women,” over which no nationality or religion has a monopoly.
14 International Crisis Group.
15 Kay Hymowitz, “Why Feminism is AWOL on Islam,” City Journal (Winter, 2003).
16 “Promising Democracy, Imposing Theocracy: Gender-Based Violence and the US War on Iraq,” 
MADRE report (6 March 2007): 1-40.
17 “Promising Democracy, Imposing Theocracy,” 18.
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Furthermore, the orientalist construct of the Muslim woman as “victim” inevitably
discounts the possibility of the potentially emancipatory elements o f Islam, which could
“offer powerful spaces of resistance to injustice and provide avenues for critical
18contestation and political engagement.” Instead, a simplistic dichotomous analysis sees 
posits secular/Westem forms of political engagement as modem and inherently good, 
while religiously inspired engagements is seen as backward and hence an impediment to 
“development” and “progress.” For some women Islamist activists, though, Islam itself 
enabled them to overcome cultural obstacles and participate more fully in “modem” 
political activities such as grassroots campaigning, elections, and governance. As Jamila 
Shanti, one of Hamas’ elected female members of the Palestinian Legislative Council 
explained, “[t]here are traditions here that say that a woman should take a secondary role 
— that she should be at the back...But that is not Islam.”19 According to Shanti, Hamas 
would “scrap many of these traditions. You will find women going out and 
participating.”20 Because o f the static vision of political Islam of the “modem rationalist” 
paradigm, these analyses cannot see how Islamist movements are themselves transformed 
by the participation of Muslim women, through their influence on political, social and
9 1economic agendas.
Like the representations of oppressed Muslim women in the rhetorical justifications for 
19th century European colonialism, in the contemporary discourse on political Islam 
generally, and the “war on terror” specifically, “there is no subject....[Westerners] have
99thought more important than the condition of Muslim women.” Perhaps to avoid the 
contradictions o f the colonial discourse, which switched schizophrenically between 
portrayals of Muslim women as oppressed and infantile or as exotic sexual temptresses in 
laughably inaccurate descriptions of “harems,” the contemporary discourse uniformly 
relies on the former depiction to call for a Western “savior.” Playing the same identity
18 “Promising Democracy, Imposing Theocracy,” 18.
19Alan Johnston, “Women ponder future under Hamas,” BBC News, 3 March 2006.
20 Johnston.
21 See Islah Jad, “Between Religion and Secularism: Islamist Women o f  Hamas,” in On Shifting Ground: 
Muslim Women in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone (New York: Feminist Press at the City 
University o f  New York, 2005).
22 Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: the Making o f  an Image (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1960), 36, quoted in Lockman, 70.
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constructing and affirming function in the discourse on political Islam as did her 18°* and 
19th century counterparts, the “archetypal image of the deprived and debased Muslim 
woman [has been] resurrected to perform her duty as a signifier of the abject difference 
o f Muslims, the barbarity and anti-modernism of Islam and its essential repression of 
women and most importantly as a camouflage for U.S. military interventions.”
1.2 American Democracy as “Good Angel ”
In order to protect both the extemal/Westem and intemal/”good Muslim” from the 
savage other enemy, the “savior” must be constructed so as to justify both its status as 
“good angel” (capable o f managing the task at hand) and its policies addressing the 
savage threat (inextricably linked to, and confirming of, the savior’s self-identity). In 
addition to the various militant or “hard” power policies associated with the “war on 
terror” discussed in previous chapters, and in line with the United States self-identity as a 
beacon of “democracy,” “progress” and “modernity,” the Bush administration’s “soft” 
power policy prescription was the spread of “modernization” and “democracy” 
throughout the Middle East. A November, 2003 address to the National Endowment for 
Democracy which many commentators credit with launching the democracy component 
of the “Bush Doctrine” aimed rhetorically to shift U.S. policy away from appeasing non- 
democratic allies in the Middle East towards holding these states to account. Bush 
explained the thinking behind the new policy:
Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the 
Middle East did nothing to make us safe — because in the long run, 
stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.. .As long as the 
Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will 
remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.24
Bush’s democratization agenda was presented a year earlier in the September 2002 
National Security Strategy document that attributed lack of security in the United States
23 Zine, 8.
24 Quoted in Ken Silverstein, “Parties o f  God: The Bush Doctrine and the Rise o f  Islamic Democracy,” 
Harpers M agazine (March 2007).
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to the “internal conditions of other states—particularly the lack of democracy.” This 
theme has been reiterated throughout the course of the two G.W. Bush administrations 
and was reaffirmed by Condoleezza Rice in her confirmation hearings as Secretary of 
State on 26 January 2005. Here she insisted that the Bush administration had “broken 
with six decades of excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the hope o f 
purchasing stability at the price of liberty.” Further, she argued that “[a]s long as the 
broader Middle East remains a region of tyranny and despair and anger, it will produce 
extremists and movements that threaten the safety of Americans and our friends.”
Now that the enemy had been defined as the anti-modem, violent Islamist movement that 
despises freedom, democracy, and “modernity” itself, the obvious remedy is to transform 
the political and economic structures that incubate such movements and promote political 
contexts, social policies and cultural values better suited for the “modem” world. Chief 
among the initiatives developed to achieve this end were: 1) the Middle East Partnership
77Initiative (MEPI), structured around four thematic “pillars”: political reform, economic 
reform, education, and women’s empowerment; 2) the “Microfinance Initiative to help 
over two million entrepreneurs escape poverty through microfinance loans over the next 
5 years”; 3) the “Literacy Initiative to assist the region’s efforts to halve the illiteracy rate 
over the next decade”; 4) “Business and Entrepreneurship Training Initiative to help as 
many as 250,000 young entrepreneurs, especially women, expand their employment 
opportunities”; and 5) a “Task Force on Investment to assist the region’s efforts to 
improve the business climate.”28 To supplement and reinforce the ideological component 
of these programs, the administration also developed what Secretary of State Rice 
describes as “transformational diplomacy,” meant to “inculcate public diplomacy into
25 Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Bernard, Lowell H. Schwartz and Peter Sickle, “Building Moderate Muslim 
Networks,” RAND Corporation (2007).
26 Quoted in Jim Lobe, “Bush Democracy Doctrine, 2003(?)-2006, R.I.P,” Inter-Press Service, 24 May 
2006.
27 The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was established by then-Secretary Powell on 12 
December 2002 “to create educational opportunity at a grassroots level, promote economic opportunity and
help foster private sector development, and to strengthen civil society and the rule o f  law throughout the 
region.” ‘T h e Middle East Partnership Initiative,” State Department.
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both policy design and implementation,” through programs such as Radio Sawa and the 
United States Middle East Television Network (A1 Hurra).
Yet like European colonial powers a century earlier, the American “saviors” found 
themselves struggling to justify their endeavors in terms that concealed the contradictions 
underlying their policies and actions. In particular, the central paradox at the heart o f the 
democratization agenda has proven difficult to overcome: on the one hand, the United 
States’ rhetorical justification for interventionist policies has been to facilitate 
transformation of Muslim/Arab states into “modern,” “democratic,” or Westernized 
states; yet on the other hand is the implicit belief in the United States’ / West’s 
superiority, inextricably linked to the belief that U.S. interests are best safeguarded by 
protecting the status quo and leaving client governments in place to continue to dictate 
vital policies in the region. This paradox, as pointed out by Albert Hourani, was one their 
colonial European predecessors were confronted with as well:
For the settler communities, and for the European governments, the use of 
their power to defend their own interests was paramount, but power is not 
comfortable unless it can turn itself into legitimate authority, and the idea 
that they were there in order to carry out a civilizing mission was strong 
among Europeans who ruled or conducted their business in Arab 
countries, whether it expressed itself as the idea of a superior civilization 
bringing justice, order and prosperity, or the communication of a language 
and the culture expressed in it. Such ideas, o f which the logical conclusion 
was the ultimate absorption of Arabs on a level o f equality into a new, 
unified world, were crossed by others: a sense of unbridgeable difference, 
o f an innate superiority which conferred the right to rule.
Grasping this central paradox —  an inevitable response to the lack o f correspondence 
between a discourse that claims to promote “freedom” and “progress” for targeted people
and the actual impact o f those policies on the people —  is vital to understanding what
•2 1
otherwise look like policy blunders, inconsistencies and unintentional failure.
29 Rabasa et al., xx.
30 Hourani, 324.
31 In the context o f  this paradox one can understand how an administration that proclaims to be committed 
to democracy promotion in the Middle East can so cavalierly turn a blind eye to the voices o f the “people” 
themselves when claims are inconsistent with U.S. interests in the region (e.g., by ignoring the fact that the 
majority o f  Iraqis have expressed their opposition to the U.S. occupation, or by boycotting a 
democratically-elected Hamas government in Palestine for its failure to abide by rules set in place during
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One need only look at the spending patterns o f the principal democratization programs 
initiated by the Bush administration as part of the “soft” power component of its “war on 
terror” to find evidence of the glaring contradiction at the heart of this agenda. In addition 
to MEPI, which has received more than $293 million since its establishment, the 
administration’s Governing Justly and Democratically (GJ&D) programs associated with 
the Transformational Diplomacy policy32 received $225,385 million for fiscal year (FY) 
200633 and is requesting $407,340 million for its Middle East initiatives in 2008 (an 
increase o f 81 % over actual 2006 spending levels). Notably, administration funding for 
the latter program has been criticized by the prominent democracy promotion think-tank 
Freedom House for its failure to adequately fund associated civil society and human 
rights programs, and for the disproportionate funding earmarked for Middle Eastern 
countries at the expense of countries “within the East Asia and the Pacific and Central 
Asian regions, and for particular countries of concern, including Russia and 
Zimbabwe.”34
The top two recipient countries of the GJ&D program — Iraq and Afghanistan, neither
various stages o f  the official “peace process,” while turning a blind eye to Israeli parties in the government 
which have similarly shown contempt for these processes, through official statements or actions. Sean 
Rayment, “Secret MoD poll: Iraqis support attacks on British troops,” The Telegraph, 23 October 2005; 
Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘T he Soldiers Speak. Will President Bush Listen?” New York Times, 28 February 
2006; and John Hari, “Ethnic cleansing returns to Israel's agenda,” The Independent o f  London, 13 
November 2006.
32 The Just and Democratic Governance project is one o f  the key elements o f  the Transformational 
Diplomacy policy. The stated aim o f this policy is to work “with International Organizations to offer help 
to countries that seek to reinforce rights and freedoms.” For further information see: “Governing Justly & 
Democratically: Diplomacy that Serves Human Rights, Freedom and Democracy,” Office o f  
Undersecretary o f  Political Affairs, State Department, (2007); For further information see: Larry Nowels 
and Connie Veillette, “CRS Report for Congress: Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role o f  the Director 
o f Foreign Assistance,” Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division (8 September 2006); “Fact Sheet: 
Transformational Diplomacy,” Under-Secretary fo r  Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (18 January 
2006). A related development is the creation o f a new State Department position: Director o f  Foreign 
Assistance (DFA), who serves concurrently as Administrator o f  the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), which is charged with coordinating U.S. assistance programs. The DFA will have 
authority over most State Department and USAID programs, and will provide “guidance” to other agencies 
with foreign aid programs. Nowels and Veillette.
33 The Freedom House report looks at fiscal year 2006, as opposed to 2007, “as a point o f  reference because 
FY2006 is completed, and because the current year FY2007 is an atypical and distorted year, given the 
Continuing Resolutions and the belated obligation o f  funds for foreign operations.” “Supporting Freedom’s 
Advocates? An Analysis o f  the Bush Administration FY2008 Budget Request for Democracy and Human 
Rights,” Freedom House (April 2007).
34 Ibid.
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with anything approaching a functioning government, let alone one ripe for 
democratization —  are scheduled to receive $171,800 and $202 million respectively. 
Furthermore, when the Iraqi parliament attempts to exercise its democratic rights, its 
efforts have been hindered by the Bush administration. For example, recent efforts to 
thwart the U.N. Security Council’s rubber-stamping of the U.S.-led multinational force 
mandate in Iraq without parliament’s approval have been ignored by the Bush 
administration, despite polls showing that most Iraqis (70-80%) support the parliament’s 
position. As one commentator put it, “Washington —  apparently unconcerned about 
democracy in Iraq — is determined to keep troops there, run the show, and to press 
forward with another U.N. mandate, irrespective of the parliament’s wishes.” In the 
Middle East (broadly defined), after Iraq and Afghanistan, the next largest recipient of 
GJ&D funds for FY 2008 will be the United States’ archenemy Iran, where $75 million 
has been spent developing Farsi-language radio and television programming similar to
•> 7
the Cold War Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.
From this information two conclusions can be drawn. First, democracy funding has had 
little or no impact on actual democratization in the region over the past several years, as 
countries receiving the greatest levels of funding have shown little, if  any, appreciable 
movement towards democracy. Second, apportionment of democratization funds is 
decided on something other than a needs-basis, since many states with the most severe 
authoritarian problems, often located outside of the Middle East (e.g., Burma and
-> o
Uzbekistan), receive little or no funding, while those whose most intractable problems 
are unrelated to democracy-related issues (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq, whose primary 
issues are security and foreign occupation) receive disproportionately large amounts of
' I Q
funding. In addition, when the total projected U.S. government spending for its
35 Thalif Deen, “Iraqi MPs Challenge Coalition Mandate,” Inter-Press Service, 13 November 2007.
36 Ibid.
37 “U.S. must promote Iranian’s right to democracy: Rice,” Agence France Presse, 4 April 2006.
38 According to Freedom House, Burma is “ruled by one o f  the most repressive regimes in the world” and is 
described as “Not Free." Despite this, funding for Burma in the “Governing Justly and Democratically” 
category was cut from $4.17 million to $550,000; and for Uzbekistan, described as among the “Worst o f  
the Worst” in Freedom House rankings, U.S. assistance for democracy programming has been cut in half. 
“Supporting Freedom’s Advocates?” 17-18.
39 Gerges points out the importance o f “security,” a "sine qua non " in the project o f “nation building” in 
Lebanon during the time o f  the civil war. A similar argument can be made o f  the importance o f  security to
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numerous democratization and human rights programs, an estimated $845,680 million for 
FY2008, is compared to the total projected spending for the “hard” power component of 
the “war on terror,” an estimated $647 billion,40 the sincerity o f  this approach is further 
called into question 41
In addition to issues associated with the allocation of democratization funds, two 
additional reasons may have predicated the failure of the Bush administration’s 
democratization policies. The first involves the double standards inherent in the approach 
of the Bush administration in deciding which states/political parties to target, which to 
ignore, and, perhaps most importantly, which to undermine in its democratization 
campaign. For example, in the cases o f Lebanon and Palestine, recent U.S. intervention 
on behalf of particular political factions, rather than more general support for vital 
institutions or civil society, have actually diminished prospects for democracy. In 
particular, through policies aimed at marginalizing Islamo-nationalist movements 
Hezbollah (in Lebanon) and Hamas (in Palestine), Saad-Ghorayeb has argued that the 
Bush administration’s “war on terror”-associated democracy promotion programs have 
actually been “promoting failed states rather than encouraging state-building.” 42 
According the Saad-Ghorayeb, measures employed by the United States include 
“undermining their national unity, infringing on their sovereignly, refusing to recognize
Afghanistan and Iraq prior to the construction o f  a functioning democracy. A s he argues, “Civil society and 
social and sectarian harmony cannot survive without stability and security.” Gerges, 2007, 81.
40 This budget, according to one United States defense policy expert, “more (than 25 percent larger, in real 
terms, than the one for 1968, at the height o f  combat in Vietnam.” Betts.
41 Steven M. Kosiak, “The Global War on Terror (GWOT): Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating Funding 
Requirements: Testimony Before the United States Senate Budged Committee,” Center f o r  Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 6 February 2007.
42 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “Washington in Lebanon and Palestine: Fatal Manipulation,” Conflicts Forum (14 
August 2007). To substantiate this point in regards to Palestine, Saad-Ghorayeb provides the example o f  
how the U.S. government, “in its campaign to oust the Hamas government in 2006-07, designated $86.4 
million for Abbas’s Force 17 presidential-guard units and the preventive security services (PSS), led by 
Fatah strongman Mohammed Dahlan.” In the case o f  Lebanon, she explains; how, after the 2006 summer 
war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Bush administration intervened <on behalf o f  Fuad Siniora's 
government and to the detriment o f the opposition, including Hizbullah and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic 
Movement. In order to “strengthen” the Lebanese army, the Bush administration increased its funding from 
an annual average o f $2-3 million to $220 million in “training, light weapons, ammunition and Humvees. 
The declared purpose o f such funding is not to enable the army to defend Lebanon from Israeli incursions 
and attacks, but to transform the army into a force capable o f ‘extending state sovereignty’ across the 
country by ‘enforcing [UN] Resolution 1701’ - in other words, into a force capable o f  confronting the 
resistance.”
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the popular will, and attempting to mask their government’s loss o f popular and 
constitutional legitimacy.”43
In other words, the Bush administration cannot win over the “hearts and minds” of the 
citizens of the Middle East and convince them of the sincerity of democratization policies 
which appear so unevenly applied, and for economically/geopolitically expedient reasons 
with little to do with promoting “freedom” and “liberty” in the region. How, for example, 
would the government justify maintaining or strengthening relations with states known 
for systematic violations of democratic norms both in relation to their own citizens (e.g., 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco)44 and their treatment of non-citizens under their 
internationally sanctioned jurisdiction (e.g., Israel,45 for both its Palestinian citizens and 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories), while boycotting Islamist states (e.g., Iran) or 
democratically elected Islamist governments (e.g., Hamas) for alleged lack of 
“democracy” or violence. As Thomas Carothers, director of the Democracy and Rule of 
Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) argues: “You add 
up all the pieces, and the message to the world is, ‘We have a lot of other business than 
just democracy in this region...and that business means friendly relations with all sorts of 
autocrats.’”46
Of course the use of democratization programs for politically expedient ends is nothing 
new for the U.S. government. Throughout the last decade of the Cold War, the tactical 
and strategic model for the Bush administration’s “war on terror,” the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED), was used to expand ideological hegemony over states 
that fell outside the United States’ sphere of influence. As a 1996 report to Congress for
43 Ibid.
44 For in-depth descriptions o f  the authoritarian nature o f  these regimes, see Marsha Posusney and Michele 
Penner Angrist, eds., Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner, 2005).
45For more information on the undemocratic nature o f  the Israeli government in its treatment o f  its 
Palestinian citizens and subjects in the Occupied Territories, see “Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: 
70th Session o f  the UN Committee on the Elimination o f  Racial Discrimination (CERD), 19 February to 9 
March 2007: Update to Comments by Amnesty International on Israel’s compliance with its obligations 
under the International Convention on the Elimination o f  all Forms o f  Racial Discrimination (ICERD),” 
Amnesty International (1 February 2007); and “Israel and the Occupied Territories: Road to Nowhere,” 
Amnesty International (1 December 2006).
46 Lobe.
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increased NED spending explained, the organization is an “effective instrument of 
foreign policy at a time when American interests and values are under sustained 
ideological attack from a wide variety of anti-democratic forces around the world...”47 
Although ostensibly a not-for-profit organization promoting human rights and 
democracy, the NED has often been indistinguishable from other covert government 
activities. As Allen Weinstein, its first President, confessed in a 1991 Washington Post
AQ
interview: “A lot o f what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.” 
Although the United States’ ideological enemy is no longer communism, the NED’s 
original raison d ’etre — to spread human rights and democracy in the world by 
establishing free market principles —  still helps define new missions, especially in the 
context of the “war on terror”. As President Bush put it in his January 2004 State o f the 
Union address, the NED budget needed to be doubled so it could “focus its new work on 
the development o f free elections, and free markets, free press, and free labor unions in 
the Middle East.”49
The second reason this policy was doomed to failure is the problematic nature o f the 
notion that democracy can be achieved through outside intervention as opposed to the 
organic development of the necessary institutions and consciousness on the part of a 
state’s citizens and rulers, a notion invalidated by the experience of Western foreign 
policy in the region over the past century. As Rashid Khalidi points out, “[t]here are solid 
historical and political reasons for suggesting that war, external intervention, and foreign 
occupation are far from being ideal recipes for the introduction of democracy in the 
Middle East.”50 The history of the Middle East is replete with examples of the deleterious 
effects of outside intervention on budding democratic movements, including Britain’s 
occupation of Egypt in 1882, which “short-circuit[ed] a nationalist movement that, 
among other things, aimed to limit the autocracy of the khedive and to move towards 
parliamentary democracy”;51 early 20th century British intervention in Iran, which turned
47 Hernando Calvo Ospina, ‘The CIA’s Successors and Collaborators, United States: Overt and Covert 
Destablisation,” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2007.
48 Ibid..
49 Ibid.,.
50 Khalidi, 55.
51 Ibid., 56.
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the clock back on advancements made in that country’s 1906 constitutional revolution,; 
and from the early 1920s until the late-1950s in Syria, Jordan and Iraq, where early 
experiments in democracy were largely reversed by unpopular French and British 
military occupations under UN mandate.
According to Khalidi,
[b]y the time they had disappeared from the Arab world, with the sole 
exception of Lebanon, these deeply flawed parliamentary democracies had 
become largely discredited. This was in part because of their manipulation 
by entrenched elites, endemic corruption, and widespread failure to 
address deep domestic problems, but also because of their inability to end 
a foreign occupation and to resist Western powers’ interventions in these 
states’ domestic affairs.53
In his article “How Not to Promote Democracy and Human Rights,” Aryeh Neier 
discusses another way United States military intervention in the region undermines 
democracy and human rights: by undermining the perceived legitimacy o f movements 
receiving funds from, or in any way associated with, the United States government or its 
policies. As Neier puts it,
The willingness to use American force to try to impose democracy and 
human rights has aroused great antagonism in the Middle East, as well as 
in other parts of the world, particularly parts of Asia. It has resulted in 
what President Mubarak of Egypt has termed a level of anti-Americanism 
that is unprecedented worldwide. One of the consequences of this is that 
proponents o f democracy and human rights in the Middle East, but also in 
various parts of Asia, have found themselves on the defensive because 
they are seen as promoting the American cause. It is increasingly difficult 
for them to articulate concern with democracy and human rights.54
Considering the inability of democratization to qualitatively improve the lives of Muslim 
innocent “victims” and its inefficient conceptualization and implementation, one must
52 Ibid., 256.
53 Ibid., 56.
54 Aryeh Neier in Richard Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the “War on Terror, ” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 138-139.
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question its policy function and look to other explanations for the robust development of 
this component of the Administration’s overall “war on terror”: its discursive function.
2. United States Policy Makers Construct the “Victim” and “Savior” in the “War on 
Terror” Discourse
Similar to the role they played in constructing the image of the “savage” other in the 
aftermath of the September 11th attacks, American politicians were central in defining the 
nature of the “victims” of Islamist violence, of which the Twin Towers attacks were but 
one manifestation, as well as the characteristics of the angel “savior” whose prompt 
action was necessary to eliminate this enemy and protect the innocent from further 
victimization. In this section I will consider the contributions of prominent politicians, 
both Republican and Democrat, to the construction of the Islamist other in the “war on 
terror” discourse.
2.1 Construction o f the Innocent “Victim”
In a speech to Congress on September 20, 2001, Bush made clear the administration’s 
belief that “[t]he terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been 
rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics —  a fringe 
movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.” 55 The President went on to 
assure the Muslim world that the United States was not at war with it: “We are not at war 
with Muslims. We don’t have a beef with Muslims. We want to be friends with Muslims 
and Muslim children.” He then explained the purpose of the first component of the 
United States declared “war on terror,” the invasion of Afghanistan, to protect the United 
States from future attacks on its homeland and to save the “good Muslims” of 
Afghanistan from their evil counterparts:
Afghanistan’s people have been brutalized — many are starving and many 
have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for 
owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate.
A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if  his beard is not long enough.
55 George W. Bush, ’’Address to a Joint Session o f Congress and the American People,” White House News 
and Policies, 20 September 2001.
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The United States respects the people of Afghanistan — after all, we are 
currently its largest source o f humanitarian aid — but we condemn the 
Taliban regime.56
In this example, the “victims” o f Islamist violence are primarily Afghani women, and the 
civil/human rights of all non-Taliban Afghanis (e.g. freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression). The culprit is the religious extremism of the Taliban regime; the assumption 
is that, without the oppressive religious regime, women would be free and considered 
equal to their male counterparts and all Afghanis would have access to education, would 
be protected by liberal institutions that guarantee their civil/human rights, and would live 
in relative security. This assertion was made despite the non-Islamist regimes in the 
region, many United States allies, which also fall short o f the liberal democracy label, 
particularly in their failure to guarantee their citizens’ basic civil/human rights, including 
women’s rights. That this decontextualized statement can be made with such authority is 
testament to the power of discourse to distort and disguise facts. The United States 
government, in particular throughout the Bush administration, has maintained close 
relationships with countries like Uzbekistan, where, according to former British 
Ambassador Craig Murray, United States policy is focused not on “democracy or 
freedom,” but rather on “oil, gas and hegemony,”57 Turkmenistan, described by Human
co
Rights Watch as “one of the most repressive countries in the world,” and oil-rich 
Kazakhstan, where Sectary of State Condoleezza Rice went so far as implementing a 
waiver to allow the continuation o f military aid on national security grounds even after a 
State Department report pointed out that “numerous steps backward” had been taken by 
the government in regards to human rights.59 These facts exemplify the administration’s 
lack of concern for the human rights of the people in the region. The purpose of President 
Bush’s statement, therefore, must be seen as purely rhetorical, to point out the inherent
56 Ibid.
57 Craig Murray, Guardian, 16 May 2005, quoted in Chomsky, 2006, 141. Chomsky points out that even 
though the Bush administration made public its desire to distance itself from the Karimov regime in 2005 
as a result o f  the Uzbekistan leader’s growing relationship with the Kremlin, during this period, and 
according to David Wall o f the Royal Institute o f  International Affairs whom he quotes, Washington 
increased its funding for the Uzbek government and, according to “independent observers,” “United States 
presence in the country is up to twice as large as Washington is willing to admit.”
58 ‘Turkmenistan: N o Deals Without Rights Reform: International Community Should Not Reward Sham 
Election,” Human Rights Watch (8 February 2007).
59 Chomsky, 2006,141; “US Pursues Ties to Oil-Rich Kazakhstan,” Associated Press, 25 September 2006.
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g o o d n e ss  o f  our ways (read: democratic, secular and modem), and the concomitant evil 
of theirs (read: traditional, religious, violent).
As with the discourse defining the savage “enemy,” in the innocent “victim” discourse 
we see attempts to distinguish between the “good” and “bad Muslim,” where the “good 
Muslim” is not only the “moderate” other capable of assimilation, but also a legitimate 
“victim” o f the backwardness, repression and violence of the enemy. The “good” 
Muslim’s “victim” status is evidenced in a speech given by then-Secretary of State Colin 
Power one month after the September 11th attacks:
To understand the true faith of al-Qaida and the Taliban, all we have to do 
is look at the way they hijacked Afghanistan. The Taliban squeezed the 
life out o f Afghanistan — no music, no soccer, no education or jobs for 
women, nothing —  nothing but total support to Usama bin Laden and his 
gang of al-Qaida murderers. Now, in recent days, as the curtain has been 
lifted, we have seen on television the joyous pictures of liberated Afghans, 
of women throwing off their burqas, children happily flying kites.60
In this passage, the innocent “victims” of Islamist oppression are not only the helpless 
women, subjugated by their male counterparts and forced to hide themselves behind 
burqas (the most significant symbol for Western audiences o f the Muslim woman’s 
oppression), but also the innocent children, who must have been imprisoned in their 
homes during the Taliban regime, forbidden to participate in various “normal” children’s 
pastimes, as well as the young men kept from such simple pleasures as sports. Rather 
than attempting to understand and engage a different ontological system, the discourse 
solely judges and condemns, and hence eliminates all possibility of a hermeneutical 
understanding or the meaningful dialogue it could produce. In doing so, this aggressive 
discourse leaves little space for multiple voices within that system that may seek to 
challenge its parameters, those that endeavor to, as one self-defined “faith-centered 
Muslim feminist” put it, “create alternative readings of religious texts that build a 
discursive and spiritual basis for more equitable gender-based structures, systems, and
60 Colin Powell, “Remarks at the McConnell Center for Political Leadership, University o f  Louisville, 
KY,” The Avalon Project 19 November 2001.
243
practices.” 61 Although Powell’s statements were directed towards the Taliban, as 
demonstrated in the last chapter, the discourse on the “war on terror” came to encompass 
all Islamist movements that refused to “moderate” their language or agendas to Western 
dictates.
Another prevalent trend in the discourse on political Islam, especially in the context of 
the “war on terror,” is the tendency to see women’s status in the Muslim world from an 
ahistorical perspective, with no reference to their position prior to foreign invasions and 
occupations. This is evidenced in Bush’s 29 June 2001 State of the Union address when 
he declared: “The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. The mothers and 
daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes. Today women are free.” 
The effect o f this rhetoric is to ultimately link Afghani (or Iraqi, Palestinian, Iranian, etc.) 
women’s freedom with Western presence. Writes Zine:
The history of Afghan women before foreign military occupations and 
conquests is obliterated through this statement. They are invested with 
freedom and agency only by the grace of the American military complex.
As a result, their agency and ontological presence are erased from history 
prior to the “libratory” conquest made by the U.S. led “coalition of the 
willing.”62
Leaders of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), an 
independent political/social organization of Afghan women fighting for human rights and 
social justice, largely agree with Zine’s assessment, arguing that the United States 
occupation on the whole has done more harm than good in promoting women’s rights in 
the country.63
In remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 2006 Policy 
Conference, United States Vice President Dick Cheney discussed the severity o f the
61 Hossein Nasr, 247; Zine’s article provides a good overview o f  the types o f  discussions taking place in 
regards to the status and rights o f  Muslim women today, in particular in the context o f  the conflict between 
Islamic “fundamentalism” and Western intervention, and involving Muslim women from all political and 
epistemological backgrounds, including secular feminists, religious feminists, Muslim women living in the 
West and those living in the Muslim world.
62 Zine, 8-9.
63 “On the Situation o f  Afghan Women,” Revolutionary Association o f  the Women o f  Afghanistan (RA WA).
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threat faced by the United States, Israel and “all civilized nations” devoted “to the ideals 
of liberty, equality, and the dignity of every person.”64 In this speech Cheney described 
the innocent “victim” in terms similar to Powell’s, although the oppressive enemy here is 
the ideology that underpins all Islamist movements:
This enemy has a set of beliefs —  and we saw the expression o f those 
beliefs in the rule of the Taliban...This ideology rejects tolerance, denies 
freedom of conscience, and demands that women be pushed to the margins 
of society. Such beliefs can be imposed only through force and 
intimidation, so those who refuse to bow to the tyrants will be brutalized 
or killed —  and no person or group is exempt.65
Again we see the individual liberties of Western democracy contrasted with the 
constraints and oppression of the Islamists, where women, denied any agency, are seen as 
helpless “victims” in need o f saving. Underpinning this depiction of oppressed women, 
children, and individual ffeedom-seekers is a patronizing tone, which asserts the 
authoritative knowledge of the author in regards to the object being described. This 
attitude is also seen in a speech by Donald Rumsfeld in which, speaking about a “true” 
Islam that has been distorted by the Islamists, he says of the innocent “victims”:
I think people in the Moslem world who think about it carefully ... 
understand that their religion’s being hijacked and...they’re going to have 
to take back their religion and not allow people to pervert it the way the A1 
Qaeda leadership is perverting it. They’ve got to worry also that the 
people in their countries start believing this twisted approach to the 
world.66
Underlying Rumsfeld’s critique of the way Islamists have “perverted” Islam is the 
assumption that he understands “true” Islam better than the Muslims themselves. This 
assumption of knowledge and, through it, authority, allows Rumsfeld and other 
contributors to this discourse to assert their superiority to both Muslims and their 
approach to economic, political and social policies, and even their own religion.
64 Richard Cheney, “Vice President's Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 
Policy Conference,” White House News and Policies, 7 March 2006.
65 Cheney, 7 March 2006.
66 Donald Rumsfeld, “Interview with USA Today,” 24 October, 2001, quoted in Jackson, 65.
245
2.2 Construction o f the Angel “Savior”: Republican Discourse
In the introduction to the first post-September 11th National Security Strategy, Bush 
described in lofty terms the goals of the “soft” policy component of the “war on terror,” 
which was meant to signify a clean break with the policies of appeasement o f Middle 
Eastern dictatorships that dated back to the Nixon doctrine. In this strategy document the 
president alluded to what would later become one of the primary pretexts for the 
Administration’s policy of regime change vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Iraq: the notion that 
lack o f “freedom” and “democracy” in the Middle East (at least those states that were not
fslpro-West) were to blame for the rise of religious “fanaticism.” If religious governance 
and democracy are incompatible, as argued by adherents of the modem rationalist 
paradigm, and democracy is capable of overcoming the destructive forces of “tyranny” 
and terrorism and promoting liberal ideals regarding freedom and human rights, it 
follows that democracy is the antidote for the problems caused by the “savage” Islamist 
enemy. To save the innocent Muslims from the repressive and backward Islamists who 
either already mle (in pre-2003 Afghanistan, or Iran and Palestine today) or threaten to 
take over (Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria) and in turn, save the West from the violence and 
barbarity bound to infect the “civilized world,” drastic measures must be taken to 
transform these countries into Westernized, secular democracies. Argues President Bush: 
“One thing we cannot do is give up on the hundreds of millions of ordinary moms and 
dads across the Middle East who want the hope and opportunity for their children that the 
terrorists and extremists seek to deny them, and that’s a peaceful existence.”
Two-and-a-half years after President Bush declared his “war on terror,” Condoleezza 
Rice explained how successful the administration had been in its benevolent efforts. In a 
speech on the “war” in her capacity as National Security Advisor, Rice assured audience 
members that although some important Islamist terrorists were still at large, the United 
States military has nonetheless succeeded in “delivering freedom to more than 50 million
67 “National Security Strategy o f  the United States o f America,” (2002), 4.
68 George W. Bush, “Press Conference by the President, Indian Treaty Room,” White House news and  
Policies, 20 December 2006.
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people in the space o f two-and-a-half years.”69 As for the people of Iraq, heirs of one o f 
the oldest civilizations in the world, Rice had one simple and clear message: “We are 
giving the Iraqi people an opportunity for a free Iraq.”70 The ball was now in their court. 
What would they choose: modernity or barbarism; moderation or radicalism; freedom or 
tyranny?
The Afghanis, according to Bush, had been oppressed by the former. As a result o f the 
American invasion in the aftermath of September 11th, the “barbaric regime” o f the 
Taliban was gone, and in is place is a liberal democracy. “And the people of Afghanistan 
are better off for it...W e love the fact that people in Afghanistan are now free,” he 
proclaimed in a speech made to the New Mexico Military Institute. Whereas “prior to our 
arrival, the Taliban wouldn’t even let girls go to school,” today, “the people of 
Afghanistan have written a constitution which is—guarantees free election, freedom, full 
participation in government by women.” All of this, the audience members should 
conclude, would not have been possible were a radical Islamist government in power 
instead of the moderate, secular, pro-American Hamid Karzai, elected as a result o f the 
United States invasion. The self-righteous and polemical nature of the discourse aside, 
the Bush administration has yet to address the fact that women’s rights, one o f the main 
battlefields in the war of words over the invasion, have improved only marginally in 
some areas, and in others, as a result o f lack of personal and economic security, have
n i
even deteriorated.
To remind the American public that their financial and physical sacrifices in the context 
of the “war on terror” were made not only in the name of the innocent (native) Muslim 
“victims,” but also for their present and future security and prosperity, Bush insists:
69 Emphasis added.
70Condoleezza Rice, “National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses War on Terror at Reagan 
Library and Museum, Simi Valley, California,” White House News and Policies, 28 February 2004.
71 “Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch (July 2006); Alissa J. 
Rubin, “Afghan Women's Quiet Revolution Hangs by a Thread,” Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2007; and 
Christina Lamb, “Women Back Under Wraps With Taliban Vice Squad,” Sunday Times, Australia, 24 July 
2006.
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I know you know I feel this strongly, but I see this —  we’re in the 
beginning of a conflict between competing ideologies —  a conflict that 
will determine whether or not your children can live in peace. A failure in 
the Middle East, for example, or failure in Iraq, or isolationism, will 
condemn a generation o f young Americans to permanent threat from 
overseas...It is in our interest that we combine security with a political 
process that frees people, that liberates people, that gives people a chance 
to determine their own futures. I believe most people in the Middle East 
want just that. They want to be in a position where they can chart theirnoown futures, and it’s in our interest that we help them do so.
Here we see the neoconservative version of the “democratic peace theory” at the heart of 
the Project for the New American Century, as described in Chapter Three. It is based on 
the notion that the only way to ensure world peace, and more importantly, the United 
States’ pre-eminent role in constructing, maintaining and managing this peace for its own 
benefit, is through spreading Western style democracy and the economic and political 
institutions and systems that underpin it. This component of the discourse provides 
rhetorical justification for policies intended to transform Middle Eastern states into 
secular, quasi- democracies capable of better serving U.S. interests the region. It draws 
attention away from internal contradictions within the Bush administration’s 
democratization policy, such as the U.S. supporting alleged democratic processes in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, while at the same time turning a blind eye to blatantly undemocratic
processes in states like Turkey or Egypt when Islamists stand to lose the most from these
1%processes. It also reaffirms the United States’ identity as the beacon o f democracy in 
the world, capable o f actually executing the ambitious task of not only delivering security 
to the “victims” o f Islamist extremists but at the same time “freeing” and “liberating”
72 George W. Bush, “Press Conference by the President,” Office o f  the Press Secretary, 20 December 2006.
73 For example, in the April 2007 Turkish parliamentary elections to confirm the ruling party’s (AKP) 
selection for Turkey’s next president, the Islamist Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, the minority secularist 
parliamentarians boycotted the poll leaving the Constitutional Court, which is powerfully influenced 
Turkey’s military, to invalidate the parliament’s vote for Gul on the rarely-used technical grounds that it 
lacked a two-thirds quorum. Five days later, Gul withdrew his candidacy. In the aftermath o f  the standoff 
between secularists and the AKP there were massive demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara, most likely 
opening the way for early general elections, in which the AKP is expected to emerge as the largest party. 
Andrew Finkel, ‘Turkey: Tom between God and State,” Le Monde Diplomatique (May 2007); Dilip Hiro, 
and Tom Engelhardt, “Unholy Alliance,” TomDispatch, 10 May 2007. Another example is Egypt, where 
the U.S. has remained noticeably silent on issues relating to the repression o f  the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which won close to one fifth o f  parliamentary seats in the 2005 elections. One recent incident involved the 
controversial trial o f 40 members o f the Brotherhood, including Khairat el-Shatir, third-in-command o f the 
group, on what many believe are trumped up charges o f  terrorism and money-laundering. “Military to try 
Brotherhood members,” AI Jazeera, 14 May 2007.
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them and giving them “a chance to determine their own future.” This is precisely the 
volatile mixture of “American idealism and American Realpolitik,” combined with an 
inflammatory dose of “messianic American civic nationalism,” 74 that Anatol Lieven 
refers to in America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism.
In a speech to AIPAC on the United States’ continued commitment to the “war on 
terror,” Vice President Cheney similarly extolled the virtues of Western democracy and 
ruminated on the positive impact he believes it could have in countries where violent and 
oppressive movements hinder the potential of “good Muslims.” Although in this speech 
he does not mention the Islamist movements by name, the specific “terrorist” acts 
referred to (i.e., the bombings of the United States Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and 
“terrorist” attacks in Iraq, Bali, the United States and Jerusalem) clearly reference the 
same divergent group of movements regularly conflated in the “ideologization of terror” 
approach:
It is not hard to see why the terrorists oppose and rage against the rise of 
democracy in Iraq. They know that as liberty advances, as men and 
women are given a say in the affairs of their country, they turn their 
creative gifts to the pursuits o f peace. People who live in freedom are able 
to choose their own destiny, and this gives them real hope for material 
progress in their own lives, and a better future for their children. As 
democracy advances, ideologies that stir anger and hostility lose theirne
appeal, and terrorists lose recruits, safe havens, and sources of funding.
Secretary o f State Condoleezza Rice has proven equally optimistic about the potential of 
imposed Westem-style democracy to overcome the anachronisms o f Islamic and Arab 
culture that the Islamists are intent on preserving:
The success of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq will give strength and 
hope to reformers throughout the region, and accelerate the pace of 
reforms already underway. From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are 
seeing elections and new protections for women and minorities, and the 
beginnings of political pluralism. Political, civil, and business leaders have 
issued stirring calls for political, economic and social change.
74 Lieven.
75 Cheney, 7 March 2006.
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Increasingly, the people are speaking, and their message is clear: the
7 ( \future of the region is to live in liberty.
As is the norm with the discourse on political Islam, that element which prescribes 
democracy as an antidote to the rise of political Islam tends to be ahistorical. Although 
the Muslim world under the various caliphates that ruled since the Prophet Muhammad’s 
death were often tolerant of religious minorities, even welcoming “refugees and outcasts 
from a much less tolerant Christian Empire,” the discourse tends to attribute religious 
intolerance, deemed anathema to Western democracy, to those movements advocating the 
restoration of an Islamic caliphate. It does so without providing specific examples to 
justify the denial of this historical precedent in favor of a retrograde vision o f Islamists, 
which, in a typically strained dichotomous construct, opposes a notion o f liberal 
democracy that promotes “freedom” and “liberty” with oppressive Islamist rule. As Bush 
put it in a discussion of the “war on terror” at the National Endowment for Democracy, 
“This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, political vision: the 
establishment, by terrorism, subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that 
denies all political and religious freedom.”77 The idea that political Islam and democracy 
are mutually exclusive is reinforced again in a statement made by President Bush in 
response to a question posed in a town hall meeting regarding the lack of separation 
between “church and state” in the Middle East: “It’s going to be the spread of democracy 
itself that shows folks the importance of separation of church and state.” He then cited 
Iraq’s new constitution, which says Islam is “a basic source of legislation” but guarantees
70
rights to the country’s non-Islamic and non-Arab citizens to exemplify his point. 
Implicit in this statement is the notion that democracy and secularism are intrinsically 
linked.
The opinions of United States policy makers regarding the potential of their government 
to “bring democracy” to the Middle East reflects their essentialist views on Middle
76 Condoleezza Rice, “Opening Remarks by Secretary o f  State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice,” Secretary 
o f  State Condoleezza Rice, 18 January 2005.
77 George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” White 
House News and Policies, 6 October 2005.
78 Warren P. Strobel, “Islamists gain ground from American push for Mideast democracy,” Knight Ridder 
Newspapers, 16 January 2006.
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Eastern cultures and histories, and on the supremacy and transferability o f Western styles 
o f governance, views also expressed by their European orientalist counterparts a century 
earlier. In particular, one finds echoes of the prominent British politician and colonialist 
Arthur James Balfour who, in his lecture to the House of Commons on 13 June 1910, 
spoke of a similar need to assume the “white man’s burden” by “delivering” rational 
governance to the people of this region/religion. In an effort to persuade British MPs of 
the importance of maintaining a British presence in Egypt in the face of enhanced 
Egyptian nationalist efforts to remove them, Balfour argued:
First of all, look at the facts o f the case. Western nations as soon as they 
emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self- 
government...having merits of their own...You may look through the 
whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the 
East, and you never find traces of self-government. All their great 
centuries—and they have been great—have been made under that form of 
government. Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; one domination has 
followed another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have 
you seen one o f those nations o f its own motion establish what we, from a 
Western point o f view, call self-government. That is the fact. It is not a 
question of superiority or inferiority. I suppose a true Eastern sage would 
say that the working government which we have taken upon ourselves in 
Egypt and elsewhere is not a work worthy of a philosopher—that it is the 
dirty work, the inferior work, of carrying out necessary labor.79
Similar to Lord Balfour’s claim that the British government must first destroy the 
Egyptian nationalist movement in order to lay the groundwork for “self-government,” so 
too did the Bush administration see no contradiction in the desire to “bring” democracy to 
the Middle East via war (the “dirty work” of nation building), and thereby destroy those 
very elements that most students o f democracy/democratization deem as prerequisites for 
the creation of a stable democracy (i.e., universal education system, infrastructure, middle
OA
class, civil society).
79Quoted in Said, 1978,32-33.
80 Posusney and Angrist.
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2.3 Construction o f  the Angel “Savior”: Democrat Discourse
Similar to their role in the construction and maintenance of the “savage” other discourse, 
prominent members of the Democratic Party have also contributed generously to the 
innocent “victim” and angel “savior” discourse, as evidenced in an address to the London 
School of Economics in 2005 by United States Senator and presidential hopeful John 
Edwards. In it, Edwards evoked the “white man’s burden” sentiment when delineating 
the role he would like to see the United States government play in the soft power 
component of the “war on terror.” Recalling the words of General John Abizaid, former 
head o f United States military forces in the Middle East, Edwards argued that the “war 
against terrorism is ‘a battle of ideas as much as it is a military battle’,” and that it was 
hence incumbent on the United States government to “convince” the “ordinary men and 
women from Egypt to Morocco to Indonesia... that democracy and liberty are the 
pathway to possibilities.”81 If given the chance, Edwards pleaded, the innocent and “good 
Muslim” men and women of the Middle East would respond in a way that “so many in 
the past have done”:
They could pull down the great books from the shelves in libraries. They 
could exchange ideas with others from different countries. And they could 
begin to move their country out of that fog of hate. This is the power of 
liberty and democracy. If given the chance, it stirs the soul and makes all 
people long for that fundamental human right to be free.
Considering the context in which these statements were uttered, underpinned by a 
dichotomous understanding of progress and stagnancy, tradition and freedom, the “so 
many in the past” Edwards refers to must be Westerners and non-Westemers who have 
responded “correctly” to the stages o f modernization, e.g., through liberalization of their 
economies, separation of church and state, and adoption of democratic principles as 
defined by the West.
In a speech on foreign policy delivered at Georgetown University, Massachusetts Senator 
and former presidential candidate John Kerry expressed a similar desire to help the
81 John Edwards, ‘Towards a New Partnership: America, Europe and the New World,” London School o f  
Economics & Policy Network Lecture, 25 May 2005.
82 Edwards.
252
innocent Muslims of the Arab world, in particular by pushing the United States to enable 
the region to emerge from its self-imposed, marginal status:
We must embark on a major initiative of public diplomacy to bridge the 
divide between Islam and the rest of the world. We must make avoidance 
of the clash of civilizations the work of our generation: Engaging in a new 
effort to bring to the table a new face of the Arab world —  Muslim clerics, 
mullahs, imams and secular leaders —  demonstrating for the entire world 
a peaceful religion which can play an enormous role in isolating and
o->
rebutting those practitioners who would pervert Islam’s true message.
In this passage another common trait of the discourse becomes evident: the assumed 
authority of the speaker in regards to the interpretation of Islam, as evidenced in Kerry’s 
reference to “Islam’s true message.” The sentiment expressed here is not far off from that 
expressed by one of the first proponents of public diplomacy as a means to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the Muslim world: Napoleon. On one o f the three ships 
commandeered by the diminutive French leader on his mission to colonize Egypt was an 
Arabic printing press meant to produce leaflets for distribution upon arrival, including 
one that read: “You will be told that I have come to destroy your religion; do not believe 
it! Reply that I have come to restore your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that more 
than the Mamluks, I respect God, his Prophet, and the Qur’an.”84
Also stressing the importance o f the “soft” or diplomatic component o f the “war on 
terror,” another Democratic senator and presidential hopeful, Hillary Clinton, evoked the 
lessons learned from the Cold War in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. She 
called on young Americans to fulfill their patriotic duty by learning the languages and 
cultures of the Middle East, not because it might help the United States enter into real 
dialogue with those who felt wronged by longstanding United States policies in the
o r
region, but because these societies are “where our biggest threats are incubating.” 
Extolling the United States’ preordained role as purveyor of democracy and modernity to
83 John Kerry, “Kerry speech on national security— Georgetown University,” Office o f  Senator Kerry, 23 
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the world, she praised the Bush administration’s invocation of democratic principles to 
fight Islamist extremism, while criticizing it for not going far enough: “We’ve done a 
good job talking about democracy but we sure haven’t done a comparable good job in 
promoting the long-term efforts that actually build institutions after the elections are over 
and the international monitors have gone home.” This type of support, along with her 
“global education” program, would provide an alternative to the “incubators o f 
religiously-fuelled extremism,” so that innocent and “good Muslims” could be on the side 
of “dignity and progress.”
3. United States Journalists Construct the “Victim” and “Savior” in the “War on 
Terror” Discourse
As is the case in the construction of the “savage” Islamist other, the mainstream U.S. 
media has at times performed the dual roles of source and conveyor of orientalist 
stereotypes and the modem rationalist paradigm in relation to the construction o f the 
innocent “victim” and angel “savior” in the context of the “war on terror” discourse. In 
this section I will focus on the role of particularly influential pundits who have facilitated 
the creation and/or perpetuation of this discourse.
3.1 Construction o f the Innocent “Victim”
In the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, Fareed Zakaria, the influential “liberal hawk” 
editor of Newsweek, echoed the views of the Bush administration, both in his description 
of the native “victims” and his plans for saving them, in the article, “The Politics of Rage: 
Why Do They Hate Us?” later a book.88 Zakaria fears the growing influence o f religious 
“fanaticism,” which he believes, in a statement affirming Mutua’s point on the culpability 
of the underpinning culture of the savage other, “come out of a culture that reinforces
86 Rodham Clinton, 31 October 2006.
87 Tom Regan, “White House’s ‘rush to war was reckless’,” Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 2004; 
Farid Zakaria came to Newsweek magazine from Foreign Affairs, the influential journal o f  international 
politics and economics, where he was managing editor. In 1999 Esquire magazine described Zakaria as 
“the most influential foreign policy adviser o f  his generation,” and named him “one o f the 21 most 
important people o f  the 21st Century.” Bruce Ledewitz, “The Promise o f Democracy,” Capital University 
Law Review  32, no. 2 (2003).
88 Farid Zakaria, “Why do they hate us?” Newsweek {15 October 2001).
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their hostility, distrust and hatred of the West—and of America in particular.” He is 
certain of a “moderate majority” whose complacency he worries will lead to the 
ascendance of the Islamists, or “a small poisonous element who advocate cruel attitudes 
toward” the following putative and actual “victims”: “women, education, the economy
QQ
and modem life in general.” Zakaria adds “people of other faiths and creeds” to this list, 
“victims” who will presumably be aided once Muslims accept the West’s message that, 
once secularized, Islam is “compatible with modem society.”90
For Nicholas Kristrof, another liberal pundit who writes for the New York Times, despite 
his original opposition to the American-led invasion of Iraq, there is hope for Afghanistan 
and Iraq because President Bush’s “team include[s] conservative idealists who want to 
leave the Middle East more democratic than ever before.”91 Although not questioning the 
“honorable” nature o f their intentions, Kristof nonetheless urges caution so that the 
mistakes he believes were made in Kuwait during the first Gulf War can be avoided in 
Iraq. Overlooking all other possible explanatory factors for that war, including various 
geostrategic factors (e.g. challenging Saddam Hussein’s political and military hegemony
QO
in the region, and greater access to the country’s vast oil reserves), Kristof urges the 
Bush administration to avoid the same mistakes that led “Americans to lo[se] their lives 
to liberate Kuwait” and yet end up with the current situation in Kuwait, where “women 
still don’t have the vote.” 93 Contented with the rationales provided by the Bush 
administration for the most recent invasion and occupation of Iraq, Kristof argues in 
favor of a policy geared towards establishing a liberal and secular democracy in Iraq, so 
that Americans would not feel “annoyed” that they sacrificed so many lives, at such great 
expense, to finally see the “benefits of freedom flowing to enemies o f our values...” To 
illustrate his point, the Times journalist recounts an anecdote from the Kuwaiti experience 
where, despite the United States’ benevolent intervention on the side of women’s 
freedom, their repression is evident everywhere, even in grocery shops:
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Nicholas Kristof, “Running for the Exits,” New York Times, 18 April 2003.
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93 Kristof, 2003.
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Special K is sold in Kuwait, but every box has a piece of white paper 
pasted over an image of a young woman exercising. It’s not a sexy image, 
unless you’ve spent a month in the desert alone with a herd of camels, but 
it’s still considered too explosive for Kuwaitis to handle.94
Continued American attention to the “democratization” in Iraq is therefore necessary, lest 
a similar fate await its innocent female “victims,” should “Shiite clerics who favor an 
Islamic republic and want to cover up cereal boxes” come to power. Kristof makes a 
similar argument on behalf o f continued efforts in Afghanistan, where he points out “the 
war may be ending, but the effort to bring opportunities to Afghan women should be just 
beginning.”95 (emphasis added) To refute potential criticism of what some might consider 
a patronizing attitude, Kristof argues in another article that “encouraging more 
opportunity for Afghan women is not cultural imperialism, any more than are our efforts 
to bring Afghanistan a central bank, modem roads or free elections. These are all simply 
elements of nation-building,” presumably the burden of the more advanced and 
knowledgeable United States and its Western allies.96
The contribution of neocon writer Daniel Pipes to the discourse is similar to that of the 
administration he has advised, arguing that the principle “victims” of Islamism in many 
parts o f the world are Muslims themselves.
Islamism is a global affliction whose victims count peoples of all 
religions. Non-Muslims are losing their lives to it in such countries as 
Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, and the Philippines. Muslims are the main
07casualties in Algeria, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.
In another article further elaborating on the native “victims” of Islamism, Pipes makes 
explicit his understanding of the distinction between “good” and “bad Muslims,” arguing: 
“Islamism threatens the West in a way that the traditional faith does not...[although] 
traditional Muslims, who are often the first “victims” of Islamism, express contempt for
QO
the ideology.” And though he provides no substantiation that “Islamism is perhaps the
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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most vibrant and coherent ideological movement in the world today; it threatens us all,” 
he is certain the United States government is capable of overcoming this scourge with the 
help o f its innocent “victims,” Muslim and non-Muslim alike (especially Jews and 
Christians of the world, toward whom Islamists “espouse deep antagonism”),99 just as 
they managed to do with the evil that confronted the “civilized” world in the years 
leading to World War II.100
In an article that asks “Is Islam the problem?,” Jonah Goldberg, writing for the 
influential pro-Israel Jewish World Review, also attempted to distinguish between “good” 
and “bad Muslims,” arguing: “There are over 1 billion Muslims in the world and some 6 
million in the United States alone. It would be morally absurd to claim that all o f these 
people subscribe to an evil religion.”101 Yet the message of the Islamists comes across to 
Westerners the loudest, as they are espouse a “world view at odds with what we in the 
West consider morally acceptable: the beating of Afghani women who teach girls to read; 
the imprisonment and occasional execution of religious dissidents, etc.” Despite 
Goldberg’s best attempts to employ politically correct language, he goes on to betray the 
orientalist foundations of his beliefs, which assumes the “savage” enemy other can really 
only be understood by looking at the underpinning culture. For Goldberg, this type of 
culture is clear: “Much of Muslim world simply lives in a different time than the West. 
Oh sure, some of the big cities, with their cars and satellite dishes, may look modem. But 
their culture is horribly behind the times.”102
3.2 Construction o f the Angel “Savior”
In “How to Save the Arab World,” the title itself revealing his patronizing attitude, 
Fareed Zakaria argues for a break with past appeasements, or “the Fear of the Alternative 
(FOTA)” policies, which he attributes with facilitating the rise in popularity o f Islamist 
movements. Following modem rationalist thought, Zakaria argues that the cultural 
impact of globalization, half-hearted attempts at modernization and lack of reform by
"Ibid .
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Arab regimes have led to malaise and alienation as the norm and Islamism as the only 
answer. “The greatest potency Islamic fundamentalism holds is that it is an alternative —  
a mystical, utopian alternative — to the wretched reality that most people live under in 
the Middle East.” 104 Yet, despite their rhetoric and promises, once in power, Zakaria 
argues, the Islamists are incapable of delivering. “The mullahs can preach, but they 
cannot rule.” As the problem Zakaria has identified is caused by reaction to an uneven 
and unfinished process of modernization, the solution is to complete the process. Zakaria 
emphasizes that this will take time, and can only come once “radical political Islam” is 
first militarily “defeated.” Then, it can be “deligitimated” as an ideology by the 
consolidation of modernity and the implementation of Western democracy. Yet 
democratization cannot occur immediately:
We do not seek democracy in the Middle East — at least not yet. We seek 
first what might be called the preconditions for democracy, or what I have 
called “constitutional liberalism”--the rule of law, individual rights, 
private property, independent courts, the separation of church and state. In 
the Western world these two ideas have fused together — hence “liberal 
democracy” —  but they are analytically and historically distinct.105
To encourage implementation of these stages, Washington must be prepared to use its 
economic and political influence to “insist on genuine reform — new legal codes, new 
regulations, privatization.”106 In Middle Eastern/Muslim states like Afghanistan, already 
beyond repair, a more forceful American intervention may be necessary:
First, we have to help moderate Arab states, but on the condition that they 
embrace moderation. We can fund moderate Muslim groups and scholars 
and broadcast fresh thinking across the Arab world, all aimed at breaking 
the power o f the fundamentalists...Obviously we will have to help 
construct a new political order in Afghanistan after we have deposed the 
Taliban regime... For those who argue that we should not engage in 
nation-building, I would say foreign policy is not theology.... In this case, 
stable political development is the key to reducing our single greatest 
security threat. We have no option but to get back into the nation-building 
business.107
104
105
106
107
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Like Zakaria, Thomas Freidman, another “liberal hawk” journalist, also believes that 
democratization by “revolution, invasion or election” is a necessary process for the 
region. Friedman shares his colleague’s view that democratization is only one step in the 
larger transformation the Muslim world must undergo if truly interested joining the 
“civilized world.” In addition to free elections, the region’s leaders will need to permit 
development of “real political parties, institutions, free press, competitive free markets
10Rand proper education —  a civil society...” Another article linking the rise of Islamism 
in the region to democracy, penned by Friedman days after the Madrid bombings, urged 
the people of Spain not to rashly pull their troops out of Iraq in reaction to the bombings, 
and thus “appease” the terrorists, but rather to continue to support “the first democracy- 
building project ever in the Arab world.” Like other journalists, analysts and policy 
makers involved in developing and maintaining the discourse on political Islam, 
Friedman identifies the “savage” enemy, “victim” and prescription for “savior”. “We are 
up against a terrible nihilistic enemy,” Friedman writes. The “Islamist terrorist” seek to 
“kill as many people in Iraq and elsewhere... so even a glimmer of democracy never takes 
roots in the Arab world and so America is weakened.”109 Friedman further argues that the 
only way democracy will prevail in Iraq, and indeed in the Middle East, is if  President 
Bush “dispenses with his discredited argument for the war —  W.M.D.” and instead 
declares the true, and no less noble, intent of the war: “to depose the genocidal Saddam 
regime in order to partner with the Iraqi people to build a decent government in the heart 
o f the Arab-Muslim world —  because it is the pathologies and humiliations produced by 
Arab misgovemance that are the root causes o f terrorism and Muslim extremism.”110
Norman Podherotz, a founding father of the neoconservative movement,111 agrees with 
his liberal counterparts on the need for the Bush Doctrine vis-a-vis democratization and 
the rise of Islamism in the Middle East, although he is less circumspect in his praise for 
what it has actually accomplished thus far. In an article for the neoconservative 
Commentary, Podherotz poses the question: “Is the Bush Doctrine dead?,” to which he
108 Friedman, “Addicted to Oil,” 2006.
109 Thomas Friedman, “Axis o f  Appeasement,” New York Times, 18 March 2004.
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112responds with a resounding “no.” Citing examples of success such as the liberation of 
Iraq, the “successful” elections held there and in Afghanistan, and the fact that “forces 
opposed to democratization are fighting back with all their might,” Podherotz refutes the 
challenges to democratization, mostly in regards to its implementation, by traditional 
conservative pundits and politicians like George Will, Brent Scowcroft, Patrick Buchanan 
and Philip Gordon who have given up on the notion that democratization in the Middle 
East is possible, or even desirable. He urges conservative, liberal interventionist and 
neoconservative supporters who have lost faith in the doctrine to remember that the 
“shallow roots” of modem nation states were originally planted in the region by the 
French and British colonial powers, and therefore it is not “utopian” to believe that a 
“third Western power” could plant roots for “a better political system [that] could be put 
in their place.”113
Evoking the Cold War analogy, Podherotz compares those who have lost faith in Bush to 
the people who criticized Truman in 1947, when he spoke of the need to address the new 
threat faced by the United States in the form of an “aggressive totalitarian” Soviet Union, 
which eventually led to the Truman Doctrine, a strategy that came to be known as 
containment. “Consider the similarities with Bush,” Podherotz urged. “Even after 9/11, 
many pooh-poohed the threat of Islamofascism and, seeing its terrorist weaponry as 
merely a police matter, denied (and continue to deny) that we were even really at war, 
much less in a new world war.” According to Podherotz, just as Truman’s clear 
“Understanding” of the post-World War II threat to Western democracy led to the Truman 
Doctrine, so too would Bush’s ability to read the challenges and threats of the post Cold 
War international system lead to the promulgation of a new and equally important 
doctrine.114
One neocon journalist who has not jumped ship is Mark Steyn, who has written 
prolifically for a varied range of publications, including the Jerusalem Post in Israel, the 
Chicago Sun Times and the “Happy Warrior” column for National Review. In one column
112 Norman Podhoretz, “Is the Bush Doctrine Dead?” Commentary (September 2006).
113 Ibid.
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revealingly entitled “Imperialism is the answer,” Steyn urged the United States to proudly
tViembrace the “white man’s burden” view o f the world with as much enthusiasm as its 18 
and 19th century European counterparts, although without irony pointing out that the 
terminology may need to be “modified in the age of Colin Powell and Condi Rice.” Pre­
empting realist arguments regarding costs and benefits o f such a large scale 
“democratization” project, Steyn argued: “Given the billions of dollars of damage done to 
the world economy by Sept. 11, massive engagement in the region will be cheaper than 
the alternative”115
Another leading neocon who has not lost faith in the Bush Doctrine is Charles 
Krauthammer, who has argued in support of what he calls “democratic globalism” while 
urging that the ideology and practice should be tempered by more realist concerns. In a 
speech before the American Enterprise Institute, he criticized the naivety of isolationists, 
the idealism of liberal internationalists and the lack of vision of realists. Krauthammer 
explained why he believed “democratic realism” was the only way forward for the United 
States in the new unipolar world order.116 Krauthammer argues that the desire to spread 
democracy in the Middle East is an idea whose “inspiration comes from the Truman 
Doctrine of 1947, the Kennedy inaugural of 1961, and Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ speech of 
1983.” Like Bush, these past American leaders “all sought to recast a struggle for power 
between two geopolitical titans into a struggle between freedom and unfreedom, and yes, 
good and evil.” They too were criticized by influential realists of the time, like Hans 
Morgenthau and George Kennan, of “ideologizing the Cold War by injecting a moral 
overlay.”117 For Krauthammer a vision like that of Bush’s predecessors is needed today to 
overcome “the new existential enemy, the Arab-Islamic totalitarianism.” Yet recalling the 
United States’ Cold War experiences, Krauthammer cautions against simplistic 
comparisons to the communist adversary, since “this time the enemy knows no reason.” 
Nevertheless, Krauthammer is certain victory in the “Islamic crescent stretching from 
North Africa to Afghanistan” can still be attained:
115 Mark Steyn, “Imperialism is the Answer,” Chicago Sun-Times, 14 October 2001.
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a second difference between now and then: the uniqueness of our power, 
unrivalled, not just today but ever. That evens the odds. The rationality of 
the enemy is something beyond our control. But the use of our power is 
within our control. And if  that power is used wisely, constrained not by 
illusions and fictions but only by the limits of our mission —  which is to 
bring a modicum of freedom as an antidote to nihilism —  we can 
prevail.118
Typical of the “modem rationalist” analysis, Krauthammer speaks with an authority of 
the “Islamic crescent” that presumably only a Westerner could possess. In lieu of detailed 
scholarly analysis, orientalist stereotypes and simplistic dichotomies assert the West’s 
superiority and privileged place in history. Martin Peretz, owner of the influential neocon 
New Republic, speaks with similar authority about the democratization antidote to the 
growing popularity o f Islamist movements in the region, or what he describes as 
“removing the effect [rise of Islamism] means removing the cause [Arab 
dictatorships].” 119 He goes on to “give George W. Bush his due on democracy” by 
arguing that that “democracy did not begin even to breathe until the small coalition of 
Western nations led by the United States destroyed the most ruthless dictatorship in the 
area.”120
According to Max Boot, “award-winning author, United States military historian, and
1^1self-described neocon,” the question on the “war on terror” is not whether the Bush 
Doctrine was correct in its (rhetorical) belief in the power of democracy to transform the 
Middle East and minimize the allure of political Islam, but rather why the Bush 
administration has not taken this project further. According to Boot’s “modem 
rationalist” assessment, “the witches’ brew of repression, stagnation and governmental 
incompetence found in many Middle Eastern countries leaves the mosque as the only 
place where dissent can be aired and social services delivered.” According to this 
reductionist argument, the only way to address the issue of radical Islamism, inherently 
viewed as an existential threat to the West, is by addressing the democracy deficit. 
Despite having originally acknowledged this and made democratization the centerpiece
118 Ibid.
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of his “war on terror” policies, Bush’s subsequent response, according to Boot, “has been 
oddly passive,” as “much-ballyhooed programs such as the Greater Middle East Initiative 
seem to have fallen by the wayside.” David Frum, former speech writer for George W.
toy
Bush and one of the architects o f the administration’s “war on terror,” now a columnist 
for the National Review Online, praises both Bush’s democratization policies and 
American exceptionalism in general. According to Frum, “Americans are fundamentally 
a generous and optimistic people,” and Bush’s policies vis-a-vis the Muslim world have 
basically just “extend[ed] the universal principles that Americans espouse to that vast and
123challenging stretch of earth from Morocco to Malaysia.”
4. United States Think-Tanks Construct the Innocent “Victim” and Angel “Savior” 
in the “War on Terror” Discourse
Similar to the construction of the innocent “victim” in the discourse of American policy 
makers and pundits, one also finds ubiquitous references by think-tanks to the native 
“victims” of the backward, intolerant and violent Islamist enemy other in the “war on 
terror” context. As is the norm in this discourse, dichotomous reasoning is often 
employed to make artificial distinctions between “good” and “bad Muslims,” and 
reference is frequently made to the oppression of women and other “vulnerable” groups 
at the hands o f tyrannical and intolerant Islamists.
4.1 Construction o f the Innocent “Victim”
One finds evidence of all the above trends in the recent RAND Corporation report on 
Building Moderate Muslim Networks.124 In the report, staff members for RAND, a now 
independent think-tank initially established in 1945 by the United States Air Force to 
conduct scientific and technological research and development for military purposes, 
employ the Cold War analogy to advocate that the United States government take a 
network-building approach to organize and strengthen “liberal and moderate Muslim”
122 Danny Postel, “Fukuyama’s moment: a neocon schism opens,” Opendemocracy.com  (28 October 2004).
123 David Frum, “I know Bush H e’s Your Best Chance for Peace,” Sunday Telegraph, 23 November 2003.
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elements, similar to that developed during the Cold War to “foster networks of people 
committed to free and democratic ideas” in regions already under, or susceptible to, the
t ' y c
Soviet sphere o f power. Employing the modem rationalist paradigm, they argue that 
the only way to counter the strength of Islamist movements, whose appeal is in their 
ability to effectively employ violence, mobilize funds and develop networks through 
religious institutions, is by strengthening the networking and mobilizing capacities of 
their “moderate” counterparts.
At the heart of the RAND report’s argument is the belief that this task should be 
relatively easy, as the majority o f Muslims need little convincing to realize that they will 
be victimized in one way or another should the Islamist movements assume power and 
subsequently impose shar’ia law. Those who have “the most to lose” should Islamists 
gain power, and hence are the West’s most logical partners in the struggle against 
“religious extremism” are “women and religious minorities.” In some countries, the 
authors point out, “women are already beginning to organize to protect their rights from 
the rising tide of fundamentalism and are becoming an increasingly important
177constituency of reformist movements.” Typical of the innocent “victim” discourse, this 
statement is made without any historical or contemporary context of women’s rights in 
the region, in-depth examples substantiating their argument, and without any apparent 
consultation with Muslim women who support or are members of these Islamist 
movements. The authors o f the report recommend that United States democracy- 
networking programs reach out to other natural allies such as “liberal and secular Muslim 
academics and intellectuals” and “moderate journalists and writers.” From the examples 
provided, including writers and scholars such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Salman Rushdie, and 
Irshad Manji (considered orientalist or even anti-Islam by many Muslims and a 
significant number of non-Muslims around the world), clearly the criteria used by RAND 
to choose appropriate partners and distinguish between “moderates and radicals” is “not
1? o
commitment to democratic values and practices, but proximity to Islam.”
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Recalling with approval President Bush’s speech to graduates at the United States Air 
Force Academy that “we must keep in mind the nature of the enemy,” Jospeh Loconte, 
William E. Simon Fellow in Religion and a Free Society at the conservative Heritage 
Foundation, described the “victims” of Islamic “barbarism” as “citizens not only of the 
United States,” but also many from the Muslim world, including “politicians, police, 
factory employees, doctors, relief workers —  anyone supporting a decent [read: 
Westernized] civil society. They include not only Christians and Jews, but dissenting 
Muslims.” He goes on to explain that the enemy ideology is one “that reviles anyone who
I
upholds the moral norms of civilized states.” Ariel Cohen, also o f the Heritage 
Foundation, believes that movements as disparate as Hamas, A1 Qaeda, Hizbollah, and 
the Muslim Brotherhood are all guilty of adherence to this backward ideology. Included 
amongst the innocent “victims” of these “totalitarian organizations” are all “‘infidels,’ 
especially the United States, and other ‘non-believers,’...Christians and Jews, who are 
subject to discriminatory practices, such as the imposition of a special head tax, 
jaziyah,...women [who are] subjugate[ed],...children as young as five” [who are] 
exploited [and] brainwash[ed]... into becoming suicide bombers.” Even their own
130 • •supporters are “victims,” as they are denied “basic civil rights.” Again, no specific 
examples are provided to substantiate the argument.
Mark Blitz from the neoconservative Hudson Institute agrees that the casualties of 
Islamic “extremism,” such as “rights for women” and the “free exercise of religions,” 
cannot be addressed adequately unless the system that underpins these repressive 
practices (in other words Islam itself) is confronted. As Blitz authoritatively puts it, 
“theocracy and natural rights are incompatible.”131 Paul Marshall, also from the Hudson 
Institute, agrees that the numerous native “victims” of Islamic extremism —  including 
“women accused of adultery” stoned to death for their crime and ordinary Muslims killed 
for criticizing their government and other forms of “apostasy and blasphemy” —  are the 
result of Islamist adherence to a “reactionary version of Islamic sharia” as opposed to 
“democracy and ‘man-made’ law,” assumed, although without qualification from
129 Joseph Loconte, “Barbarism Then and N ow,” Heritage Foundation (12 August 2004).
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Marshall, as inherently more conducive to a more humane and equal society. Therefore,
Marshall argues, these innocent “victims” (in other words, the “good Muslims”) are the
1 ^
West’s “natural allies” in the fight against “Islamist totalitarianism.”
Writing for the Democratic Leadership Council’s Blueprint Magazine, Will Marshall, 
president of the neoliberal Progressive Policy Institute, echoes the assumptions o f his 
(neo) conservative counterparts that the “majority” of Muslims are “moderates” who are 
actual or potential “victims” of the excesses of “extremist” Islamist movements. 
Recommending a “Helsinki-type process,” and hence evoking the Cold War analogy, 
Marshall urges the West to “make common cause” with these actual or potential 
“victims’Vallies, including “human rights activists, liberal reformers, and independent 
civic groups in the Muslim world,” who, one assumes from the argument, are naturally 
secular and pro-Western.
4.2 Construction o f the Angel “Savior”
Prior to the 6 May 2007 political crisis that broke out in Turkey between the Islamist 
government and its supporters and the secular opposition (including the military), sparked 
by the latter’s refusal to accept the Islamists’ choice of president,134 James Wilson of the 
American Enterprise Institute praised Tayyip Recep Erdogan and his Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), for their “enlightened moderation,” which he contrasted with 
the “radicalism” of leaders such as the Ayatollah Khomeini and the exiled Tunisian 
Islamist, Rachid Ghannouchi. Wilson argued that these “radicals” have failed to learn the 
“historical lesson of the liberal West” that “freedom triumphs absolute values.” Of
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course “freedom” like its binary opposite “tyranny” is never actually defined. While his 
definition of freedom lacks clarity, his prescription for achieving it in the Middle East is 
clear. Like Bush and Rice, Wilson believes the Iraqi people, and indeed the entire Middle 
East, can achieve freedom only if Americans maintain their resolve: “In order for 
freedom to have a chance... we must be patient and strong.” Although Iraqis lack the 
essential elements that have helped other Muslim nations (e.g., Turkey, Indonesia and 
Morocco) to modernize, including a “strong central government” (despite Great Britain’s 
efforts to “bring” it to them twice), “a strong army devoted to secular rule, and an 
absence of ethnic conflict,” there is still room for optimism, if Americans are willing to 
“stay there as long as we are needed,” in other words: as long as it takes to defeat the 
radicals and ensure the victory of the “enlightened” moderates. Yet, the quest for 
democracy in all Muslim states is an ongoing and upwards struggle, as Wilson believes 
that “wherever the Islamic religion is powerful, there is little opportunity for a liberal 
regime.”137
In an article entitled “To Bolster Muslim Moderates, Add Democracy and Stir,” Vance
Serchuk, also writing for the AEI, similarly assumes the good of such “universal” notions
as democracy, secularism, and “moderation,” a concept never defined. Also employing
the Turkish example, Serchuk argues the only way to avoid tyrannical Islamist rule and
1instead “foster” moderation in Arab states is through “democratic institutions.” 
Serchuk praises the moderate AKP for avoiding “getting bogged down in emotionally 
charged, but largely symbolic, arguments over secularism,” as did their predecessors 
under the short-lived government of the more radical Islamist, Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan. Instead, the Islamist government voted into power in 2002 “has received high 
marks for concentrating” on less “emotional” (and thus more “rational”) issues, such as 
“recovering the Turkish economy and other issues of good governance.”
136 Ibid..
137 Ibid.
138 Vance Serchuk, ‘T o  Bolster Muslim Moderates, Add Democracy and Stir,” American Enterprise 
Institute (8 July 2005).
139 Ibid.
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For those subscribing to the modem rationalist paradigm, the promotion of democracy 
and “moderate” regimes in the Middle East should form the centerpiece of the United 
States’ diplomatic component of the “war on terror,” although many do not see the 
diplomatic and military components as mutually exclusive. According to Lome Craner, 
president of the International Republican Institute (IRI) and former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2001-2004), too often United States 
democratization policy is misconstrued as militarily focused, despite the fact that in only 
five of the eighty countries that have become democracies over the past quarter century— 
Grenada, Panama, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—did United States military intervention 
play a role.140 “Washington’s primary commitment to Middle East democratization 
support remains in the realm of coordinated diplomacy and international programs,” and 
opines Craner, George W. Bush’s foreign policy reverses that of his predecessors willing 
to accept the Middle Eastern “democratic exception” so long as United States interests in 
the region continued to be served. Craner compares the “war on terror” to the Cold War 
and argues in favor of a Reaganite foreign policy which recognizes that “U.S. success [in 
the Cold War] was in part due not only to stating what America stood against — 
communism —  but also in enunciating a counter vision of democracy and freedom.”141 In 
analyses like these that depend upon an essentialized view of Islamist movements, 
creation of Westernized, liberal democracies in the region is assumed to naturally 
diminish the political gains of Islamists (“bad Muslims”), who benefit from a closed 
system that eliminates liberal opposition (“good Muslims”) but spares their Islamist 
counterparts who have an easier time organizing clandestinely through religious 
networks. This theory is generally presented as a logical fact not needing substantiation, 
even though, in reality, Islamist movements have often suffered the most from repressive 
policies of Middle Eastern countries like Egypt and Algeria, and have benefited the most 
from democratic change.142 Although future elections across the Middle East may lead to
140 Lome Craner, “Will U.S. Democratization Policy Work? Democracy in the Middle East,” M iddle East 
Quarterly (Summer 2006).
14‘ Ibid.
142 Anna Badkhen, “Political Islam rises on Bush's doctrine,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5 February 2006; 
“Democracy's Consequences,” Washington Post, 4  February 2006; and David Ignatius, “Muslim Radicals 
in Power,” Washington Post, 3 February 2006.
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greater Islamist representation in governments, Craner insists, “Greater U.S. 
engagement...could mitigate the outcome.”143
Kim Holmes, Director o f the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International 
Studies at The Heritage Foundation agrees that democracy is the best cure for “radical 
Islamism.” Holmes agrees with President Bush that it is not enough to merely “denounce 
radical Islamism,” and goes on to praise the President for insisting on an “ideological 
component to the war,” namely his “assertion that America should actively support the 
spread of freedom and democracy around the world.”144 This component of the policy, 
which includes “political and economic reforms,” will “empower” “good Muslims” to 
“denounce” the radical Islamist ideology that Holmes, in typical orientalist, authoritative 
fashion, denounces for “distorting] and exploiting] Islam for destructive ends.” 
Highlighting the identity-affirming role of the discourse, Holmes argues that one o f the 
principal benefits o f this policy is its ability to “lay claim to the high moral ground” vis-a- 
vis the United States’ Islamist enemies.145 Laurent Marawiec, Senior Fellow with the 
Hudson Institute, argues similarly that the “despotic regimes and backward economies” 
have served as incubators for the “religion-clad totalitarianism of militant Islam” that 
today threatens the West.146 Given that this is the case, policies that support economic 
and political “reform” in the Arab world must be prescribed to counteract the actual and 
potential damage caused by these militant Islamists. According to Marawiec, the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussien’s regime was merely a first, although necessary, step to 
achieving these policy goals; in executing this component of the “war on terror,” the 
United States and its allies must
also commit themselves to supporting the Arab Muslim world’s transition 
to modernity, non-despotic government, and economic growth. This must 
be seen and undertaken not as a U.S. desire for self-aggrandizement or 
empire-building, but as a matter of long-term survival.147
143 Craner.
144 Holmes.
145 Ibid.
146 Laurent Marawiec, “A Post-Saddam Strategy,” 2003.
147 Ibid.
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Included amongst Marawiec’s policy proposals are “strong American financial and 
propagandistic help, and public diplomacy” to support the “good Muslims” [of Iran] 
“pushing for liberalization” in the face of oppressive “reactionary clerics;” “American 
employment of Arabic-language media... throughout the region,” to “target the 
weaknesses of the Arab Middle East: the archaism of the societies, the autocratic nature 
of the regimes, and the absence of pluralistic debate, and challenge them by promoting 
the reverse values, attitudes and practices;” “financial help, media exposure, and 
diplomatic and public assistance” as well as support for these backward Muslims “with 
help in rewriting schoolbooks, establishing objective media, and creating political parties 
and civil-society organizations.” Through these policies the Muslim world “will be 
brought into the West.”148
In his January 2002 Foreign Affairs article “Back to the Bazaar,” Martin Indyk, Director 
of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, argued in favor of a policy overhaul of 
United States relations with the Arab world. Expressing a view that, as described earlier 
in the chapter, came to be adopted rhetorically by the Bush administration in regards to 
appeasement of authoritarian regimes by past administrations, Indyk argues the United 
States government must “confront the dilemma o f political change in the Arab world” if  
it is serious about “dry[ing] up the swamp” that has generated Islamist radicalism. 
Employing the typical authoritative tone, Indyk argues that states like Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt should “be encouraged to develop a more tolerant model of Islam, one more 
reconciled to modernity, as an alternative to the hatred and xenophobia now propagated 
through school and mosque. And they should also be prodded into undertaking economic 
reforms.” 149 Kenneth Pollack, Director of Research at the Saban Center, similarly 
criticizes Cold War policies vis-a-vis the Middle East that he blames for having 
“produced Islamic terrorists seeking to harm the United States and its allies and 
desperately unhappy populations increasingly willing to challenge illegitimate and 
insecure regimes.” 150 Employing a typical modem rationalist analysis, Pollack argues 
that, like all “traditional societies confronted by modernity,” the Muslim world needs
148 Ibid.
149 Indyk.
150 Kenneth Pollack, “Grand Strategy: Why America Should Promote a New Liberal Order in the Middle 
East,” Blueprint Magazine (22 July 2006). Pollack is Director o f Research at the Saban Center.
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“transformative reform of virtually every sector o f life,” including “economic reform in 
accordance with free-market principles,” “educational reform to produce graduates who 
can compete in the global economy,” and “social reform that adapts traditional values to 
modem necessities.”151 Naturally, these transformed indigenous values, institutions and 
societal relations will be more like their Western, “modem” counterparts.
In an article for the Democratic Leadership Council’s Blueprint Magazine, Will Marshall, 
president o f the neoliberal Progressive Policy Institute and Jeremy Rosner, senior vice 
president at Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, a political polling and strategy firm, similarly 
argue in favor of the angel “savior” o f Western democracy to save innocent Muslims and 
the West from the evils of “jihadist ideology,” which, as in all “ideologization of terror” 
analyses, goes completely unexplained.152 What is, however, explained in great detail are 
the duo’s policy recommendations for a “remedy to the pathologies that afflict the greater 
Middle East” that inevitably result in radical Islamism. They claim their approach is 
“different from the military-centric approach [of] the Bush administration.” However, 
their proposals to “launch a sweeping program of economic, political, and social reform 
in the region [of] trade and financial investment, aid tied to open governance and modem 
education systems, and consistent backing for human rights and pro-democracy 
reformers,” are virtually identical to those proposed as part o f the “soft” power 
components of the Bush “war on terror”. 153 Similar ideas are expounded by other 
Brookings Institution colleagues, such as Peter Singer, who argues along the lines of the 
UN’s 2002 Arab Human Development Report that “human development concerns” are 
vital “to both the problem and any solution” to “the rise of political Islam.”154 Likewise, 
Tamara Wittes advocates on behalf of “American engagement to push reform in the 
direction o f liberal democracy” to “help reduce the risk that the current and coming 
upheavals in Arab politics might provide Binladenist ideas strong new footholds in major 
countries.”155
151 Pollack.
152 Will Marshall and Jeremy Rosner, “Fighting Smarter: A five-part progressive plan to defend liberal 
democracy,” Blueprint Magazine (17 May 2006).
153 Ibid.
154 Peter Warren Singer, “America, Islam and the 9-11 War,” Current History (December 2006).
155 Tamara Wittes, “Promoting Reform in the Arab World: A Sustainable Strategy,” Saban Center fo r  
Middle East Policy  (28 April 2005).
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Even those wary about the prospects of democratization programs to deliver secular, pro- 
Western, “democracies” in the region, who worry that past experiences in which Islamist 
movements have benefited most from democratic reforms may repeat themselves, still 
believe that a Westem-style liberalization program is necessary to counteract the forces 
o f Islamism. The principal difference between these analyses and their democratization 
counterparts is that they believe that the process involves several stages. As Judith Miller 
put it in a 1993 article for Foreign Affairs, “the promotion of free elections immediately 
is likely to lead to the triumph of Islamic groups that have no commitment to democracy 
in any recognizable, meaningful form.”156 Quoting the quintessential orientalist Bernard 
Lewis, Miller argues, “‘The pressure for premature democratization can fatally weaken 
existing regimes, with all their flaws,’ and lead to their overthrow, not by democratic 
opposition, but by other forces that then proceed determined dictatorship.” To avoid this 
scenario, the United States government should instead
promote elections tomorrow and civil society today—increased 
participation in public life by a growing number of individuals, groups and 
associations who genuinely crave liberal democracy—so that the concepts 
and traditions upon which democracy depends have time to take hold, and 
so that countries that have known little else but one-party authoritarian 
rule will stand a better chance of developing truly democratic 
governments.157
Ariel Cohen of The Heritage Foundation contributes to this strain o f the discourse,
arguing in favor o f United States government support for democracy in the Middle East
in the long-term, but urging that it weigh this support against other United States interests
1“when election outcomes jeopardize such vital American interests.” To stop such a 
situation from arising, rather than principally focusing on elections, the United States 
government should press for the development of “civil society, rule of law, protection of 
minority rights, freedom of speech and worship, and other individual rights,” which once 
achieved will presumably produce the type of pro-Western and secular democracy where
156 Judith Miller, ‘T he Challenge o f Radical Islam, ” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993).
157 Ibid.
158 Ariel Cohen, “State o f  the Union 2006: Democracy in the Middle East: the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom 
Davis Institute for International Studies,” Heritage Foundation (1 February 2006).
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Islamists are marginalized.159 Victor Hanson, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute 
qualifies his support for the Bush administration’s democratization, or “soft” power, 
policies by pointing out the concurrent need to maintain “hard” power policies.160 For 
example, “democratic reform in the Middle East” would have been “impossible” with the 
“sinister presence of an oil rich and genocidal Saddam Hussein, given his history of 
attacking four of his neighbours,” which is why military intervention in Iraq was 
necessary before the United States could deliver democracy. For Hanson though, now 
that the West has “an exegesis of the dangers of radical Islam — why it hates Western 
freedom and how it thrives on the oil, misery, and dictatorship o f the Middle East,” it 
requires not only “our democratic values,” but “resilience” to overcome this “nihilis[tic]” 
enemy.161
5. Challenges to the Construction of the Innocent “Victim” and Angel “Savior” in 
the “War on Terror” Discourse
Although the prominent policy makers, journalists and think-tank members discussed in 
this chapter are representative of mainstream trends in the “war on terror” discourse in 
relation to the construction of the Islamist other, there is an emerging counter-discourse 
that challenges the innocent “victim” and angel “savior” constructs, and which parallels 
the challenges to the “savage” enemy as demonstrated in Chapter Four.
For example, despite his worldview being firmly rooted in Enlightenment thought, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Amr Hamzaway 
acknowledges his subjective standpoint, rather than cloaking it in the language of 
neutrality and objectivity, and explains nonetheless why Westerners must grasp the 
importance of Islamist movements to the future stability and democratic development of 
the region. He frankly asserts that “it would be nice if liberal democrats among the 
Arab intelligentsia could be the vanguard of political reform,” but acknowledges that 
“democracy cannot come to Arab societies without the participation of movements that
159 Ibid.
160 Victor Hanson, “When Cynicism Meets Fanaticism,” H oover Institute (31 March 2006).
161 Hansen.
162 Hamzawy.
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command huge popular support,” a fact even secular opposition parties in the Muslim 
world are now coming to acknowledge. “In Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt, differences 
between liberals and Islamists remain relevant, but the degree o f convergence of liberals 
and Islamists over national priorities is systematically growing.”164
Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies-Intemational Politics and Governance at 
the Carnegie Endowment, goes further in defying the mainstream discourse by directly 
questioning the validity of the United States’ “savior” role in the “war on terror”. 
According to Carothers, the United States’ long history of intervening in the region for 
typically realist, geo-strategic objectives has damaged its credibility as an objective third 
party with benevolent interests.165 Furthermore, the Bush administration’s apparent 
disregard for international law and human rights norms in implementing various policies 
associated with its “war on terror” leads Carothers to believe that the United States can 
have no real impact on the development of stable, democratic governments in the Muslim 
world until it addresses and ameliorates the rampant inconsistencies in its 
democratization agenda. In order to accomplish this, the Bush administration and 
successive governments must first “decontaminate” United States’ democracy promotion 
agenda by “improving U.S. compliance with the rule of law in the war on terrorism, 
ending the close association of democracy promotion with military intervention and 
regime change, and reducing the inconsistency of U.S. democracy policy by exerting real 
pressure for change on some key autocratic partners, such as Pakistan and Egypt.” 166 
Although Carothers’ perspective is rooted in the “modem rationalist” paradigm, as is 
apparent from his reductionist account o f the rise of Islamism in the Muslim world, 
which he attributes solely to socioeconomic or political factors, he nonetheless rejects the 
“ideologization o f terror” tendency to discount the influence of past experience and 
context on the decision-making processes of Islamist movements, in particular in regards 
to whether to employ violence. To overlook such motivational causes as “anger over U.S. 
policies in the region, from the war in Iraq to the special U.S. relationship with Israel,”
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Thomas Carothers, “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After,” Carnegie Endowment (Fall 2007).
166 Ibid.
274
and instead focus solely on the issue of (lack of) democracy as the primary independent
11 - n
variable capable of explaining Islamist violence, is “analytically misguided.”
The International Crisis Group’s report on the Bush administration’s Middle East 
democracy initiative is equally critical, arguing against the orientalist assumptions 
implicit in the mainstream discourse. Rather than cast the United States in the role of 
angel “savior,” the ICG report instead cuts the Bush administration (and West in general) 
down to size, urging it to first “educate itself better about the tremendous diversity o f 
Middle Eastern political and religious thinking,” and secondly, to adopt the more modest 
agenda of working towards peace and stability in a region marked by chaos and violence, 
in no small part due to past and present U.S. policies, so the people o f the region can 
figure out for themselves what constitutes “good governance.” As the report claims,
democratization and reform require a generation of constant effort, and 
90 per cent of their prospects for success or failure rest in indigenous 
hands. The responsibility of the Americans and Europeans —  as a 
practical matter, in the first instance, especially for the former —  is to 
take political actions that might produce the calmer regional 
environment in which indigenous efforts would have the necessary 
twenty or so years to operate and Western help on the remaining 10 
per cent would be welcomed.169
Although these challenges to the construction and function of the innocent “victim” and 
angel “savior” in the discourse on political Islam in relation to the “war on terror” are 
welcome, as with the modem, post-modem and hermeneutic academic challenges, as well 
as the budding counter-discourse on the “savage” enemy other as discussed in the 
previous chapter, these perspectives have yet to fully penetrate mainstream, non- 
academic discussions on political Islam.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered the various ways in which a modem rationalist 
understanding of political Islam, underpinned by a generally patronizing view of non-
167 Ibid.
168 B r o a d e r  Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Imperilled at Birth,” International Crisis Group 
(June 2004).
169 Ibid.
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Western peoples and cultures, and a deep-seated orientalist vision of the Muslim world, 
has impacted the types of non-military remedies prescribed by the discourse to address 
the Islamist “threat” in the context of the “war on terror”. As is the case in the 
construction of the “savage” enemy other, the discourse on the innocent “victim” and 
angel “savior” is based on an oversimplistic, biased, and often erroneous understanding 
of Islam as a religion, seamlessly carried over to analyses of Islamist political 
movements. These analyses are generally based on the assumption that one need not 
attempt to understand the origins, development, or demands of Islamist groups, because 
they are completely beyond the scope of legitimate politics, and hence incompatible with 
Western notions o f democracy. Seen through the orientalist lens, Islamist 
movements/governments are necessarily backward, violent, illiberal and oppressive of 
women and religious minorities. Accordingly, it is assumed the most effective way to 
ensure the triumph of liberal, secular, pro-Western political parties/movements in the 
Muslim world is to fully “modernize,” or more specifically Westernize, the societies and 
polities of states where Islamist movements thrive, creating an environment more 
conducive to the emergence of liberal, pro-Western movements and political parties. This 
analysis, and the discourse it spawns, deny the possibility that Islamist movements could 
also thrive in such an environment, as they are ideologically committed to the notion that 
Islamist movements are relics from the past, doomed to “melt into air” in a globalized
17ftand modem (or postmodern) world.
170 Marx uses this expression in The Communist Manifesto where he discusses the inevitable reaction o f  
oppressed workers in the face o f  the brutally transformative changes wrought on society by unhindered 
capitalism. One can see a similarly deterministic vision o f  transformation in the discourse on political 
Islam, although in relation to the inevitable secularization o f  society, rather than the communist 
transformation predicated by Marx’s dialectical materialism. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto 
(New York: Penguin, 1998).
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Conclusion
Imagining what it is like to be someone other than yourself is at the core o f  our 
humanity. It is the essence o f compassion, and it is the beginning o f  morality
-Ian McEwan, 15 September 20011
The belief that an “enlightened” and “developed” United States/West has the natural 
right and unique ability to mould and control the course o f the political, economic, 
and social development o f non-Westem states, or that there exists an “ideal form” o f 
modernity, namely the type achieved by the West, to which all the manifold peoples 
and states o f the world, despite their disparate cultures, religions, histories and 
collective visions for the future, must aspire, are notions that have been widely 
challenged by academics, politicians, and activists across the world over the last two 
decades. Nevertheless, according to the discourse on political Islam, in particular in 
relation to the “war on terror,” it is clear that a political movement/government must 
be secular and capitalist in order to be democratic and “modem,” and therefore 
amenable to a stable and “peaceful” (in a liberal, Western understanding o f the term) 
Westaphalian international system.2 This is despite the longstanding existence of 
cogent critiques from the Muslim world regarding the narrow criteria for “good 
governance” set by American bureaucrats and politicians who often have very little 
background knowledge o f the regions at the receiving ends o f their policy 
prescriptions. As the prominent Islamist activist Rachid Ghannouchi has argued, 
“[w]hile secularism is incompatible with Islamic values, Muslims require ‘genuine’ 
modernity no less than anyone else...However, we need to enter modernity in our 
own way.” More often than not, these protests for genuine sovereignty and freedom 
from outside manipulation and aggression are cast aside as irrelevant or stubborn 
obstacles to American attempts to consolidate material and ideological hegemony in 
the Middle East.
1 Ian McEwan,”Only Love and Then Oblivion,” The Guardian, 15 September 2001.
" A s Oliver Richmond explains, the mainstream, uncritical Western view is one in which “peace is a 
liberal ideal made possible by correct forms o f  governance and institutionalisation, and are a product o f  
the practices and discourses o f  the post-Enlightenment development o f the international community.” 
Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation o f  Peace  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 9.
3 Tamimi, 106.
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In this sense, the discourse and associated policies o f the “war on terror” have served 
a multi-pronged agenda. They at once have allowed the United States to guide the 
development o f the non-Western world in terms that suit its own economic and 
political interests, while at the same time reinforcing U.S. identity as an exceptional 
beacon o f “progress,” ensuring that the non-Westem world is kept in the position of 
“perpetual consumer o f modernity,” or a “mere extension o f Western power.”4 As a 
result o f U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, many o f the central assumptions o f this 
discourse have gone unchallenged, at least in the popular domain. Most prominent 
among these has been “the stages o f growth” theory, which came to form the 
foundation o f modernization theory in the mid-twentieth century, and holds that all 
societies are alike at the “traditional” stage and eventually would pass through the 
same sets o f transformations that led the West to the “modem” stage, i f  they but 
adhere to the “right” path.5 In their dichotomous understandings o f the world, 
modernization theory and Orientalism share much in common. As Lockman has 
pointed out, “both approaches can be seen as premised upon the drawing o f sharp 
distinctions between ‘us’ (Westerners living as modem people in modem societies) 
and ‘them’ (non-Westerners, especially Muslims, traditional people living in 
tradition-bound societies).”6
Through the othering o f political Islam, the academics, politicians, think-tanks, and 
pundits whose contributions to the discourse o f political Islam I have examined in this 
thesis have succeeded in constructing an enemy so extraordinary and so distinctively 
lacking in human attributes that exceptionally brutal and illegal actions could be taken 
to subdue him, with very little enduring damage done to the “democratic” and “human 
rights” credentials of the perpetrators. In doing so, the discourse has cast the United 
States in the role o f the true heir to Europe’s ontological and physical supremacy over 
the “lesser peoples” o f the world, and with it, their benevolent “burden” to save these 
peoples from their own destructive devices. However, the sad irony marking the “war 
on terror” has been lost on most o f its progenitors: almost every component o f the 
“war” has resulted in outcomes that are the absolute inverse o f its (stated) goals, most 
important o f which has been to make the world a generally more peaceful and safe
4 Euben, 151.
5 Klaren.
6 Lockman, 139.
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place for its nearly 7 billion inhabitants. Several recent reports and expert statements 
have shown that the world is actually more vulnerable to terrorist attacks today than it
it. h 9 #
was prior to September 11 ; that there have been more American casualties in Iraq 
than from the World Trade Centre bombings;8 that Islamist movements have been the 
first to benefit from democratic reforms in Muslim countries;9 that women, whose 
liberation was to form the centrepiece o f both “soft” and “hard” components o f the 
“war on terror,” are actually worse off today in at least two o f its principal 
battlefields;10 that there are now millions more innocent (native) victims as a result o f 
the violence wrought by the “war on terror,” than at its inception;11 and that other, 
possibly more severe threats to United States, Western, and indeed, world security 
have been overlooked as the result o f the U.S. government’s obsessive focus on the 
“terrorism” threat (e.g., climate change, growing inequality in the world, poverty and 
global militarization)12. In other words, even by its own standards, the “war on terror” 
has been an abject failure.
It is the opinion o f this author that this colossal failure is due neither to conceptual nor 
implementational faults o f any of the specific policies related to the Bush Doctrine 
and the “war on terror.” Rather, it is due to the Eurocentric epistemological 
foundations o f the ideology that underpins it. As first elaborated in Chapter One and 
demonstrated through examples in the subsequent chapters, these foundations 
influence how political Islam is conceived by social scientists, politicians, and the 
public as generally lacking in those characteristics deemed necessary for what they
7 Kim Sengupta and Patrick Cockbum, “How the War on Terror Made the World a More Terrifying 
Place,” The Independent UK, 28 February 2007; Marx Mazzetti, “Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens 
Terror Threat,” The New York Times, 24 September 2006; Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, 
‘Terror Attacks Up Nearly 30 Percent, Report Says,” M cClatchy Newspapers, 27 April 2007.
8 ”US Deaths in Iraq, War on Terror Surpass 9/11 Toll,” CNN, 3 September 2006.
9 Rabasa et al., 2007.
10 Haifa Zangan, “The Iraqi resistance only exists to end the occupation,” Guardian, 12 April 2007; 
Nadje Sadig al-Ali, Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from  1948 to the Present (London: Zed Books, 2007); 
Kavita N . Ramdas, “Iraqi Women's Bodies Are Battlefields for War Vendettas,” G lobal Fund fo r  
Women, 19 December 2006; Alissa J. Rubin, “Afghan Women's Quiet Revolution Hangs by a Thread,” 
Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2007); Christina Lamb, “Women Back Under Wraps With Taliban V ice  
Squad,” Sunday Times, Australia, 24 July 2006.
11 David Brown, “Study Claims Iraq’s ‘E xcess’ Death Toll Has Reached 655,000,” Washington Post,
11 October 2006; “Afghanistan: US Should Investigate Civilian Deaths,” Human Rights Watch (6 
March 2007); James Palmer, “1 in 8 Iraqis D ies Before Fifth Birthday,” San Francisco Chronicle, 23 
May 2007. In addition to deaths and injuries, one must consider also the plight o f  Iraqi refugees, both 
internal and external, who are some o f  the greatest victims, in socioeconom ic and psychological terms, 
o f  the war. “Doors closing on Iraqi displaced,” BBC, 10 October 2007.
12 Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, “Beyond Terror The Truth About the Real Threats to 
Our World,” Oxford Research Group (April 2007).
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regard as legitimate politics, in particular in relation to Islamic conceptions o f the 
state, sovereignty, modernity and rationality.
Despite the hegemonic nature o f this discourse, there are increasing attempts to 
subvert it through a deconstruction o f its central paradigms and the development o f a 
counter-discourse in its place. Most mainstream among these has been analyses 
critical of the discourse’s narrow understanding o f modernity which instead argue for 
a perspective which accepts the possibility that Islamist movements, by virtue o f their 
incubation within a context o f globalized modernity, have advertently or inadvertently 
adopted the central ideological and material demands o f their “modem” nationalist 
and socialist counterparts, including, according to Halliday, resistance to 
cultural/political imperialism and rampant individualism, as well as a Third Worldist 
“solidarity [with] the oppressed people o f the world,” although they have 
instrumentalized the language of Islam in order to attain greater legitimacy for their 
agendas.13
Postmodern analysts go even further in challenging the mainstream discourse, 
pointing out the dialectical relationship that exists between the West’s 
epistemological, ontological and physical hegemony over the Muslim world and the 
Muslim world’s status as other in Western identity construction. By deconstructing 
the various facets o f the West’s “regime o f power,” post-modem analysts have been 
able to create space for a hermeneutic understanding o f Islamism.14 In doing so, they 
have discovered the desire o f many Islamist movements to think and act outside the 
orbit o f the West, rather than merely to ape its political and institutional structures, by 
employing specific religious and cultural references that lend them an air o f 
authenticity. Furthermore, post-modern analyses recognize the Islamist desire to be 
“disruptive, not only o f a geopolitical order, but also o f an episteme which has been 
dominant for the last three hundred years.”15 Whereas for Sayyid this challenge is a 
uniquely Islamist endeavour, in which Muslims have invested their hopes for a 
“better” future, Euben sees the Islamist challenge as only one part o f a global 
expression o f general malaise, one which crosses nations and religions, which has
13 Halliday, Two Hours, 2002, 148.
14 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977  (New  
York: Pantheon, 1980).
15 Sayyid, 160.
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developed in “resistance to a world o f radical doubt,” and seeks to reintroduce 
meaning and significance into modem existence.16 What unites these postmodern 
writers is their shared belief in the existence o f a growing political and social trend, 
whether transcultural or solely emanating from the Muslim world, that expresses 
unease with the limits o f modem rationalism and instead feels a commitment to the 
“conviction that we ‘may still need to see ourselves as part o f a larger order that can 
make claims on us’.”17
As I have argued in this thesis, such counter-hegemonic challenges to the mainstream 
discourse on political Islam have yet to activate a full “paradigm shift,” though they 
increasingly call into question the essentialist vision o f the Muslim world peddled by 
proponents o f the “clash thesis” who saw in the chaos and confusion following the 
9/11 attacks an opportunity in which to execute their post Cold War “end o f history” 
visions o f a liberal world peace, which would reflect and benefit its primary 
implementer and enforcer: the United States. This vision of obtaining a self-interested 
“peace” via the indiscriminate violence of war was not unique to the neocons and 
their supporters, but was rather preceded by two “waves” of intervention by European 
states: the Crusades and later conquest of the Americas in the name o f Christianity, 
and the nineteenth and twentieth century imperialism on behalf o f “European
1 ftcivilisation.” The speed with which this group was able to establish discursive 
hegemony and implement associated policies was no doubt in part due to these earlier 
precedents and a reservoir o f Eurocentric and Orientalist language and concepts on 
which to build.
In order to alleviate the detrimental effects o f the “war on terror” and ensure that self- 
interested wars for “peace” will be avoided by the United States/West in the future, 
one must first engage in the type o f critical re-evaluation of these foundations that I 
have provided in this thesis. As Jackson points out, “if  a campaign o f violence like the 
‘war on terrorism’ can be socially and politically constructed, it can also be 
deconstructed.”19 Most importantly, this critical process has demonstrated the intimate
16 Euben, 167.
17 Here Euben quotes Charles Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 89.
18 Richmond, 11-12.
19 Jackson, 188.
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relationship between the discursive/ideological and material components o f Western 
hegemony in the Middle East, and the role played by the “savage” enemy other in 
consolidating this relationship and thereby reinforcing the United States’ constructed 
vision o f itself as the ultimate “angel saviour” in the world against which it is 
contrasted. As Said poignantly argued regarding the role o f the “other” in national 
identity construction:
The construction o f identity...while obviously a repository o f distinct 
collective experiences, is finally a construction - involves establishing 
opposites and “others” whose actuality is always subject to the 
continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences 
from “us.” Each age and society re-creates its “Others.” Far from a 
static thing then, identity o f self or o f “other” is [a] much worked-over 
historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a 
contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies.2
Once the United States’ self-identity as an ontologically exceptional state is 
deconstructed and repositioned within the realm o f the ordinary, albeit with some 
extraordinary elements, a “space for alternatives” is automatically “pry[ed]” open for 
the development o f a counter-discourse on political Islam based on alternative
91methodological approaches such as the ones discussed in this thesis. Most effective 
amongst these are the post-modern and hermeneutic approaches that, in their attempt 
to engage the ideas o f the subjects o f their research on their own terms, are inherently 
subversive o f the “regimes of truth” established on the foundations o f deliberately 
fictitious or distorted analyses which the discourse seeks to enforce. Although it may 
be impossible, as Euben has argued, for the analyst “whose position is exterior to the 
worldview o f the subjects]” studied to develop a completely unadulterated, or 
“objective” understanding o f their perspective o f the world, it may be possible, 
nonetheless, for this approach at the minimum to allow for the subjects’ “conceptual 
world” to be grasped. Such a grasp could enable the possibility o f a dialogue, as 
opposed to monologue or lecture which casts the Islamist/Muslim world on the 
receiving end o f authoritative knowledge it has no choice but to accept i f  it wishes to
O')avoid violent intervention. Initiating such a conversation would have two tangible
20 Said, 1978 ,7 .
21 Campbell, 227.
22 Euben, 13.
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benefits for the people o f the United States and other Western states that have 
similarly bought in to the “war on terror” and the dichotomous vision o f the world on 
which it is based. First, it would force the government to reassess its threat assessment 
mechanisms and readjust spending priorities away from a fundamentally flawed 
“war” that has done more harm than good for national security, and towards long 
neglected non-military components o f “human security,” such as increased spending 
on health, education, (non-military) foreign aid to states on the basis o f need, and the 
economy. In the United States, the government’s astronomical spending on the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars, totalling anywhere from $1.6 trillion, according to Democrats 
on the Joint Economic Committee, or nearly $ 3 trillion, according to Nobel laureate 
economist Joseph Stiglitz, has left the U.S. economy with a budget deficit o f $55.6 
billion, up 12.6 percent in the 2007 fiscal year, despite tax revenues hitting an all-time
93high during that same period. Stiglitz even partially attributes the United States’ 
subprime housing crisis, a principal contributing factor to the country’s current 
economic woes, to the excessive costs o f the wars.24 With the Administration’s 2009 
military budged expected to reach more than $515 billion, annual military spending, 
when adjusted for inflation, will reach its highest level since World War II.
The second tangible benefit would be to open up the possibility for 
Americans/Westerners to re-connect with a world from which they have been 
alienated for centuries as a result o f their perceived exceptional status. As Todorv has 
argued in relation to the Spanish victory over the “Indians” in Latin America, “[b]y 
winning on one side, the Europeans lost on the other; by imposing their superiority 
upon the entire country, they destroyed their own capacity to integrate themselves into
Of\the world.” Although this may seem too abstract to be considered a “tangible” 
benefit, recent polls have shown that Americans are increasingly aware o f  and 
disturbed by the plunging levels o f respect their state commands across the world, 
largely as a result o f the way in which the “war on terror” has been conducted. Even
23 “Democrats Forecast $3.5 Trillion in War Costs,” Reuters, 13 November 2007; “David Nitkin, Bush 
Vetoes Health, Education Measure,” The Baltimore Sun, 16 November 2007; Joseph Stiglitz and Linda 
Bilm es, The Three Trillion D ollar War: The True Cost o f  the Iraq Conflict (Essex: Allen Lane 
Publishers, 2008).
24 Mary Kane, “Debate Heats Up About Whether Hidden Iraq Costs Are Damaging the Economy.” The 
Washington Independent (14 March 2008).
25 Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Seeks Record Level in 2009 Budget,” The N ew York Times (3 February 
2008).
26 Todorov, 97.
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Americans are capable o f recognizing the drawbacks o f the “go-it-alone” approach to
oninternational relations. This re-connection with the world at large, and with the 
Muslim world in particular, is more vital today than even before as the world faces 
seemingly insurmountable, apocalyptic threats, such as those posed by nuclear 
weapons, climate change and mammoth levels o f inequality. According to Hossein 
Nasr, should it be willing to listen, Islam has much to offer to the rest o f the world in 
this regard because o f its antipathy towards rampant individualism and nihilism, and 
its belief in the necessity o f an “equilibrium between man and his natural
7o
environment.” A more humble West would be willing to acknowledge past wrongs 
committed against the Muslim world (including colonialism, neo-imperialism, and 
habitual political and military interventions in the polities and economies o f the region 
over the past two centuries). It would consider the positive contributions Islamist 
movements could offer the world in solving inequality, conflict, environmental 
degradation and other “catastrophic impasses” caused by blind faith in the power of 
science and technology.29 This humbled West would be better placed to tackle the 
very real issue o f Middle Eastern violence, more often suffered by the people o f the 
region themselves than by Westerners. And it ultimately would be in a better position 
to share its understanding o f democracy, economic development, and human rights, 
derived from its own unique historical path o f development, with other peoples o f the 
world hitherto reluctant to take advice from a region they have viewed as marred by 
hubris and imperial aims.
27 A  survey o f  1,000 voters conducted for BDA by Zogby International found that 76% o f  Americans 
are concerned about their country’s reputation, 74% believe the U.S. is viewed negatively by people in 
other countries and 66% say U.S. relations with the rest o f  the world are on the wrong track. 
“Americans Alarmed About Declining U.S. Global Reputation, Study Shows,” PRNewswire- 
USNewswire, 3 May 2007.
28 Hossein Nasr, 223.
29 Ibid., 225.
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